NATIVE GROUND, MIDDLE GROUND, BATTLE GROUND
THE RIVER RAISIN, THE WAR OF 1812, AND THE COURSE OF NORTH AMERICAN HISTORY

A HISTORIC RESOURCE STUDY OF RIVER RAISIN NATIONAL BATTLEFIELD PARK, MICHIGAN

Mark David Spence, Ph.D.
Native Ground, Middle Ground, Battle Ground:
The River Raisin, the War of 1812, and the Course of North American History

Historic Resource Study of River Raisin National Battlefield Park, Michigan

Detail from Samuel Lewis, A correct map of the seat of war (1812). Library of Congress

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By
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Cover image presents six Bodéwadmi doodem (Potawatomi clan symbols) affirming the transfer of land along the River Raisin to François Navarre in 1785.
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Historic Resource Study of River Raisin National Battlefield Park, Michigan

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Introduction

A Fulcrum of History and War: The River Raisin at the Crossroads of Empires, Native Nations, and the Early Republic

Centered around lands on the south and north shores of the River Raisin in the City of Monroe, Michigan, and including non-contiguous parcels within Monroe and Wayne counties, the River Raisin National Battlefield Park encompasses sites directly associated with the battles of Frenchtown that occurred on and between January 18 and 23, 1813.¹ These include the First (January 18) and Second (January 22) battles of Frenchtown, and the subsequent killing of wounded American prisoners (January 23). The latter actions also accompanied the destruction of Frenchtown, one of the only French ribbon farm settlements to be established within the territory of the United States after the Revolutionary War. The battles and their aftermath represent a key point in the War of 1812, when the British-Confederacy alliance successfully defended their hold on Michigan Territory and stymied a planned U.S. invasion of Upper Canada (present-day Ontario). As such, these events are a high-water mark for the Native Confederacy that had come together—in alliance with British forces—to foster the creation of a distinct American Indian territory to the west and southwest of lakes Erie, Huron, Michigan, and Superior.

The strategic importance of the events along the River Raisin were further magnified by their disastrous consequences for U.S. forces. In terms of the scale and number of combatants, the battles of Frenchtown are often referred to as the largest conflict to ever occur within the present boundaries of Michigan. Yet the Second Battle of Frenchtown is better known as the deadliest engagement for U.S. forces during the War of 1812. Out of a combined force of approximately 1,000 U.S. Infantry and Kentucky militia, more than 400 died in battle and approximately thirty badly wounded prisoners were killed in the aftermath. Except for thirty-three men who managed to escape on January 22, all the rest were taken prisoner. The number of U.S. dead from the battles of Frenchtown and their aftermath amounts to roughly one-fifth of all U.S. soldiers killed in battle during the War of 1812.² Viewed in the United States as a

¹ In accordance with the Battlefield’s enabling legislation, delineation of the areas relating to the battles and their aftermath in Wayne and Monroe counties was initiated in 2011—with final refinement occurring in 2017. There are more than ten primary sites in the two counties that are associated with the interpretation of the national battlefield and its significance.

² The casualty figures noted here are for both engagements (January 18 and 22) and the events of January 23, 1813. The battles of Frenchtown are certainly the largest conflicts to occur within the present-state of Michigan since the region was first contested by European imperial powers. However, it is likely that larger Indigenous conflicts occurred around western Lake Erie and within present-day southeastern Michigan in the early 17th century. On casualties at Frenchtown in January 1813, and during the War of 1812 in general, see Thomas H. Palmer, The Historical Register of the United States, Part II: From the Declaration of War in 1812, to January 1, 1814 (Philadelphia: G. Palmer, 1814), 195; and G. Michael Pratt and William E. Rutter, “The Battles of the River Raisin: Clash of Cultures, Clash of Arms,” in Archaeology of
profound tragedy, with the fallen as martyrs in a war against the twin “villainy and tyranny” of American Indians and Great Britain, this loss inspired the spirited cry of “Remember the Raisin!” for U.S. forces in subsequent battles. Among these was the decisive U.S. victory at the Battle of the Thames (October 5, 1813) in Upper Canada, where British forces surrendered and the celebrated Shawnee leader Tecumseh was killed.³

Because the battles of Frenchtown occurred in an inhabited area, and near a key British military installation (Fort Amherstburg) at the mouth of the Detroit River, the events are well documented in the written historical record. More recent archeological investigations have further corroborated the documentary record, and provide insight into

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the specifics of the battles as well on the layout and functioning of the community. Archeologists have located the fence lines that served domestic and military functions in Frenchtown, the cellars of destroyed homes and outbuildings that were used during the battles, and clusters of dropped or fired munitions. These findings confirm and clarify the reported actions of combatants and residents during the events of January 1813, as well as reveal layers of Indigenous residence that extends back for several centuries. As the River Raisin National Battlefield Park develops and new properties are acquired, further archeological investigations will likely occur in areas that are presently covered by structures and buildings or used for commercial, residential, or recreational purposes.⁴

Fig. I.2: Core Management Area: River Raisin National Battlefield Park, Monroe, Michigan. Source: National Park Service.

⁴ For a brief overview of archeological investigations in the battlefield area, see “Michigan Archaeological Site File for River Raisin Battlefield, Site Number: 20MR227” (January 28, 2008); copy on file in the Office of the Michigan State Archeologist, Lansing, MI. These matters are discussed more fully in later chapters.
Introduction

Scope and Purpose

As noted in the park’s Purpose Statement, “River Raisin National Battlefield Park preserves, commemorates, and interprets the January 1813 battles of the War of 1812 and their aftermath.” The present study is directed toward interpretation, and offers a multi-perspective analysis of the park’s historical significance—which is both expansive and singular. The larger, or expansive, significance derives from the position of Frenchtown within broader geographical and historical contexts that extend back to the early 17th century. As a military event, the battles of Frenchtown and their aftermath also reflect generations of crisis, conflict, and accommodation for a host of confederated American Indian groups in their dealings with European empires and colonists. Beginning in the mid 18th century, these processes were further shaped by three complex and overlapping historical trends. One involved the rise of settler colonialism, resulting conflict with British colonists moving across the Allegheny and Cumberland mountains, and the depopulation of Native territories in the upper Ohio Valley. Another corresponded to cycles of commercial competition and war between French, British, and (following the American Revolution) U.S. interests around the southern Great Lakes and in the Ohio Valley. Lastly, a third dynamic involved the persistence of French and Métis (French and American Indian) communities around western Lake Erie and the Detroit River region.

The singular, or more immediate, significance of the battles and their aftermath follows from these trends, but also reflects specific matters of time and place. In the first decade of the 19th century, Frenchtown was situated along a key travel corridor within a historically and culturally complex borderland of competing interests. First established in the mid 1780s, the settlement was primarily inhabited by French-speaking Catholic habitants whose mostly French and—to a lesser degree—Métis lineages reached back to the early colonial era in the Great Lakes region. While the habitants of Frenchtown

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6 Patrick Wolfe, who has written extensively on settler colonialism, defines the term as “an inclusive, land-centred project that coordinates a comprehensive range of agencies, from the metropolitan centre to the frontier encampment, with a view to eliminating Indigenous societies … [through] summary liquidation [i.e., genocide] …, frontier homicide, the dissolution of native societies, [and other means to] … access to territory. Territoriality is settler colonialism’s specific, irreducible element,” which is exercised through inherently violent means. “Settler colonialism destroys to replace.” See Patrick Wolfe, “Settler colonialism and the elimination of the native. Journal of Genocide Research 8.4 (2006): 389 and 393.
7 In the parlance of the 18th century, the French word métis was the equivalent of the English terms “mixed blood,” “half-breed,” or “half-caste.” While the English variations were often applied to, and occasionally adopted by, people of Anglo or Scots and Indigenous ancestry, in this study “Métis” (using the formal capitalization that occurs in Canada) applies almost exclusively to people and communities of French and Indigenous ancestry. While many Métis individuals lived entirely within Indigenous communities, others occupied a more liminal position between European and Indigenous worlds. Through subsequent generations, Métis people (often through marriage and upbringing) tended to identify with French, American Indian, or distinct Métis communities that occupied a central position within the fur trade. Regardless of the community they became associated with, Métis individuals often served as indispensable cultural intermediaries between European and American Indian communities. The distinct Métis communities that formed and remain in what is now Canada are officially regarded as Aboriginal Peoples, a designation they share with First Nations peoples and Inuit. In the United States, where no formal Métis identify is recognized and few Métis communities persist, Métis individuals generally became part of American Indian groups or made their way among—and eventually passed into—non-Indigenous communities.
generally held no particular loyalties beyond their own communities, they lived within a narrow space that was impinged upon by powerful regional, national and global forces. The same was true of nearby populations that included multi-ethnic American Indian villages of mostly Bodéwadmi (Potawatomi) to the west and northwest, mostly Odawa (Ottawa) to the south, and mostly Wyandot to the north. Familiarity and long association fostered relatively peaceful relations between the habitants and American Indian communities, but their interests did not necessarily align. This became increasingly apparent in the decades after the 1783 Peace of Paris ended the Revolutionary War, but failed to resolve the older dynamics of a region the French, British, and U.S. variously called the Pays d’en Haut (Upper Country), Western Country, and Ohio Country.⁸

With the Detroit River and western Lake Erie providing an easily crossed boundary between British Canada and the United States, unsettled tensions over the post-war disposition of the Great Lakes area remained a live concern for various groups and communities in the border area and beyond. To the south, in Ohio and Kentucky, settlers, land speculators and political leaders were committed to finishing a decades long process of destroying and removing American Indian communities from present-day Ohio and areas to the north and west. To the southwest, west, and northwest, a growing confederacy of American Indian groups associated with the Shawnee brothers Tecumseh and Tenskwatawa was organizing to revitalize their communities and defend common territories against further loss. As the competing agendas of Kentuckians, British officials, U.S. policy makers and the Native Confederacy intensified, crisis and conflict became more likely. In the process, their varied and competing interests became increasingly focused on the area around western Lake Erie and the Detroit River—where the British maintained a military and commercial presence on the Detroit River, and the Wyandot had long hosted the Council Fire or central assembly for several Native alliances at the village of Big Rock (aka Brownstown). U.S. interests became centered on the upper Maumee River in northwestern Ohio, where government and military officials administered American Indian policy and worked to open trade with Indigenous and habitant communities to the north.⁹

This remarkable social geography, and the various interests and dynamics it represents, developed in the context of what historian David Skaggs has termed the “Sixty Years War for the Great Lakes.” Extending from 1754 to 1815, the “war” was punctuated by a series of conflicts known in the United States as the French and Indian War (1754-1763), Pontiac’s Rebellion (1763-1765), Lord Dunmore’s War (1774), the Revolutionary War (1775-1783), the Northwest Indian War (1785-1794), and the War of

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⁹ For an overview of these conditions, see the essays in David Curtis Skaggs and Larry Lee Nelson, eds. *The Sixty Years’ War for the Great Lakes, 1754-1814* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2010), and Tanner, ed., *Atlas of Great Lakes Indian History*, 48-121.
As the various dates indicate, the region was not wracked by six decades of continuous warfare, but repeated conflict had touched every community and marked each generation on all sides of the war. Moreover, the treaties that followed each period of conflict tended to encapsulate—and thus perpetuate—the conditions that led to violence. This was especially true when treaties broached the issue of Native land cessions, and intervening years of “peace”—such as they were—invariably came with expectations of more conflict. The series of conflicts known as the Northwest Indian War is the strongest illustration of this dynamic, since it was triggered by U.S. demands for land cessions, and followed by the Treaty of Greenville (1795) and several other treaties that laid claim to most of present-day Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. As Native resistance to further loss of villages and land intensified in the early 1800s, however, U.S. officials, Trans-Appalachian settlers, British officials, and American Indian communities prepared for a renewal of old conflicts. War came in 1811 with the Battle of Tippecanoe in present-day Indiana, and the persistent dynamics of the “Sixty Years War” ultimately shaped the course of the War of 1812 in the western Great Lakes region.

The River Raisin and the War of 1812

In a war that was ostensibly between Great Britain and the United States, the events of January 1813 make clear that the War of 1812 was very much rooted in generations of contest and conflict over territory that involved American Indians, imperial interests, settlers, and an emerging U.S. nationalism. Well-known maritime issues like British impressment of American sailors and restrictions on U.S. trade with Europe and European colonies certainly informed President James Madison’s “Special Message” to the Congress in June 1812. Yet the push for war was strongest in the Trans-Appalachian West, where political leaders and citizens actively pressed for concerted military action against American Indians and the invasion of Canada. Conversely, the British hoped to foster an independent territory for American Indians in the Great Lakes region that would restore pre-Revolutionary War conditions and serve as a buffer against further U.S. expansion. For the confederacy of American Indians that allied with the British, conflict with the United States related to more existential questions of territory, culture, and autonomy. All of these various conditions and motivations preceded, inspired, and left unresolved by the American Revolution—and it is for good reasons that U.S. citizens would later refer to the War of 1812 as the “Second War of Independence.”

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10 Skaggs, “The Sixty Years’ War for the Great Lakes, 1754-1814: An Overview,” in Skaggs and Nelson, eds. The Sixty Years’ War for the Great Lakes, 1-20. The terms used here reflect commonly used designations in the United States, which can differ from American Indian, First Nations, Canadian, French, and British conceptions of these conflicts.


Introduction

The battles of Frenchtown and their aftermath occurred at the epicenter of radiating fault lines that ran through multiple Indigenous populations and histories, European imperial interests, the aspirations of a young Republic in a world of powerful empires, the desires and expectations of settler colonists, and the abiding fidelity to place, community, and ancestors that defined—and still defines—Native communities. These were foundational issues for all concerned, and they found dramatic expression in a remarkable spate of violence along the River Raisin. Consequently, any effort to understand the battles of Frenchtown and their aftermath must first engage the various cross-currents that had shaped the region and much of the continent for several generations. Secondly, the events of January 1813 should be situated within the multiple perspectives and motivations of the people involved as well as the events’ significance within a broader period of conflict. These approaches will in turn demonstrate how the battles and their aftermath present a raw but comprehensive view of peoples, events, and historical processes that both created and resisted the early expansion of a young nation with continental ambitions.  

Consequences

The events of January 1813 were not simply a product or expression of historical processes and contexts. They had immediate consequences for participants as well as the habitants of Frenchtown, and represented one of the most dramatic episodes in a war that shaped the nation and the continent through most of the 19th century. Despite catastrophic losses in 1812 and 1813, U.S. forces ultimately proved victorious in the western theater of the War of 1812. Following Commodore Oliver Hazard Perry’s victory over the British on Lake Erie in September 1813, and the Battle of the Thames near present-day Moraviantown, Ontario, where a retreating army of Native Confederacy warriors and British soldiers were defeated in October and Tecumseh fell, the United States achieved all that the War Hawks hoped to gain short of acquiring portions of Canada. The British had been driven out of the region, the Confederacy defeated, and the program of aggressive land acquisition reinstated. Unlike the costly and deadly stalemate that defined the eastern theater of War of 1812, and resulted in Treaty of Ghent’s (1814) call for a return to status quo antebellum (i.e., conditions prior to the outset of war), the victory in

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the western theater was as complete for the U.S. side as defeat was for the Native Confederacy.  

Within a few years the United States concluded more than a dozen treaties with various American Indian groups in the Great Lakes region, which ceded vast tracts of land in Ohio and the present states of Michigan, Indiana, and Illinois. More treaties came in the late 1820s and, with the passage of the Indian Removal Act in 1830, the accelerating process of land cessions were coupled with the forced relocation of Native communities to lands west of the Mississippi River. While some groups managed to remain on small reservations in Michigan and Wisconsin, the majority were forced to move west. These coerced removals were often disorderly and poorly implemented, with many communities suffering exposure, severe hunger and death during the westward treks. In their place, growing populations of Euro-Americans, recent European immigrants, and some former African American slaves created what has since become known as the Heartland of America. Though often referred to in the United States as the “Forgotten War,” the War of 1812—especially in the Upper Midwest—was one of the most transformative in the nation’s history. To many American Indians with current and historical connections to the Great Lakes region, the losses that followed the events on the River Raisin are clearly remembered as direct precursors to the removal era.

A number of Native leaders who fought at Frenchtown became signatories to land cession treaties and removal treaties, while others moved with their communities to Canada or managed to remain on a diminished land base in the Great Lakes region. U.S. veterans and officials who were associated with the conflicts around western Lake Erie and the Detroit River region were also involved in the process of dispossession and removal. Chief among these was Lewis Cass, who served as the Governor of Michigan Territory from 1813 to 1831 and negotiated several land cession treaties then, as the U.S. Secretary of War from 1831-1836, became responsible for developing and implementing federal programs for removing American Indian nations to the west side of the Mississippi River. Veterans who served in the western theater of the War of 1812, including a number who either fought at the River Raisin or the Thames, often acquired lands within ceded American territories—either through land grants they received for their service or by directly purchasing lands they had first admired during the campaigns of 1812-1813. Some of these men also participated in organizing specific land cession treaty councils and participated in the implementation of subsequent removals.

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16 While there are no general studies on the activities of War of 1812 veterans in relation to land cessions and removal, individuals do appear in correspondence and other primary documents related to treaty proceedings and the implementation of subsequent removals. These are cited in Chapter Nine, but brief discussions can be found in Daniel F. Littlefield, Jr., “State Militias and Removal,” in Encyclopedia of
Introduction

Action and Place

One of the most dramatic features of the battles, both in their recounting by Euro-American participants and in all subsequent commemorations, is the level of violence and death that occurred. Yet it is rarely viewed as anything more than pathological or ignoble behavior from an incomprehensible time, and thus historically important because of its seeming aberration. Such matters are directly addressed in subsequent chapters, through American Indian Removal, vol. 1, eds. Littlefield and James W. Parins (Santa Barbara: Greenwood, 2011), 163-67; and Cayton, “The Meanings of the Wars for the Great Lakes,” in The Sixty Years War for the Great Lakes, 1754-1814, eds. Skaggs and Nelson, 373-90. It is also worth noting that the historical significance of the battles of Frenchtown and the cry of “Remember the Raisin!” are literally written into the landscape of southeastern Michigan. These include counties, townships, cities, landscape features, and travel corridors that bear the names of Indigenous villages and individuals associated with the events of January 1813, the names of U.S. and Kentucky militia soldiers and officers (and future politicians) who were present or closely associated with the battles, and major political figures like President James Monroe, U.S. Representative Henry Clay of Kentucky, and Michigan Territorial Governor Lewis Cass. Indigenous names of individuals, places and communities are recognized in the community of Macon Township, Brownstown Township, City of Wyandotte, and the City of Tecumseh. Kentuckians who fell at Frenchtown are commemorated in places, communities, roads, parks, and monuments that honor the names of Lieutenant Colonel John Allen, Captain Nathaniel Hart, Captain John Simpson, Captain James Meade, and many others. Nine counties in Kentucky were named after men who fought at the River Raisin, including the four named here. North Dixie Highway and Kentucky Avenue, which run through the battlefield area, are also named in collective honor of the Kentucky militia. U.S. military names are commemorated in the likes of Winchester Street, Hull Road, and Harrison Street in the City of Monroe, and are also noted on monuments in Michigan and Kentucky.
emphases on the consequences of disease epidemics, cultural imperatives, distinct conceptions of land and community, European wars, and the more intimate contexts of violent conflict between and within Indigenous communities and settler colonies in the Ohio Valley. In other words, this study seeks to make comprehensible one of the most remarked upon—and least understood—features of the battles of Frenchtown and their aftermath.

Appreciating the significance of the battles of Frenchtown also requires close attention to environmental settings. Though often overshadowed by the drama that occurred on the River Raisin, one of the most important riddles that might be posed about the events of January 1813 is a very simple “why here?” Addressing this question, which is essential to understanding and interpreting the battles and their aftermath, requires contributions from the fields of geology, environmental science, archeology, cultural history, ethnology, colonial history, military history, Early National history, and a host of other historical disciplines. The effort to address these questions, as well as the other subjects noted above, has resulted in a narrative that reaches back to the Pleistocene and the early human history of the region, and has extended the geographic scope of this study far beyond western Lake Erie. Doing so provides insights into the antiquity of many of the alliances that composed the Native Confederacy, as well as the ancient connections that many of the groups that fought at the River Raisin had to each other and the collective homelands they defended. Consequently, it is with these ancient and abiding processes that this study begins.
This chapter describes how ancient processes along with protohistorical developments shaped Native lives around western Lake Erie, and subsequently defined their later engagements with other Indigenous communities as well as imperial powers, settler communities, and national policy makers.

Kitche Manitou (The Great Spirit) beheld a vision. In this dream he saw a vast sky filled with stars, sun, moon, and earth. He saw an earth made of mountains and valleys, islands and lakes, plains and forests. He saw trees and flowers, grasses and vegetables. He saw walking, flying, swimming, and crawling beings. He witnessed the birth, growth, and the end of things. At the same time he saw other things live on. Amidst change there was constancy.1

Basil Johnston (Neyaashinигмиigung [Chippewas of Nawash] First Nation)

The siting of Frenchtown, and thus the location of the River Raisin National Battlefield Park, was determined by a host of factors. Some were cultural or vaguely political, and included the aspirations of French-speaking habitants and their relations with nearby communities of Bodewadmi (Potowatomi), Odawa (Ottawa), and Wyandots in the years following the American Revolution. Other factors might be described as economic, particularly in terms of the area’s potential for subsistence and small-scale commercial agriculture as well as its location within established fur trade networks. Yet the most basic, and in many respects most determinative, factors long predate the communities and concerns of the late 18th and early 19th centuries. It is in the contents and contours of the landscape itself that the events at the center of this study are most deeply grounded. At base, the history of the River Raisin National Battlefield Park area has long been defined by three key features: a gently flowing river that drains a level plain; the nearby shore of Lake Erie; and a central location between two major river corridors (the Maumee River and Detroit River) that provide access to vast expanses of the continent. From long before the time when ancient farmers established communities around western Lake Erie to the causes and still lasting consequences of the War of 1812, these basic factors repeatedly made the lower River Raisin a nodal point in wider networks of alliance, competition, exchange, and conflict.

Along with these broad connections to regional and even international contexts, local environmental conditions have also contributed significantly to the area’s wider importance. Before extensive engineering of the river in the late 19th century, the lower River Raisin flowed through a diverse landscape of open oak woodlands, dense hardwood forests, prairies, swamps, extensive marshes, lagoons, barrier beaches and a

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complex estuary—all over the course of just a few miles. Such diversity supported an array of plant and animal populations that, in turn, shaped and sustained human communities within the battlefield area for countless generations. Easy travel up the River Raisin led to more inhabited sites and a 2,776.5 km² (1,072 mi²) upper watershed that included mixed oak and pine forests, dry prairies, hardwood swamps, upland lakes, and the varied habitats associated with faster flowing streams—all of which further diversified the available resources nearer the lake shore. The river itself, which at nearly 225 km (140 mi) is the longest in the entire Lake Erie basin, also connected western Lake Erie to Lake Michigan by way of portages to the Grand and St. Joseph rivers.²

By themselves, these basic environmental conditions cannot explain the course of human events along the lower reach of the River Raisin. Yet they do provide a key basis for understanding several key factors and developments: namely, how and why people traveled through the area or made it home for thousands of years, the reasons for the establishment and development of Frenchtown, why opposing forces were drawn to this specific locale during the War of 1812, and subsequent developments on the site over the past two centuries. Consequently, they deserve more than passing attention. To borrow a few lines from a poem written on the evening after the Second Battle of Frenchtown, the history of the River Raisin National Battlefield Park may not be written in the stone that underlies the “fatal plain” of the battlefield, in “the Flowers of the land,” or the sound of “Erie’s wave [or] Raisin’s waters,” but an overview of the geology, ecology, and geomorphology of western Lake Erie and the surrounding region provides an essential preface.³

Forming the Land: Bedrock Geology

-Out of nothing he made rock, water, fire, and wind. Into each one he breathed the breath of life. On each he bestowed with his breath a different essence and nature. Each substance had its own power which became its soul-spirit.

Far below the surface of western Lake Erie and the River Raisin watershed is an igneous and metamorphic basement complex of crystalline materials that formed in the Proterozoic Eon (4,600-541 million years ago). While little is known about the formation or physical structures of this complex, the bedrock layers that overlay the Proterozoic level are well understood and have a more direct bearing on the current and historical landscapes around the western Lake Erie basin. As is the case in much of the Midwest,

⁴ Johnston, Ojibway Heritage, 12.
particularly in the states of Indiana and Illinois, the bedrock beneath southeastern Michigan and northwestern Ohio is composed of different layers of sandstones, dolomites, limestones and shales that were once part of vast sea beds during the Paleozoic Era (540-250 million years ago) when the midcontinent of North America was situated between the tropical latitudes and inundated by warm shallow waters. Most of these bedrock materials are hundreds of feet beneath the surface, but some of the younger limestones are visible near the western shore of Lake Erie in the beds of shallow streams and rivers. This is true of the River Raisin as it passes through Monroe, just before reaching the Lake Erie marshes.5

The youngest layers of bedrock are shales that were laid down before the end of the Paleozoic, but relatively small amounts of this material is in the bedrock stratigraphy of western Lake Erie and the River Raisin watershed. In part, this is because movements in continental plates and orogenic (mountain building) processes in the western half of the continent gradually caused the bedrock layers beneath the lower Great Lakes to dip eastward along a downward sloping arc. Consequently, the older strata are tilted upward and thus closer to the surface in southeastern Michigan while the younger strata tend to be more prevalent in areas to the southeast of Lake Erie. However, this basic arrangement does not hold for the bed of Lake Erie, which is underlain by more ancient and much harder limestones as well as recent sediments that are no more than 12,000 years old. This geological arrangement, and the absence of shales from the stratigraphy of the lake basin, derives from the two processes that formed Lake Erie and the River Raisin watershed: downcutting and erosion associated with an ancient river system, and glaciation.6

For 300 million years, from the late Paleozoic Era through the Mesozoic “Age of Reptiles” (252-66 million years ago) and most of the Cenozoic “Age of Mammals” (66 million years ago—present) eras, extensive river drainages cut through the areas that later became lakes Ontario, Erie, Huron, and Michigan. A particularly complex drainage system that the geologist J. W. Spencer called the Erigan River eroded a series of channels across what is now the western basin of Lake Erie, then cut narrower and deeper channels as it flowed northeast toward the ancient course of the Ottawa River. For millions of years, as it followed the northeastward sloping gradient of the bedrock, the mainstem of the Erigan carved into the upper level shales and carried away the eroded sediments of the ever-steepening tributaries that laced the river basin.7

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The Erigan River basin was effectively erased by Pleistocene glaciation as a series of glacial lobes scoured the bedrock shales that had been channeled by the older river system.\textsuperscript{8} The surface beneath the glacial ice was shaped into a relatively smooth and broad basin that neatly followed the arc of the harder bedrock layer that underlay the more brittle shales. The resulting topography is evident in present-day depth charts of Lake Erie. In the western basin, where the limestone layer is closest to the surface, the deepest point is 18.9 m (62 feet) below the surface but the mean average depth is just 7.4m (24 feet); in the central basin, where the limestone layer slopes away from the surface, where the deepest point is 25.6 m (84 feet) and the average depth is 18.5 m (60 feet). The shift to the eastern basin is more dramatic, where deepest point is 64 m (210 feet) below the surface and the average depth is 24.4 m (80 feet). Because the glaciers that formed Lake Erie pushed well beyond the present bounds of the western lakeshore before receding at the end of the Pleistocene epoch (2.6 million years ago—11,700 BP, or years Before Present), much of southeastern Michigan and northwestern Ohio is remarkably level and follows the same gently sloping gradient of the adjacent lakebed.\textsuperscript{9}

Glacial Geology and Geomorphology

To the sun Kitche Manitou gave the powers of light and heat. To the earth he gave growth and healing; to waters purity and renewal; to the wind music and the breath of life itself.\textsuperscript{10}

The formation and contents of ancient bedrock layers help explain the level topography of the lower River Raisin drainage and, along with the ancient Erigan River basin, account for the depths and contours of Lake Erie. However, glaciation is the great environmental template of the Great Lakes. The movements of glaciers scoured and leveled vast landscapes, carved out broad lakebeds, and formed a series of terminal moraines where the glaciers deposited the huge amounts of sands, gravels, rocks and soils they had carried down from the north. As the glaciers melted, the resulting bodies of water received a rich mixture of aeolian (wind borne) and river borne sediments, as well as the materials that had accumulated within the glacier itself. Subsequent changes in lake levels, and their eventual reduction at the dawn of the Holocene epoch (11,700 years ago—Present), left behind level expanses of rich soils that previously lay at the bottom of the lakes. Around western Lake Erie, these lacustrine (i.e., lake formed) plains are rimmed by the low-lying hills of former moraines. The resulting landscape is both familiar and ancient, and the processes that formed it explain the river courses, soil types, topography, and general parameters of ecological diversity that have shaped human life in this area for at least 10,000 years.

The most recent glacial episode ended at the close of the Pleistocene, but the glacial processes that shaped the Great Lakes and the Upper Midwest began some 1.6 million years ago when a vast mountain of ice formed in what is now central Canada.

\textsuperscript{8} Herdendorf, \textit{The Ecology of the Coastal Marshes of Western Lake Erie}, 31-33.
\textsuperscript{10} Johnston, \textit{Ojibway Heritage}, 12.
Anywhere from three to four km (2 - 3.5 miles) thick, its weight pressed the earth’s crust downward—in a process known as glacio-isostatic depression—by as much as 100 m (328 feet). As the mass accumulated, the bottom layers of ice were compressed toward the edges and eventually bulged outward to form a growing rim of vast glaciers that pushed southward. This process fluctuated and repeated over hundreds of thousands of years, but was most pronounced during the four major episodes of glaciation that carved through the Great Lakes area. Each episode gave way to an interglacial period, when a warming climate caused the glaciers to retreat north—leaving behind a vastly altered landscape of scoured valleys, glacier-fed rivers, and lakes.

![Figure 1.1: Glaciation and the formation of the Great Lakes.](image)

The last glacial episode occurred between 105,000 and 11,700 years ago. Known as the Wisconsinan glaciation, it reached its greatest extent around 20,000 years ago when the vast Laurentide Ice Sheet (LIS) pushed as far south as the present-day courses of the lower Missouri and Ohio rivers. As the LIS moved southward, valleys and basins from previous glaciations were scoured more deeply while older moraines, streams,
surface vegetation and other topographic features were completely removed. Once the LIS reached its maximum extent and began a slow 8,000-year retreat, it did not leave an ice-free wasteland in its wake. The process was both too slow and too dynamic for such a result. Whenever the climate cooled for a few centuries, the glacial retreat would halt, advance southward, then retreat again as a warming trend returned. Previously carved valleys were broadened and deepened whenever the ice sheet expanded, while lakes, rivers and vast moraine fields were created during periods of retreat. One of the largest of these temporary advances occurred around 14,000 years ago and ultimately formed the present drainage basins of the Great Lakes, with terminal moraines becoming the high points that divided whole river systems. To the south of Lake Erie, for instance, the rivers that flow into the lake all have their headwaters in a long moraine that corresponds to the southernmost extent of the Erie Lobe and runs the breadth of north-central Ohio.  

Blocked by ice to the north and northeast, and a chain of terminal moraines around the southwest, south and east, Glacial Lake Maumee (ancestral Lake Erie) filled with melting glacial water between 14,400 and 12,400 years ago. At its furthest extent, the lake filled a shallow basin at its western end that extended as far as present-day Fort Wayne, Indiana, where it drained southwestward into the precursor of the Wabash River. Over the next 7,700 years, as glaciers continued to retreat northward, lake levels and drainage patterns underwent dramatic changes throughout the Great Lakes Basin. The effects were especially pronounced in the Erie Basin, where lake levels were determined by two key factors: the rate of flow from the upper lake basins through the ancient Detroit River channel, and the level of the Niagara escarpment—which controlled the outlet to Lake Ontario and the St. Lawrence River. During temporary glacial advances, for instance, the upper Great Lakes drained through the southern end of Lake Michigan as well as into Lake Erie. During extended periods of glacial melting and retreat, however, the drainage of the Upper Lakes was routed through what are now Lake Nipissing and the Ottawa River—thus completely bypassing Lake Erie.

The latter conditions persisted for more than 5,000 years (between 10,400 and 5,300 BP), and the Lake Erie basin contained three separate lakes that were centered in the eastern, central, and western basins. These shallow bodies of water were likely “stagnant and perhaps eutrophobic,” and the western lakeshore was as much as 125 miles east of its present location. The Lake Erie basin finally began to fill again around 5,300 BP, as accelerated thinning of the northern ice sheet resulted in post-glacial rebound that raised the elevations of the Ottawa River and the Niagara escarpment. As the flow out of the Huron basin slowed at its eastern outlet, more water poured southward into the Lake Erie basin, which continued to fill until it reached the new elevation of the Niagara River. By 4,700 BP, as the process of post-glacial rebound reached its current state, Lake Erie filled to a level about 3-4m (10-13 feet) higher than the present shoreline. At this time the lake would have reached as far as Sterling Island, immediately opposite the headquarters of the River Raisin National Battlefield Park and the former site of Frenchtown. For some distance upstream from this site, the shoreline would have been marshland and the site of Frenchtown would have been at the head of a larger estuary. Within another 1,200 years (ca. 3,500 BP), as the climate became somewhat cooler and drier, Lake Erie stabilized at

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its current surface elevation of 174 m (571 feet).\(^{13}\)

\[\text{Figure 1.2: Shorelines of Early Stage (ca. 12,000 BP) and Middle Stage (ca. 10,000-5,300 BP) of Early Lake Erie. Source: Charles E. Herdendorf, "Research Overview: Holocene Development of Lake Erie," The Ohio Journal of Science eleven2:2 (2013): 24-36.}\]

Surficial Geology and the Environmental Template

*On earth Kitche Manitou formed mountains, valleys, plains, islands, lakes, bays, and rivers. Everything was in its place; everything was beautiful.\(^{14}\)*

Ancient river systems, glaciation, and the consequent inundation and draining of lake basins all profoundly shaped the landscapes of southeastern Michigan and northwestern Ohio. Glacial moraines and ancient shorelines are still traceable in hilly areas and low-lying ridges that extend in concentric arcs around the western shore of Lake Erie. The headwaters of the River Raisin watershed, for instance, rise in the Irish Hills about 45 miles west of the River Raisin National Battlefield Park area. This upland region is part of an interlobate moraine that formed where two lobes of the vast Wisconsinian ice sheet pushed together. The combined deposition of large amounts of glacial debris resulted in a complex arrangement of hilly landscapes, numerous streams, small lakes, swamps, large exposed slabs of glacially deposited bedrock, and an abundance of sandy and gravelly soils. The interlobate region in southeastern Michigan was formed by the Saginaw and Erie Lobes, and extends from the Irish Hills north to the Auburn Hills near Pontiac, Michigan. South of the Irish Hills and the River Raisin drainage, the interlobate gives way to the singular moraine formed by the Erie lobe as it carved the Maumee River basin. Downstream from the Irish Hills, the various tributaries of the River Raisin run through well-drained, moderately hilly topography composed of glacial till. From there, the River Raisin and its main tributaries flow through a mostly level landscape that is occasionally marked by bands of low sandy ridges before heading

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\(^{14}\) Johnston, *Ojibway Heritage*, 12.
through Monroe, Michigan. These features were formed, respectively, by the sediments at the bottom of shallow glacial lakes and the beaches formed at the shores of these earlier lakes.\textsuperscript{15}

Another illustrative and extensive example of the post-glacial landscape around western Lake Erie is the 1,500 square-mile Black Swamp, which covered much of the Maumee River basin about 15 miles south of Monroe, Michigan. Following the retreat of the Erie Lobe and the subsequent draining of Lake Maumee, the Black Swamp became a vast saturated landscape of densely forested swamps, marshes, and wetlands. For thousands of years the Black Swamp defined residence patterns, travel networks, and resource gathering activities for American Indian communities. Village sites were common along the edges of the vast swamp where an abundance of plants, animals and fish were accessible throughout the year. Longstanding pathways across the swamplands followed glacial moraines and ancient beach zones that formed during long halts in the gradual retreat of Glacial Lake Maumee. These areas supported narrow bands of prairie, sand barrens, and oak savanna that were maintained through purposeful fires. The broad and gentle flowing Maumee River also provided access to an easy and widely used portage to the Wabash River and thence to the Ohio and Mississippi rivers. During the War of 1812 the Black Swamp was a strategically important zone of operations for U.S., British, and American Indian forces, and a critical site in the actions that preceded and followed the battles of Frenchtown.\textsuperscript{16}

The retreat of Glacial Lake Maumee, and smaller successor lakes, left a broad lacustrine plain that extends around the western end of Lake Erie from the Detroit River area to Sandusky Bay in northwestern Ohio. Bisected by numerous creeks and a handful of rivers, the soils of this nearly level plain are mostly composed of clays, silts and fine sands that were laid down at the bottoms of shallow glacial lakes. Remnants of ancient lakeshores and river channels are also evident in narrow and somewhat elevated bands of sandier deposits left behind by former beaches, deltas, and river bars. These features are more evident within and between the Huron River and the River Raisin basins, and provided relatively dry and open routes of travel near the lakeshore. Hull’s Trace (present-day North Dixie Highway, U.S. Turnpike Road, and West Jefferson Avenue), for instance, follows one of these ancient paths between Monroe and Gibraltar, Michigan.\textsuperscript{17} Aside from these sandier and more xeric remnants of late-glacial geomorphology, the loamy and clayey soils of the lacustrine plain were poorly drained areas dominated by elm-ash swamp and beech forest. In edge environments between the drier oak savanna and the nutrient rich soils of wetland areas and flood zones, however,

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horticulture and farming was successful for several centuries. This was the case along the lower reach of the River Raisin, which had sustained American Indian and—later—French Canadien farmers long before forest clearing and drainage projects opened the entire region to wide-scale commercial agriculture in the 19th century.  

**Figure 1.3: Environmental Conditions, ca. 1800.** Historically, the site of Frenchtown was situated in the midst of forest and shrub swamp, and adjacent to prairie. *Source:* P. J. Comer and D. A. Albert, *Vegetation Circa 1800 of Monroe County, Michigan: An Interpretation of the General Land Office Surveys* [Map] (Lansing, MI: Michigan State Natural Features Inventory; Michigan State University Extension, 1997).

One other distinct environmental consequence of glaciation deserves mention at this juncture, since it bears directly on historic and present landscapes of the battlefield area. The lacustrine plain around western Lake Erie overlays the same limestone bedrock that was scoured by repeated glaciation, and was thus an extension of the same bathymetry (underwater topography) that still defines the lake’s shallow western basin. Because the eastern basin is much deeper, and prevailing winds follow the northeastward orientation of the lake, the western shore is particularly vulnerable to a seiche (pronounced *saysh*). Defined by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) as “a standing wave oscillating in water,” this phenomenon occurs on Lake Erie when storms push surface waters from the western basin to the far eastern ends of the lake. In extreme cases, the difference in water levels between the two ends of the lake can be as much as five meters (15 feet). When the wind abates, the elevated water flows back to the west and hits the relatively flat western shore much like a powerful storm surge from the open ocean.  

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Along with seasonal flood events or large waves caused by occasional storms out of the northeast, seiches are a key environmental and climactic component of the marshes that ring the western end of Lake Erie. The inland extent of the marshes is largely defined by the reach of the water surge associated with a seiche, while the variability of seiches and flood events is reflected in the dynamic environments of these marsh areas.\(^\text{20}\) The core of historic Frenchtown, and the River Raisin National Battlefield Park, lies immediately west of an extensive marshland that still approximates the scale and inland reach of early 19th-century conditions. As a result, the site of Frenchtown and the American Indian villages that previously occupied the site were just beyond the reach of a seiche but still had ready access to the lake by way of the river and to the abundant resources of the marshes through a network of side channels. For this and several other reasons that will be discussed below, the site of Frenchtown was located within a kind of Goldilocks mean. Maps and surveyor notes from the early 19th century show that Frenchtown was amenable to cultivation, located on a glacial beach ridge that served as a key line of north-south transportation, adjacent to the river but just above the surrounding flood plain, surrounded by a variety of habitats that included swamps and wet prairies as well as oak savannas, and with ready access to both the lake and the upper watershed.\(^\text{21}\)

**Ancient Environments and Peoples**

*Then Kitche Manitou made the plant beings. These were four kinds: flowers, grasses, trees, and vegetables. To each he gave a spirit of life, growth, healing, and beauty. Each he placed where it would be the most beneficial, and lend to earth the greatest beauty and harmony and order.*

*After plants, Kitche Manitou created animal beings conferring on each special powers and natures. There were two-leggeds, four-leggeds, wingeds, and swimmers.*\(^\text{22}\)

At the end of the Pleistocene epoch, as humans moved into areas no longer covered by the edges of a vast ice sheet, an open tundra-like environment encompassed the western half of the Lake Erie basin and much of the Lower Peninsula of Michigan. Continued warming through the early Holocene fostered a transition to a spruce-sedge parkland environment throughout the region by \(~11,000\) BP. Though similar to present-day environments further north, the mixture and arrangement of floral species that colonized the post-glacial landscape had no modern analog. The transitional forests of the early Holocene, for instance, had species of sedges, grasses, shrubs and trees that are now more common in areas to the north and south—but not found together in the regions where they currently predominate. On the other hand, the faunal assemblages of the southern Great Lakes region did not resemble any populations in present-day North America. While animals such as striped skunk (*Mephitis mephitis*), black bear (*Ursus americanus*), and raccoon (*Procyon lotor*) are familiar enough, they lived in an environment that was also populated by late Pleistocene megafauna that included Giant


\(^{21}\) P. J. Comer and D. A. Albert, *Vegetation Circa 1800 of Monroe County, Michigan: An Interpretation of the General Land Office Surveys* [Map] (Lansing, MI: Michigan State Natural Features Inventory; Michigan State University Extension, 1997).

Beaver (*Castoroides ohioensis*), Jefferson’s ground sloth (*Megalonyx jeffersonni*), mastodon (*Mammut americanum*), and more. Because Lake Erie remained far below modern levels, it is important to note that the people, plants and animals that composed these environments extended around the shallow body of water in the western basin and well into the central basin.23

Archeologists use the term “Paleoindian” in reference to the people who lived in North America in the Late Pleistocene and Early Holocene epoch. Originally coined in the mid 20th century when it was assumed that the first people in the Americas came from Asia across the Bering Land Bridge at the close of the Ice Age, more recent evidence indicates that humans have been in North America as much as 20,000 and perhaps even 50,000 years ago.24 Paleoindian remains in use, however, and still serves as a broad category for three distinct periods known as Clovis (11,500-10,600 BP), Folsom (10,900-10,000 BP), and Plano (10,000-7,500 BP). Clovis, Folsom, and Plano sites have been found in most areas of the contiguous United States, and all are identified with the widespread production and use of particular forms of blades and spearpoints that were used for hunting and processing animals. The periods in which these different tools were made correspond to long-term climate changes, and thus the different kinds of animals on which they were utilized. In the Great Lakes region the dates and telltale lithic tools of these three periods are somewhat different from other parts of North America, but the general periodization—and its correspondence to climactic conditions—is still utilized.25

Given the antiquity of early Clovis-era materials, and the relatively small imprint that sparse human populations made on the landscape, there are very few identified sites that date back to Clovis-era habitation in lower Michigan and northern Ohio. The earliest known site in Michigan is in the northern portion of the Erie-Saginaw interlobate region, and dates to between 11,500 and 11,000 BP. Known as the Gainey site, it is characterized by the presence of parallel-sided fluted points made from lithic materials that are only

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24 Some controversy exists around these dates, but evidence of human DNA was found in 2007 that dates back some 14,300 years, which is 3,300 years before the end of the Wisconsonian glaciation. While people have clearly been in North America for longer than 14,000 years, those who lived in the vicinity of the lower Great Lakes at the end of the Pleistocene must have arrived—as did the post-glacial flora and fauna—from ice-free areas to the south and west. The 50,000-year date is noted in Daniel C. Schiffner, “The Current Debate About the Origins of the Paleoindians of America,” *The Free Library*, 22 December 2003 <http://www.thefreelibrary.com/The current debate about the origins of the Paleoindians of America-a0111897842> (accessed 17 February 2015); and “New Evidence Puts Man in North America 50,000 Years Ago,” *Science Daily*, 18 November 2004 <http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2004/11/041118104010.htm> (accessed 17 February 2015). On controversies over these dates, see Michael J. Shott, “The Midwest Context,” in *National Park Service Archeological Program: The Earliest Americans Theme Study* <http://www.nps.gov/archeology/pubs/nhleam/E-Midwest.htm> (accessed 2 June 2015). On the discovery of human DNA from 14,300 BP, see Andrew Curry, “Ancient Excrement,” *Archaeology* 61:4 (July/August 2008): 42-45.

present in Ohio and Ontario. These Gainey-type points are present in other locations around the Great Lakes, including the Paleo Crossing site in northeastern Ohio (12,000-11,000 BP), and are associated with a region-wide subsistence regime that focused on hunting caribou (*Rangifer arcticus*). Another significant archeological site in southern Michigan is Holcombe (11,000-10,500 BP), which is situated on a former strandline of a glacial lakeshore near what is now Lake St. Clair. Artifacts include small distinctive Holcombe type points that may have been used with an atlatl, and resemble—in their size and delicate manufacture—Folsom points from other parts of North America.

While Holcombe points have been found at sites associated with caribou hunting in southeastern Michigan, Ohio, southern Ontario, and areas further west, it is important to note that projectile points and the types of fauna they kill do not define cultures. Likewise, they should not be construed as prima facie evidence that those who made and used the points were primarily hunters. New research indicates that Paleoindians, instead of being classic big-game hunters, were broad-spectrum foragers that utilized a wide array of plant, animal and mineral resources across fairly large territories. This would have even more likely between 11,000-10,000 BP (the approximate dating of the Holcombe site), when the post-Pleistocene warming trend faltered and climate conditions included long droughts followed by wetter periods. Punctuated by changing temperature gradients and significant changes in lake shorelines, the nature of local environments shifted between marsh, tundra, open parkland, open spruce parkland, and spruce forest zones. These dramatic changes, even though they occurred over centuries, made life for the people living in the region less predictable across generations. Such conditions fostered smaller population densities and required greater mobility across larger areas to utilize a sufficient array of resources.

**Time Out of Memory**

_Last of all he made man. Though last in the order of creation, least in order of dependence, and weakest in bodily powers, man had the greatest gift – the power to dream._

The extent of this mobility is suggested by a recently identified archeological site at the bottom of Lake Huron, which—like Lake Erie—was largely exposed during the Early Holocene. Composed of stone cairns and blinds (ca. 9,000 BP) associated with drive lanes that channeled herds into the ancient lake where they were killed, this is the first significant Early Holocene site found beneath the Great Lakes—and affirms the long-held expectation that similar evidence exists in the vicinity of former shorelines.

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beneath Lake Erie. Moreover, it is likely that archeological evidence beneath the lower Great Lakes will correlate with interior sites in the interlobate hills, since new research suggests that caribou hunters in Lower Michigan moved seasonally within river drainages between interior and lakeshore sites. Small groups would congregate together near the lake zone to intercept the large autumn migration of caribou, then leave the tundra environments near the lakeshore and head up river drainages to the forested interior. There they would forage on a broader array of floral resources, hunt elk, moose, deer, bear and other animals, catch fish and fowl, and likely interact with other groups within the shared headwater regions of the interlobate. In this scenario of seasonal movements between interior and lakeshore areas, and given the vast trove of well-catalogued amateur finds of Paleoindian materials in the Irish Hills, the entire River Raisin drainage would have certainly been a key area of travel, use and temporary residence throughout this period.\(^{30}\)

Caribou hunting likely ended in southern Michigan after 9,000 BP, as the onset of the Holocene Climate Optimum (9,000-5,000 BP)—or Altithermal—caused herds to shift further north. The same was also occurring with other large game animals like moose, while the megafauna that were once found in the interior regions were already extinct. The shift in animal populations coincided with marked transition from spruce dominated forests to a mixed hardwood forest of oak, hickory, walnut and maple as well as other flora that were more common in southerly environments. Human populations adjusted to the changes and likely increased as the range of available resources grew in geographic and seasonal scale. Milder and shorter winters, for instance, greatly increased the amount and scale of available floral resources such as late autumn tree nuts and early spring tubers. An increasing human population would have been accompanied by a commensurate decrease in seasonal mobility as the proximity of diverse resources increased.\(^{31}\)

The onset and persistence of the Altithermal necessarily involved an array of cultural adaptations, re-organizations of social structures, and new geographic orientations for most communities in North America. Archeologists refer to these new arrangements and the environments in which they were situated as the Archaic period. In part distinguished from the Paleoindian period by the absence of late Pleistocene and early Holocene megafauna, the archeology of the Archaic period is defined by a general lack of large kill sites and the presence of a broader-spectrum of plant and animal resources in the archeological record. For North America as a whole the Archaic period

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\(^{31}\) Matthew P. Purtill, “The Ohio Archaic: A Review,” in *Archaic Societies*, 565
spans 7,000 years (10,000-3,000 BP) and is subdivided into Early (10,000-8,000 BP), Middle (8,000-4,500 BP), and Late (4,500-3,000 BP) periods.\footnote{Much like the term “Paleoindian,” which was coined at a time when the antiquity of humans in North America was assumed to begin at the end of the Ice Age and described simple groupings of big game hunters, the term “Archaic” is equally problematic. As Thomas Emerson and Dale McElrath note, “the archaic label” still carries the implications of its first use in the 1930s: “to be archaic was to be technologically and socially primitive.” “More than anything else,” they write, “the Archaic concept reflects the persistence of a neo-evolutionary stage framework” in which primitive cultures give way to increasingly more advanced societies. In the case of the Archaic, this often means people who did not know how to make pottery or organize themselves into chiefdom societies—as occurred in the more recent Woodland period. While acknowledging the problems with the terminology, this narrative will use “Archaic” in its discussion of current archeological research and theory. See Thomas E. Emerson and Dale L. McElrath, “The Eastern Woodlands Archaic and the Tyranny of Theory,” in \textit{Archaic Societies: Diversity and Complexity across the Continent}, eds. Emerson, McElrath and Andrew C. Fortier (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2009), 26.} In southeastern Michigan and northwestern Ohio, as well as other regions of the continent, these periods are marked by environmental and cultural changes that correspond to increased sedentism and an orientation toward more stable riverine settings. The Archaic as a whole comes to an end with the development and adoption of agriculture.\footnote{Matthew P. Purtill, “The Ohio Archaic: A Review,” in \textit{Archaic Societies}, 570-75; William A. Lovis, “Hunter-Gatherer Adaptations and Alternative Perspectives o the Michigan Archaic: Research Problems in Context,” in \textit{Archaic Societies}, 735; and David M. Stothers et al, “Archaic Perspectives in the Western Lake Erie Basin,” in \textit{Archaic Transitions in Ohio and Kentucky Prehistory}, eds. Olaf H. Prüfer, Sara E. Pedde and Richard S. Meindl (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2001), 233-39.} The material evidence associated with Late Paleoindian and Early Archaic sites in the Great Lake region is very similar, but a greater abundance of sites from the latter period—particularly in the Maumee Lake Plain—indicates the gradual population growth noted above. This increase may have resulted from more diversified environmental conditions that allowed established populations to grow, from the migration of larger communities from the south who took the place of caribou hunting groups that moved northward, or from some combination of these scenarios. While the source of the population increase cannot be clearly determined, the persistent use of the same residential and procurement sites from Paleoindian through Early Archaic periods suggests continuity in the location and composition of some populations across many generations. Of course, it is also possible that the choice of the same sites by entirely different peoples—at different times—might simply reflect the specific advantages of certain locales over long periods of time. Yet even if the latter situation proved the rule, and Early Archaic migrants gradually but completely replaced Paleoindian residents of the western Lake Erie Basin, it is implausible that no information was shared, no material or cultural exchanges occurred, no intermarriage happened, and no blending of populations was allowed. Whatever explains the shifts between these and later archeological periods, the distinctions they mark should be understood as transitions on a continuum that involved related communities with shared understandings of the same places across long periods of time.\footnote{Stothers, Abel and Schneider, “Archaic Perspectives in the Western Lake Erie Basin,” 239-42, 246-49. Also see J. M. Adovasio, R. Fryman, A. G. Quinn, D. C. Dirkmaat, and D. R. Pedler, “The Archaic of the Upper Ohio Valley: A View from Medowcroft Rockshelter,” in \textit{Archaic Transitions in Ohio and Kentucky Prehistory}, 141-82.}
Chapter One

Throughout the Early Archaic the entire western basin of Lake Erie was above water, but lake levels and shorelines remained fairly consistent. Consequently, the archeological sites within the lower River Raisin drainage and nearest the current shoreline would have been situated within a network of forested streams and rivers that flowed around and through what is now the western third of the lake. How and when these communities might have utilized lake environments, and how such use might have corresponded with seasonal residence and use at interior sites cannot be known without further research beneath modern Lake Erie. Even absent such evidence, and given the likelihood of eutrophic conditions in the lake during this time, it is still clear that Early Archaic communities relied increasingly on interior animal populations such as deer, bear, turkey, and various small game as well as fish and mollusks in the extensive drainages of the lacustrine plain.\(^{35}\)

Through most of the Middle Archaic period the climate continued to warm and precipitation rates fell. This trend reached a peak around 4,800 BP, but temperate and xeric conditions persisted for another 1,800 years. Adaptations to these conditions are manifested in the archeological record, which includes “the development of new groundstone technology which featured woodworking tools such as axes, adzes, and gouges, as well as grinding implements for processing nuts and seeds.”\(^{36}\) Middle Archaic sites also present an array of harpoon tips and fishhooks made from animal bone that, along with stone plummetts and netsinkers, indicate an increased reliance on taking fish. The presence of dugout canoes in the archeological record further indicates an increased orientation to riverine environments, and likely reflects the repeated and continued use of long established village sites. This is partly indicated by the amount of time in one place it would have required to build canoes, as well as the number of repeatedly used sites that were established to transport, concentrate, and distribute a larger amount of resources along rivers and lakes. Tools like axes and adzes, which are closely associated with this era, would have been used for constructing canoes as well as larger houses, storage baskets, large bowls, masks, and other items that are readily associated with a more settled pattern of residence.\(^{37}\)

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37 Brad Koldehoff and John A. Walthall, “Dalton and the Early Holocene Midcontinent: Setting the Stage,” in Archaic Societies, 137, 145. While no Archaic period canoes have been found in northwestern Ohio or Southeastern Michigan, this is likely a consequence of later environmental conditions. When Lake Erie rose to near, and then beyond, its current level around 4700 BP, the expected locations of former village sites from the Middle Archaic period were either swallowed by the lake or buried by alluvial deposition as the rising lake slowed and broadened the course of larger streams and rivers. However, canoes have been found uncovered in remnant glacial lakes within the terminal moraine created by the southern margin of the Erie ice lobe at sites that post-date the Middle Archaic. Unaffected by the various changes in Lake Erie’s shorelines, the canoes and any affiliated village sites remained in situ and near the surface for thousands of years. See David S. Brose and Isaac Greber, “The Ringler Archaic Dugout from Savannah Lake, Ashland County, Ohio: With Speculations on Trade and Transmission in the Prehistory of the Eastern United States,” Midcontinental Journal of Archaeology 7, no. 2 (1982): 245-82.
“We have always been here”  

In southeastern Michigan and northwestern Ohio, the advent of the Late Archaic period corresponds with two key environmental developments: the gradual cooling trend and commensurate rise in precipitation that marked the latter part of the Altithermal; and the filling of Lake Erie to levels that approximate those of the present day. Characterized by many of the same tool assemblages associated with the Middle Archaic, and following a similar pattern of interior-to-shoreline migration that had developed during the Paleoindian period, Late Archaic communities followed long established patterns of resource procurement and seasonal population movements. Because the lakeshore of the Late Archaic period was at or near current conditions, these movements and procurement strategies are more clearly delineated in the archeological record—particularly around Sandusky Bay, the drainages of the Maumee River, the River Raisin, and Stony Creek. As David Stothers has argued, “Late Archaic populations in the western Lake Erie Basin” would coalesce in spring and summer “into large focal settlements in lowland and riverine environments where abundant riparian resources such as fish, waterfowl, and marsh plants could support large aggregations of people. During the late fall and winter, populations dispersed into smaller groups or family units in order to exploit the sparse resources of the hinterlands.”

Given the increased orientation toward fishing during the Middle and Late Archaic, and the settling of lake levels at their current position around 3,500 BP, it is likely that the abundant sturgeon fishery that once existed within the present-day boundaries of the national battlefield park was first established during the Late Archaic period and persisted into historic times—when the River Raisin was known to the Bodéwadmi (Potawatomi) as Nmézibe, or “Sturgeon River.” Though prodigious during the spring spawning season, this fishery was likely “just one of numerous small, scattered short term habitations and related activity areas in close proximity to” each other that formed a larger community focused on collective “resource procurement, material production, and social interaction.” As Stothers notes, such “activity areas” were often located near, but separate from, an established cemetery that must have served as a focal point for community identity across generations. This focused settlement likely had a territorial component that corresponded to the smaller fall and winter encampments that moved through interior areas of common or adjacent watersheds.

Based on similar patterns of movement, seasonal congregations, and procurement

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38 This phrase is common in transcripts of treaty councils around the Great Lakes and in the Ohio Valley from the 17th to the 19th centuries, and remains a common refrain among various Native communities throughout the region and across the continent.
41 Stothers, Abel and Schneider, “Archaic Perspectives in the Western Lake Erie Basin,” 242-243; quotation is from p. 243.
strategies, Stothers concludes that Late Archaic communities in the western Lake Erie Basin represent “a direct continuum with those of the Middle Archaic” —and perhaps the Early Archaic and Late Paleoindian. However, increasing populations and a greater abundance of repeatedly used interior encampments and near-shore village areas also indicates that Late Archaic communities operated with a greater “degree of intensification [and] task specificity.” On the one hand, these developments constrained the mobility of small bands and the collective range of their broader groups—yet the growth of a complex trading network around the lower Great Lakes fostered increased interaction and competition between distinct communities. As the gradual intensification of these internal and external group dynamics led to a more centralized scheduling of larger-scale “harvesting and storage of seasonally abundant resources,” they fostered greater cooperation between neighboring groups that was maintained through reciprocal exchanges. Consequently, “population interactions flourished and became more regionally integrated…[;] social networking became increasingly scheduled” or ritualized, and the arrangement of settlements and subsistence regimes became more structured.\textsuperscript{42}

Within these broader contexts of population growth, increased sedentism, and more complex social organizations, several key developments signal a marked transition to what archeologists refer to as the Woodland period (3,000 BP–1200 CE; i.e., Common Era).\textsuperscript{43} Characterized by the use of cultigens, the production of ceramics, and further development of long distance trade networks, the Woodland period in eastern North America corresponds to a number of revolutionary shifts within American Indian societies that involved larger populations and increased interaction among distinct groups. Notable expressions of these changes during the Early Woodland Period (3,000-2,100 BP) include larger population concentrations associated with more intensive farming practices in the Middle and Lower Mississippi Valley, the construction of mounds and mound complexes in the Ohio Valley and upper Mississippi Valley, and networks of exchange that incorporated copper from the upper Great Lakes, marine shells from the Atlantic Seaboard and the Caribbean, and lithic materials from as far west as the Rocky Mountains. By the Middle Woodland Period (2,100 BP-400 CE), tropical cultigens such as bottle gourd (\textit{Lagenaria siceraria}), beans (\textit{Phaseolus vulgaris}), squash (\textit{Cucurbita pepo}), and corn (\textit{Zea mays}) had become widely adopted across eastern North America and were grown along with previously domesticated plants such as sunflower (\textit{Helianthus annuus}), sumpweed (\textit{Iva annua}), goosefoot (\textit{Chenopodium berlandieri}), maygrass (\textit{Phalaris caroliniana}), knotweed (\textit{Polygonum erecturn}), and little barley (\textit{Hordeurn pusillum}). This period is also marked by the development of cities and large ceremonial centers in the middle and lower Mississippi Valley and the Southeast. In the late Woodland Period (400-1200 CE) the cultivation of domesticated crops increased throughout eastern North America as populations spread to new areas.\textsuperscript{44}

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., 247, 252, 256, 258.
\textsuperscript{43} Common Era, or CE, is the chronological equivalent of Anno Domini and AD.
Some of these major hallmarks of the Woodland Period found expression in present-day Ohio and southwestern Michigan, most notably the earthworks and burial mounds associated with the Adena (3,000 BP-2,000 BP) and Hopewell (2,200 BP-400 CE) cultural traditions. A number of these sites have been recorded from Lake St. Clair southward along the Detroit River and around western Lake Erie—including sites on the middle and upper River Raisin as well as a substantial burial area at the river’s mouth. Though most have been lost to excavations by amateur antiquarians in the late 19th century and subsequent developments in the twentieth century, some significant sites remain—including the Springwells Mound on the grounds of Historic Fort Wayne in Detroit near the mouth of the River Rouge.\(^5\)

Hallmarks of Woodland Period material culture include the wide use and manufacture of ceramics, the gradual development of native cultigens, and the persistent use of a central village with established social gathering sites and burial areas. Around the western end of Lake Erie, Early Woodland period communities increased in population and became more organized around managing and harvesting various floral resources as well as organizing large cooperative fishing ventures during seasonal runs of anadromous fish. These latter events also became associated with annual social gatherings and trade fairs that occurred in conjunction with spring runs of sturgeon, northern pike, muskellunge and other fish. Along with the processing of surplus catch for later use and trade, these events also became times of feasting and gift exchanges. In this way the rich fisheries along the lower reach of the River Raisin and nearby rivers both distinguished the Early Woodland communities of western Lake Erie from the large Hopewellian towns near the Ohio River and to the southwest, as well as provided a basis for important exchanges with these and other more distant groups.\(^6\)

The advent of the Late Woodland period around western Lake Erie and the Detroit River area, as well as in most other areas of eastern North America, corresponds with the early incorporation of maize. While archeologists have not been able to establish precise dates, it is likely that the earliest use of maize in this area predates 400 CE. Even if this early date holds, the incorporation of maize and other exotic cultigens like squash and beans did not become central to the lifeways or diets of the people who lived around western Lake Erie for many generations. During a pronounced warming trend known as the Medieval Warming Period (950-1250 CE), which fostered increased maize production throughout eastern North America as well as caused the level of Lake Erie to drop by approximately two feet, residential patterns underwent a slight shift to interior locales.\(^7\) The central villages located at major fishing areas were gradually abandoned


\(^7\) William C. Foster, *Climate and Culture Change in North America: AD 900–1600* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2012), 14-86; and John P. Coakley, “Lake Levels in the Erie Basin: Driving Factors and
for sites a mile and more upstream where increased maize cultivation was a central concern. The former village sites still served as large seasonal fishing encampments, but the upriver villages became the center of large social gatherings and trade fairs that, as Stothers and Abel note, “provided a periodic focus for feasting, marriage and funerals that reproduced the social relations [between associated communities and fostered] the homogenization of ideas and material culture across large areas.” After the fall harvest and processing of cultivated plants, various tree nuts, wild rice, and other flora and fauna, however, the age-old pattern of moving further upriver into smaller encampments persisted.48

The general trends discussed above apply to the entire area around western Lake Erie, from Sandusky Bay in the southeast and around to the Thames River drainage in present-day southwestern Ontario. Nevertheless, archeologists have clearly identified two distinct Woodland period cultural traditions known as the Western Basin Tradition and the Sandusky Tradition. In the Early and Middle Woodland period (500-1000 CE), communities associated with the Western Basin Tradition migrated southward from areas around Lake St. Clair to areas along the western shore of Lake Erie—perhaps to take advantage of a longer growing season as maize cultivation became more important. In the Middle to Late Woodland period (1000-1300 CE), during the Medieval Warming Period, Sandusky Tradition communities became more numerous around western Lake Erie and pushed northward around Lake St. Clair—where maize production increased. At the same time, Western Basin Tradition communities moved to the southwest, northwest, and northeast.49

While the material cultures of these communities are distinguishable in terms of ceramics, residential arrangements, structures, and particular trade goods, there is some disagreement among archeologists about their origins and legacies. One (primarily U.S.) school of thought suggests that the Western Basin Tradition is connected with Iroquoian cultures that were concentrated around the St. Lawrence River Valley and Lake Ontario, while the Sandusky Tradition was an expression of the Algonquian cultures that predominated in the western Great Lakes. Canadian scholars are less inclined to see the Western Basin Tradition as related to ancestral Iroquois, but generally agree that the Detroit River area and western Lake Erie was a kind of borderland between mostly Algonquian cultures to the southwest and mostly Iroquoian cultures to the northeast. Moreover, there is broad agreement that the Iroquoian communities that inhabited this area were ancestors of the Attiwandaron and Tionontati—who later became integrated with the people who today call themselves Wyandot and Wyandotte (in the United States) and Wendat (in Canada). Likewise, there is broad concurrence between archeological studies, oral histories, and ethnological reports that the Sandusky Tradition

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is ancestral to present-day Kiikaapi (Kickapoo) Thâkîwa (Sauk, or Sac), and Meskwaki (Fox), and perhaps some Odawa (Ottawa) communities.\textsuperscript{50}

Considerable interaction must have occurred among the various communities around western Lake Erie, but apparently became more competitive and adversarial around 1300 CE as Algonquian communities associated with the Sandusky Tradition created larger agricultural settlements in areas that were also utilized by Iroquoian groups. This process became more pronounced with the onset of a prolonged cooling trend known as the Little Ice Age (1350-1800 CE), which prompted a marked shift in settlement patterns around the lower Great Lakes and throughout much of eastern North America. Small, scattered settlements were abandoned as affiliated communities concentrated in larger villages within prime agricultural areas. While this adaptation

ensured better success in the midst of less certain growing conditions, it also fostered a larger and more distinct sense of group identity. As small seasonal villages amalgamated and concentrated into larger towns of between 100-500 people, residence and relationships still followed established lines of kinship, clan, and historic proximity. Yet these relations were necessarily extended to members of the town as a whole, as collective decisions were formulated regarding production, group protection, and large community ceremonies. While these towns grew in numbers and social complexity, and encompassed between 1-3 hectares (2.5-7.5 acres), the population of the surrounding area declined and the distance between settlements increased. Consequently, the growth of a town identity was also fostered by distance and separation— and a particular territorial sensibility.51

Similar demographic and social changes occurred in the Ohio River Valley, the lower Great Lakes, and the Saint Lawrence River Valley, and were accompanied by a growing focus on long distance trade networks that had been dormant since the Late Archaic era. Increased population growth and concentration, accompanied by intensified use of specific agricultural zones and increasing access to exotic goods, created competition for land, territory, and position within systems of exchange. As the breadth of exchanges and interactions increased, relations within specific communities and among associated groups likely strengthened through efforts to access, maintain, and protect collective resources. However, competition and defense—in part compounded by the deepening of the Little Ice Age—resulted in warfare and the construction of fortified towns. In western Lake Erie these dynamics resulted in the withdrawal of Iroquoian groups from what is now southeastern Michigan and their consolidation with related communities to the northeast. Warfare and fortification did not cease, however, and likely persisted around western Lake Erie through long distance campaigns that involved local Algonquian groups as well as Iroquoians to the northeast, Fort Ancients to the south, and others from the west.52

It would have been in this context that a substantial village site was developed on the River Raisin within what is now the core area of the national battlefield park. Though only partly excavated in July 2000, and only as part of a project to find materials relevant to the battles of Frenchtown, the site was identified as “a late stage Sandusky Tradition site” (ca. 1450-1650) that is much like others in “northwestern Ohio, southeastern Michigan and southwestern Ontario.” Precise dating of this site has not occurred, but its apparent association with accidental finds of skeletons during the construction of the River Raisin Paper Company in the early 20th century, as well as later finds within.


disturbed areas, suggests that the village area was extensive and long—or repeatedly—used.\textsuperscript{53} This would not have been the first use of the site, of course, but may have been the most extensive. The village would have appeared like others throughout the region, extending over 2.6 hectares (6.5 acres) and fortified by perimeter ditches and palisades, with longhouses, a council house, and other structures within. Beyond would have been fields plots of maize and other crops, a midden and areas for processing animals and lithic tools, canoes on the edge of the river, and fishing weirs within. This was life on the River Raisin in the mid 16th century, expressing important adaptations in a period of demographic and climatic change yet embodying understandings of community and environment that had developed over thousands of years.\textsuperscript{54}

\textbf{Figure 1.5: Locales of Known Archeological Features, Superimposed on Maps of Counties in the State of Michigan, ca. 1930.} Map presents the location of known village sites, burial grounds, and transportation routes in Monroe, Wayne, Washtenaw, and Lenawee Counties. The identified sites correspond to different eras and multiple use periods, but are representative of pre-Contact and historical patterns of residence, travel, and land use. Source: Slight adaptation of “Map 6” in Wilbert B. Hinsdale, \textit{Archaeological Atlas of Michigan} (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1931), 59.


\textsuperscript{54} Stothers, “The Protohistoric Time Period in the Southwestern Lake Erie Region,” 52-95.
Chapter Two

A New World in Motion, ca. 1650-1750

This chapter describes and explains the historical developments and conditions that profoundly shaped Indigenous worlds in the Great Lakes/Ohio Valley region in the Colonial Era. The close of the chapter establishes the contours of Native communities at the dawn of a new era of crisis and revitalization. In doing so, it provides a basis for examining Native and non-American Indian actions, motives, and expectations through the late 18th and early 19th centuries.

In the middle of the 16th century, the various communities that lived around the Great Lakes heard tales of small islands with broad white wings that moved over the surface of the water. These islands were European sailing ships that first appeared off the coast of present-day Newfoundland, and carried bearded men who pulled fish from the sea, dried the catch on the shore, and traded exotic metal wares for pelts, food, and other common items. More disturbing information came from south of the Ohio River, where the people lived in large towns and built temple mounds. Hundreds of strangers, some wearing metal and riding on animals the size of elk, attacked towns from the Gulf Coast to the Appalachian Mountains and across to the lower Mississippi River. Many of the people in the towns were enslaved and many were killed, but the strangers were driven away and half were killed or died before leaving the region. In their wake, though, a number of deadly diseases swept through whole communities.

More of these strangers came in the ensuing decades: some from Spain in a quest for treasure, slaves, and souls in what is now the southeastern United States, and others from France seeking more pelts along the northeastern coast and among interior communities. From both regions, deadly new diseases erupted and some found their way to the Great Lakes. Distance from the initial outbreaks and infrequent exposure helped limit the effects of these diseases during the latter half of the 16th century—and allowed some Great Lakes communities to recover most of their numbers within a generation. The same vectors that brought disease into the interior, namely the vast web of ancient travel routes and exchange networks that connected the lower Great Lakes with areas to the south and the east, also brought new items and materials. Initially, these amounted to a few items of iron, copper, or glass beads that may have been used more in the context of ceremonial and diplomatic activities than as utilitarian items. By the end of the 16th

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century, however, the peltry trade accelerated as annual fairs developed along the lower St. Lawrence River. In fairly short order, European trade goods were carried through long established exchange networks to communities in the lower Great Lakes. At a site between Georgian Bay and Lake Simcoe, for instance, archeologists have recovered more than a thousand items of European origin from a village (ca. 1585-1609) that was home to approximately 2200 inhabitants. These include iron knives, axes and awls, copper and brass ornaments, glass beads, brass tools, metal scrap, and a variety of other items that all arrived before any people from this area had travelled to a trade fair or a European had reached the vicinity of Georgian Bay.3

Making Trade

The presence of so many European goods was not exceptional, but it is indicative of the broader context in which the items were valued and used within Native societies. Just like every other material or object not produced within the village community, all of the European-sourced goods arrived through long established exchange networks that were maintained through reciprocal gift giving across extended social ties that existed within and between villages. Moreover, the glass beads, metal ware and textiles that came to North America all had direct analogs within Native communities throughout the Great Lakes and beyond. More easily obtained and perhaps more eye-catching, glass and copper beads from Europe were nevertheless used to adorn ritual objects, clothing, bodies, and everyday items in much the same way as processed and polished shells, quartzes, and Great Lakes copper. Metal ware was usually acquired in the form of pots, utensils, or blades, but such items were also cut and reprocessed once they arrived in a village. In either case, metal was used in lieu of bone, antler, stone and pottery –for arrowheads and lance points, as cook ware and utensils, and in tools for processing wood, butchering animals, cultivating crops, and building structures. In short, American Indian communities defined the meaning and use of European objects and materials in accordance with their cultural values and material wants or needs.4

Much the same was true of how the French viewed the pelts they received through down-the-line exchanges from the lower Great Lakes to the East Coast. Within Great Lakes communities, and among American Indians throughout much of North America, an animal like the beaver was appreciated in several different contexts: as a source of food, medicine, and material for warm and water-repellent cloaks, as the maker of ponds that sustained a variety of plants and animals, and as an ancient ancestor or doodem (Clan identity). For the French, a beaver—as well as a fox, mink, otter, or marten—was the


source of a pelt that could become part of a luxurious piece of clothing. Its utility, then, was as a lightweight commodity that could be shipped to Europe, sold, processed, and utilized in a manner wholly foreign to the communities from which it came.\(^5\)

The differences between American Indian and French conceptions of the early fur trade were apparent to all participants. Jesuits were confounded by Native “religion, or rather their superstition,” which included the singing of prayers to beavers, elk, porcupine, and a host of other animals. Moreover, French traders marveled at how readily an American Indian would give away a trove of expensive furs in exchange for a few cheap trinkets and baubles. For their part, American Indians wondered about the sanity of people who would trade such valuable things for a few beaver pelts. An Innu (Montaignais) man made this perfectly clear in a gentle ribbing of a Jesuit priest: “The Beaver does everything perfectly well, it makes kettles, hatchets, swords, knives, bread; and, in short, it makes everything.”\(^6\) Yet these different perspectives, and the judgments they fostered, did not undermine the nascent fur trading between Europeans and American Indians in the late 16\(^{th}\) and early 17\(^{th}\) centuries. Rather, the exchanges persisted and grew through a kind of mutual exploitation. As the historian Richard White notes, “diverse peoples adjust[ed] their differences through what amount[ed] to a process of creative, and often expedient, misunderstandings” that allowed each to value the exchanges on their own terms.\(^7\)

The Nature of Empire

Regardless of how seamlessly American Indian communities and French traders incorporated new materials into their lives, these initial, small-scale exchanges occurred within a larger context that reached far beyond the Kingdom of France or the local environments and regional exchanges of the lower Great Lakes and St. Lawrence River Valley. In the century following the initial Spanish conquest and colonization of the Caribbean and adjacent areas of North, Central, and South America, Europe was wracked by an almost unbroken series of wars. Variously inspired by religious, political, and cultural divisions associated with the Protestant Reformation, these wars were fueled by Spain’s imperial ventures and the wealth of silver pouring into Europe from the Americas. By the turn of the 17th century the long spasm of war had drawn to an end in Western Europe, and thus provided an opportunity for the English, Dutch, and French to expand on their initial overseas interests. In France, for instance, the conclusion of the Wars of Religion (1562-1598) provided Henri IV an opportunity to further consolidate power within his now unified kingdom. Toward these ends he committed to strengthening France’s commercial interests in North America as a means to build up his

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\(^6\) Quotations from Thwaites, *Jesuit Relations*, 6: 203, 297.

treasury, energize domestic manufactures and trade, and counter Spain’s weakened but still potent economic clout.\(^8\)

In turning to North America, Henri IV formally committed France to the imperial contest that had previously been dominated by Portugal and Spain. In doing so he joined with the Dutch and English in a maritime contest for access to, and control of, overseas resources in North America. This imperial competition was largely an extension of the warfare that had just ended, but now oriented toward monopolizing overseas resources with two basic goals in mind: strengthening the economic and political power of the state within its borders; and gaining financial advantage over rival nations or kingdoms in Europe. Known as mercantilism, this approach to overseas empire was predicated on an assumption that the world possessed a vast amount of resources but a relatively finite amount of wealth or treasure (as measured by the amount of gold or silver then available). Success within the mercantile framework was achieved through monopolizing valued resources that could then be sold to economic rivals (i.e., other kingdoms), and thereby impoverishing one’s rival while gaining a larger share of the world’s treasure. While mercantilism defined international commerce as a zero-sum game for gaining and controlling wealth, it also created a kind of inflationary scramble to access, monopolize and defend more resources. As Fred Anderson and Andrew Cayton note, “early modern statesmen instinctively understood trade as” a kind of battle for territory and thus imperial ventures largely amounted to the “continuation of war by other means.”\(^9\)

In the early 17th century, the region to the east of the Great Lakes became one of the first arenas in this relatively new imperial contest for resources. As the French accelerated their commercial endeavors in North America, they were soon rivaled in the 1610s by Dutch traders on the Hudson River and in the 1620s by English Colonists on the coast of what is now New England. The growing popularity of hats made from felted beaver fur drove this competition, and obtaining beaver pelts became the primary focus of traders. Among Europeans, competition depended on establishing and maintaining exclusive access to American Indian communities that would channel the lucrative trade to a commercial outpost. While this required a level of cultural fluency with the protocols and interests of specific Native groups, such knowledge primarily operated in the service of mercantile principles and imperial goals. The same is true of the close alliances that Europeans developed with particular Native communities, even to the point of joining them in conflicts with their enemies. When these enemies were also the allies of another European power—as often proved the case—trade was not so much a matter of “war by other means” as it was simply war in another place.\(^10\)


This is not to suggest that European ventures in North America were nothing more than the working out of monolithic principles about war and commerce. In many respects, quite the opposite was true. Perhaps no one understood this better than Samuel de Champlain, who established direct trade relations with American Indian communities in the eastern Great Lakes in 1609 and then administered French trading ventures from what is now Quebec City for the better part of 25 years. The people with whom Champlain and his countrymen engaged were entirely responsible for acquiring and transporting the resources that the French coveted, controlled all the networks of trade, and frequently determined the place and terms of exchange with Europeans. If they declined to trade, opposed a colonial settlement, or rejected a diplomatic overture, Champlain knew that the vision of empire he served might collapse before it began. At the very least, this dependence required a level of tolerance and begrudging respect for the motives of Native leaders.\footnote{Calloway, \textit{New Worlds for All}, 44-45; Trigger, \textit{The Children of Aataentsic}, 1: 296-305.}

A similar dynamic held for Jesuit missionaries who endeavored to fit their theology to a world where “superstitions are infinite,” as one priest put it, among people who also possessed “noble moral virtues …, [especially] a great love and union, which they are careful to cultivate by means of their marriages, of their presents, of their feasts …, and their hospitality to all sorts of strangers.”\footnote{Quotation from Thwaites, \textit{Jesuit Relations}, 12: 121-22.} Though not as frequently as Jesuit missionaries, the 100 or so \textit{habitants} (French colonists) and French administrators who lived in Quebec City in the 1620s still had regular contact with nearby American Indian groups. Their meetings invariably created some new challenge or affirmed a recent lesson about how to adapt to—rather than change—a world that was largely defined by their American Indian neighbors and not themselves. The most successful adjustments came from the early \textit{coureurs des bois} (“runners of the woods;” i.e. independent traders who operated without official sanction from French administrators) who developed an even closer affinity with Native communities through marriage or adoption, and thus became incorporated into the kin-based relations at the heart of Native exchange networks.\footnote{Innis, \textit{The Fur Trade in Canada}, 9-12;}

Imperial ventures in the Americas also had a profound effect on European societies and worldviews. The wealth pulled out of the Americas provided the basis for the rise of a secular professional class of administrators and investors, and enriched the patrons who financed the Northern European renaissance in art, architecture, literature, and craftsmanship. Perhaps the most fundamental change was culinary and caloric, as new foods from the Americas enriched European diets. These included vast quantities of cod that fed a growing number of landless laborers, as well as corn, tomatoes, potatoes, beans, squash, turkey and a host of spices and peppers that diversified farming and cuisine. The idea of America Indians living in a fundamental state of nature also prompted critical new interpretations of European society and economics. As the political philosopher John Locke famously quipped, “in the beginning all the World was America”—where the natural laws that once ordered life in ancient Europe still prevailed. From this supposition, Locke then reasoned that early governments developed out of unstructured societies that were composed of free and equal individuals. Locke did not advocate a return to such a condition, but instead argued—in terms that would later inspire the
American Revolution—that legitimate government arose from such equality and did not derive from the divine right of kings or their minions. Moreover, he asserted that the ultimate purpose of government was to ensure potential equality by protecting the rights of property and capital. Other contemporaries of Lock used the same starting point to reach a different conclusion; namely, that property, capital, and law only corrupted humans and that the freest people in the world were the so-called “noble savages” of the Americas. While none of these commenters actually knew or lived with the people they alluded to, their comments are a further indication of the profound adjustments that imperialism and colonization brought to European life and thought.\(^\text{14}\)

Though far from the shores of North America, and farther still from western Lake Erie, these historical developments were part of the broader processes that created “New Worlds for All”—in the Americas, in Europe, and across the globe between the 16\(^{\text{th}}\) and 18\(^{\text{th}}\) centuries. They also serve as a reminder that the dynamic changes occurring in North America were universally complex. Europeans (let alone the French) were no more homogenous and static than American Indian communities, and thus the history of the transatlantic fur trade more closely resembles a kaleidoscope of changing conditions and concerns than an inexorable working out of imperial designs. Even in the earliest stages of the fur trade, as Fred Anderson and Andrew Cayton have written, French “success depended on choices made by Indian leaders in America and by financiers and government officials in Europe, groups whose agendas and intentions could fluctuate with chaotic unpredictability.” This dynamic, along with dramatic population shifts, wars, ecological changes, technological adaptations, and a host of other variables associated with the fur trade, would shape the subsequent history of the lower Great Lakes through the War of 1812 and beyond.\(^\text{15}\)

Native Ground

For nearly two centuries, from the early trading ventures of the French through the American Revolutionary War, western Lake Erie and the lower Great Lakes remained “native ground.” As Kathleen Duvall uses this term, the region was a place where “European colonization met neither accommodation nor resistance but incorporation. Rather than being colonized, [American Indians] drew … [the agents of] European empires into local patterns of land and resource allocation, sustenance, goods exchange, gender relations, diplomacy, and warfare.”\(^\text{16}\) This is not to suggest that the experience of


\(^{15}\) See Calloway, *New Worlds for All*, 1-7. Quotation is from Anderson and Cayton, *Dominion of War*, 32.

imperialism somehow met the goals and expectations of Indigenous leaders. Nor is it to deny that incorporating European materials into their everyday lives attached American Indian communities to emerging commercial networks that increasingly followed abstract principles of supply and demand. On the contrary, European diseases weakened communities, trade with Europeans fostered conflict and competition over a group’s access to resources or its position within changing exchange networks of the fur trade, and the use of metal weapons and European firearms transformed old animosities into wars of unprecedented scale. Yet the response to all of these challenges was predicated on sustaining the distinct needs and concerns of American Indian communities within a changing world.

In the first half of the 17th century, the “native ground” of the lower Great Lakes largely centered on two distinct but allied groups that the French called les Hurons and les Cheveaux-relevés. The term “Huron” derives from the French word hure (boar’s head), but also had a slang-equivalent with “ruffian” or “rustic.”17 The “Huron” that the

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17 As the etymology of “Huron” implies, the term was entirely based on French perceptions and is replete with condescending associations. It is not used by people who collectively refer to themselves as Wyandot or Wendat, and is considered derogatory.
French first met referred to themselves as Arendaenronnon ("People of the lying rock"), who were part of a larger confederacy that included the Hatinniawenten ("They are of the bear the country"), the Hatingeennonniyahak ("Makers of cords for fishing nets"), the Atahontayenrat ("two white ears," i.e., "Deer people"), and the Ataronchronon ("People of the clay," i.e., wet earth in water). Located between Georgian Bay and Lake Simcoe, the members of this confederacy referred to themselves collectively as Wendat, and in the early 1600s probably numbered 30,000 people residing in as many as 40 villages. Its constituent groups had migrated from areas to the south as well as the east and west over a few generations, and the confederacy as a whole maintained close relations with the Iroquoian groups to the south and southeast: namely, the confederacy who the Wendat referred to as the Attiwandaron (People whose speech is slightly different or awry) and the French called "la Nation neutre" (Neutrals). The largest constituent group in this confederacy was the Chonnonton ("Keepers of the deer"), a chiefdom of 40 villages that was centered on the Niagara Peninsula. Other nations within or associated with this confederacy included the Eriechronon ("People of the cougar") who lived around the southeastern end of Lake Erie, the Ataronchronon ("People of the clay, i.e., wet earth in water") who lived around the western end of Lake Ontario and the eastern end of Lake Erie, the Wenrehronon (perhaps "People of the moss-backed turtle") who lived to the east of the Niagara River, and the Ongniaaharonon, who were the namesakes of the Niagara peninsula, river, and falls. Though not part of the Wendat or Neutral confederacies, the Tionontati (also Khionontatehronon, "People where there is a mountain or hill") had particularly close relations within both of these groups. They lived a short distance from the Wendat, within the region both knew as Wendake, but remained a distinct nation that numbered about 10,000 within 8-10 villages.18

The Wendat and Tionontati—who were collectively known as Wendakeronon (People of Wendake)—lived within and near areas that had long been the homelands of several Algonquian-speaking peoples.19 These included Omâmiwinini (Algonkin) who lived along the lower Ottawa River, Nipissing who lived near the lake that bears their name, and the Odawa (Ottawa; aka Cheveauz-relevés, or "Standing Hairs"), who lived at the south end of Georgian Bay, on the Bruce Peninsula, and on Manitoulin Island.20 All of these groups culturally identified (and still identify) themselves as Anishinaabeg, a broad association that also includes Ojibwe (Ojibway, or Chippewa) and Bodéwadmi (Potawatomi), and tended to be more seasonallynomadic and more oriented toward a

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19 For the applicability of the term Wendakaronon, at least until the 1650s, see Kathryn Magee Labelle, *Dispersed but Not Destroyed: A History of the Seventeenth-Century Wendat People* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2013), 243, note 3.

20 James Morrison, *Algonquin History in the Ottawa River Watershed* (Ottawa: Sicani Research & Advisory Services, 2005), 14-22. The term Odawa is generally regarded as a derivation of atawe, the Anishnaabemowin (Anishinaabe language) word for “trader” or traveler.
hunting economy than their Iroquoian neighbors. Yet compared to the more northerly Anishinaabeg with whom they traded, traveled, and hunted, the Weskarini (aka La Petite Nation, an Omàmiwinini group that lived to the northeast of present-day Ottawa) and the Giishkaakhang Odawa (who were located at the southern end of Georgian Bay) were remarkably sedentary. Both cultivated crops and lived in Iroquoian-style longhouses—rather than the smaller bark covered wiigwahm (wigwam) used by their more northerly kin—and often overwintered with the Arendaeronnon and Tionontati respectively. Like the semi-nomadic and hunting-oriented people with whom they were related, however, these groups were patrilineal and thus traced kinship, clan relations, and descent through the father—while the Wendat and Tionontati (like other Iroquoian groups) were matrilineal. This marked distinction among closely associated communities would have complicated intermarriages, but it did not affect the strong associations that existed between these distinct communities.

Wendat-Huron scholar Georges Sioui postulates that the value of these associations stemmed in large part from the different strengths of each party, and that Wyandot communities had moved to the vicinity of Georgian Bay to continue a symbiotic relationship with specific Anishinaabeg communities that likely reached back to the Late Woodland period and the rise of what archeologists call the Sandusky and Western Basin Traditions. By far the most durable connection was, and remains, between the Tionontati and Giishkaakhang Odawa—who later migrated to western Lake Erie and jointly occupied a central position within Great Lakes history through the 18th and early 19th centuries. Though perhaps not entirely unique, their enduring association provides a strong example of what Sioui describes as a relationship “rooted in difference, where each group stood to benefit.” Such relationships, “often functioning outside the realm of a particular confederation framework, were some of the most prevailing systems of alliances within the North American context.” This was especially true for the Tionontati and Giishkaakhang Odawa, who were independently associated with (but not part of) confederacies with whom they were culturally related. The enduring strength of this relationship continues today, some 170 years after both groups were forced to move

21 Anishinaabeg (sing. Anishinaabe) is frequently translated as “human beings” or “first people,” and is used as a collective autonym for the Odawa, Ojibwe, and Bodéwadmi. Together, these three groups constitute the Nswe’mishkote’win (Council of Three Fires)—a close and many centuries-old alliance or confedera cy. The individual groups within the Nswe’mishkote’win speak a mutually intelligible dialect of a common language: Anishinaabemowin. Other Anishinaabe groups include Misi-zaagiing (Mississaugas), Nipisirinien (Nipissing), Omàmiwinini (Algonkin), and Nakawē (Western or Plains Ojibwe, aka Saulteaux).


to what is now eastern Kansas and then relocated to Indian Territory (present-day Oklahoma) where their two small reservations adjoin each other.\textsuperscript{24}

Figure 2.2: Environments and Residential Locations in Wendakeronon and Surrounding Region. Map shows the northern extension of agriculture, the southern extension of hunting, and intensive near shore fishing around the southern perimeter of Georgian Bay. Base map is from “Subsistence Patterns,” in \textit{Atlas of Great Lakes Indian History}, ed. Helen Hornbeck Tanner (Norman: Published for the Newberry Library by the University of Oklahoma Press, 1987), 21.

At the time of the French entry into the Great Lakes, the basic dynamics of this relationship could be seen in clear geographical terms. Wendake was located within a northern extension of the area where intensive agricultural production was possible, but largely surrounded by areas where game animals were abundant. While this situation allowed the Wendakeronon to draw on a wide range of resources, and their Anishinaabeg neighbors to readily trade for maize and other crops, it also placed both groups at the heart of several wide-ranging exchange networks that extended northward and westward across the Great Lakes Basin, eastward down the lower St. Lawrence River to the Atlantic coast, north to the game rich forests of the Canadian Shield, and south to the expansive agricultural areas of the Ohio Valley. Besides a close trade with Odawa and

\textsuperscript{24} Sioui and Labelle, “The Wendat—Algonquin Alliance,” 178.
Nipissing communities that involved the exchange of corn and other agriculture produce for meat, skins, pelts, and fish from more northern environs, the Wendakeronon were also a conduit for a host of resources from all points on the compass. These included strings of wampum beads and dried fish from the coast, tobacco and gourds from the south, copper and prized stones from the western Great Lakes, and a host of distinctive pelts and foodstuffs from all directions. It is no wonder that the French referred to Wendake as “the granary of most of the Algonquians,” since much of the produce that moved north and west to the Odawa and others was either grown in the region or came by way of trade from the south.25

Trade, Empire, and a New Kind of War

When Champlain established the Habitation de Québec (a fortified settlement and trade center in what is now Quebec City) in 1608, he was well aware of the central position the Wendakeronon and their Anishinaabeg partners held in the trade networks of the Ottawa River Valley and the Great Lakes Basin. His eagerness to establish relations with these communities was fully reciprocated in late fall when a small delegation led by Iroquet of the Weskarini and Ochatenguin of the Arendaeronnon arrived from the Pays d’en Haut (i.e., Upper Country), as the French referred to the vast region upriver from present-day Montreal. The following summer Champlain set out to engage with the communities along the upper St. Lawrence, but just a few days into his journey he was met by 300 Weskarini and Arendaeronnon warriors. They had come to reconfirm his promise from the year before that he would “assist them against their enemies,” and to request his participation in a raid against the Kanien’kehaka (Mohawk). Champlain readily assented, stating that he “had no other purpose than to engage in the war…; and that my only desire was to fulfill what I had promised them.”26

For Champlain, the alliance was a key entre into a promising trade with the people of the Pays d’en Haut—where beaver were abundant and the exchange networks throughout and beyond the region were extensive. He viewed this military action, along with a promise that he would later be guided through the Pays d’en Haut, as an essential first step in guaranteeing the success of his new venture in North America. Though his perspective was different, Champlain’s motives generally fit with his new allies’ conception of trade and war. For American Indians throughout much of North America, trade was a social and material exchange that built and maintained connections within and between communities. Put simply, the purpose of exchange was to “satisfy the … needs of each party” in a way that was mutually advantageous to both. These needs and advantages, in turn, were often determined by the strength and significance of the relationship between the two parties. A stronger party might be more generous in order to maintain an established relationship, or a weaker party could give more than expected in order to foster a future reciprocation from the other. In either case trade was relational

25 Trigger, *Children of Aataentsic*, 62-64 and the Ronald F. Williamson, “The Archaeological History of the Wendat.” Quotation is from Labelle, *Dispersed but Not Destroyed*, 71. This same north-south axis of exchange likely accounts for the name “Petun” (tobacco) that the French used in reference to the Tionontati—which the French mistakenly believed was grown in abundance by the “Petun Nation,” but was largely acquired through exchanges with groups further south.

rather than transactional, and—especially in the case of tobacco, strings of wampum, copper beads, and other items with sacred characteristics—the exchanged items embodied the relationship and its obligations.\textsuperscript{27}

While trade involved good relations and friendship, war entailed the opposite. Strangers and enemies were, by definition, people with whom mutually beneficial exchanges did not occur. Gift giving and diplomatic rituals could make strangers known or end conflicts, but absent these processes they remained people who could be shunned, have things taken from, or warred against. By joining in the raid against the Kanien’kehaka, Champlain fully affirmed his status as a friend and ally—and further obligated himself not to trade with the Kanien’kehaka or other enemies of his allies. In doing so he affirmed the age-old virtues of reciprocity and mutuality that informed the worldviews of his new allies. Yet Champlain’s commitment to fight against the Kanien’kehaka brought a new aspect to war, and marked a new era of unprecedented violence and destruction.\textsuperscript{28}

As noted in the previous chapter, warfare had become endemic in the lower Great Lakes and much of eastern North America in the 15\textsuperscript{th} and 16\textsuperscript{th} centuries. During this period a varied alliance of Chonnonton, Tionontati, Anishinaabeg, and Wendat warred against a loose alliance of Central Algonquian communities in what is now southeastern Michigan and northwestern Ohio. Around the eastern part of Lake Ontario and the St. Lawrence River Valley, a more easterly alliance of Wendat and Omàmiwinini (Algonkin) were frequently in conflict with Kanien’kehaka (Mohawk), Onyota’ake (Oneida), Onoda'gega (Onondaga) villages of the Haudenosaunee (Iroquois Confederacy).\textsuperscript{29} These conflicts were primarily focused on the middle reach of the St. Lawrence River Valley, which—as a consequence of disease epidemics and war in the mid 16\textsuperscript{th} century—was a mostly uninhabited land. The area was also contested by Abenaki and Innù (Montagnais) nearer the coast, who crafted metal-tipped weapons and pushed their Kanien’kehaka, Onyota’ake, Onoda'gega enemies away from the developing French trade and the resources of the St. Lawrence. Combined with the ongoing pressure from the west, the Haudenosaunee were forced to retreat southward. The raid that Champlain was invited to join fit within this general historical context, and was intended to prevent Mohawk hunters and traders from ranging north.\textsuperscript{30}

Like the conflicts of the preceding century and a half, this foray into Kanien’kehaka (Mohawk) territory was expected to result in two kinds of battle: either a raid to obtain trophies and seize captives (usually adolescent males and young women), or a pitched battle that involved overt demonstrations of valor and martial skills along with the capture or killing of some enemy warriors. Even in the largest formal

\textsuperscript{27} White, \textit{Middle Ground}, 8-9, 94-100; quotation is on p. 8.
\textsuperscript{29} Richter, \textit{The Ordeal of the Longhouse: The Peoples of the Iroquois League in the Era of European Colonization} (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 14-18. The Haudenosaunee formed as a five-nation confederacy prior to the arrival of Europeans in North America, and comprises—from east to west—the Kanien’kehaka (Mohawk), Onyota’ake (Oneida), Onoda’gega (Onondaga), Guyoohkhowyo (Cayuga) and Onónówága: (Seneca). In 1722 the Tuscarora were incorporated into the Haudenosaunee.
engagements, outright destruction of the enemy was not the goal—nor was it possible since both sides used shields and wood-plated armor that kept most injuries from being fatal. Rather, the strategic purpose of victory was the inverse of a good trading relationship: to create or perpetuate an unequal relationship that strengthened the victor and weakened the vanquished. Perhaps the best illustration of this outcome is the adoption of captives, who were taken in the midst of a battle or raid. Usually beaten, humiliated and consigned to a kind of traumatized limbo, they were taken back to the captor’s village where they were presented to a grieving family that had made known their desire to replace a deceased relative. If found acceptable the captive would undergo a ritual adoption, and then fill the place of the deceased person within their new family and community. In this way the victors’ social and demographic “needs” were met while the vanquished community was physically and emotionally diminished.31

The purposes and expected outcomes of these conflicts were profoundly altered with the addition of Champlain and two other French musketeers in the campaign against the Kanien’kehaka. After a month of travel, the mixed company of Weskarini, Innu, Arendaeronnon and French encountered a Kanien’kehaka war party at night in the vicinity of Ticonderoga on Lake Champlain. The Kanien’kehaka brought their canoes together on the shore and commenced to fell trees and put up a substantial barricade. Two canoes from Champlain’s group approached the shore, and through a formal parley all agreed to wait until morning to wage battle. On the morning of the battle, Champlain and his companions kept out of sight of the Kanien’kehaka, donned armor, loaded and prepared their weapons for firing, and watched “the enemy go out of their barricade … with a dignity and assurance…. Our men also advanced in the same order.” Champlain was made to understand that three Kanien’kehaka warriors with large feather plumes “were the chiefs…, and that [he] should” aim at them. Just as the battle commenced, Champlain and his companions fired several deadly shots. This “caused great alarm [among the Kanien’kehaka] … to such a degree that, seeing their chiefs dead, they lost courage, and took to flight, abandoning their camp and fort, and fleeing into the woods.” Champlain set out in pursuit, “killing still more of them.” He also noted that “Our [allies] also killed several of them, … [while] fifteen or sixteen were wounded on our side with arrow-shots; but they were soon healed.”32

Champlain was disappointed when his new allies did not press their advantage against the fleeing Kanien’kehaka and exploit an easy opportunity to kill or capture most all of the enemy. Instead, they contented themselves with collecting the spoils of war: namely armor, weapons, food and other items. The number of prisoners already taken was more than sufficient, and their subsequent tortures would greatly atone for past losses. Yet the relative ease of such a victory was a new marvel, and the victors were eager to have the French join them again. The opportunity came the following June when the French, Weskarini, Arendaeronnon, and Innu gathered “to traffic in peltries”—as Champlain put it—near present-day Trois-Rivières. After receiving word that a group of 100 Kanien’kehaka warriors were not far away, a force of nearly 200 was quickly assembled and headed south. Fortified by eleven French musketeers, the attackers

32 Champlain, Voyages of Samuel De Champlain 2: 100-01.
(including some armed with swords) managed to tear down the Kanien’kehaka defense works and quickly routed their foes “without finding much resistance.” All were killed, drowned while escaping, or captured and made prisoners. The latter were tortured and killed, except for one man who was given to Champlain and later escaped.  

These two events shocked the Kanien’kehaka, emboldened their enemies, and marked a profound shift in the dynamics of trade and war in the Great Lakes region. By making conflict more lethal, firearms and metal weapons allowed those who possessed them to more thoroughly exclude enemies from exchange networks and the alliances they fostered. This proved especially significant as the volume of trade increased, with more pelts and European items moving through long-established exchange networks alongside the wampum, tobacco, corn, gourds, copper, hides and other items that continued to make up the bulk of trade materials. The need to maintain a strong position within regional exchange networks in a world that was both more dangerous and more abundant also had a pronounced inflationary effect. Stronger and weaker parties sought to appease the other through increasingly generous exchanges, antagonists wanting to end their estrangement attempted to give more gifts and feasts, and allies combined their efforts to either acquire or share more European weapons.

Within this arena of accelerated trade, European goods were especially valued for several reasons. Some items, like axes, awls, and pots were highly sought after because they fit seamlessly within village life but made tasks easier and more precise. Less utilitarian items like beads, mirrors, and bells were also analogous to decorative and spiritually charged objects already found in North America, but were highly prized for their distinctive qualities and exotic origins. None of these items or materials were essential to daily life, and it could hardly be said that American Indians were dependent on European goods. Nevertheless, as Richard White notes, “they had integrated these valued goods into a series of social relationships on which the honor, power, and prestige of both individuals and groups depended … [and a]cquiring sufficient European goods became a requirement of … ceremonials and diplomacy.” In this regard, at least, American Indian communities in the Great Lakes area were increasingly dependent on the process of trade itself.

Mourning and the Cycles of Violence

The central importance of exchange networks, and their intrinsic associations with alliances and warfare, came with a number of vulnerabilities. Once beaver were overhunted within a community’s or alliance’s recognized hunting area, continued participation in the fur trade often required the invasion or usurpation of other hunting areas—which in turn led to an escalation of violent conflict. More warfare required more guns, powder, and ammunition—which proved increasingly decisive in Native conflicts.

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33 Ibid. 103-05; Labelle, *Dispersed but Not Destroyed*, 33-39.
Since European weapons were both prestige items and martial necessities, their relative scarcity only further accelerated the dynamics of the fur trade. The result was more competition for beaver, more conflict, and more casualties. To the French this rapidly growing fur trade meant greater profits, and they invested in a new trading infrastructure—which soon exposed the greatest vulnerability of American Indian communities. Beginning in the 1630s, direct trade with the French occurred in the context of early summer trade fairs, shortly after the arrival of ships full of trade goods, colonists, soldiers, administrators and priests. The concentration of people from around the Great Lakes region, and the arrival of newcomers direct from Europe, proved fertile ground for the transmission of disease epidemics that quickly spread across a wide swath of territory.

In 1634, when the French established a new trading post at the settlement of Trois-Rivières, an unknown disease (perhaps measles) infected a group of Wendat traders who brought the illness back to their villages—from which it spread through the extensive trade networks that ran along the Ottawa River and the lower Great Lakes. In 1636 and 1637 influenza swept through the region, both times with reportedly high fatalities among the Wendakeronon, Odawa, Omâmiwinini, and Nipissing. Scarlet fever also came in 1637, perhaps from groups further south, and then three years later smallpox burned through the already weakened communities. In this short period of time, according to the estimates of Jesuit missionaries, the combined population of the Wendakeronon had dropped from perhaps 30,000 to 10-12,000. Their Anishinaabeg allies who lived in smaller and less densely populated communities likely suffered a lower but still horrendous number of deaths.

For survivors, the disease epidemics brought on a collective crisis that weakened community structures and raised fundamental questions about core beliefs, inherited traditions, and social order. In the midst of profound despair, some lashed out at Jesuit missionaries while others sought baptism in hopes that the ritual might restore health, stave off disease, or promise reunion in the afterlife with baptized relatives. Still more turned to or against surviving healers, clan mothers, and headmen. The specific demographic effects of disease also shaped the post-epidemic responses of a community. With high mortality rates among older men and women, many respected (and potential) male leaders died as did the clan mothers and matriarchs who largely determined their selection. The higher survival rates among younger men, on the other hand, brought a new generation of leaders with different priorities to the fore. William Fox suggests that this generational shift may have contributed to an escalation of warfare since younger men traditionally held leadership roles in matters related to war while their elders were primarily responsible for civil issues related to diplomacy and alliances. Whether or not the demographics of disease had this specific effect, “death and disease meant constant

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turnovers in leadership and policy, often removing the very individuals best suited to generate consensus.  

The most immediate and concerted response to the onslaught of disease epidemics came through an intensification of the traditional mourning war complex that had long been common among all Iroquoian groups. Often described by Europeans as an act of vengeance or a kind of blood feud, a mourning war involved raids against an enemy for the primary purpose of acquiring captives—who would then be incorporated into the community to replace a deceased person. While battle deaths certainly led to calls for such raids, mourning wars were also inspired by death from murder, accident, or disease—with the latter becoming the most prevalent reason in the mid 17th century. As Daniel Richter notes, “the target of a mourning war was usually a people traditionally defined as enemies; neither they nor anyone else need necessarily be held responsible for the death that provoked the attack.” Rather than find and punish a specific culprit, the goal was to restore what had been taken and—in the process—weaken an enemy. “Because an individual’s death diminished the collective power of a lineage, clan, and village,” the call for war—as well as the fate of the captive—reflected the matriarchal nature of Iroquoian society. Captives were brought to a grieving woman, her female kin, or a clan mother who either rejected or accepted the captive. In the latter case, a “Requickenning” ceremony was performed “in which the deceased’s name, … social role and duties … were transferred” to the captive. With the ceremony completed, the grieving process was ended and a void in the community was filled. 

For previous generations, mourning wars had generally involved small scale raiding. In the context of accelerating trade, increased competition for beaver, more firearms, and a wave of disease epidemics, however, the mourning war complex entered a deadly spiral. High mortality from unknown sicknesses caused profound and widespread grief which led to calls for larger and more frequent mourning wars; the growing importance of firearms in these conflicts fostered a scramble for beaver pelts in order to acquire guns and metal for weapons; competition for furs resulted in more warfare and death, which exacerbated the mourning war cycle even further. Born of the diseases and “economies of violence engendered by [European] intrusion,” as Ned Blackhawk writes, “such warfare and conflict brought heightened levels of trauma to the everyday lives of Native peoples” that would persist across generations and profoundly reshape the Great Lakes region.  

The first clear example of this new dynamic occurred in the early 1640s when the Chonnonton went to war against the people they broadly referred to as Assistaeranon (“Fire Nation”). Living around western Lake Erie and areas to the west, the Assistaeranon were a loose confederacy of Central Algonquian villages—namely

38 Fox, “Events as Seen from the North: The Iroquois and Colonial Slavery,” in Mapping the Mississippian Shatter Zone, 64-65; Labelle, Dispersed but not Destroyed, 14-28 (quotation on p. 14). Also see Trigger, Children of Aataentsic, 499-602.  
Mascouten, Kiikaapoi (Kickapoo), Thâkîwa (Sauk, or Sac), Meskwaki (Fox), and Bodéwadmi—that had long been the enemies of the Chonnonton, Wendakeronon, and Odawa around Georgian Bay. In 1640 a large Chonnonton war party (perhaps with Tionontati and Giishkaakhang Odawa allies) embarked on a mourning war campaign and reportedly took 100 captives from an unrecorded village. The next year a veritable army of 2,000 returned to western Lake Erie and reportedly took 170. Finally, in 1643, another large force laid siege to the last substantial Mascouten village for ten days. Unable to lift the siege, the Mascouten initiated a desperate but futile battle. The village was completely destroyed, many of the residents were killed, and approximately 800-1,000 women and children were taken captive. Elderly men who survived were crippled and left to die in the woods, while seventy captured warriors were ritually tortured to death during the multi-day return journey to the Chonnonton villages around the northeastern end of Lake Erie.\(^{41}\)

While these three campaigns to western Lake Erie followed the basic motives of a mourning war, the scale of destruction and number of captives was unprecedented. A series of deadly epidemics certainly explains the intensity of the Chonnonton attacks, but so do the dynamics of the fur trade. The Chonnonton had access to firearms and metal weapons, and their position in Great Lakes exchange networks allowed them to impede communication and trade between the French and the Central Algonquians at the western end of Lake Erie. The result was a pronounced arms disparity that greatly favored the Chonnonton and accounts for the magnitude and relative ease of their victories. The campaigns also achieved another strategic aim by allowing the Chonnonton to extend their hunting territory into the beaver-rich marshes, rivers and streams of what is now southeastern Michigan and northwestern Ohio. On all fronts their efforts were as successful as they were unprecedented, and resulted in the Mascouten, Kiikaapoi, Thâkîwa, Meskwaki, and Bodéwadmi soon abandoning their territories to seek refuge to the south and west of Lake Michigan.\(^{42}\)

The scale of these wars and the displacements they caused would have been unimaginable a few years earlier, but they would soon be overshadowed by larger and more enduring conflicts. As Dutch and then British imperial interests were added to the cauldron of demographic collapse, accelerating trade, and old animosities, a period known as the “Beaver Wars” quickly overwhelmed all that had come before. The first shift in this new dynamic occurred in 1628 when the Kanien’kehaka (Mohawk) defeated the Mahican and established themselves as the central trading partner with the Dutch on the upper Hudson River. With direct access to a European trading partner, the Kanien’kehaka (Mohawk) and their Haudenosaunee allies were better able to prosecute and defend against the spate of mourning wars that followed the epidemics of the 1630s. As with the Chonnonton, Haudenosaunee mourning wars coincided with efforts to acquire new beaver hunting territories. In the late 1630s and early 1640s, the western

\(^{41}\) Garrad, 
Haudenosaunee—namely the Onöndowága: (Seneca), Guyohkohnyo (Cayuga) and Onoda’gega (Onondaga)—attacked Wenrohonon, Eriehonon, and Chonnonton communities around Lake Ontario while the eastern Haudenosaunee—Kanien’kehaka and Onyota’ake (Oneida)—invaded the Nipissing and Omámiwinini. While the spiral of disease, displacement and war affected the entire region in the 1630s and early 1640s, the only decisive conflicts came against the Wenrohonon—who were killed, taken captive, or sought refuge among the Eriehonon and Chonnonton. By the late 1640s, however, the five nations of the Haudenosaunee began to consolidate their forces for larger attacks. Fortified by captives from the Wenrohonon as well as from raids into New England and the southern Appalachians, and emboldened by the acquisition of hundreds of new firearms from the Dutch (who hoped to carve into the French trade), the Haudenosaunee had become strong enough to challenge the Chonnonton, Wendat, Tionontati and their Anishanaabeg allies. In the summer of 1648 a force of several hundred Haudenosaunee destroyed Teanaostaiaé, a large and well-fortified Attigneenongnahac (“People of the Cord”) town near the western end of Lake Simcoe, and captured 700 people. Other villages were attacked as well, and thousands of refugees sought food and shelter from towns around the southern end of Georgian Bay or at the Jesuit Mission of Sainte-Marie. In the spring of 1649 a force of 1,000 Haudenosaunee warriors returned and laid waste to several Wendat towns and missions, took more captives, then killed surviving warriors as well as Jesuit priests. Those who escaped, as well as their allies and kin who had fled from other destroyed villages, pieced together a collection of refugee communities that were plagued by famine and disease through the fall and winter. Many fled to the Tionontaté, one of the last substantial villages in the region, then reorganized and moved further north to Gahoendoe (an island in Georgian Bay) before the next onslaught came.

With efforts to attack or repel the Haudenosaunee having failed, the Wendat and Tionontati now considered leaving their homeland altogether. As Kathryn Magee Labelle notes, this decision took time and required the organization of multiple councils and consultations among clan mothers to find a broad consensus. “In the end,” she writes, “the [Wendakeronon] directed their own removal: rather than simply reacting to European or Haudenosaunee decisions and events, they engaged in a series of Native-orchestrated initiatives, influenced by traditional coalitions and kinship networks” and fortified by alliances with the French and Anishinaabeg. Within a year, these various elements ultimately sent the Wendakeronon in two directions. Members from communities and clans with close associations to the Jesuit missions chose to make a long and dangerous journey to the vicinity of Quebec City where they became the core of the present-day Nation huronne-wendat at Wendake. Most of the Tionontati, along with a number of southern Hatinniawenten and Atahontayenrat refugees with whom they were closely related, and Wendat “traditionalists” who rejected the Jesuits, moved northwestward toward the Giishkaakhang and other Odawa communities. Within three years this composite of Iroquoian-speaking people, who would subsequently identify

themselves as Wyandot, would move to the north end of Georgian Bay, then to Mackinac Island, and finally to the southern end of Green Bay.\textsuperscript{45}

Still driven by old animosities and consumed with the need to “Requicken” the thousands who had been lost to disease and war, the Haudenosaunee continued their war campaigns in the wake of the Wendakeronon departures. The Jesuit priest Isaac Jogues, who was tortured and later killed in a Kanien’kehaka (Mohawk) town, offered a succinct appraisal of Haudenosaunee strategy: “it is the design of the Iroquois to capture all the Hurons, if it is possible; to put the chiefs and a great part of the nation to death, and with the rest form one nation and one country.” Toward these ends they turned their focus on

\textsuperscript{45} Labelle, op. cit; Quotation on p. 47. Also Trigger, \textit{Children of Aataentsic}, 782-819. The term Wyandot, rather than Wyandotte, is used in this study for two reasons: It is the self-identifier of the Wyandot of Anderdon, which is the group with the longest historical association to the River Raisin area, and it is the name of the Iroquoian language used by the various groups that composed the Wendakeronon. The Wyandotte Nation is the one federally recognized group of Wendakeronon people in the United States.
the Chonnonton confederacy, which had long maintained a neutral position between the Onöndowága: (Seneca) to the south and the Wendat to the north. By the late 1640s, however, this history only made the Chonnonton—along with the Eriehronon, Wenrohonon, and Tionontati refugees among them—the largest and nearest population to the Haudenosaunee; the precepts of a mourning war and the presence of the Haudenosuanee’s enemies among them, erased any past recognition of Chonnonton neutrality. Following a few inconclusive campaigns the previous year, the two principal towns of the Chonnonton were completely destroyed by a large force of Onöndowága: (Seneca) in the summer of 1653. Along with captives from other Haudenosaunee wars, the surviving Chonnonton composed a somewhat separate community within the Seneca that would eventually become known as Ōkwe'ōwé (Seneca-Cayuga; aka Ohio Iroquois or “Mingo”). Just ten years after the conquest of the Mascouten, the Chonnonton ceased to exist as a distinct nation.46

The ten years between the unprecedented victories of the Chonnonton around southwestern Lake Erie and their subsequent defeat by the Onöndowága near the opposite end of the lake encompasses the temporal and geographical heart of the Great Lakes “shatter zone.” As Robbie Ethridge defines it, the shatter zone was “created by the combined conditions of … [weakened] Native polities; the introduction of Old World pathogens and the subsequent serial disease episodes and loss of life; the inauguration of a nascent capitalist economic system by Europeans through a commercial trade in animal skins …; and the intensification and spread of violence and warfare through the … emergence of militaristic [alliances] that caused widespread dislocation, migration, amalgamation, and in some cases, extinction of native peoples.”47

In geographical terms the Great Lakes shatter zone encompassed the drainage basins of lakes Ontario, Erie, and Huron, as well as the Ottawa River Valley, the Lower Peninsula of Michigan, and most of present-day Ohio. As a lived experience, however, the shatter zone was likely remembered as a time of shadows and horrors. Between the disease epidemics of the 1630s and 1640s, and the welter of conflicts in the 1640s and 1650s, the population of the lower Great Lakes region fell by at least two-thirds. The combined population of the four groups that composed the Wendat, for instance, numbered between 20,000-30,000 in 1630, but probably no more than 10,000 a decade later. More would die in the ensuing years from war, famines associated with social collapse, displacement, crop destruction, and especially hard winters. The survivors carried these experiences into new lives as captives or part of refugee communities far from their homelands. By the mid 1650s, the shattering was complete; marked by the remains of destroyed or abandoned villages, weed-choked fields, and grass covered


pathways, it had become the depopulated home territory for a complex diaspora of people who had fled to the west and south.\(^{48}\)

**The Middle Ground**

Aside from the missionized Wendat who moved east, most of the refugees from the Great Lakes shatter zone fled west. When the Wyandot joined with the Giishkaakhang Odawa at Mackinac, and then both moved to Green Bay, they became the latest in a string of refugees that had moved into the territory of the Hoocąągra (Ho-Chunk, aka Winnebago), and Mamaceqtaw (Menominee) on the western side of Lake Michigan. They were preceded by the Bodewadmi, Thâkîwa (Sauk), Meskwaki (Fox), Kiikaapoi (Kickapoo) and Mascouten that had come from areas between lakes Michigan and Erie. Along with these other groups, the Wyandot and Giishkaakhang Odawa endeavored to put in crops, hunt, and gather foods in a crowded landscape. The Hoocąągra (Ho-Chunk, aka Winnebago), who spoke a Siouan language, and the Mamaceqtaw, who spoke a unique Central Algonquian dialect, were essentially bilingual with each other—but their communications with all of these newcomers likely occurred in some versions of the central Algonquian dialects as well as the Wyandot language—which had become the *lingua franca* of the Great Lakes fur trade over the previous decades. While all of these groups were familiar with each other, not all of their past relations had been amicable. Yet the unease felt by refugees who may have been erstwhile competitors and enemies, and the challenges that the arrival of so many different people must have brought to the Hoocąągra (Ho-Chunk) and Mamaceqtaw, were diminished by raw necessity. The imperatives of community building and collaboration generally outweighed the fragmented loyalties of past animosities.\(^{49}\)

Distance from the eastern Great Lakes provided an important measure of protection from the Haudenosaunee, while fertile soils and an abundance of waterfowl, fish, and game allowed the polyglot communities around Green Bay to become more established. Similar developments occurred to the south along the Fox, the upper Wisconsin and the upper Illinois rivers where villages of Myaamia (Miami), Illiniwek (Illinois Confederacy), Kiikaapoi (Kickapoo), and Mascouten refugees had come together. To the north, along Chequamegon Bay, mixed villages of Ojibwe and Odawa also put in crops and had ready access to excellent fishing grounds. Abundance did not mean stasis, however. Concerns about vulnerability to Haudenosaunee attacks from the east and Dakota attacks from the west, desires to access new or different trade and subsistence resources, or divisions within refugee communities and alliances, led to frequent movements through the 1650s. By the 1660s, however, the region to the west of Lake Michigan, from Michilimackinac to Chequamegon Bay and south to the Illinois River, had become a fairly stable constellation of villages composed of many peoples. Over the next two decades the combined population around Green Bay held at around 10,000, while the number of people in the main village along the upper Illinois River

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numbered around 6,000, with several thousand more in smaller villages along the river and nearby streams. To the north on Chequamegon Bay, where several villages of Anishinaabeg were joined by seasonal and semi-permanent residents that had moved north, the population rivaled that of the other locales.\(^{50}\)

As Richard White notes, “this clustering of diverse peoples … disrupted older notions of territory [and] geographical boundaries between refugees became difficult to maintain. Ethnic or local distinctions remained, but now villages of different groups bordered on each other or previously separate groups mingled in a single village.” Frequent moving might alleviate tensions, but any relief this brought had to be weighed against the virtue of strength in numbers when it came to the threat of a Haudenosaunee attack. Pushed by necessity and common interest, “these survivors of the [Great Lakes] shatter zone … came to be intimate neighbors and kinspeople.”\(^{51}\) Crafting an alliance and building community among displaced peoples is no small feat, no matter the circumstances, but it is important to remember that the congregation of peoples to the west of Lake Michigan were not all strangers. The Bodéwadmi were very familiar with the Hoocąągra (Ho-Chunk) and Mamaceqtaw, as well as with the Central Algonquians from the western end of Lake Erie. Even the most recent arrivals, the Wyandot and Giishkaakhang Odawa had become familiar with many of these groups through the 1610s and 1640s as the primary conduits of the fur trade with the French. Though most all were driven from their home villages, their arrival on the west side of Lake Michigan was not mere happenstance. In short, they moved toward and with people they knew.\(^{52}\)

Unlike the groups congregated around Green Bay and further south, the Odawa and Ojibwe who moved to Chequamegon Bay remained within vast networks of clan and familial relations along the broad arc that extended across the northern Great Lakes to Lake Nipissing and the Ottawa River. This entire region was a homeland for diverse but related communities, where the landscape was scripted with aadizookaanag (sacred stories) that corresponded to specific sites and features. Not surprisingly, the Odawa—along with their fellow Anishinaabeg (Ojibwe, Boděwadmi, Mississauga, and Omâmìwininìwak) and Tionontati—became the primary conduit of trade between the western Pays d’en Haut and Montreal. As a consequence, the mostly Ojibwe, Odawa, and Wyandot village on Chequamegon Bay developed into the “center for all the nations” of the region. As the Jesuit priest Jean Claude Allouez described it, at Chequamegon “More than fifty Villages can be counted, which comprise diverse peoples either nomadic or sedentary,” and included seasonal residents from as far away as the Illinois River. Peltry and European goods were part of this diverse trade center, as were a host of other materials that included maize, fish, tools, hides, canoes, garments, copper, pipestones, and an array of other items.\(^{53}\)


The regular movements of Anishinaabeg groups throughout their homeland made them central to the development of trade within the western *Pays d’en Haut*, while their relative distance from the disease and violence of the “shatter zone” made them formidable defenders against attacks from the Haudenosaunee. In 1662 a combined force of Ojibwe, Odawa, and Nipissing warriors intercepted a “great party of” Kanien’kehaka (Mohawk) and Onyota’ake (Oneida), near Bawaating (Sault Sainte Marie) and, as the Ojibwe elder Charles Kawbawgam learned the story, “slaughtered [them] in heaps.” This decisive victory, along with others by the French and Abenaki further east, brought a period of calm in the decades-long wars that plagued the Great Lakes. As a consequence, trade between Montreal and the western *Pays d’en Haut* increased over the next several years and sizeable groups of Frenchmen were able to travel to the region for the first time.

![Figure 2.4: Western Pays d’en Haut, ca. 1680s.](image)

While there was considerable population movement through the second half of the 17th century, as well as various degrees of integration and co-location of various communities, this map illustrates the general location and distribution of Indigenous groups and population centers about a generation after the initial diaspora in the early 1650s.

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Chequamegon served as the hub of this growing trade as well as the site where various groups developed, refined, and renewed their relationships. Not surprisingly, it also became a new focal area for French traders, officials, and priests enroute to other parts of the Pays d’en Haut. In the midst of these developments two related shifts occurred within the fur trade. First, the Wyandot, Odawa, and Ojibwe preferred to focus on exchanges and alliances within the Pays d’en Haut, and less on carrying the trade to and from Montreal. And second, a surge in the population of New France resulted in the hiring and assembling of voyageur convoys between the St. Lawrence River and western Lake Superior that carried more trade goods and more Frenchmen into the western Pays d’en Haut.  

As the French entered the western Pays d’en Haut, they established themselves in three distinct but related ways. The earliest of these involved the development of new Jesuit missions, which numbered seven by 1675 and extended from Lake Superior southward to Kaskaskia on the Illinois River. On a visitation to the region in 1669, Father Claude Allouez was struck by the diversity of “all the Nations [in the main population centers], who maintain a constant intercourse, either in visiting or trading.” “Here,” he proclaimed, is “a great Field for Gospel workers.” Though few baptisms, and fewer conversions, occurred in these missions, the persistence of the Jesuits, their regular contact with surrounding communities, and their embodiment of French spiritual concerns within the larger networks of trade and alliance, brought a level of constancy to French and American Indian relations in the western Pays d’en Haut. This was even truer of the coureurs de bois, who represented the inverse of the Jesuit’s mission to christianize and franciser (Frenchify) American Indians. Instead of proselytizing, the coureurs de bois became members of the communities with whom they lived, relatives of the families they married into, and moved easily through a multilingual world. The third pillar of the French presence centered on licensed trading posts that sometimes served as forts against potential attacks from the Dakota or Haudenosaunee. Less intimate than the coureurs de bois, and perhaps less constant than the Jesuits, these facilities provided a more formal representation of New France.

New Alliances from Old

As more French came west, the same frameworks of kinship, reciprocity, exchange networks, and alliances that existed prior to the disease epidemics and wars of the 1630s and 1640s were still central to life in the western Pays d’en Haut. Yet the shape and contents of those frameworks had been altered by fragmentation, relocation, and the passage of time. Like the Wyandot, the Central Algonquin communities were created from the pieces of once distinct villages. Older kinship ties—whether derived through descent, clan association, adoption, or marriage—allowed these new communities to coalesce, but new bonds could be more tenuous and thus more prone to schism. As Richard White notes, the same was true of some long-standing alliances that were


reconstituted in the west. Kinship in the *Pays d’en Haut* held the strongest ties within villages and among strong allies, but in large congregations of diverse communities the “politics of kinship … was not a harmonious politics. Factionalism divided the village councils; and because village boundaries were permeable, factions formed links with [nearby] outsiders.” Village leaders worked to mediate between factions, but such efforts invariably drew in an array of headmen from other communities and resolutions became more elusive.\(^5^9\)

Creating consensus within and between communities was inherently difficult—but the problem was often compounded by new crises that were part and parcel of life in the western *Pays d’en Haut*. For instance, high population concentrations that fostered discord within kin-based politics could also overtax local ecosystems to the point where food sources became unpredictable—and thus further encourage schisms and relocations. These movements would in turn make some more isolated populations vulnerable to attacks from the east or the west.\(^6^0\) The example of the Bodéwadmi (Potawotomi) leader Onanghisse in the late 1670s demonstrates the challenges of maintaining and forming alliances in these circumstances. A respected presence around Green Bay, Onanghisse was ideally situated within an array of potential alliances. Along with the Odawa and Ojibwe, the Bodéwadmi were one of the Nswe’mishkote’win (Council of Three Fires) of the Anishinabeg, and Onanghisse maintained close relations with the communities around Chequamegon Bay. The same was true of the Hoocąągra (Ho-Chunk) and Mamaceqtaw (Menominee), with whom the Bodéwadmi were settled, as well as the Central Algonquian communities on the upper Illinois River that had formerly lived near the Bodéwadmi prior to the attacks of Chonnonton around western Lake Erie. Yet Onanghisse was not able to build on these connections to form a more extensive alliance that also included large communities of Myaamia (Miami) and Illiniwek to the south. A recent disease epidemic and rumors of a new Haudenosaunee attack thwarted his plans, and raised concerns that a Bodéwadmi-centered alliance could undermine relations with the French at a time of potential crisis.\(^6^1\) Onanghisse apparently concurred, or recognized his efforts as futile, and instead advocated for strengthening connections to Onontio—as

\(^5^9\) White, *Middle Ground*, 40.


\(^6^1\) Along with the Odawa and Ojibwe, the Bodéwadmi were one of the Nswe’mishkote’win (Council of Three Fires) of the Anishinabeg, and Onanghisse maintained close relations with the communities around Chequamegon Bay. To a lesser degree, the same was true of his relations with the Hoocąągra (Ho-Chunk) and Mamaceqtaw (Menominee) who lived in the area to which the Bodéwadmi had retreated in the 1640s—as well as the Central Algonquian communities on the upper Illinois River. These latter groups, which had been driven away from western Lake Erie by the attacks of Chonnonton, were former neighbors of the Bodéwadmi when all lived in their former homeland. Clifton, *The Prairie People*, 69-79; Edmunds, *The Potawatomi*, 10-15, 22; Morrissey, *Empire by Collaboration*, 83; White, *Middle Ground*, 40; Donald J. Horton, “Ounanguissê,” *Dictionary of Canadian Biography* <http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/ounanguisse_2E.html> (accessed 15 October 2015).
the communities of the *Pays d’en Haut* commonly referred to the Governor of New France.\(^{62}\)

As French imperial interests grew alongside the tangle of American Indian relations and alliances, a place and process developed in the western *Pays d’en Haut* that Richard White has termed the Middle Ground. The “infrastructure” of the Middle Ground developed through the 1660s and 1670s, and consisted of the large population centers that formed in the wake of the shatter zone, the missions, trading posts and forts that were located within these centers, and a fairly steady supply of trade goods that was administered by sanctioned traders who also served as de facto emissaries of Onontio. While this infrastructure could hardly be described as colonial, the “presence of Frenchmen in all the major [population] centers” connected Montreal to the various communities of the western *Pays d’en Haut*. This broad presence and these connections allowed the French to assume the role of mediators within the sometimes-fragile networks of alliance and exchange that crisscrossed the region. Because the French and the American Indians in the *Pays d’en Haut* had common enemies, and a common desire to expand their trade relations, strengthening and maintaining alliances within the region served an array of mutual interests. And as the example of Onanghisse demonstrates, only Onontio had the breadth of resources and connections to nurture these common concerns.\(^{63}\) The Middle Ground that grew from these conditions was not a trade-pact or mutual defense agreement, but a network of material, cultural, political, personal, and diplomatic relationships that connected the population centers of the western *Pays d’en Haut* to each other and to the French. The common concerns of all participants were grounded in the twin pursuits of peace and trade, and the broad alliance that developed in the *Pays d’en Haut* defused potentially dangerous disagreements by replacing them with a patient willingness to compromise.

The central position of Onontio, both as a mediator of disputes and a common source of trade goods, placed him in the role of a “Father” to the various communities—or “children”—in the region. This kin-based metaphor, which had particular relevance to these mostly patrilineal societies, was less about hierarchy than it was about responsibility. A good father gave gifts rather than orders, offered protection rather than harsh discipline, encouraged cooperation rather than discord, and listened rather than commanded obedience. Good children, for their part, were expected to participate in their collective well-being, seek areas of compromise, and recognize the connections they all had to a common father. Gift giving was central to these relationships, which the French directed toward village leaders who in turn distributed them within their own communities—thus enhancing the leaders position within the community and strengthening a broader connection to the French. A similar dynamic occurred with men the French identified as “alliance chiefs” who, like Onanghisse, were leaders within multi-village or multi-group alliances. Along with the positions they held within their

\(^{62}\) The term Onontio was likely coined by the Kanien’kehaka (Mohawk) in the 1640s, and is a translation of Montmagny (Great Mountain)—which was part of the then Governor of New France’s name: Charles Jacques Huault de Montmagny. The word in the Kanien’kehaka language is Iononténion, and refers to the Adirondack Mountains. It is roughly pronounced as *yo-noon-TAY-nee-oon*.

\(^{63}\) Morrissey, *Empire by Collaboration*, 63-84; White, *Middle Ground*, 34-36;
own villages, they also became gift-givers and conduits of exchange that fulfilled the expectations of good “fathers” within their own alliances.64

Based on mutual needs and interests, this system was still open to misunderstandings and always vulnerable to the fragile complexities of any new alliance. The repercussions of a killing, whether from warfare, murder, or a tragic accident, are a good case in point. In Algonquian and Wyandot societies, any of these killings could lead to demands from the deceased’s kin that a responsible party or one of their relatives be held accountable. If the killer belonged to a related or allied group, then the deceased could be "covered" or "raised" by a ritual that involved appropriate gifts. If the killer was neither a relative nor an ally, then vengeance could be wrought against the culprit or the culprit’s community. Any disagreements over such matters, especially if they involved groups that were former enemies or strangers, could break down an alliance and quickly devolve into more widespread violence.65

To stave off these outcomes, agents of Onontio often took responsibility for “covering” the dead through gifts and by participating in ceremonies of reconciliation. Even though the French made distinctions between murder, battle casualties, and manslaughter, and chafed at Native conceptions of guilt and punishment, it was more important to fulfill the role of Onontio than lay down judgment or make distinctions between good and bad killings. By the same token, alliance chiefs could set aside their views on these matters in order to facilitate the delivery of a named culprit to French authorities. These were not small issues, nor were they simple compromises. Touching on life and death, they involved fundamental notions of culpability, justice, kinship, reciprocity, and alliance. Yet compromise and a willingness to accommodate mutual misunderstandings created a “middle ground” of discourse and behavior that assuaged—if not entirely satisfied—the needs of all parties. As Colin Calloway notes, “finding a modus vivendi in a maze of cultural incongruities taxed the resilience and inventiveness of the allies, but both persisted and engaged in endless negotiations, since the alternative to maintaining the middle ground alliance was a world awash in blood.”66

The broad alliance that took shape in the western Pays d’en Haut was not, as some scholars have claimed, a Pax Gallica where peace prevailed and France ruled.67 The potential for schisms and factionalism within Native alliances were always present, and French dictums could elicit resistance and outright hostility from alliance chiefs. Yet on the whole, the alliance resulted in important successes. Foremost among these was ending the Haudenosaunee threat of invasion, and then turning the tables. In the late 1680s and early 1690s, warriors from west of Lake Michigan attacked Haudenosaunnee around Lake Ontario with arms and assistance from Onontio. Soon after, Northern

65 Ibid., 189-93; White, Middle Ground, 40, 77, 81-82, 91-92; Witgen, Infinity of Nations, 160, 185.
67 See, for example, Havard, “‘Protection’ and ‘Unequal Alliance’: The French Conception of Sovereignty over Indians in New France,” in French and Indians in the Heart of North America, 1630-1815, eds. Robert Englebert and Guillaume Teasdale (East Lansing and Winnipeg: Michigan State University Press and University of Manitoba Press, 2013), 123.
Anishinaabeg and Wyandot as well as the Myaamia (Miami) from southwest of Lake Michigan pushed the Haudenosaunee south and east of Lake Ontario toward the center of their homeland. Bolstered by a growing number of experienced soldiers, the French invaded Onöndowága: (Seneca) and Onoda'gega (Onondaga) towns, and attacked villages in the Finger Lakes region—some 90 years after Champlain first joined in battle against the Kanien’kehaka (Mohawk). All of these conflicts either preceded or coincided with King William’s War (1688-97), which stemmed from growing tensions between New France and the Dominion of New England over the fur trade, but the concerns of imperial rivals were not relevant to the warriors from the Pays d’en Haut. The wars they fought against the Haudenosaunnee reached back to a time before most were even born—and occurred in alliance with people that some of their forebears would have barely known. With their successes, and the alliances they had formed with other Indigenous groups and Onontio, they were about to piece together the shards of the Great Lakes shatter zone.68

Chapter Three

Alliances, Onontio, and the Limits of Empire: 1700-1763

This chapter presents the historical developments and conditions that underlay what has been called “The Sixty Years’ War for the Great Lakes.” Because the events surrounding the War of 1812 in the Great Lakes region represent the final years of that six-decade period, this chapter will establish a basis for understanding how the brief period that encompassed the battles of Frenchtown and associated events was connected to long-standing historical processes from French-Native alliances to the conditions that gave rise to the American Revolution.

Between the 1650s and 1680s, the locations and compositions of the communities in the western Pays d’en Haut were broadly defined by four key factors: the presence of powerful enemies to the east (Haudenosaunee) and the west (Dakota); ongoing relations with the French through trade, alliance, interaction, and intermarriage; extensive cultural ties and kinship networks among the Anishinaabeg (Odawa, Ojibwe, and Bodéwadmi); and relations within and between the mostly Algonquian speaking communities and confederacies around Green Bay and the Illinois River. In the last decade of the 17th century a pronounced shift in the wars with the Haudenosaunee both affirmed and altered this calculus in three meaningful ways. By 1700 the Haudenosaunee had been pushed south of Lake Ontario in a series of multiple campaigns that involved up to 1,000 warriors from different groups moving across great distances. The strategy and cooperation this involved reflected a powerful ability to organize against a distant enemy and demonstrated the strength and significance of this alliance. The success of New France in direct wars with the Haudenosaunee, as well as their support for and alliance with war parties from the west, also made the once distant French a more respected and more prominent power in the Pays d’en Haut.

The Great Peace

Suffering from a spate of disease epidemics, forced to defend their villages from a variety of enemies, and located between French and British power bases, the

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1 David Curtis Skaggs and Larry L. Nelson, eds., The Sixty Years’ War for the Great Lakes, 1754-1814 (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2001.)
2 Leroy V. Eid, “The Ojibwa-Iroquois War: The War the Five Nations Did Not Win,” Ethnohistory 26, no. 4 (1979): 297-324; David D. Plain, From Ouisconsin to Caughnawaga; or, Tales of the Great Lakes First Nations (Victoria, BC: Trafford Publishing, 2013), 23-29. As these sources also note, the importance and magnitude of these victories are still remembered by the descendants of those who fought.
Haudenosaunee initiated peace negotiations with the French in 1698 and 1699. British resistance to these overtures gave the Haudenosaunee pause, but new attacks from the north and west convinced the Five Nations to seek a broad agreement with the French-Native alliance. After a preliminary peace treaty was affirmed with the French in 1700, plans were made for a much larger agreement the following summer and messengers were sent in all directions. The result was the Great Peace of 1701, which involved more than 1,300 people representing 40 distinct nations from as far away as the Acadian Peninsula, James Bay, the upper Mississippi River, and the lower Ohio River. Most, however, had come from the communities of the western Pays d’en Haut. After weeks of negotiation, ceremony, feasting, speeches, and proclamations, an agreement was reached on five broad conditions: all participants agreed not to war against each other; the Haudenosaunee agreed to remain neutral in any future conflicts between France and Britain; all Native nations agreed to have Onontio mediate any disputes or conflicts that arose between them; the nations of the western and upper Great Lakes allowed Haudenosaunee to hunt in the region; and the Haudenosaunee assured safe passage to the nations of the Pays d’en Haut to access the British fur trade at Albany.4

An outbreak of what may have been a deadly flu virus, as well as the failure of the Haudenosaunee to bring prisoners for an expected exchange, nearly scuttled the treaty from the outset. A French refusal to reopen fur trade posts in the western Pays d’en Haut that had been closed a few years earlier almost caused Onanghisse to withdraw the support of the Bodéwadmi and Thâkiwa (Sauk) for the treaty.5 Along with other doubters he was apparently inspired by the Wyandot leader Kondiaronk, who lobbied hard for acceptance of the treaty even as he lay dying from the flu. Perhaps the greatest impetus for affirming the Great Peace was a desire to reach a consensus on an agreement that would end generations of conflict and foster new opportunities for exchange. On this last score, at least, the Great Peace succeeded for several years. Besides the twin virtues of peace and exchange, particular coalitions also achieved specific goals. The Haudenosaunee gained neutrality between the French and the British, and thus became well positioned to exploit the competing solicitations of these two imperial powers. The French affirmed a broad alliance with the nations of the Pays d’en Haut and gained a buffer—in the Haudenosaunee—between New France and the British colonies. Western groups gained access to a new source of trade goods and were now finally able to return to their former homelands.

The Great Peace was also the formal culmination of the processes that shaped the Middle Ground; namely, the alliances that had formed in the main population centers of


5 The French had closed the posts over concerns about a glut in the European peltry market and the costs associated with gift giving and maintaining a bon marché (fair price) in a changed marketplace.
the western *Pays d’en Haut* as well as with the communities of Anishinaabiwek (i.e., the lands and Anishinaabeg). Moreover, the stipulation that Onontio would be universally recognized as the mediator of all disputes, and thus the “good father” to all his “children,” further extended an operative metaphor of the Middle Ground to the Haudenosaunee and groups far to the east and north. By declaring an end to the conflicts that had plagued the Great Lakes region for sixty years, the Great Peace also represented a signature achievement of alliance and mediation. Yet these successes would soon extinguish the fundamental conditions that had shaped the Great Lakes region over the previous half century.

With an end to the wars with the Haudenosaunee, a fundamental purpose of an alliance was no longer operative. The same was true of the agreement to open the lower peninsula of present-day Michigan as an uncontested territory. Many of the same groups that had fled the area in the 1640s returned, and their connections with the diverse communities around Green Bay, Chequamegon, and the upper Illinois River became less important. These moves were also fostered by three French actions that immediately preceded and followed the Great Peace: the opening of Fort St. Joseph in 1695 among the Bodéwadmi who were returning to the southeastern side of Lake Michigan, the closing of western trading posts in 1696, and the establishment of Fort Pontchartrain du Détroit (a combined trading post, administrative center, and military facility) in 1701. Lastly, the Great Peace brought a new eastward orientation to French policy. Instead of working to maintain an alliance with the communities of the western Great Lakes largely based on mutual defense and trade, the French became increasingly focused on diplomacy with the Haudenosaunee and the likelihood of more war with the British. For their part, the peoples in the western *Pays d’en Haut* were ready to test the potential benefits of trading with the British in Albany and many began to move east and southeast of Lake Michigan.

### Alliance and Discord at Fort Pontchartrain

Even before the great gathering in Montreal, a number of the communities centered around Green Bay had begun to move eastward. The Bodéwadmi (Potawatomi), who had previously resided around the St. Joseph River in present-day southwestern Michigan, had begun a return “toward the sites of their ancient homelands.” They were soon joined by elements of the Myaamiaki (Miami-Illinois Confederacy), who viewed this move as a return to Saakiiweeyonki—the place of their origin. The establishment of Fort Pontchartrain by Antoine de la Mothe Cadillac, who previously served as the Commander at Fort de Baude (in present-day St. Ignace, Michigan), brought further movement to southern Michigan. Cadillac initially invited the Wyandot and Odawa to move down from the Straits of Mackinac to the Detroit River, as well as a community of Bodéwadmi from the St. Joseph area. All three groups accepted, and soon occupied a central position in this new focal point of the fur trade in the Great Lakes region. Cadillac encouraged more people to come near Fort Pontchartrain, and whole villages of

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Myaamia, Mascouten, Kiikaapoi (Kickapoo) Thâkîwa (Sauk, or Sac), and Meskwaki (Fox) moved to what is now southeastern Michigan. Missisaugi (Mississauga) and Ojibwe communities from the north end of Lake Huron also came south to the mouth of the St. Clair River.\footnote{Clifton, \textit{The Prairie People}, 85; “Gascon Exaggerations,” 77-88; Helen Hornbeck Tanner, ed. \textit{Atlas of Great Lakes Indian History} (Norman: Published for the Newberry Library by the University of Oklahoma Press, 1987), 39.}

The number of people that had moved near Fort Pontchartrain soon grew to 6,000, with still more in what is now the border area of Michigan and Indiana. Such a rapid concentration of people depleted resources and strained relations between earlier and later arrivals. Initially, some of the alliance mechanisms of the western \textit{Pays d’en Haut} partially resolved these issues. In 1706, after a deadly clash at Fort Pontchartrain between Odawa who had recently come down from Michilimackinac and an array of Wyandot, Myaamia and French, a much larger conflict was averted by all parties assented to the rituals of gift giving and mediation administered by Onontio. Mobility also resolved these tensions, as the Odawa returned north and the Myaamia moved to the headwaters of the Maumee River.\footnote{Witgen, \textit{Infinity of Nations}, 285-87.}

These measures proved temporary, however, and the western alliance—as formalized in the Great Peace—would falter badly over the next several years. In 1710 two Meskwaki (Fox) villages moved back to southeastern Michigan where they had resided prior to the 1640s. In doing so, they also came in close proximity with communities that had recently moved to the Detroit area from Chequemagon Bay—which renewed and further inflated earlier tensions that had developed in the western \textit{Pays d’en Haut}. The Meskwaki had previously vied with the Anishinaabeg and Wyandot around Chequamegon Bay, as well as French traders on the upper Mississippi River, for direct and more exclusive relations with the Dakota. They ultimately failed in this effort and became isolated within the western alliance, a situation that was only exacerbated when they moved near Detroit. In doing so they reawakened the recent tensions in the west, but also renewed the older history of animosity and warfare around western and northern Lake Erie that had involved the loose alliance of Meskwaki, Mascouten, Kiikaapoi (Kickapoo) and Thâkîwa (Sauk, or Sac) against the ancestors of the Wyandot and their Anishinaabeg allies. With the French already solicitous of, and dependent upon, the collaboration of the first Native communities to come to Detroit—and holding their own resentments toward the Meskwaki—old and recent tensions soon broke in to violence.\footnote{Brett Rushforth, “‘A Little Flesh We Offer You’: The Origins of Indian Slavery in New France,” \textit{The William and Mary Quarterly} 60, no. 3 (2003): 777-808.}

In a series of conflicts that have generally become known as the Fox Wars, the recently arrived Meskwaki, Mascouten, Kiikaapoi and Thâkîwa pushed for a more central position within the new center of trade and alliance that was located within their ancestral lands. In 1712 the Meskwaki and Mascouten built a fortified village very near Fort Pontchartrain, from which they launched a brief attack on the fort. They were subsequently repulsed and driven back to their village by a combined force of French, Wyandot, Bodêwdami, and Odawa, and then placed under siege. After nineteen days the
besieged villagers sought to make a nighttime escape, but were surrounded and cut down along the Detroit River. As many as a thousand were killed, and large numbers were taken captive. Those who escaped left for the upper Illinois River Valley where they joined with Kiikaapoi and Thâkîwa allies as well as other Meskwaki and Mascouten from west of Lake Michigan. Over the next several years they became embroiled in conflicts with the Illiniwek and other communities in the Pays d’en Haut, and sought to open trade relations with the Dakota in the west as well as the Haudenosaunee and British to the east. This latter development seemed a harbinger of Governor General Philippe de Rigaud de Vaudreuil’s worst fear: conflict and disarray within the alliance, coupled with a reduced French presence in the western Pays d’en Haut, would lead Onontio’s “children” to open new exchange networks with the west and connect them to a new British “father” in Albany.11

Onontio Falters at War, Peace, and Slavery

Driven by these fears, and vacillating between punishment and mediation as the appropriate expressions of Onontio’s authority, the French followed conflicting strategies that helped fuel intermittent war against the Meskwaki for two decades. The alliance as a whole, and the northern Anishinaabeg in particular, wanted to prevent both the Meskwaki and the French from becoming a focal point in a western trade with the Dakota—and so their conflicts with the Meskwaki also worked to thwart Onontio’s efforts at mediation. Another dimension of this warfare further undermined the French position in the western country. From the 1710s forward, conflicts against the Meskwaki involved the taking of captives who were often enslaved rather than killed or adopted. As such they were enemies who could be used by, rather than incorporated into, their captors’ community—and thus each slave was a kind of laborer in a one-person prison camp. Many of these slaves, who were generally adolescents or young adults, also became part of exchange networks; not as chattel, but as gifts to confirm alliances or to complete diplomatic agreements. The French became a central conduit for these slaves, who were used to fulfill basic provisions of the Great Peace that required “covering” and “raising” Haudenosaunee dead from the wars of the 1690s. In this situation, as well as in relation to unexpected deaths, epidemics, or small conflicts within the Pays d’en Haut, slaves became part of what might be described as a mourning war exchange network. While such actions may have fulfilled Onontio’s important obligations to mediate conflicts and fulfill the requirements of the Great Peace, they also made the French complicit in the wars against the Meskwaki. This was further deepened by the continued presence of Meskwaki slaves among the French in Canada where they worked as laborers and house servants, and in the more distant imperial enterprises of Louisiana and the Caribbean.12

Because every effort to negotiate peace with the Meskwaki always came with a demand to return their unremitting kin, the French could not or would not reach final terms. Nor, for that matter, could they stave off further conflict between their allies and the Meskwaki. A continuance of warfare also prevented the French from re-establishing a substantial presence in the western Pays d’en Haut, since to do so would invite direct

12 Rushforth, “Slavery, the Fox Wars, and the Limits of Alliance” 73-76.

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attacks from the Meskwaki. The presence of Meskwaki slaves in New France thus prevented the French from negotiating peace, from further developing the western fur trade, and kept officials in Detroit and Montreal from seriously entertaining a new trade with the Dakota. While all of these conditions illustrated French weakness vis-à-vis their allies, so too did their remaining option: the only way to exercise French authority and have peace with the Meskwaki was to destroy them. Yet even in this matter the French effort fell short of the mark. In 1733 the Meskwaki had found refuge among the Thâkîwa (Sauk) near Green Bay, and the Governor of New France ordered French troops to form an alliance with “the Nations which Are faithful to us” and annihilate the Meskwaki. If any chose to surrender without resistance, they would be placed in missions or shipped off to the Caribbean. Neither scenario played out, however, since the Meskwaki and Thâkîwa repulsed the French along with their Hoocąągra (Ho-Chunk), Odawa, and Ojibwe allies. A begrudging truce was eventually established five years later, and the Meskwaki and Thâkîwa moved to the Upper Mississippi River.13

Governor General Beauharnois still viewed the end of the Fox Wars in positive terms, since peace would bring stability to the western Pays d’en Haut, and finally allow the French to develop new posts in the region as well as open direct trade with the Dakota. Yet this hopeful scenario was illusory, at best. Beginning with the closing of the licensed fur trade in 1696, and its subsequent concentration at Detroit, the French presence in the western Pays d’en Haut was almost entirely filled by coureur de bois who neither embodied nor cared much for the strategic interests of French officials in Montreal or Paris. The Native population in this region had also shifted considerably, with some groups moving south to the Illinois and Wabash rivers at the same time others came to the Detroit area. The Anishinaabeg of the northern Great Lakes remained in place, but their networks of exchange and kinship moved with the Bodéwadmi, Wyandot, and Odawa to the Detroit area and no longer reached south into the western Pays d’en Haut.14 The period of the Fox Wars corresponded with other significant changes in the Pays d’en Haut that moved beyond New France’s ability to understand let alone control. Aside from the embattled Meskwaki, populations generally stabilized among all the groups around Detroit as well as those to the north and west. In the 1730s a number of communities divided and increased their territory by establishing new villages to the southeast. These included some Wyandot who moved to the lower Sandusky River, Myaamia (Miami) who relocated to the upper Eel, Wabash, and Maumee river drainages near what is now the Indiana-Ohio state line, and a community of Mascouten and Kiikaapi (Kickapoo) who moved to the Wabash River in what is now western Indiana.15

14 Witgen, Infinity of Nations, 296-305; Rushforth, “Slavery, the Fox Wars, and the Limits of Alliance,” 78-80; Edmunds and Peyser, The Fox Wars, 194-201.
Figure 3.1: Great Lakes and Ohio Valley, ca. 1740. Map illustrates the diverse arrangement of communities that returned to, or relocated within, the Ohio Valley and lower Great Lakes in the first half of the 18th century. Groups near and along the northwestern shore of Lake Michigan, as well as around Lake Superior, remained within the ancestral homelands they had inhabited continuously for centuries. Map is based on “The French Era, 1720-1761,” in Helen Hornbeck Tanner, Atlas of Great Lakes Indian History (Norman: Published for the Newberry Library by the University of Oklahoma Press, 1987), 40-41.

Other groups came from the south and east in the 1730s and 1740s. These included several Shawnee communities that had been displaced two generations earlier, lived in various parts of southeastern North America, and then gathered together in their ancient homeland on the middle Ohio River or moved toward the Forks of the Ohio River (the confluence of the Ohio, Monongahela, and Allegheny rivers). A community associated with the Onöndowága: (Seneca) but largely composed of people of Eriehonon and Chonnonton descent also made a return of sorts to their former homelands, near the southeastern end of Lake Erie. Known to Europeans as “Ohio Iroquois” or “Mingo” (and
now part of the Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Oklahoma), they were separate from but subject to the larger Haudenosaunee Confederacy. Lastly, groups of Lunaapeew (Lenape, or Delaware) moved to the upper Ohio River from the Province of Pennsylvania as a result of pressures from new British settlements along the Appalachian front-range.¹⁶

While some of these communities were returning to former homelands, and others moved to create distance from French administrators, British settlers, or complications within an Indigenous alliance, all were drawn to the rich soils and abundant game in a region that had been left vacant by decades of war. Regardless of the motives, all of these moves extended and altered the conditions of the Pays d’en Haut within a broader regional context. The fur trade remained a key factor of village life, as did the maintenance of alliances, but Europeans had become even more peripheral. As in the western Pays d’en Haut, a growing number of coureurs de bois (and a few independent British traders) maintained connections between the region and imperial centers of trade, but they did so as members of the Native communities in which they had married and lived. In sum, the re-inhabited Ohio Valley was “a Country between,” one that provided opportunities for comparing and initiating favorable exchanges with British or French trade networks, but not subject to either. From British and French perspectives, however, this region was not so much a neutral buffer zone as it was a field of contest between these two imperial rivals—in terms of trade and war.¹⁷

“a Tryal for both”

In the fall of 1753, as the French and British empires prepared for war on the eastern edge of the Ohio Valley, Lt. George Washington was dispatched by Lieutenant Governor of Virginia Robert Dinwiddie to assess conditions in what is now western Pennsylvania and eastern Ohio. Washington’s mission was essentially threefold: to evaluate the strength of French military forces and installations between Lake Erie and the Forks of the Ohio; to confirm the laudatory reports on the area that were recently submitted to the Ohio Company of Virginia (a land speculating company that had been established in 1748 by Dinwiddie as well as members of the Washington family); and to gauge the disposition of resident American Indian communities toward the British and the French. With all of these matters in mind, Washington held an eagerly anticipated meeting with Tanacharison in late November at the village of Chiningue (aka Logstown) on the upper Ohio River that was home to a mixed population of Ökwe’öwé (Seneca-Cayuga; aka, “Mingo”), Lunaapeew (Lenape, or Delaware), and Shawnee families.¹⁸

Tanacharison was both a leader among the Ökwe’öwé as well as a “Half-King”—a sort of viceroy of the Haudenosaunee—who had concluded a treaty the previous year.

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with the Colony of Virginia and the Ohio Company (Treaty of Logstown, 1752). While he resented the construction of French forts near Lake Erie and generally preferred to work with the British and Virginians, Tanacharison made it clear that he evaluated all parties by the same terms. Repeating a speech that he recently made to the French commander at Fort Le Boeuf (near the southeastern end of Lake Erie), Tanacharison told Washington that

> We live in a Country between, therefore the Land does not belong either to [the French] or the [British]; but the GREAT BEING above allow’d it to be a Place of residence for us; so … I desire you to withdraw, … for I will keep you at Arm’s length. I lay this down as a Tryal for both, to see which will have the greatest regard to it.19

This encounter between Tanacharison and Washington, which occurred in the months before the formal outbreak of the French and Indian War (aka, Seven Years’ War), touches on the array of interests that had taken shape in the Pays d’en Haut over the previous few decades and would largely define the wars that embroiled the Great Lakes and Ohio Valley for the next four decades. As Tanacharison made clear, the overriding concern of Native communities was to continue as independent people on the lands “the GREAT BEING above allow’d” for them. Consequently, their decisions about engaging, avoiding, or repulsing a particular imperial power would be based on which option best accorded with this basic concern. At times this could simply mean providing aid to the imperial power that was most likely to weaken the other—with the hope that both would be severely undermined and ultimately withdraw from the “Country between,” but such hopes were fleeting around the Forks of the Ohio as British and French forces repeatedly contested the area and, in the process, threatened or attacked Native towns.20

Living in a country between involved more than gauging or avoiding the concerns of imperial rivals. A Lunaapeew leader named Shingas, who guided Washington to Fort Le Boeuf after the council at Chiningue, variously engaged with French and British officials in 1753 and 1754. Shortly after a Pennsylvania’s devastating attack on the mostly Lunaapeew town of Kithanink (Kittaning, Ohio), however, he abandoned any pretext of neutrality and became fully committed to war. He made his reasons known during a meeting with an emissary from the Governor of Pennsylvania in 1756. In a statement that was more a wish than a question, Shingas wondered aloud: “It is plain that you white people are the cause of this war; why do not you and the French fight in the old country, and on the sea? Why do you come to fight on our land?” Without waiting for a reply, he answered himself: “You [both] want to take the land from us by force, and settle it.” The question of imperial or colonial alliances was meaningless in a war with such a goal, and Shingas determined instead to fight whomever posed the most imminent threat.

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to the Lunaapeew and their lands—which in the case of Kithanink meant the backwoods communities that had been pressing west of the Alleghenies.\textsuperscript{21}

**The Parameters of Alliance and Conflict**

While Shingas’ interrogation and answer clearly echoes Tanacharison’s statement, it is important to see the different sides of the coming war in terms that are more complex than basic identifiers of race and nationality: of “white people,” of “French and Indian,” of British, Haudenosaunee, or even Lunaapeew. When Tanacharison spoke with Washington, he did so as a representative of the Haudenosaunee as well as a leader within the mixed community of Ōkwe'ōwé, Lunaapeew, and Shawnee that had been moving away from the Onóndowága (Seneca, i.e. westernmost Haudenosaunee) for at least a generation. As a “half-king” he represented Haudenosaunee claims of suzerainty over his own kin and neighbors as well as all the people and lands of the Ohio Valley—an authority that ostensibly came to the Haudenosaunee by right of conquest during the wars of the 17th century. Neither the French nor any of the groups that returned to the area over the previous four decades recognized such a right, but the British did. This partly derived from a history of interaction between the British and Haudenosaunee that involved trade and past alliances against the French, but it also reflected a desire for administrative simplicity. Royal officials and colonial governors preferred to deal with a single recognized authority (i.e., the Grand Council of the Haudenosaunee) that met at Onónda'ge' (Onondaga), rather than a myriad of interethnic villages and overlapping alliances. Moreover, the British considered the Haudenosaunee to be their subjects (a sentiment that was not mutual), and thus viewed Haudenosaunee claims to the Ohio Country as British rights of possession.\textsuperscript{22}

As an agent of the Haudenosaunee who was directly answerable to the Grand Council, Tanacharison was the person George Washington most wanted to meet during his reconnaissance. Yet Washington’s concerns reflected the future objectives of the Ohio Company at least as much as they did the war preparations of the Governor or the history of British relations with the Haudenosaunee. With the coming war in mind, Washington was tasked with building on Virginia’s relationship with Tanacharison to formalize an alliance that would counter recent French efforts to control the Forks of the Ohio River—which both imperial powers viewed as the gateway to the Ohio Valley and the Great Lakes. Just as importantly, success in these matters would in turn protect the legal, financial and property claims involved with the previous year’s treaty (Treaty of Logstown, 1752) and its cession of what is now most of the state of West Virginia.\textsuperscript{23}


all of these matters Washington was something of a “half-king” himself, with dual loyalties to the British Colony of Virginia as well as the Ohio Company. The title was equally relevant to both men in another way, since the term “half” more fully described both of their circumstances than did “king.” Washington’s close family ties to the Company were at least as determinative of his actions and decisions as his official commission, while Tanacharison always had to be cognizant of the concerns and needs of the people with whom he lived when exercising the interests of the Haudenosaunee. Indeed, his even-handed admonishment to the French and the British was likely pitched in a way that appealed to the divided leanings of his immediate neighbors.24

The meeting of Washington and Tanacharison embodied four broad but distinct interests: those of Great Britain, the Ohio Company, the Haudenosaunee, and the mixed community of Ökwe’öwé, Lunaapeew, and Shawnee that resided at Chiningue. For the Crown and Parliament, Washington’s trek to Logstown was a small episode in a longstanding imperial contest with France in the global system of mercantile trade. From the perspective of the Ohio Company, Washington’s endeavor was viewed as critical to advancing the interests of Virginia’s colonial elites in a grand scheme of land acquisition and speculation. Tanacharison, on the other hand, represented the interests of the Haudenosaunee (as claimants of the Ohio Valley and as a significant Indigenous counterweight to French and British imperial designs), as well as embodied the polyglot world of the “Country between” and its growing separation from the Haudenosaunee.25

Though unmentioned, other key interests that would shape the coming war involved people that regarded themselves as nominal subjects of their respective kings. These included the coureurs de bois, who were often at odds with French officials in Montreal. Since many were married within Native communities, and cultivated extensive ties through Indigenous networks of exchange, their allegiances primarily lay with Native kin and their communities’ alliances. While ties to New France certainly influenced the coureurs de bois’ ideas about British objectives, as well as their subsequent militia service, their actions and understandings could not be divorced from their livelihoods within the fur trade or the future prospects of their neighbors and kin. Another interest that framed the meeting at Chiningue involved the families and individuals that were pushing across the Alleghenies from the British colonies. Increasingly referred to as “Long Knives” (a general term applied by various Native groups to western Pennsylvanians, Virginians and, later, Kentuckians), these new people were a kind of British antithesis to the coureurs de bois. They resented royal authority, Virginia elites, and land speculators, but their greatest fears and aspersions were reserved for American Indians—who were almost universally regarded as lazy and violent, with no higher goal than to war against poor people in need of property.26

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25 Ibid.
Lastly, and in many respects the most critical dimension of the coming war, were the various Native communities in the Ohio Valley and the Great Lakes region. Most had long ties with the French through trade and alliance, but some groups had migrated to the Upper Ohio Valley in the past two decades to have better access to British traders. While these later moves suggested ambivalence about the French and the alliance centered on Detroit, they did not necessarily imply a future alliance with the British. By the same token, Ökwe'öwé, Lunaapeew, and Shawnee who had moved to the west side of the Alleghenies had a long history of relations with an array of colonial interests, from missionaries, fur traders, land speculators, government officials, squatters, and militias. The sum of these experiences did not amount to a particular affinity for a British military alliance, but neither did the recent construction of French forts. At some level, most every American Indian community in the Ohio Valley and Great Lakes region, distrusted the British and the French, resented Haudenosaunee claims on the Ohio Valley, and expected more violent encounters with the Long Knives. Their ultimate concern, however, was to ensure the future viability of their lands, communities, and longstanding alliances in an increasingly unpredictable and dangerous world. In this regard, at least, all shared a common motive. Yet distinct perspectives and experiences would lead to different actions.
during the Seven Years’ War—and all would shape the course of this conflict as well as the turbulent decades that followed.27

One of the clearest examples of how deeply Native actions could affect outcomes occurred in the first major military campaign that followed Washington’s meeting with Tanacharison. It also illustrates how, under certain circumstances, the common interests of various groups could align (or fail to align) and lead to decisive outcomes. Backwoods militiamen, British officers, and British-allied American Indian groups had very different ideas about the conduct of warfare and the expected consequences of victory, but prior to and during the outbreak of war it seemed possible that some could overcome their differences long enough to pursue a common enemy. However, the disdain of one party for another, or others, could be so intransigent that disaster ensued. This proved the case in 1755, just weeks after British General Edward Braddock wrote to Benjamin Franklin that American Indians “may indeed be a formidable enemy to your raw American militia; but upon the king’s regular and disciplined troops, Sir, it is impossible they should make an impression.” This brash dismissal of colonial militias came shortly after Braddock had rejected the assistance of Native allies in his summer expedition against the newly constructed Fort Duquesne (present-day Pittsburgh). Instead of a triumphant conquest, Braddock was routed by the kind of force he disparaged the most: namely, a combination of 250 French regulars and militia along with an alliance of 650 Native warriors that had primarily come from the Detroit area. After an hours-long battle in which nearly two-thirds of the British fighting force of 1,300 was either dead (including Braddock) or wounded, the advancing British were suddenly in full retreat.28

Braddock’s defeat, which was preceded by Washington’s surrender at Fort Duquesne the previous summer, destroyed British expectations that a fair number of American Indian communities might remain neutral—or even support the Crown—in the coming war. Even before his costly march on Fort Duquesne, however, Braddock’s rejection of a Lunaapeew offer to help push the French away from their village at Kithanink (present-day Kittanning, Pennsylvania) undermined a potential alliance in the upper Ohio Valley. As Shingas later recalled, Braddock made it clear that Indigenous interests and support were irrelevant to the prosecution of war since, in the end, “no [Native] shou’d inherit the Land.” Shingas quickly replied that if the Lunaapeew “might not have Liberty To Live on the Land they wou’d not Fight for it.” Though Shingas never became an outright ally of the French, and held a vain hope that the British might work with Indigenous communities, he remained a feared war leader who defended Lunaapeew territory against squatters in western Pennsylvania and northwestern Virginia.29

One of the most significant consequences of the early French and American Indian victories around Fort Duquesne occurred in the broad area between the Cuyahoga

27 Daniel P. Barr, “‘This Land Is Ours and Not Yours’: The Western Delawares and the Seven Years’ War in the Upper Ohio Valley, 1755-1758,” in The Boundaries between Us: Natives and Newcomers Along the Frontiers of the Old Northwest Territory, 1750-1850, ed. Barr (Kent: Kent State University Press, 2006), 25-43.
Valley and the Wabash River Basin. Over the previous two generations, communities that were formerly consolidated in the western Pays d’en Haut had been moving into the region—to return to their homelands, to gain distance from the French-Native alliance at Detroit, or to access the more easterly British trade. These included Myaamiaki (Miami—Illinois), Waayahahntwa (Wea), and Kiikaapoi (Kickapoo) as well as some Wyandot and Odawa who were variously concentrated along the lower Wabash River, the upper Maumee Basin, Sandusky Bay, and the upper Great Miami River. At the same time as these eastward migrations were occurring, communities of Shawnee, Ökweövé (Seneca-Cayuga; aka, “Mingo”), and Western Lunaapeew (Lenape, or Delaware) moved away from the Haudenosaunee and encroaching settler communities. Most of the Shawnee returned to their ancient homeland on the north side of the Ohio, while the Ökweövé and Lunaapeew tended to congregate along the Cuyahoga and Muskingum rivers. For all of these groups, the region provided fertile soils, abundant game, a network of well-traveled river corridors, and a high degree of autonomy. As word of the French and American Indian victories at the Forks of the Ohio moved through the villages around the western Great Lakes and across the Ohio Valley, these various communities coalesced around a loose alliance that viewed support of the French as the best route to securing their lands and protecting their communities. Over the next few years the exigencies of war, alliance and trade would cause villages to move toward or among each other—which ultimately brought the western and eastern groups closer together.30

At the Center of the First World War

The Seven Years’ War (1756-1763), which was not officially declared until two years after Braddock’s defeat, has been called the first world war. Though connected to the cycle of European wars that frequently pitted France and Great Britain against each other, this war began in North America—then spread to Europe, the Caribbean, western Africa, the Indian subcontinent, the Philippine Archipelago, and all the intervening oceans. As the Moravian missionary Christian Post stated to Shingas and his brother Pisquetumen in 1758, “you know so long as the world has stood there has not been such a war.”31 The global context of the war and its primary focus in North America was rooted in the mercantilism that fueled previous wars in Europe, but directed at the specific overseas claims of an imperial rival. Yet the timing and the geographic origins of the Seven Years’ War stem from the dissolution of what Fred Anderson calls “a tri-partite equilibrium in which the [Haudenosaunee] occupied a crucial position, both geographically and diplomatically, between the French and the English colonial empires.”32 By the 1740s, the Haudenosaunee could no longer provide a sufficient counterweight to British and French interests in the region between Montreal and Albany. Their claims over western peoples and lands had become increasingly hollow, and their ability to play British and French interests against each other had diminished as European trade with the communities in the Ohio Valley increased. Instead of holding these

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31 Quote from Alfred A. Cave, The French and Indian War (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2004), 158.
imperial rivals at bay, the Haudenosaunee were squeezed by both—and could offer no resistance. As one Haudenosaunee speaker told the British, “It’s as if you on one side and the french on the other will press us out of our lands.’’

In a sense, the Forks of the Ohio had become a fault zone between two tectonic plates that were pushed by imperial visions and mutual animosity. Great Britain and France each believed that whoever controlled the area would control access to the Ohio Valley, and from there would be in position to control the continent. French strategists viewed the Ohio Valley as a necessary piece that would connect Lower Canada (present-day Quebec and southern Ontario) and the western Pays d’en Haut with the Illinois Valley and the Colony of Louisiana. The loss of the Ohio Valley, on the other hand, could shatter connections between Montreal and Detroit with the peoples of the western Great Lakes—and thus destroy the fur trade economy of New France. This, in fact, was a primary objective of the British war effort; to open to all his Majesty’s Subjects a Vein of Treasure, which, if rightly managed, may prove richer than the Mines of Mexico, the Trade with the

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numerous Nations of Western Indians: It [would deprive] our Enemies of the Benefits . . ., and break . . . the Chain of Communication betwixt Canada and Louisiana.34

For officials in London poring over Robert de Vaugondy’s recent map Amérique Septentrionale (1755), loss of the Ohio Valley would be catastrophic: the French would claim a vast arc of territory from the mouth of the Mississippi River to the Saint Lawrence River estuary—and thus limit Britain’s colonial venture in North America to a relatively narrow strip from the Appalachians to the coast. In short, the consequences of victory or defeat were as unprecedented as the global scale of the war.35

For American Indians in the Ohio Valley and beyond, the prospects of loss or victory did not have grand geopolitical implications. Their territorial concerns were limited to the lands they inhabited, utilized and shared, and thus staving off defeat had a more vital and immediate significance. Victory, on the other hand, would largely amount to a return of pre-war conditions. Total victory, if such a thing could be accomplished, would result in the weakening of French and English military capacities as well as the return of rural settlers to their colonial centers. For those Native communities that directly participated in the imperial conflict between France and England, their efforts could be described as waging war for a return to peace. For all Native groups, whether they pursued neutrality, fought with or against a particular European power, attacked British American settlements, or had violent disagreements with each other, their choices and actions were directed toward protecting “the country in which the Master of Life” had placed them, and ensuring that they would continue to “know no masters, as they had none among themselves.”36

Imperial War and New Alliances on Native Ground

At the outset of the war, the Onöndowága: (Seneca), Ökwe'öwé (Mingo), Lunaapeew (Lenape, or Delaware), and Shawnee who lived around the Forks of the Ohio welcomed the arrival of the British troops. This was less a matter of support for British interests than it was a welcomed counterweight to French violations of previous agreements to militarize the region. This support also corresponded to the more localized interests of these particular groups rather than any connections they may have been developing with communities to the west. However, British declarations that they would replace rather than displace the French army caused Native support in the area to waver, while early French victories caused it to almost disappear completely. Through the rest of the war, the only significant Native alliances with the British came from Tsalagihi (Cherokee) towns in present-day eastern Tennessee and from some Kanien’kehaka (Mohawk) in the Mohawk River Valley. The Tsalagi alliance was intermittent and fairly

36 Quotation from Pierre Pouchot, Memoir Upon the Late War in North America, between the French and English, 1755-60, ed. Franklin Benjamin Hough (Roxbury, MA: W. E. Woodward, 1866), 17.
brief, and ended when Virginia militia attacked a group returning from the north. This ignited a series of conflicts that soon devolved into what became known as the Anglo-Cherokee War (1758-1761) in the Blue Ridge Mountain region. The Kanien’kehaka alliance was more durable and based on a long association with Britain’s northern colonies, but it contributed to a schism within the Haudenosaunee—in which most communities determined to remain neutral or, like some western Onöndowága: (Seneca) and Tuscarora, temporarily aligned with the French.\(^37\)

A different array of scenarios played out to the west, where most groups that participated in the war did so in support of the French. This was most evident among the groups around Detroit, Michilimackinac, Sault St. Marie, and Green Bay where the strength of a century-old alliance with the French remained strongest. Within this common association, however, reasons for fighting against the British and their allies could vary between communities and individuals. They might stem from the anxious excitement of young men wanting to prove their mettle as warriors, a promise to raise a dead relative, an opportunity to acquire war prizes, loot, or prisoners, or an effort to strengthen the alliances that had been compromised in the past few decades by the attractions of British trade. In every case, however, the goal was to protect communities, strengthen their ties with allied groups, and weaken the British threat. Support for the French fit within these goals, but it did not necessarily amount to an outright allegiance to Onontio. As noted above, this support was tied to the desire for a return to previous conditions—in which these groups protected their independence while maintaining the mutual benefits of an old alliance.\(^38\)

Circumstances were more complex in the Ohio Valley, where the movements, interactions, and consolidations of various communities had not amounted to a broad alliance. In both the eastern and the western end of the Ohio Valley, Native communities made difficult but well-reasoned decisions that would best ensure their grandchildren and great-grandchildren would still know and live in the world of their forebears. In the early years of the war, however, the pursuit of common goals for broadly similar reasons often resulted in dissimilar actions. Indeed, conditions were so fluid and the magnitude of the war so great that Native communities had to constantly adapt their long-term objectives to dynamic circumstances. For instance, the Shawnee along the Ohio River, as well as the Shawnee and Lunaapeew around the Forks of the Ohio and the head of the Muskingum River, shifted their responses to the military actions of France and Great Britain several times between 1754 and 1756.\(^39\)

A brutal attack in 1752 by a French and American Indian force against a Myaamia town on the upper Wabash River, as punishment for trading with eastern Ohio Valley groups and the British, predisposed the Shawnee and Lunaapeew to distrust the French.\(^37\)

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\(^37\) Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 457-71; Timothy J. Shannon, “War, Diplomacy, and Culture: The Iroquois Experience in the Seven Years’ War,” in *Cultures in Conflict: The Seven Years’ War in North America*, ed. Warren R. Hofstra (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), 79-104. The alliance with the British also brought some Kanien’kehaka into conflict with their close kin who resided in Quebec, which marked a tragic rift within the collective identities of the Kanien’kehaka and the larger Haudenosaunee confederacy.


\(^39\) This and the following paragraph draw from Sami Lakomäki, *Gathering Together*, 63-69; and Barr, “‘A Road for Warriors’,” 1-36.
This was further confirmed by the construction of French forts to the southeast of Lake Erie two years later. These events made the communities around the Forks of the Ohio more inclined to support the British against the French, at least until the Albany Congress in the summer of 1754. When word reached the Ohio Valley that the Haudenosaunee had ceded the region to the British Colonies that were then preparing for war, most all of the groups in the region were aghast. In the end, a handful of Shawnee and Lunaaapeew supported an imperial power on just one meaningful occasion—when some from the Forks of the Ohio offered support to Braddock (who declined), and a few fought with the French. From this point forward, most remained neutral in the conflict between France and Great Britain.

The one partial exception to this broad-based neutrality came from Shawnee communities on the Ohio River. In 1752 a combined force of Shawnee and French attacked a British post at the site of Eskippakithiki, a former Shawnee town in what is now central Kentucky where Shawnee continued to hunt and guard against outsiders. Braddock’s dramatic defeat convinced these Shawnee, as well as their kin and Lunaaapeew allies to the north, that a nominal alliance with the French could bring weapons for more campaigns against new frontier settlements along the Appalachian Plateau. While these raids were directed against British subjects, they were part of a separate conflict that was not associated with the armies and allies of the French or British. Since any captives they caught were British, however, they were generally taken to the French at Detroit. While this did not make the Shawnee allies of the French, from the perspective of British officers it made them inveterate enemies of the Crown.

Attacks against isolated settlements would persist well beyond the end date of the Seven Years’ War, and contributed to an ongoing cycle of violent conflict between Long Knives and Shawnee. For the former, the experience of chronic “Indian Wars”—after the French and Indian War had ended—forged an identity based on securing a “good poor man’s country” through sacrifice, struggle, and bloodshed. The conflicts with squatters brought unity to the long-dispersed Shawnee—as well as deepened their connections to the Lunaaapeew and other groups that had migrated into the Ohio Valley. As Sami Lakomäki notes, “the decision of most Shawnees to defend their lands with arms marked a dramatic break from their century-old strategy of migration and dispersal in the face of an enemy invasion.” Having returned to their ancient homeland, it was the land itself that kept the Shawnees on the Ohio and made them choose fighting instead of retreating. ‘The God Who made all things gave us this Country and brought us through this Ground,’ explained the orator Missiweakiwa in 1760. He underlined how intimately the Shawnees had come to identify with their [ancient] homelands.

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40 This proved the case for a young boy from West Virginia named Adam Brown, who was adopted by a Wyandot family and given the name Tohunehowetu. He grew to become a leader in the Detroit area, and the namesake of the Wyandot village commonly known as Brownstown (aka Big Rock).
and renewed the connection between people and place that defined the Shawnee as a nation.\footnote{Lakomäki, \textit{Gathering Together}, 70-71.}

Far from the Forks of the Ohio or colonial settlements, a similar dynamic but different scenario developed in the areas to the west and south of Lake Michigan where the machinations of French and British generals remained a distant concern. French traders and \textit{coureurs de bois} with connections to Michilimackinac and Detroit resided throughout the region, but familiarity and kinship with these men did not necessarily translate into strong ties with Onontio. Significant conflict did occur, and key alliances were formed, but they related to regional concerns and involved no European power. In 1753, when George Washington met with Tanacharison some 570 miles to the east, an alliance of western Kiikaapoi (later known as the Prairie Kickapoo) and Mascouten, along with Mshkodésik Bodewadmi (Prairie Potawatomi) from the southern end of Lake Michigan and some Dakota, attacked the Peoria and forced them out of the upper Illinois Valley. In the early 1750s, eastern Kiikaapoi (later known as the Vermillion Kickapoo) allied with Myaamia from the Wabash River, Ojibwe from Chequamegon Bay, and Hoocqagra (Ho-Chunk) from Green Bay, to conquer their long-time enemies the Iliniwek (Illinois Confederation) and take over the rich prairie lands of what is now northern Illinois. These conflicts were both exacerbated and ended by disease outbreaks, and likely followed the patterns of a mourning war. Drawing on the obligations and protocols of Onontio, the French helped bring an end to this intermittent warfare by the time it had mostly run its course, and sought to recruit allies from the winning alliances to fight in the war with Great Britain. Gifts, diplomatic overtures, and expectations of victory proved effective and a new contingent of Native allies from the west headed to Montreal in 1757.\footnote{Robert Michael Morrissey, \textit{Empire by Collaboration: Indians, Colonists, and Governments in Colonial Illinois Country} (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015), 178-90; Matthew R. Garrett, “Kickapoo Foreign Policy, 1650-1830” (Masters thesis: University of Nebraska, 2006), 35-39; Philip C. Bellfy, \textit{Three Fires Unity: The Anishnaabeg of the Lake Huron Borderlands} (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2011), 29-33; Clifton, \textit{The Prairie People}, 97.}

The constellations of interests in the Ohio Valley and the Great Lakes reflected ancient associations between peoples and places, the alliances that formed during and after the Haudenosaunee wars of the 17\textsuperscript{th} century, and the more recent migrations to the lower Great Lakes and into the Ohio Valley. During the Seven Years’ War they further adjusted to pressures and solicitations from European powers, diminished trade, war campaigns, and the consequences of disease epidemics. The result was a reordering of the old alliance with Onontio into loose confederations that corresponded to four regional distinctions: the Ohio Valley; the Detroit River and the area between western Lake Erie and southern Lake Michigan; the areas to the west and south of Lake Michigan; and Anishinaabewaki (the region that stretched along lakes Huron and Superior)—which maintained close ties to the communities around Detroit as well as to the west of Lake Michigan. In some respects, the rise of multiple centers within the \textit{Pays d’en Haut} and the violent rivalry of two imperial powers ended the geographic and cultural bounds of what Richard White called the “Middle Ground.” Yet these developments more fully revealed the continuing dynamics that had always made the region a Native Ground rather than a territory of New France. Like the Shawnee, Myaamia, and Bodewadmi who
returned to their former homelands, and the Anishinaabeg who never left, the cultural geography that formed in the lead up to the Seven Years’ War reflected a partial restoration of the processes that preceded the epidemics and wars of the mid 17th century. The Seven Years’ War would further shape these developments, and foster new alliances among groups that came in closer proximity to each other. These changes would in turn provide the basis for subsequent Native alliances that rivaled, and in some respects exceeded, the old relationships with Onontio over the previous century.\footnote{Witgen makes a similar argument, with a particular emphasis on the Anishinaabeg of the northern Great Lakes; Witgen, \textit{Infinity of Nations}, 218-19.}

\textbf{The Dependencies of War}

Native alliances, with other Indigenous communities or an imperial power, were not immune to the transformative effects of the Seven Years’ War. This was especially true of those who fought with an imperial ally rather than pursued neutrality. With many warriors and families embarking for, returning from, and participating in various conflicts at different times of the year, the seasonal dynamics of village life were disrupted and Native allies became increasingly dependent on food, clothing and trade items. Some of these movements and the prizes carried home from battle took the place of former trade ventures, but the hardships and time away from home—as well as the deaths and injuries incurred—far exceeded any of the normal exertions associated with peace-time exchanges. The propensity of French and British officials to bestow commissions on war leaders also tended to undermine the balance of village politics. Civil leaders derived their authority through patient consensus building, and were largely responsible for matters related to village life, relations with other communities, and the creation or cultivation of peace agreements. Decisions about war were too urgent for consensus politics, however, and the increased authority that war leaders accrued as the Seven Years’ War persisted only deepened their communities’ involvement in a global conflict that reached far beyond their homelands. Yet these empowered leaders were also open to powerful threats if they did not support their French or English “Father”—who alternately pledged favors or destruction to gain support.\footnote{White, \textit{Middle Ground}, 240-43.}

War also created a dependency among European powers—especially the French. With few regular troops in North America and a relatively small militia, New France relied heavily on Native allies. Louis-Antoine de Bougainville, who achieved the rank of colonel during the Seven Years’ War, largely oversaw New France’s relations with American Indians. While he developed a remarkable understanding of the complexities of Native communities and proved attentive to the compromises and careful management that fostered an effective alliance, he did not relish the task. “One must be the slave to these [people], listen to them day and night, in council and in private …; besides which they are always wanting something for their equipment, arms, or toilet.” Logistics also proved difficult, especially if a campaign was delayed or if Native harvests had suffered from drought or been ruined in war. In either case, the French were required to lay off large staging areas for encampments as well as feed several thousand warriors and family members. All of this was an absolute necessity, however, since warfare in North America required the French to defer to Native understandings about routes, topography, strategic
positioning, and speedy assaults. “In this sort of warfare,” Bouganville observed “it is necessary to adjust to their ways.”

In the early years of the war, the French mostly fought with allies from the mission communities between Montreal and Quebec as well as Wyandot, Ojibwe, Odawa, and Bodéwadmi from the Detroit area. Following Braddock’s defeat, Ökwe’öwé (Seneca-Cayuga; aka, “Mingo”), Lunaapeew (Lenape, or Delaware) Shawnee, and others in the upper Ohio Valley aligned with the French, adopted neutrality or diverted their attentions to attacking the settlements of the Long Knives. None of these decisions were simple matters of picking a winning side by determining which way the wind was blowing. Rather, as noted previously, each represented a chance to keep at least one imperial power—in this case Great Britain—and its colonial subjects away from Native lands. Even if the same might become necessary with the French at a later date, in the mean time one effective alliance was much better than two powerful enemies. Over the next few years, Shawnee in what is now central and southern Ohio, Myaamia (Miami) from the Wabash and Maumee rivers, as well as groups from the west, north and south of Lake Michigan, entered in force against the British and Native allies of the British. Together they scored some key victories, including the capture of Fort Oswego in 1756, which allowed New France to control Lake Ontario. Raids against colonial settlements in Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia also brought the war to civilian populations, and made it clear that contesting and undoing the formal arrangements of land speculating companies, as well as the claims of the Haudenosaunee and Colonial governments, was central to the broader war.

Fort William Henry and the Natures of War

In the summer of 1757, 1,000 or more warriors and some of their families came from the Great Lakes and Ohio Valley to Montreal, where they were joined by an almost equal number of people from the St. Lawrence River area. All told, this force represented at least eighteen different Native groups that hailed from as far away as the Gaspé Peninsula and the upper Mississippi River. They soon assembled at Fort Carrillon near the southern end of Lake Champlain, along with an army of 6,000 French Regulars, Canadien militia, and volunteers. Their primary goal was Fort William Henry at the outlet of Lake George, which was defended by a force of 2,500 British Regulars, Colonial militia and volunteers.

46 Hinderaker, Elusive Empires, 32-33, 39, 44-45; Louis Antoine de Bouganville, Adventure in the Wilderness: The American Journals of Louis Antoine De Bougainville, 1756-1760, trans. and ed. Edward P. Hamilton (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1964), 39. The Bouganville quotation includes the term “savages,” which in the original French was rendered as “Sauvages.” It has been replaced by the bracketed reference to “people.” While the most direct translation of Bouganville’s reference would be “wild people,” it was hardly a neutral term—since it was applied broadly to all Indigenous peoples and clearly implied a universal inferiority to French and European “civilization.” More significantly, the term increasingly took on the qualities of a derogatory expletive with strong racialized overtones. The use of the term will not be used in this work, except on a few occasions when the hateful virulence of the word most fully represents the tenor of specific historical moments.

47 Steele, Betrayals, 194-200.

48 Renamed Fort Ticonderoga by the British in 1759.
In this and other campaigns, Native forces would collaborate with each other, manage their own actions, and largely remained separate from French encampments and positions—but their individual objectives were not that different from their French and Canadien allies or the British and colonial Americans they opposed. Like their non-American Indian counterparts and enemies, Indigenous warriors and the kin who supported them in the field fought for their communities and the alliances they had promised to uphold. Success in battle would also bring personal honor and elevated social status within their communities, while service in a war came with expected, and often much needed, material benefits. For soldiers, militiamen, and volunteers, this could come in the form of salaries, bounties, excused debts, sustenance in the field, and the opportunity to pillage. For American Indians, debts and cash payments were not part of the bargain, though better access to trade was expected. The primary material benefits from fighting with a European army came from supplies, food, and weapons, the opportunity to take prisoners (to “raise” the dead in their own communities or to ransom for a bounty), and the chance to pillage and then distribute the proceeds to their kin. There were profound distinctions between Native and European ideas about the conduct of war, but all fought with a similar mixture of loyalty, honor, and advancement.\(^49\)

By the end of July, all the elements of the French and Native alliance had arrived in the vicinity of Fort William Henry. Over the next few days the French built trenches, established artillery positions, and developed plans for a direct assault. Native forces and some militia patrolled supply and communication routes to and from Fort Edward, which lay just sixteen miles to the south, and established positions to prevent relief or escape. Once the siege was fully in place, French artillery opened fire on August 5. Over the next two days French artillery moved forward to a range of just a few hundred yards, inflicting heavy casualties and badly damaging the fort’s defenses. On August 8, the British displayed the white flag of surrender and the fighting ceased. Although the siege was brief and the victory lopsided, the French found it necessary to grant fairly generous conditions of surrender—largely because they were not in a position to hold approximately 2,300 prisoners and associated camp followers, and transport them by canoe and foot all the way to Montreal. Consequently, they agreed to administer an orderly withdrawal of British soldiers and colonial militiamen to Fort Edward, and allowed them to keep their muskets with the understanding that all would refrain from fighting for eighteen months. The French also promised to guard the initial withdrawal from the fort in the expectation that their Native allies would not wait to pillage the fort or harass the surrendering British—as had occurred the year before at Fort Oswego. One final condition of the surrender obligated the British to return all French war prisoners then in custody within three months.\(^50\)

The siege of Fort William Henry was an important victory, and it demonstrated the renewed strength of the old alliance with Onontio, but it also provides important insights into the separate meanings that the French and Native communities ascribed to


\(^{50}\) This and the following paragraph are based on Nester, *The First Global War*, 59-62; Steele, *Betrayals*, 110-115; Francis Jennings, *Empire of Fortune: Crowns, Colonies, and Tribes in the Seven Years’ War in America* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1990), 319-322.
the war with the British. Prior to carrying out the terms of the surrender, General Louis-Joseph de Montcalm met with Native leaders to apprise them of the conditions of surrender and elicit their agreement to prevent attacks on the departing prisoners. Though no specific accounts of these meetings exist, they may have encouraged a number of Native leaders to move their encampments further from the fort. However, the diversity of communities that had come to Fort William Henry, the various languages spoken, and the difficult histories that some had with each other, certainly worked against a common agreement or understanding about the British and French plans for an orderly surrender.

Even if Montcalm’s requests were heard understood by all, and assented to by every leader, they were still largely unenforceable. A trusted war leader determined strategy and tactics, and commanded respect, but he could not dictate the actions of individuals after a battle—particularly if they ran so counter to the basic precepts of Native warfare. For Europeans, formal surrender was a ritual that transformed warriors into non-combatants and drew on sacred notions of honor to limit the scale and conduct of warfare. To France’s Native allies, surrender was a form of cowardice and there were no rituals to make it otherwise. Of course warfare itself was bounded by ritual, but for Native peoples in the mid 18th century—and for countless generations before—these were rituals that transformed a father, son, or spouse into a warrior who committed acts of violence that were not permissible in the context of domestic and village life. To return to what might be called a civil state, and thus end participation in direct warfare, required a cleansing ritual. As the British prepared to leave, however, Native fighters were still in a state of war with people who only sought their destruction. Worse still, most of the opportunities for war honors, prisoners, and plunder were about to leave with them. If these warriors were British or French soldiers who had risked much but denied their pay, they might have mutinied. Instead, most simply continued with their basic conceptions of war. As one Ojibwe man later protested to Governor Vaudreuil, “I make war for plunder, scalps, and prisoners. You are satisfied with a fort, and you let your enemy and mine live. I do not want to keep such bad meat for tomorrow. When I kill it, it can no longer attack me.”

The events that have come to be known as the Fort William Henry Massacre began on the evening of the 8th, as the British garrison was transferred to the entrenched confines of the French camp. As this process was underway, Native warriors plundered the fort of tools, kettles, baggage, unsecured provisions, horses, bedding, and a host of other items. Lives and scalps were also taken when a number of patients who were either too sick or too badly wounded to leave the fort were killed in the infirmary. Alarmed by these developments, Montcalm sought to move the British prisoners under the cover of darkness rather than wait until morning. However, this activity brought crowds of warriors who were either confused by or displeased with this large aggregation of British and French soldiers preparing to march away together.

The hasty departure was called off, and French guards were able to maintain order on the perimeter of the camp until early morning. As the prisoners and their guards began

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52 This and the following two paragraphs are based on Steele, *Betrayals*, 129-133, 144, 203-205, 312-22; Nester, *First Global War*, 59-64. Steele quotation on pp. 204-05.
to assemble and then leave the French encampment, however, they became more vulnerable to harassment from growing crowds of American Indians. Weapons, clothing, and personal items were grasped at and snatched away from departing British soldiers and militiamen, while some who struggled against this treatment were grabbed and taken away or killed on the spot. As the more loosely organized camp followers passed, a number of women and children were taken as well—most likely as potential adoptees or sources of ransom. The tenor of this gauntlet intensified as the end of the column prepared to leave the French encampment. A rush of people moved into the emptied camp to plunder the excess baggage that had been left behind, while others turned their attention to the Kanien’kehaka (Mohawk), Stockbridge-Munsee, and Mahican allies of the British as well as the African-American soldiers, servants and slaves who were concentrated at the end of the British line. More easily surrounded than the groups that preceded them, many were taken captive. Nearly all of the American Indians who were with the British came from groups that were enemies of those allied with the French, and were almost certainly taken away for torture and death. The slaves, however, were taken as prisoners to be ransomed.

As the line of prisoners moved down the road, continued harassment and the tumult that could be heard from the rear, caused many to break from the column and run “away in a confused and irregular manner.” Many were quickly run down by Native warriors and thus began “the ‘massacre’ [which], as Ian Steele notes, “lasted for only a few moments, and then became a chase for prisoners. The French commanders tried to protect the English by bargaining, by harboring those who escaped, and even by confiscating them from their captors.” Of those taken during the march from the French encampment outside of Fort William Henry, Montcalm gathered and sent approximately 500 to Fort Edward. Another 200 captives were eventually ransomed to the French at Montreal over the next several months and returned to the British. When official reports were finally completed, the number of people who were known to have been killed, captured and not returned, or otherwise unaccounted for ranged from 69 to 184 individuals. The number was likely somewhere in between, which fairly matches the official tally of 130 British casualties (killed or wounded) from the three-day siege.

The victory at Fort William Henry marked a high point in the French and American Indian alliance during the Seven Years’ War, and the array of Native groups present at the siege likely surpassed anything that had occurred over the previous century. Yet the events that followed the siege proved a significant turning point in the alliance and the war. The terms of surrender, and French interference with the taking of prisoners and plunder, deeply confused and disappointed many in the Native alliance. Most departed almost immediately, including groups from the western Great Lakes who had come 500 miles, participated in a great victory, and had less to show for their efforts than they expected. These disappointments did not necessarily preclude a future alliance, but the likelihood was further diminished by an outbreak of smallpox that may have come from exposure to afflicted soldiers in the fort’s infirmary and/or from sickened individuals encountered in Montreal. As Native groups returned home they became unwitting vectors of the disease—which took an especially heavy toll on the Bodéwadmi
along the St. Joseph River, the Odawa at Waganakising (L’Arbe Croche), and the Ojibwe at Michilimackinac.53

Figure 3.4: Seven Years’ War in North America. The broad scale and diversity of interests that defined the war are depicted in the territorial claims of France and Great Britain, that location of Indigenous groups and the number of forts in the eastern Pays d’en Haut as well as the Haudenosaunee homeland. Map is an updated and edited version of a National Park Service map entitled Indian Nations and French and British Forts 1754-1760.

The End of New France

As smallpox persisted among Great Lakes communities through 1758, and many viewed the French and the war as the source of the disease, military alliances with New France’s strongest allies failed to materialize. A series of bad harvests also caused widespread hunger among the habitants (small farmers, as well as laborers and tradespeople) along the Saint Lawrence River, and undermined efforts to supply forts or field campaigns. As the French war effort stalled in North America, the British strengthened their position. Under the direction of William Pitt (who served as the Leader of the House of Commons and the Secretary of State), more troops and expenditures were devoted to North America while British allies in Europe were supported with money and weapons to keep the French military tied down on the Continent. Along with repairing strained relations with colonial governments that chafed at the perceived arrogance and

unreasonable demands of British officials, Pitt authorized new efforts to establish trade relations with some of New France’s Native allies. This latter effort proved successful with the more neutral or anti-French Ökwe'öwé (Seneca-Cayuga; aka, “Mingo”), Lunaaapeew (Lenape, or Delaware), and Shawnee at the Forks of the Ohio River—who provided the British with much needed support during the capture of Fort Duquesne (renamed Fort Pitt) in October 1758. Followed by the successful siege of Fort Niagara in July 1759 by a combined force of British regulars, militia, and Haudenosaunee, Montreal was effectively cut off from the Ohio Valley and the Great Lakes. By the following year the French capitulated, and colonists from New Hampshire to South Carolina “rejoic[ed] … on the Reduction of Canada … as [proud] Briton[s].”

The way that Britons understood the battle and its aftermath perfectly encapsulated their worst ideas about “Gallic [French] perfidy” and “[American Indian] Furies.” While the Kingdom of France was the perennial, indispensable enemy of Great Britain, in America the French represented a kind of vile depravity that must be destroyed or held at bay. The British colonies in America were more emphatically Protestant than the British Isles, and readily condemned the “popery” of the Catholic French—with their “idolatrous superstitions,” the “cruel and bloody zeal of [their] bigoted Priests,” and the Jesuit missionaries who preached “their monstrous tenets” to Indigenous communities. As the political writer “Philanthropos” argued in 1754, tolerating such people and their alliances in North America would make every British colonist an “accessory to … intolerable Evils.”

The depravity of Catholicism was also evident in the growing number of Métis children, which British observers viewed as proof that French men were licentious, their Native wives amoral and opportunistic, and the “mixed” children they produced a corrupt form of humanity. The military alliances between New France and Native groups were worse still, since they reflected an otherwise civilized nation’s pact with the Native “devils” that were proving a fearsome scourge to new western settlements in Britain’s northern and southern colonies. These characterizations were not universally felt or applied, but they readily explained why defeats like Fort William Henry occurred. Only duplicity and dishonor, and an unwillingness of the French to control their Native allies, could overcome the fort’s noble defenders. The combination of French faults and Native depravities also explained the French and Indian War as a righteous campaign to gain possession of lands that French and American Indians claimed, and thus secure the continent and the future progress of humanity. This trio of land, imperial villain, and Native “fury” had also been used to explain smaller wars that dated back to the early 1700s in New England and the Carolinas, and it would remain central to the spate of much larger wars in the Ohio Valley and Great Lakes region over the next two generations.

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57 Silver, Our Savage Neighbors, 121-124.
Chapter Four

“Our Brethren the English”:

Revitalization, Revolution, and the Persistence of War in the Ohio Valley

This chapter details the reformulation of Native alliances in the Ohio Valley and the Great Lakes Region after the Seven Years’ War and through the American Revolution. This was a dynamic and difficult period in which groups from the eastern Ohio Valley drew closer with groups around western Lake Erie, the upper Great Lakes, and the western Ohio Valley. Caught in chronic war and conflict with settler communities, a broad alliance formed and strengthened into the post-revolutionary period. The groups around western Lake Erie, particularly along the Detroit River, would translate their central position within the French-Native alliance into and beyond this new era.

In the Ohio Valley, the period between the siege of Fort William Henry and the formal end of the Seven Years’ War (1763) was punctuated by peace initiatives as well as threats of renewed conflict. This uncertain environment reflected a number of key concerns, as well as the complex dynamics of Native communities in the region. For the British, early overtures of peace grew from the desire to remove potential allies of New France from the larger conflict. The motives of various Native leaders were more complex, and reflected the various experiences that particular groups had with the British, the French, and each other. The first successful peace agreement occurred with the Treaty of Easton in October 1758, and mostly involved representatives of the Haudenosaunee as well as Ökwe'öwé (Seneca-Cayuga; aka, “Mingo”), Lunaapeew (Lenape, or Delaware), and Shawnee from the upper Ohio River. After the British agreed to return lands in Pennsylvania that had been taken in 1737 without consulting with the Grand Council at Onönda'ge'ga' (Onondaga), the Haudenosaunee renewed their formal alliance with the King of Great Britain. The Ökwe'öwé (Seneca-Cayuga; aka, “Mingo”), Lunaapeew (Lenape, or Delaware), and Shawnee who balked at an alliance with the British in 1754 and allied with the French during a British attack on Fort Duquesne in 1755, reaffirmed their earlier neutrality but made it clear that they favored a new British attack that would remove Fort Duquesne from their lands.

The Western Lunaapeew (aka Western or Ohio Delaware) and Shawnee who lived along the middle Ohio River were also part of the treaty proceedings, but they deeply distrusted the British. The Lunaapeew leader Ackowanothio spoke for these communities at the treaty council, and railed against the “parcel of covetous Gentlemen

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1 This translated phrase was repeatedly used by Teedyuscung, an orator and civil leader among the eastern Lunaapeew (Lenape, or Delaware), at the Treaty of Easton in 1758; Minutes of the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania, from the Organization to the Termination of the Proprietary Government, vol. VIII (Harrishburg: Theo. Fenn & Co., 1852), 47-49.
from Virginia, called the Ohio Company” as well as the “many … abuses we suffered from our Brethren the English” for several years. Consequently, the treaty did not amount to an alliance with the British so much as a truce—and peace would have to be conditioned on the British forsaking any efforts to “take our Lands on the Ohio, or the West side of the Allegeny Hills.”3 While all Native leaders at the treaty council were in complete agreement on this last point, the western Lunaapeew and Shawnee communities along the Muskingum River were not represented. Their leaders still hoped the French could serve as a counterweight to the British, and they—along with their kin on the Ohio River—were still committed to future attacks against any would-be colonial settlements in present-day West Virginia or northeastern Kentucky.4

Many groups to the west remained connected to the French, at least until the fall of Quebec in November 1759, but then turned their attentions to diplomacy with the British. In August 1760, just a few weeks before the fall of Montreal and the French surrender of Canada, a large number of Wyandot, Odawa, Ojibwe, Bodéwadmi, Myaamia (Miami), and Kiikaapoi (Kickapoo) from the Detroit area and western Lake Erie as well as the Wabash River then travelled to Fort Pitt where they joined with Ōkwē’ōwē (Seneca-Cayuga; aka, “Mingo”), Lunaapeew, Shawnee and others in a nine-day conference with the British. All told, the gathering of American Indians totaled more than 1,000. No treaties were affirmed, but the British agreed to restore trade relations in the Ohio Country and the Great Lakes. As Colin Calloway notes, this was a matter of grave importance for all the Native representatives. Because war had “disrupted normal economic patterns, American Indian communities became increasingly dependent on British or French allies to provide them with food, clothing, and trade, which rendered the end of the war all the more catastrophic.” Along with trade, the British agent George Croghan also assured the various nations that their lands would be respected so long as they remained “faithful allies.”5

These matters were formally reiterated in the Articles of Capitulation signed by General Jeffrey Amherst and Governor General Marquis de Vaudreuil at Montreal in August 1760. Along with agreements to protect the rights, religious practices, and property of Britain’s new French-speaking subjects, Amherst also agreed that “Indian allies [of New France] shall be maintained in the Lands they inhabit; if they choose to remain there; they shall not be disturbed on any pretense whatsoever, for having taken arms, and served his most Christian Majesty.”6 A few months later Croghan travelled to Detroit to represent the terms of the Capitulation, and received what he described as a positive reception. “The Indians in several speeches made me,” he wrote in his journal, “expressed their satisfaction at exchanging their Fathers the French for their Brethren the

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5 Calloway, One Vast Winter Count, 337.
English, who they” viewed as a more reliable source of “necessaries.” The use of the word “Brethren” and its implication of a filial rather than a father-child relationship is telling, and it is the same term that Croghan and the British made sure to use when addressing Native leaders. With Onontio gone, it implied a trade relationship between the British and particular communities rather than a broad alliance that was centered on a common relationship with an imperial Father.7

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7 Quotation is from “A Selection of George Croghan’s Letters and Journals Relating to Tours into the Western Country—November 16, 1750—November, 1765,” in Early Western Travels, 1748-1846, vol. 1, ed. Ruben Gold Thwaites (Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark Company, 1904), 104. At various times Croghan was a fur trader, a land speculator, a rival of George Washington in the Ohio country, a judge in Pittsburgh, a respected advisor among the Haudenosaunee, and the husband of Takarihoga (Catherine) who was the daughter of a Kanien’kehaka (Mohawk) leader. In the 1750s and 1760s he served as Deputy Indian Agent under Sir William Johnson, the British Superintendent of Indian Affairs for the Northern District. Also see Anderson, Crucible of War, 25-30 and passim; Parmenter, Pontiac’s War, 620-24; and Middleton, Pontiac’s War, 12-13.
The councils at Easton and Detroit, as well as the meetings Croghan and other British officials held with American Indian communities at Michilimackinac, the western Ohio Valley, and the western Great Lakes, reflected a social and cultural geography that had developed over the previous generation and would persist into the 1780s. Not surprisingly the initial and long-term responses to these early British overtures corresponded to the location and composition of the various population centers of “the western nations,” as the British referred to the peoples of the Ohio Valley and the Great Lakes. For instance, the Bodéwadmi, Ojibwe, Odawa and Wyandot who lived around Detroit viewed the prospect of peaceful relations with the British in the context of their central position in the now ended alliance with Onontio. Though cautious, they intended to shape a new relationship along similar lines. The same was true of the Ökwe’öwé (Seneca-Cayuga; aka, “Mingo”), Lunapeeew (Lenape, or Delaware) Shawnee groups that had moved into the Ohio Valley from the east and southeast. All had developed or strengthened preexisting ties with one another, and shared a resentment of French militarization as well as a distrust of British interests in their lands. This ambivalence was at the root of all these groups’ neutrality at the onset of the war, as well as the shifts that some communities made independently toward a French or British alliance. The end of the war and the possibility of peaceful relations with the British was a hopeful development, but none were willing to forfeit their lands to Long Hunters and squatters from east of the mountains. Lastly, groups from south and west of Lake Michigan hedged any commitments to British entreaties with the possibility of increased trade with the French and Spanish to the south.\(^8\)

A War without France

Not long after the peoples of the Great Lakes and Ohio Valley spoke of peace with their new “brothers,” a series of false steps and unfulfilled expectations caused relations to sour. An early sign of trouble took formidable shape at the Forks of the Ohio, where the British transformed the ruins of Fort Duquesne into Fort Pitt between 1759 and 1761. With French officials and troops having returned to France after the capitulation, the purpose of the new fort seemed to have just one purpose: to assert military authority over Native lands and communities. Despite British protests to the contrary, the construction, reconstruction, and reoccupation of another twelve forts by 1762 indicated otherwise. While most of these facilities also served as administrative centers and trade houses, the structures and the troops they housed were also intended to keep order between colonists and Native communities. But with so many of the latter building the new settlement of Pittsburgh, for instance, “order” looked like “invasion” to the

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Ökwe'öwé (Seneca-Cayuga; aka, “Mingo”) leader Gayusuta, who began advocating for war against the British as early as 1761.9

The new and rebuilt forts were galling to people who were as disturbed by French forts in 1753 as were British colonial officials and representatives of the Ohio Company. At worst, they represented an instrument of future conquest; at best, they were administrative centers for settlers. If they functioned well as trade centers and places of diplomacy they might have been welcomed, but on this score they failed. The reasons are two-fold. Great Britain had defeated France in North America, but at great cost, and heavy war expenditures were still accruing from the conflicts in Europe and other parts of the globe. Consequently, victory in America meant new taxes for the colonies and a reduction in the kind of expensive gift giving that had always been central to Native diplomacy. Jeffrey Amherst, who served both as Major General of British forces and the Royal Governor of Virginia, found virtue in the diminished resources of the military’s Indian Department. Infuriated by the events at Fort William Henry, the General had a particular loathing for all Native peoples and had neither patience nor concern for their diplomatic protocols. To him, empires required strong governance—not negotiations and gifts. Moreover, as Colin Calloway notes, Amherst reasoned that “British traders entered Indian villages to turn a quick profit, not for exchange between allies. Dispensing with gifts would make trade more cost-effective.” Toward these ends, Amherst banned all gift giving and placed restrictions on what and how much American Indians could acquire in trade.10

While Amherst believed these measures would make Native communities more enterprising and resourceful, he was frequently warned that parsimony would prove more costly than diplomatic largesse. For American Indians, trade and diplomacy were not transactional; they were relational, and required constant renewal through reciprocation. Moreover, presents were expected as a kind of rent—or gift of appreciation—for residing on another’s lands. These were matters that Sir William Johnson, the Superintendent of Indian Affairs clearly understood, and he knew they were beyond Amherst’s experience or comprehension. Yet he sought to convey their necessity in terms that Amherst would understand. “A little generosity & moderation will tend more to the good of His Majesty’s Indian interest than the reverse, which would raise their jealousy much more than it is now.” Among other things, Johnson recommended that gunpowder be more readily available for trade, and at fair prices. Poor hunts partly stemmed from not having enough of this resource, which contributed to and compounded a year of hunger and sickness. All of this Johnson knew from traders’ reports and his own interactions with Native leaders, and he warned Amherst that “refusing them now will increase their jealousy and make them all very uneasy I am certain, this Sir, I think my duty to make known to you.” Amherst ignored the advice, and the continued restrictions confirmed what Johnson already knew and feared. Withholding gifts from people in need, building forts and settlements in their territory, and restricting their ability to trade for gunpowder,

could lead to only one conclusion within Native communities: the British were preparing
to conquer them and take their lands.\footnote{\textit{Nester}, \textit{Haughty Conquersors}, 8-14; quotation from p. 10.}

These sentiments were widespread across the Ohio Valley and beyond, but they
were felt most acutely by the communities around the Forks of the Ohio and the eastern
end of Lake Erie—where the British had occupied or reconstructed a chain of four forts
from Fort Presque Isle to Fort Pitt. The western Onöndowágá: (Seneca), Ökwe'öwé
(Seneca-Cayuga; aka, “Mingo”), Lunaaapeew (Lenape, or Delaware), and Shawnee who
lived in this area had long familiarity with the British and were certainly the most hard-
pressed by new colonial settlements. Leaders in these communities were particularly
alarmed by General Amherst’s departure from past relations with Native communities,
and were convinced of an imminent British conquest. Not surprisingly, the seeds of a new
war against the British came from the people in this region.\footnote{This section is closely based on the following sources: Dowd, \textit{War Under Heaven}; David Dixon, \textit{Never Come to Peace Again: Pontiac's Uprising and the Fate of the British Empire in North America} (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2005); Middleton, \textit{Pontiac's War}; McConnell, \textit{A Country Between}; and Calloway, \textit{Scratch of a Pen}.}

Pan-Regional Alliance and the Master of Life

In early 1761, Guyasuta (who had escorted George Washington to Fort Duquesne
some eight years earlier) and a western Onöndowágá: war leader named Tahaiadoris
developed a complex strategy that would combine the alliances that had fought with the
French to force the British back to the eastern side of the Alleghenies. Their plan would
focus on four different areas and involved distinct groups. In the west, the Odawa,
Bodéwadmi, Wyandot and Ojibwe would combine forces to take Fort Detroit, kill the
garrison, and seize the large stores of trade goods and weapons. The Lunaaapeew,
Shawnee and Myaamia (Miami) who lived to the south and west of the Forks of the Ohio
were to attack forts Ligonier and Bedford to cut off support to Fort Pitt. To the north,
Ökwe'öwé and Onöndowágá: (Seneca) warriors would capture forts Presque Isle, Le
Boeuf, and Venango to seize more trade goods and weaponry as well as sever
connections between Fort Pitt and Lake Erie. Lastly, the plan called for Onöndowágá and
other communities within the Haudenosaunee to ensure that no materials or
communications moved through their territory from Fort Niagara, the Mohawk Valley,
and Fort Oswego to Fort Pitt. This last element of the plan would work like a vast
regional siege that would ultimately force the British to surrender forts Niagara and Pitt
without a fight.\footnote{This and the following paragraph are based on Middleton, \textit{Pontiac's War}; 34-37.}
Neolin, a Lunaapeew prophet who lived in the same cluster of multi-ethnic villages as Guyasuta.

Neolin came to prominence among the Lunaapeew in 1760, after a period of fasting and dreaming that opened him to a vision from the Master of Life (the supreme deity that had called all of creation into being). He was taught the reason for Native sufferings, and given a set of teachings that would revitalize the Lunaapeew. Loss of lands and generations of migration had caused the Lunaapeew and other Native groups to lose sight of the original gifts from the Creator. Moreover, their dependence on European goods had caused them to forget the lessons the First People learned about how to live in the world. The worst and most widespread example of these failings was manifested in Achgiuchsowagan (drunkenness). Instead of prayer, fasting, and ritual, people turned to alcohol or “spirits” to achieve an altered (but corrupted) state of consciousness that quickly turned to anger, violence, or an empty stupor. Because alcohol was acquired from Europeans, and purchased with the skins of animals that were killed for trade, it was a moral, cultural, and spiritual sin. The animals the creator had made to sustain his people were squandered in bouts of inebriation, and thus the land and its people were impoverished while the Europeans gained.14

Such failings could be prevented by a return to the “Good Road,” but they could have no lasting effect so long as white people continued to proliferate on lands that the Creator had made for American Indians. Indeed, their growing presence threatened to destroy Native peoples and the lands that sustained them, and their assortment of trade goods, liquor, and low morals were preventing the Lunaapeew from following the “Good Road” that ultimately led to a peaceful afterlife with their departed kin. To revitalize their communities and return to the “Good Road,” the Master of Life told Neolin that his people must renew older traditions, hunt for subsistence and not trade, and foreshow European tools, materials, and ways of living. A commitment to self-sufficiency was not enough, however. Native communities needed to follow prescribed prayers and rituals to align their actions with the rhythms and harmonies of Creation, and they needed to keep Europeans off of the lands that the Master of Life had prepared for them.15

Neolin’s message was not unlike those of Lunaapeew prophets in previous decades, and it shared many features with the teachings of a Shawnee prophet in the 1730s. This is not to say that Neolin borrowed or repurposed messages that he may have heard previously. Rather, his vision and teachings shared in a common and often recurring process that anthropologists have termed “revitalization,” or “revitalization movements”—in which a community actively reinvigorates inherited traditions to guide their actions and return to a peaceful afterlife with their kin.

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15 Cave, *Prophets of the Great Spirit*, 37-44. The fullest written presentation of Neolin’s teachings comes from a speech by Obwandiyag (Pontiac) at Detroit, which was most likely transcribed and translated by Robert Navarre; see *Journal of Pontiac’s Conspiracy*, 1763, trans. R. Clyde Ford and ed. M. Agnes Burton (Detroit: Clarence Monroe Burton Under the Auspices of the Michigan Society of the Colonial Wars, 1912). This publication includes a French and English version, respectively titled “Journal ou Dictation d’une Conspiration, Faite par les Sauvages contre les Anglais, et du Siège du Fort de Detroix par Quatre Nations Différentes le 7 Mai, 1763,” and “Journal of a Conspiracy, of the Indians against the English, and of the siege of Fort Detroit by Four Different Nations (beginning) May 7, 1763.”
its adaptations during a period of profound change or challenge. The conditions of the present necessarily become embedded in these movements, and Neolin’s vision certainly reflected in the broad conditions of Native alliances, war with non-American Indians, and the chronic displacements of the Lunaapeew over several generations. His message, which was primarily directed to his fellow Lunaapeew and neighboring communities, would resonate far beyond the Forks of the Ohio because it corresponded to the experiences of so many other groups. Through the western regions, nearly every community shared the same travails described by Neolin, and many would find merit in the Master of Life’s admonishment that Native peoples should treat each other as relatives, foreswear war with each other, and instead “drive off” the British.

There is no written evidence that suggests Guyasuta or Tahaiadoris were inspired by Neolin, but they contributed to spreading his message. In the spring and early summer of 1761 they circulated belts of red and black wampum calling for war, and traveled to communities across the Ohio Valley. They were especially interested in having a conference with the Odawa, Wyandot, Bedéwadmi, and Ojibwe around Detroit, but were politely rebuffed. Although the British occupation of Fort Detroit would prove to be the largest military force in the old Pays d’en Haut—it was too recent to be intrusive and still seemed to hold promise as an important trade center. Similar assessments occurred in the Ohio Valley, and responses to the entreaties of Guyasuta and Tahaiadoris were not as warm as they hoped. However, over the next year and half—as Amherst’s policies became aggravating and insulting—a number of communities began to reconsider. This change of view was also invigorated by messages from Louisiana that Onontio would return and drive the British back over the Alleghenies. War belts were again sent to the Detroit area in the summer of 1762, where a conference was held at the main Odawa village with representatives from the communities around Lake Superior, Green Bay, and the Wabash River. The formal decision of the council was to decline the war belt at this time, but to “be on their Guard and watch the motions of the English for the future.”

Obwandiyag and the Detroit Council Fire

By the time the Lunaapeew war belt reached the Detroit River Odawa in April 1763, much had changed. The Treaty of Paris was signed in February, and word soon

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16 The Odawa elder Ki-je Omashkooz (Great Elk) offered a fine explanation of revitalization movements and their ongoing significance. “Sure. That’s exactly what I mean by ‘revitalization.’ Over time, our traditions have been jeopardized –both by other people and our own digressions –and we’ve lost sight of who we are as a community. It's our moral responsibility to correct this. We once were a very vital and cohesive community, but for a time we weren't. For many reasons, we didn't practice our traditional ways, either because the government denied us the right or simply because we ourselves either forgot them or didn't care. But we have a lot more confidence now and are basically much stronger. We've been part of this place for a long, long time and neither we nor others should forget or ignore that.” Quotation in Melissa Pflüg, *Ritual and Myth in Odawa Revitalization: Reclaiming a Sovereign Place* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998), 23. The literature on revitalization is extensive, but see Scott L. Pratt, “Native American Thought and the Origins of Pragmatism,” *Ayaangwaamizin: The International Journal of Indigenous Philosophy* 1 (Spring 1997), 55-80; and Duane Champagne, *Social Change and Cultural Continuity Among Native Nations* (Lanham: Altamira Press, 2007).


Chapter Four

spread that the King had abandoned New France and—without consulting French or
Native residents—had forfeited all territorial rights to the British. By this time Amherst’s
policies had become more onerous, and hunger more rampant. Neolin’s teachings had
also become more widespread, and found a particularly strong adherent in an Odawa war
leader named Obwandiyag (Pontiac)—who likely met the prophet while enroute to Fort
Duquesne and, later, Fort Pitt. At the 1763 council regarding the latest war belt, the
leaders of the Bodéwadmi and Wyandot were receptive but Obwandiyag proved the most
forceful. After reviewing the wide-ranging plans of Guyasuta and Tahaiadoris, he quoted
Neolin’s vision to argue that the time had come to “drive off your lands those dogs
clothed in red [the British] who will do you nothing but harm.” War, in short, was a
necessary component of revitalization and Neolin’s vision gave a spiritual and
ideological framework for aligning with others to defend, protect, and properly utilize a
common homeland. The council ended with an agreement to attack Fort Detroit, and
Obwandiyag sent messengers with black and red belts to his Ojibwe relatives at Saginaw
Bay, the Odawa at Michilimackinac, and the Ojibwe on the Thames River.

With support from the communities along the Detroit River, and positive
responses to all of his war belts, Obwandiyag had sufficient numbers and support to take
and hold Fort Detroit. Trusting that groups further east were well apprised of the plan
drawn up by Guyasuta and Tahaiadoris, and not wanting to lose the element of surprise,
Obwandiyag chose to move on the fort before sending messages about his decision to the
eastern groups. Under the guise of requesting a meeting with the commanding officer,
Obwandiyag planned to enter the fort on May 7 while his entourage secreted weapons
inside the stockade. On a given signal, the garrison would be attacked and captured, and
the trade stores looted. The French habitants were also advised to stay away from the fort
that day, but this neighborly consideration may have undermined the plan. On the night
of May 6 attack, however, Major Gladwin, the commanding officer, was warned of the
scheme. The following morning Obwandiyag found the garrison under arms, his
entourage was detained at the gate, and—though he and Gladwin pretended to engage in
a cordial encounter—the first stage of the attack plan was foiled. With the element of
surprise gone and a frontal assault out of the question, Obwandiyag chose to establish
what he hoped would be a short-lived siege. As word of the siege went out, the plans of
Guyasuta and Tahaiadoris quickly unfolded across the Ohio Valley. Within weeks,
various combinations of Bodéwadmi, Myaamia, Wyandot, and Odawa took forts
Sandusky, St. Joseph, and Miami—in two instances employing the same ruse that
Obwandiyag intended to use at Detroit. On June 2, a force of Kiikaapoi, Mascouten and
Waayahtahtanwa (Wea) took Fort Ouiatenon (near present-day Lafayette, Indiana), while
Ojibwe at Michilimackinac took the British fort there.

Obwandiyag, which is roughly pronounced as Bwon-tee-ak, refers to the blade or fluke that holds a
canoe’s anchor in place.

Dowd, War Under Heaven, 87-92; Middleton, Pontiac’s War, 66-70. Quotation is from Journal of
Pontiac’s Conspiracy, 81.

Middleton, Pontiac’s War, 71-76. All of the British forts taken by Indigenous warriors in 1763 originally
served as French trading posts and military installations. Aside from the brief siege of Fort Ouiatenon,
which ended without single shot being fired, the other engagements involved significant British casualties
who gave way to overwhelming force.
By the middle of June, Forts Le Boeuf, Venango, and Presque Isle all fell to forces that included various combinations of Onöndowága: (Seneca), Ökwe'öwé (Seneca-Cayuga; aka, “Mingo”), Lunaapeew (Lenape, or Delaware), Shawnee, Odawa, Ojibwe, and Wyandot. Only forts Detroit, Niagara, and Pitt remained in British hands, and all were under siege. If the planned ruse of Obwandiyag had worked, the entire west would have been free of the British and more warriors made available for the two sieges in the east. Yet even with that glitch, the original plans for the war had unfolded almost perfectly. Moreover, Native peoples had demonstrated to themselves that—even without French support—they could come together in an alliance and defeat the British military. And with forts destroyed and garrisons under siege, encroaching settlements could be attacked, their residents killed or captured to atone for Native deaths, and the fleeing survivors sent back to where they had come from.  

In late July, during a lull in the siege of Fort Pitt, Lunaapeew leaders Shingas and Agassqua (Turtle’s Heart) conveyed this confidence in a parley with the commanding officer Captain Ecuyer. “You yourselves are the cause of this [war]. You marched your armies into our country, and built forts here, though we told you, again and again, that we wished you to remove. My Brothers, this land is ours, and not yours.... If you leave this place immediately, and go home to your wives and children, no harm will come of it; but if you stay, you must blame yourselves alone for what may happen. Therefore we desire you to remove.” Colonel Henry Bouquet understood the reasons for Native confidence. British losses that summer were staggering; by fall they numbered as many as 400 soldiers killed with many more wounded, and at least 2,000 civilians killed or captured. Summarizing the events of the year, he noted that the loss of so many forts and “continual ravages of the enemy, struck all America with consternation, and depopulated a great part of our frontiers .... [T]hose posts, suddenly wrested from us, which had been the great object of the late war, and one of the principal advantages acquired in the peace. Only the forts of Niagara, the Detroit, and Pitt remained in our hands, of all that had been purchased with so much blood and treasure.”

The sense of resignation in Bouquet’s summary was really a prelude to fury. In this sentiment, as in much else, he was of one mind with General Amherst—who was apoplectic. “Immediate and total vengeance [must be taken] upon all Indians in every encounter,” Amherst steamed to a subordinate on July 3, “and that no mercy whatever be shown to these perfidious barbarians. They must be destroyed utterly as an example for any others who might hope to follow the pattern they have set.” With no good news on the horizon, and with American Indians in close proximity to the besieged forts, Amherst wrote Bouquet asking “could it not be contrived to send the small pox among those disaffected tribes of Indians? We must … use every stratagem in our power to reduce them.” Bouquet agreed to “try to inoculate the bastards with some blankets” from a

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24 *Historical Account of Bouquet’s Expedition Against the Ohio Indians in 1764* (Cincinnati: The Robert Clarke Company, 1907), 6.
smallpox ward, but Captain Ecuyer had already implemented the idea in late June when Shingas and Agassqua first came to the fort and offered to let the garrison depart.  

“Out of our regard to them,” one of Ecuyer’s officers noted in his journal for June 24, “we gave them two Blankets and a Handkerchief out of the Small Pox Hospital.” Whether this action created an epidemic is not clear, and it is worth noting that the “gift” did not sicken Shingas or Agassqua. Yet it is likely they gave the items to others who desired them, and perhaps unwittingly spread the disease. While scholars have long debated the plausibility of such a means of transmission, and most scientific evidence suggests it is very unlikely, a smallpox epidemic did spread through Native communities in the summer of 1763—including those that had besieged Fort Pitt. In either case, the episode is meaningful for the intentions it reveals and its affinity with actions that are now deemed “war crimes” and “crimes against humanity.” Under current international laws, at least, the British might be charged with “intent to commit mass murder.”

Disease and a shortage of supplies weakened Native war efforts in the fall, while ongoing sieges prevented people from returning to their villages to harvest, hunt, and put up winter stores. Through the winter the war entered stalemate, and by spring the ability to wage war had diminished greatly. The alliance, which came together through the agreements of different communities, began to unravel when some contemplated a separate peace. As early as February, William Johnson began preliminary peace talks with the Chenusso Onôndowága (Western Seneca) at Johnson Hall on his large estate in Johnstown, New York. By summer, some Shawnee communities withdrew from the war while other groups that would have been open to peace councils were forced to defend against two British military expeditions across the Ohio Valley. Further south and east, however, Shawnee and Lunaapeew (Lenape, or Delaware) raids continued against settlements south and east of the Ohio River. By autumn, however, the conflict known as Pontiac’s Rebellion was largely over, and the following summer most of the groups in the Ohio Valley sent representatives to a large peace conference at Johnson Hall. Only the Illinois country, where Obwandiyag had retreated and still found some support, remained outside the purview of British diplomacy. In the summer of 1766, however, Obwandiyag travelled to Johnson Hall and formally surrendered. The war without France was over.

**Proclamations and Boundaries**

The defeat of the Native alliance could be ascribed to many things, from disease and the fortunes of war to the challenges of holding together a diverse alliance. Yet it also stemmed from a change in British military policy that came with the formal end of the Seven Years’ War in 1763. In Parliament and at Whitehall, Amherst’s policies were widely viewed as the cause of the war and he was recalled to London in August 1763. As

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26 Ibid., 112.
one contemporary critic put it, Amherst initiated “a war conducted by a spirit of murder rather than a brave and generous offense.”

The change of command came with a new directive to use active diplomacy in concert with martial force to bring a successful end to the conflict. While this policy proved effective, the Crown sought to remove “all just Cause of Discontent, and Uneasiness” among Native groups to the west of the Appalachian Mountains—and thus prevent future conflict to the west of the Appalachian Divide. Toward these ends, a Royal Proclamation established a boundary between colonial settlements to the east of the mountains and Native lands to the west. To the west of the line all private “Purchases or Settlements” of lands were prohibited and recent sales were voided; no surveys of new land patents could be granted by any Colonial authority; only official agents of the Crown could acquire land through formal treaties with recognized Native leaders; and only licensed traders would be permitted to reside and operate within “said Territory.”

These policies represented significant changes and, like a bright red line on a map, they marked a sharp divide between London’s desire to avoid expensive wars and organize its vast new domain in North America against the interests of colonial elites who sought to control the commerce and lands of these new regions as well as the desires of poorer colonists to gain a level of economic and social independence through the acquisition of land. The Proclamation Line was a response to the long-standing Native demand that the British stay on the east side of the Alleghenies. The abiding complaint against the British related to their stingy and overbearing policies was also addressed in the Plan for the Future Management of Indian Affairs (1764)—which restored gift giving, provided guidelines for a regulated trade, and an emphasis on regular diplomacy. As the Lords of Trade noted in a letter to Sir William Johnson, the Plan had “for its object the regulation of Indian Affairs both commercial and political throughout all North America, upon one general system, under the direction of Officers appointed by the Crown.” A key goal of this policy was to thwart “all local interfering of particular Provinces, which have been one great cause of the distracted state of Indian Affairs in general.”


Chapter Four

Figure 4.2: “Lands Reserved for the Indians” and the Proclamation Line. The parameters of the Royal Proclamation of October 7, 1763 are clearly delineated in this map of the British Colonies in North America. Colonial populations, commerce, and civil governance were limited to a region extending from East Florida in the south to Quebec in the north—with the crest of the Appalachian Mountains and the St. Lawrence River serving as a general western boundary. The expanse between the Appalachians and the Mississippi River, and south of Rupert’s Land (the region chartered to the Hudson’s Bay Company) was officially designated “Lands Reserved for the Indians.” All subsequent dealings with Indigenous communities were deemed the exclusive purview of royal officials. *Cantonment of His Majesty’s forces in N. America according to the disposition now made & to be compleated as soon as practicable taken from the general distribution dated at New York 29th March 1766.* Source: Library of Congress. (Image has been enhanced to better illustrate boundaries.)

Imperial Reforms

The peace settlements and policy adjustments of the mid 1760s corresponded to earlier Native demands that Great Britain not indulge the claims of the Haudenosaunee over western lands, treat directly with the residents of the Ohio Valley and Great Lakes, and restrict colonial movements and ventures into the region. Yet the Royal Proclamation Line and the Plan for the Future Management of Indian Affairs was rooted in a unilateral sovereignty that was not imagined by any Native leaders. As noted in the Royal Proclamation of 1763, the King “declare[d] it to be our royal will and pleasure, for the
present as aforesaid, to reserve under our sovereignty, protection, and dominion, for the
use of the said Indians, all the lands and territories” west of the line.33 These were matters
of fine legal distinctions that could not have translated well into Native languages. Over
the next few years, however, they did play out in adjustments to the Proclamation Line
and the Plan for Management that troubled Native communities across the Ohio Valley
and around Lake Ontario.

For a large number of colonists, however, the Proclamation and the Plan were
immediately viewed as a betrayal. The French and Indian War was so named for a very
simple reason: in British America, colonists fought in militias, died or were wounded,
lost property, were captured, supplied troops, and suffered shortages in an effort to defeat
the “Catholic French” and the “heathen Indian.”34 By the same token, the fruits of victory
were easily defined as the removal of the French from North America and the taking of
Native lands. Efforts to exercise the second prerogative led in part to Pontiac’s Rebellion
against the British colonial order, and thus victory in that second conflict should have
resulted in new lands for speculators and settlers as well as new opportunities for traders.
Instead, the King was protecting one enemy (the Indians), acting like another (King Louis
XV), and denying the spoils of war to his own subjects—who suffered the war’s many
hardships. These offenses were further compounded by the new tariffs, trade regulations,
and taxes that were put in place to pay off the massive debts incurred during the Seven
Years’ War. These new taxes, along with an increased administrative bureaucracy to
collect the taxes and regulate commerce, were felt throughout the colonies but especially
among consumers and merchants along the eastern seaboard as well as planters in the
South. Whether or not these taxes were just and necessary, or that additional regulations
may have been needed in a disordered economy, they were widely resented as burdens
placed on those who won a war but gained no victory.35

Visions of the West on the Road to Revolution

While merchants and privateers along the eastern seaboard may have lumped the
economic policies of the King’s Privy Council with the Proclamation and the Plan, their
concerns and protests were largely restricted to matters of taxation, regulation, and
representation. The inverse was true in the west, where a mostly subsistence-based
economy was barely touched by any changes in economic regulations and few if any
people felt colonial legislatures were any more representative than the Parliament in
London. Instead, land policy was an intensely local concern that fostered profound
resentment against the Crown. Nearly all of the civilian deaths, captivities, and property
damages between 1754 and 1763 had occurred among these populations, and the desire
for retribution was acute and widespread. So too was the sense that the King meant to
cheat them out of their chance to acquire land. Like the colonists to the east who
protested Crown policies in the 1760s and early 1770s with petitions, protests, vandalism,
and acts of civil disobedience, squatters and settlers on the frontier actively thwarted
royal authority by clearing forests, planting crops, building cabins, and conducting long

33 “The Royal Proclamation—October 7, 1763.”
34 These statements are ubiquitous in the historical record, but see Moses Coit Tyler, The Literary History
hunts on the west side of the Proclamation Line. Within a few years tens of thousands of western colonists pushed beyond the Appalachians to take up new lands or reclaim those they had lost in the war. By the early 1770s this growing westward movement, fueled by resentment of the Crown and a vengeful hatred for Native adversaries, would contribute to a growing unrest across the colonies that pushed toward war and revolution.36

One powerful interest in the colonies shared the resentments of backwoods communities for the Crown, as well as the political and economic grievances that animated protests in Boston and New York. This was the planter class of Virginia, which included such luminaries as Washington, Jefferson and Madison. These men and their associates would have an outsized role in the American Revolution and dominated national politics until the 1820s, while their long-standing interests in western lands would persist through the War of 1812 and the Indian Removal period of the 1830s. Their concerns about the Proclamation Line and the Plan had little to do with moving west or vengeance, or even politics. Rather, they were intent on securing and augmenting their prewar investments in the Ohio Company and similar enterprises. To them, the Proclamation and Royal Plan amounted to what, in modern jurisprudence, would be termed an illegal taking with lost opportunity costs. In other words, the Crown took away their investments and any future returns they might bring. For George Washington and other partners in the Ohio Company, the most prudent response was to simply proceed as if nothing had changed—with the expectation that more surveys and preemptive deeds would eventually convince Whitehall to recognize their claims. In September of 1767 he proposed a partnership with William Crawford, who served with Washington during the Seven Years’ War, that would “secure [through preemptive claims] some of the most valuable Lands in the King’s part … notwithstanding the Proclamation that restrains it at present and prohibits the Settling of them at all for I can never look upon that Proclamation in any other light (but this I say between ourselves) than as a temporary expedient to quiet the Minds of the Indians and must fall of course in a few years.”37

Washington was right, as was his sense of urgency that he and his associates needed to exploit “the present opportunity of hunting out good Lands & in some Measure Marking & distinguishing them for their own (in order to keep others from settling them) [or they] “will never regain it.” In response to hard lobbying from land speculators in the colonies and Great Britain, Sir William Johnson negotiated a huge cession of land from the Haudenosaunee in the Treaty of Fort Stanwix (1768). The treaty moved the Proclamation line westward to encompass part of central New York, much of western Pennsylvania, and almost all of present-day West Virginia and Kentucky. The treaty council did not include any of the native groups that resided in the area, and thus reneged on the treaties signed at Johnson Hall in 1763. The amount of lands also exceeded the desires of the home office in London, but the agreement—which encompassed the land

claims that Washington had made in the 1750s and worked to secure in 1767, as well as a number of holdings that Johnson claimed—was authorized nonetheless.\textsuperscript{38}

As the coincident interests of Johnson and Washington suggest, colonial elites and British officials could have similar ideas about the disposition of western lands. Yet there were some distinctions. For instance, royal officials in North America worried more than colonial elites about the possibility of another expensive war with American Indians, and wanted to sustain the basic principles of the Proclamation and the Royal Plan. Some Members of Parliament, along with officials at Whitehall, believed that American Indians had been wronged by the likes of General Amherst and were owed a fair degree of support and protection from the government against the colonists. Yet all held a common desire that the eventual settlement of western lands would occur through the application of careful surveys and fair administration of property claims to ensure orderly settlement and a healthy market in land sales. Consequently, they shared a particular disdain for backwoods squatters and settlers, who they considered a lazy and disorderly “parcel of banditti who will bid defiance to all authority.” These were the people who violated property laws, tore up surveyors’ stakes, caused wars, and thwarted peace. The feelings were more than mutual, and backwoods communities had their own sense of propriety and social order that disdained the privileges of birth and political connections. More importantly, they had a common vision of fighting for and securing a “good poor man’s country” along the western edges of colonial America. In a very real sense this vision of America was their declaration of independence, and a key ingredient of the American Revolution.\textsuperscript{39}

Credit for the “first shot” of the Revolutionary War is generally given to a militiaman at the Battle of Lexington in April 1775, but it may have come twelve months earlier when a mixed group of surveyors, squatters, and land agents pushed across the Ohio River and engaged in a brief battle with a group of Shawnee. This was followed a few days later with a tragic event known as the Yellow Creek Massacre, in which twenty-one Virginians killed a group of Ökwe’öwen (Seneca-Cayuga; aka, “Mingo”) who had stopped at a tavern on the west side of the Ohio River about forty miles from Fort Pitt. Six of the seven were killed, mutilated, and scalped, including a pregnant woman who was disemboweled and her unborn son scalped. The only survivor was a two-year old girl—the daughter of the pregnant woman—who was ultimately placed in the care of her white father. Before the Virginians departed they encountered two canoes of warriors coming across the river, and killed most of those in the forward canoe with a concentrated fusillade.\textsuperscript{40}

\textsuperscript{38} Quote from ibid. Also see William J. Campbell, Speculators in Empire: Iroquoia and the 1768 Treaty of Fort Stanwix (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2012), 139-66.

\textsuperscript{39} Disparaging quotations about backcountry communities are from George Washington and various colonial and British officials, as cited in James Belich, Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Angloworld (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 146. The phrase “good poor man’s country” comes from Aron, How the West Was Lost: The Transformation of Kentucky from Daniel Boone to Henry Clay (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 3. Also see Eric Hinderaker and Peter C. Mancall, At the Edge of Empire: The Backcountry in British North America (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 125-60; and Nobles, “Breaking the Backcountry,” 659-62.

\textsuperscript{40} Amy C. Schutt, Peoples of the River Valleys: The Odyssey of the Delaware Indians (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), 144-45.
A number of those killed at the tavern were relatives of Tocanioadorogon (aka Logan) who was a well-known advocate of peaceful relations between Native communities along the upper Ohio River and colonial Americans. The brutal killings at Yellow Creek inspired an alliance of Ökwe'öwé, Lunaapeew (Lenape, or Delaware), and Shawnee to attack settlements in Virginia as well as present-day Kentucky and West Virginia—which the colonists viewed as open territory in accordance with the Treaty of Fort Stanwix. In response, John Murray, the Earl of Dunmore and the royal governor of Virginia, authorized a large military campaign into the backcountry. Known as “Lord Dunmore’s War” (1774), the 2,000 militiamen who answered the call to arms were not fighting for the governor or even the colony. As Eric Hinderacker and Peter Mancall write, these men “had waited a decade in mounting frustration and anger while the king neglected their needs” in favor of land speculators and American Indians. This war was their rebellion.41

The brief war only lasted until late October, but it led to the Treaty of Camp Charlotte (1774) in which the Shawnee towns on the lower Scioto River acknowledged the Ohio River as the boundary between what the Crown termed the “Indian Reserve” and the areas claimed by Virginia in present-day West Virginia and Kentucky. While this new treaty seemed to resolve colonial concerns about a specific western boundary, Parliament’s almost simultaneous passage of the Quebec Act seemed to upend all expectations for lands to the north. Regarded as one of the four Intolerable Acts that so offended defiant colonists, the Quebec Act created a new administrative body for the management of the entire area from the Ohio River to the Mississippi, and northeastward across the Great Lakes and the St Lawrence River Basin. Fearful colonists along the eastern seaboard viewed this as a blueprint for removing and replacing colonial assemblies with royal administrators, while land speculators and would-be settlers were angered by the voiding of the western land claims embedded in colonial charters and their transfer to the vast Province of Quebec. A final insult came with the recognition of French civil law and the authority of the Catholic Church. Just as Lord Dunmore’s War seemed a belated confirmation of the victory that came with the French and Indian War, the Quebec Act pushed it all away. Worse still, none of this abated the continuing raids from Shawnee communities that were not party to the Treaty of Camp Charlotte and—along with Tsalagihí (Cherokee) and Mvskoke (Muscogee or Creek) from the south—continued to raid settlements located west of the Appalachians (in present-day Kentucky and West Virginia). To colonists in Virginia it seemed as if the world was turned upside down and the time had come for an armed insurrection against what Thomas Jefferson and many others called the twin threats of British “tyranny” and Native “treachery.”42

41 White, Middle Ground, 358-364; Richter, Facing East from Indian Country, 203-23; Lakomäki, Gathering Together, 100-01; Hinderaker and Mancall, At the Edge of Empire, 125-60, quotation is from p. 160.

Chapter Four

Revolution in the West

The Declaration of Independence is best known for the Preamble with its references to liberty, natural rights, and self-evident truths, but most of the document is devoted to cataloging the King’s “repeated injuries and usurpations” that gave rise to the call for independence. Most of the abuses treat with matters relating to taxation and trade restrictions, undermining colonial assemblies and legal systems, preparing for war against the colonies, and thwarting the concerns of specific colonies. Two items in the list of injuries do not fit this pattern, however, and both relate directly to American Indians and the disposition of western lands. One takes on the Quebec Act “For abolishing the free System of English Laws in a neighbouring Province [Quebec], establishing therein an Arbitrary government, and enlarging its Boundaries so as to render it at once an example and fit instrument for introducing the same absolute rule into these Colonies.” The second, which is also the final item in the catalog of abuses, addresses American Indian wars: “He has excited domestic insurrections amongst us, and has endeavourd to bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers, the merciless Indian Savages, whose known rule of warfare, is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes and conditions.” Both of these matters were of particular interest to Jefferson and his fellow Virginians, but they deeply resonated with all colonists who looked westward to secure their futures.43

As a sustained military conflict, the Revolutionary War began in the summer of 1776 with engagements in southeastern New York and northern New Jersey. From the vantage point of American Indians in the Ohio Valley and around western Lake Erie, the conflict seemed like a civil war that did not directly concern them. Like the outbreak of the Seven Years’ War, this new conflict came with the possibility that both sides might be weaker by the time they sued for peace—and thus Indigenous communities might gain simply by maintaining a distant neutrality. Within a year, however, the war had pushed into the territory of the Haudenosaunee and both the British and the Americans began actively working for the support of Native communities. These solicitations and the prolonged campaign in northern New York fractured the Haudenosaunee, with Tuscarora, Onyota’a:ke (Oneida) and some Kanien’kehaka (Mohawk) assisting American forces and an alliance of Kanien’kehaka (Mohawk), Onoda’gega (Onondaga), Guyohkohnyo (Cayuga) and Onöndowága (Seneca) declaring for the British. Three years later, General Washington ordered a scorched earth campaign on the Kanien’kehaka, Onoda'gega, Guyohkohnyo, and Onöndowága villages in the Finger Lakes region, which led to mass starvation the following winter and effectively destroyed the Haudenosaunee as a potent diplomatic or military force.44

43 Declaration of Independence <http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/declaration_transcript.html> (accessed 14 October 2015). The phrase “merciless Indian Savages” is retained in this quotation because it is a central component of a foundational document of U.S. history, and because it encapsulates the tenor and methods of nation building that would develop over the next century. The clause about “domestic insurrections” is part of two complaints in the penultimate draft of the Declaration about Loyalist resistance efforts in Virginia and slave insurrections in the southern colonies. In this context, however, it could also relate to Native groups that acted against treaties they had not participated in. See Pauline Maier, American Scripture: Making the Declaration of Independence (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997), 146.

In the southern Ohio Valley, Chalahgawtha (Chillicothe) Shawnee and Ökwe'owé (Seneca-Cayuga; aka, “Mingo”) from villages along the Scioto River continued to raid into Kentucky through 1776 and into 1777. These attacks were a continuation of previous conflicts and were entirely independent of any concerns about the new war to the east. While British officials, along with the Haudenosaunee, had previously worked to stop these raids with the Treaty of Camp Charlotte, the onset of the Revolutionary War changed their views. With armies engaged in northern New York, the British sought to open a southern front by supporting war parties from western Lake Erie to raid into Kentucky, West Virginia and western Pennsylvania. Local militias organized for defense and retaliation but, as Virginia Governor Patrick feared, the militiamen did not or could not distinguish between neutral and warring groups. This proved the case in November 1777 when a militiaman killed the Mekoche Shawnee leader Colesquo (Cornstalk), his son, and two others who had come to Fort Randolph to foster a truce. A similar tragedy occurred with the Lunaapeew (Lenape, or Delaware) leader Koquethagechtan (White Eyes), who was a strong ally of the Americans until his death in 1778. By eliminating advocates for neutrality, particularly ones of stature, such deaths and killings only created more advocates for war.45

Pressed by colonial militias from the south and east, and an array of Native allies of the British from the north and west, maintaining neutrality in the southern Ohio Valley during the Revolutionary War was increasingly difficult—and mostly limited to a few Christianized Lunaapeew towns. However, alliance with the British was not simply a default position. The days of Jeffrey Amherst were long gone, and the British had taken on many of the responsibilities of Onontio—particularly among the groups around Detroit, the Sandusky River, and the western Great Lakes. British officials well understood the importance of reciprocity, and had professed and demonstrated a willingness to restrain colonists from moving on to Native lands. British traders were a better and more reliable source of goods than the unlicensed traders along the colonial frontiers—and once war had broken out the likelihood of acquiring trade goods, let alone powder and shot, from a colonial post was a near impossibility. More often than not, the British tended to support the prosecution of conflicts that corresponded to long-standing Native concerns rather than requesting support for large campaigns against distant military installations.46

With the British and their closest allies around western Lake Erie, and the Virginia militia to the south and west, the region in between became a “Dark and Bloody Ground.” While this term was erroneously thought to be a translation of what “the Indians [called] the fertile region, now called Kentucke,” it well applied to the Blue Grass region and much of the lower Ohio Valley during the Revolutionary War and after.47 By the mid 1770s, Shawnee had been raiding colonial encampments and settlements south of

46 Calloway, 30-58, 158-81.
47 John Filson, The Discovery, Settlement and Present State of Kentucke (Wilmington: James Adams, 1784), 7. The meaning and origin of the word Kentucky is not known.
the Ohio for at least a decade, and bands of Long Knives often retaliated in kind. These raids and counter-raids increased in the wake of the Fort Stanwix Treaty, but they became more frequent and deadly in the context of the Revolutionary War. For Americans in general, fighting Indians was an assertion of sovereignty that rejected British policy in the west and applied the Treaty of Fort Stanwix to all Native communities. For Virginians in particular, the war was either about land claims and speculation, or making a “good poor man’s country,” but in every case it was about destroying destroying and erasing the Native presence. For the Shawnee, this was an existential war. As Colesquo (Cornstalk) conveyed in a translated statement to the Continental Congress in 1776, the Shawnee were fighting for “our Lands, … our heart”— their place of creation near the Ohio River, to which they had returned, and the lands that made them who they were. With “white people … seated on our Lands … we are jealous that you still intend to make larger strides …. This is what sits heavy on our Hearts and the Hearts of all Nations, and it is impossible for us to think as we ought whilst we are thus oppressed.” Hokoleskwa would subsequently press for neutrality among the Mekoche Shawnee, but his murder the next year unleashed pent up frustrations and it became “impossible” for his people “to think” of anything but war.48

Among adversaries who neither understood nor valued the claims of the other, but who both viewed the same landscape as an intrinsic expression of their very different needs and world views, small conflicts quickly spiraled into ever increasing cycles of violence. In the process, the nature of the violence inflicted by each side came to resemble the other even though the cultural contexts and motives were different. For instance, taking scalps was prevalent among Shawnee and Long Knives (both as proof of a battle kill and an intimate violation of the enemy’s body), as were indiscriminate attacks on families and communities. Since the Shawnee viewed the land as their “Heart,” all colonists west of the mountains were invaders and all could be construed as enemies in the context of war. For Long Knives raiding Native villages to the north of the Ohio River, the residents were obstacles to achieving the exclusively “American rights … to life, liberty and property.” When attributed to a race of humanity rather than a specific group or village, these latter sentiments could result in indiscriminate massacres.49

In diplomatic or otherwise peaceful meetings with each other, American Indian leaders and American officials bemoaned the amount of violence and destruction that occurred in the borderlands of the Ohio River and elsewhere. By way of explanation, they blamed “foolish young men” whose ardor and lack of discipline tended toward violent excess. While this implied a diminished authority on the part of the speakers, these statements often served as excuses and apologies rather than actual analyses. In truth, young warriors and Long Knives often followed leaders with proven experience in battle. The violence that ensued certainly reflected ardor, inexperience, and even “bloodlust,”

but the strategic directives of the British and the Americans during the war—and the amount of supplies and arms that poured into the Ohio Valley—fomented the most destructive cycles of violence.  

especially among communities already engaged in ongoing conflicts with Long Knives, to Clark and most all Euro-Americans it seemed that Hamilton was the general of an army of American Indian mercenaries who paid for scalps to be carried back to Detroit.51

Hamilton did take tallies of scalps, and likely used them as a rough measure of battle casualties, but there is no specific evidence that he paid bounties for scalps. The charge of “Hair Buyer” is plausible, since the practice was common among the French and British during the Seven Years’ War, and “scalp bounties” were paid by some colonies during the Revolution. However he may have felt about these matters, or the epithet of “the hair-buying general,” Hamilton did worry about the scale and nature of the conflicts he supported. Knowing that American Indians were allied with but not fighting for the British regime, Hamilton clearly understood that fighting for their lands necessarily entailed attacking the communities that occupied them. Try as he might to encourage distinctions between Long Knives and what might be called civilian non-combatants, he knew that he had become an agent in a war that troubled him deeply. “Would to God this storm which is ready to fall on the Frontiers could be directed upon the guilty heads of those wretches who have raised it,” he wrote a friend in June 1777, “and pass by the miserable many who must feel its fatal effects.” Such regrets notwithstanding, that summer he supported between 1,100 and 1,200 Native warriors and a number of French habitant militia who engaged in near continuous assaults on Long Knives and Kentucky settlements.52

George Rogers Clark shared with Hamilton a sense of the distinction between European (or Euro-American) and American Indian warfare, but their experiences differed in important regards. Badly in need of men, Clark accepted the services of the French habitants of the Illinois Country, who made up half his army during his daring capture of Hamilton at Vincennes in February of 1779. However, Clark had no expectation of an alliance with any American Indian communities since nearly two decades of conflict had essentially defined all Native peoples in the region as implacable foes. Consequently, he had none of Hamilton’s doubts or worries about the violence committed by American Indians. Nor did he worry about the violent actions of his forces since, as a Lieutenant Colonel in the Virginia Militia, Clark participated directly in the campaigns he oversaw and inspired the actions of his forces. In short, his views on war followed a simple moral code that was readily defined by his mentor Thomas Jefferson who, as Governor of Virginia was also his Commander-in-Chief. In discussing a planned invasion of Detroit in the winter of 1779-1780, Jefferson reminded Clark that

the Shawanese, Mingoes, Munsies, and the nearer Wiandots are troublesome thorns in our sides. However we must leave it to yourself to decide on the object of the campaign. If against these Indians, the end

proposed should be their extermination, or their removal beyond the lakes or Illinois river. The same world will scarcely do for them and us.”

In prosecuting such a war, Clark believed it necessary to show “Indians the Horrid fate of those that would dare make war on the big Knife; to excell them in barbarity … was and is the only way to make war and gain a name among the Indians.” On one count, at least, the Shawnee and their allies shared a basic conviction with Jefferson and Clark; the same land could not be home to Long Knives and Native communities, and the war in the Ohio Valley reflected this persistent truth. With the tenor of the war intensifying in the summer of 1777, a thousand Shawnee from different villages left the Scioto Plains to live among the Myaamia to the west. Almost all of the Mekoche under Colesquo (Cornstalk) remained, still hoping to avoid conflict with the Virginians whose “intentions were to deprive us [the Shawnee] of our whole Country.” With the murder of Colesquo, his son, and two fellow Mekoche, however, most Shawnee communities chose to strengthen their alliances with the British and other Native groups and enlarge the war against the Long Knives. Through 1778, they inflicted a series of punishing raids south and east of the Ohio River. The following year colonial militia retaliated with a push as far north as the town of Chalahgawtha (present-day Chillicothe, Ohio), where the renowned Shawnee war leader Mkateewéθi-maqua (Black Fish) received a mortal wound.

In 1780 the war intensified, as more than 700 Shawnee, Haudenosaunee, Ojibwe, Odawa, Bodéwadmi, and Wyandot—joined by British Rangers and more than eighty mostly Canadien militiamen under the command of Captains Louis de Joncaire de Chabert and Isidore Chene supporters—attacked settlements and fortified sites throughout the Blue Grass region. The force was smaller than originally planned, however, since a good portion was held back after word that Clark’s forces had departed the Falls of the Ohio (present-day Clarksville, Indiana) and were marching toward Detroit. Nevertheless, the toll on civilian communities was significant—with dozens of settlers killed in the presence of their families and hundreds taken prisoner. The campaign ended by late June, but fear reigned among the civilian population for most of the summer as tales of violence and death were shared across the Blue Grass region. As the stories grew, the perils of some became the trials of all—and fueled an abiding resentment against the “infernal rage and fury of those Execrable Hell Hounds” and their British allies.

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Chapter Four

Clark was not at the Falls, as originally feared, but he did assemble a punitive force of more than 1,000 militia to attack the town of Chalahgawtha and Pekwöi (Piqua, Ohio) in early August. The Shawnee burned Chalahgawtha before it could be taken and looted by the Virginians, but a brief battle occurred at Pekwöi. Clark’s force suffered approximately thirty killed and forty wounded while Shawnee battle losses may have been similar, but an unknown number of Shawnee were killed and wounded when artillery fire was directed on the large council house where they had taken refuge. After capturing the town, Clark’s militiamen spent two days destroying fields and food stores, burning homes, and plundering graves for “curiosities” and scalps.56 Like the stories that spread around Kentucky after the early summer raids, these desecrations would horrify the Shawnee and deepen their rage against the Long Knives.57

The war between the Shawnee and the Long Knives was especially persistent, but other Native-British alliances were also active in the Ohio Valley and the western Great Lakes. Hoocąągra (Ho-Chunk) and Mamaceqtaw (Menominee) from Green Bay came to Detroit in 1779 to participate in campaigns in the southern Ohio Valley, while Odawa, Ojibwe, and Bodéwadmi from the northern Great Lakes also participated in the war alliances centered on Detroit. The Myaami along the Wabash were inclined to join alliances against the Long Knives, particularly in concert with their Shawnee neighbors to the east, but also had to maintain their associations to the west among the Kiikaapoi, Mascouten, Bodéwadmi who traded with the (anti-British) Spanish to the south. When Clark marshaled a large force to attack Canadien settlements along the lower Illinois River in 1778, and at Vincennes in 1779, the Myaamia avoided conflict with the Long Knives. Such caution ended the following year, however, after France officially joined the Americans in their war against the British and a small force led by Captain Augustine Mottin de La Balme recruited some Canadiens and Native warriors from around Kaskaskia to undertake an invasion of Detroit. After attacking a British post and plundering the Myaamia village of Kiihkayonki (aka Kekionga, present-day Fort Wayne, Indiana), La Balme and his forces were met and badly routed by a returning war party led by Mihšihkinaahkwa (Little Turtle). This series of events ultimately turned most Myaamia leaders toward the British alliance and active support of the Shawnee as well as the Ökwe’ōwé (Seneca-Cayuga; aka, “Mingo”) and Lunaapeew (Lenape, or Delaware) on the Muskingum River.58

No Place for Neutrality

Further east on the Tuscarawas River, some Lunaapeew communities remained among growing settler populations and worked to avoid conflict with Euro-Americans.

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56 Lakomäki, Gathering Together, 96-110; Calloway, The Shawnees and the War for America, 61-65; Aron, How the West was Lost, 35-47.
Often led by strong civil leaders, they sought to become the center of a neutral alliance and reached out to Lunaapeew, Shawnee, Wyandot and other communities further west. In 1778 the commitment to building this alliance faltered after a series of complex and deadly challenges. In February the neutral Lunaapeew village of Coshcouton was attacked by Pennsylvania militia under the command of Colonel William Crawford, and some of Konieschquanoheel’s (aka, Hopocon, or Captain Pipe) family was killed. That summer military officials pressed other neutral Lunaapeew leaders to become active allies of the patriot cause, which complicated the positions of neutral leaders within their increasingly divided villages and among their Euro-American neighbors. Perhaps the most energetic supporter of the patriots was the Lunaapeew leader Koquethagechton (White Eyes), who served as a guide for an assault on Detroit, but he was killed by a militia officer (or died of mysterious causes) somewhere around the western end of Lake Erie. These developments weakened the position of the neutral leaders, and a number of families left their villages to live among their British-allied kin on the Scioto and Sandusky Rivers. These developments ultimately created a schism among the eastern Lunaapeew, and by 1781 Konieschquanoheel openly favored close relations with the British alliance while Gelelemend (Killbuck), who became principal leader of the eastern Lunaapeew after the death of Koquethagechton, lost his authority and moved to Fort Pitt where he served as a Captain in the Continental Army. It was in that position that he joined an expedition in April 1781 that destroyed Coshocton.59

After the burning of Coshocton, the former residents sought refuge at Upper Sandusky and Detroit. In September they returned east to escort the populations of three mission communities of Christianized Lunaapeew that were upriver from the site of Coshocton. The Christianized Lunaapeew, who had been threatened during the Continental’s campaign on Coshocton, were a distinct and mostly independent part of the Lunaapeew nation that embraced the pacifism of Moravian missionaries and remained strictly neutral during the Revolution. Nevertheless, Konieschquanoheel feared they might be drawn to the Patriot cause and relocated them against their will. After four-and-a-half difficult and hungry months at Upper Sandusky, about 100 of the Christianized Lunaapeew were allowed to return to the main mission of Gnadenhütten where they had ample stores of food and supplies. In early March, after learning that a sizeable group of Lunaapeew had returned to the Tuscarawas, about 160 Pennsylvania militia appeared at Gnadenhütten and accused the recent returnees of having raided settlements in areas where a number of the militiamen had family. The accusations were denied, but the militia, under the leadership of Colonel David Williamson, held a council and voted to kill all of the Lunaapeew and destroy the village. After granting the condemned a night to prepare for death, they held them prisoner in two separate buildings—one for men, and the other for women and children. The next morning, the militiamen began a methodical slaughter in the two “killing houses” that involved striking each individual in the head with a mallet, then using a scalping knife to kill them with deep cuts to the skull. In all, twenty-eight men, twenty-nine women, and thirty-nine children were slaughtered and

59 Schutt, Peoples of the River Valleys, 168-75.
their corpses burned within the buildings. Before leaving the militiamen plundered the town then burned it to the ground.60

The Gnadenhütten Massacre was not kept a secret. Some militiamen boasted of the action, while others who refused to participate also told the tale. Many civilians condemned the action, as did General William Irvine, the commandant at Fort Pitt. Yet a general hatred of all American Indians, and the widespread resentment of military command that bordered on mutiny, effectively silenced these voices.61 Though little known in the colonies, word of the massacre electrified the Lunaapeew and their allies in the west—and would be long remembered as a dark symbol of the Long Knives’ way of war. The first chance for revenge came in June 1782 at the Battle of Sandusky, when Colonel Crawford and a force of 500 Pennsylvania militia were defeated by a combined force of Lunaapeew, Shawnee, Wyandot, Ókwe’öwé (Seneca-Cayuga; aka, “Mingo”) warriors and British rangers. Though actual battle losses are unknown, most of the militia’s casualties occurred while in captivity and a number were tortured to death. The most notable was Crawford, who Konieszchquanooheel singled out as the leader of the deadly attacks on neutral villages, including his own, and the current leader of the men who previously committed the Gnadenhütten Massacre. Before a large crowd, and at the hands of different men and women, Crawford was burned, beaten, dismembered, and variously tortured for hours until he finally perished. A similar fate awaited others who were taken to the Shawnee town of Wapatomica, including Crawford’s son-in-law and nephew.62

Treaty of Paris Redux

The victory at the Battle of Sandusky helped rebalance the Lunaapeew world after the Gnadenhütten massacre, and marked a deepened commitment of all parties to the British-Native Alliance against the Americans. It also preceded two other decisive victories by a few weeks: the Battle of Blue Licks (August 19, 1782), when nearly half of a Virginia militia unit was killed or taken captive by a force of fifty Loyalist Rangers and 300 warriors from across the Ohio Valley, and the destruction of Hannastown, Pennsylvania, by a combined force of Ókwe’öwé and British rangers under the leadership of Guyasuta.63 With a broader and more unified coalition, and three significant victories in the span of one month, the war seemed to be turning in favor of the Native-British

alliance in the Great Lakes and Ohio Valley. By fall, however, British officers and agents began urging their allies to refrain from further conflict. Rumors of a peace treaty to end the war between Great Britain and the Thirteen Colonies were proving true, and the military was ordered to scale back all offensive operations. When Native leaders around Detroit were informed of this decision, and that the British expected to withdraw from the war with the colonies while the latter became an independent nation, they were stunned, angered, and deeply worried. As Frederick Haldimand, the Governor of Quebec, reported to Home Secretary Thomas Townsend,

the Indians are thunderstruck at the appearance of an Accommodation so far short of their expectations from the language that had been held out to them, and Dread the idea of being Forsaken by us and becoming a Sacrifice to the Vengeance which has already in many instances been raked upon them. Foreseeing the possibility of the Americans becoming an independent, powerful people and retaliating severely upon them, they reproach us with their ruin.

Haldimand received official notice of the treaty’s final terms in the spring of 1783, and he had good reason to fear Native reactions. Early in the treaty negotiations, the British proposed recognition of an independent United States as well as the creation of three large American Indian Territories: one in the areas covered by the Quebec Act, and the other two encompassing regions to the south of Kentucky that would be administered by the United States and Spain. However, in an effort to settle matters in North America and pivot to negotiating an end to its wars with France, Spain and the Netherlands, British ministers assented to U.S. demands to recognize the entire area between the Appalachians and the Mississippi River as U.S. Territory. In the Great Lakes and the Ohio Valley, large councils confronted the British with demands for explanations and requests for supplies. At Niagara, Brigadier General Allan Maclean reported,

the Indians from the surmises they have heard of the Boundaries, look upon our conduct to them as treacherous and cruel; they told me they never could believe that our King could pretend to cede to America what was not his own to give .... That they were faithful Allies of the King of England but not his subjects.

Great Britain may have surrendered to the United States and signed the Peace of Paris, but the King’s erstwhile allies angrily reminded Maclean that they had defended all of their lands. Indeed, not a single soldier or settler resided north or west of the Ohio River.

Recalling Pontiac’s Rebellion from twenty years earlier, British officers and agents were left with a frightening dilemma. They were compelled to demonstrate that the king “still considers you his faithful allies,” and to make promises of continued

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65 Haldimand to Townshend, October 23, 1782, in Michigan Historical Commission, Historical Collections: Collections and Researches Made by the Michigan Pioneer and Historical Society, Vol. 20 (Lansing: Robert Smith & Co., 1892),67. For a fuller synthesis of these issues and their consequences, see Allen, His Majesty’s Indian Allies, 52-56.
66 Quotation from Allan Maclean to Haldimand, May 18, 1783, in Collections and Researches, 20: 119.
relations that were somehow congruent with the development of a new American regime. At a council in Big Rock (Brownstown) in June 1783, anger at the British received a full airing. A Wea spokesman gave a blunt assessment that captured the mood of many: “We are informed that instead of prosecuting the war we are to give up our lands to the enemy which gives us great uneasiness. In endeavouring to assist you, it seems we have wrought our ruin.” Such sentiments were tempered by the formality and respect with which the British conducted the meeting, as well as a generous distribution of gifts to affirm continued relations. Promises to increase the activities of agents and traders now that peace had returned also gained a favorable reception.

By the time the council ended, British officials managed to create a general sense that they would help protect the lands north of the Ohio River from U.S. encroachment. This was more than anyone at Fort Lernoult (Detroit) could legitimately offer in June of 1783, but the sentiment was likely fostered through personal and unrecorded conversations. Government officials, military officers, traders, and British Indian agents in the west were also upset with the final terms of the Peace of Paris, and many would spend the rest of their careers seeking to ameliorate or rectify the Crown’s abandonment of the region and its peoples. These ideas and feelings, while still very fresh in the late spring of 1783, may have inflated the actualities of British policy while capturing the aspirations of those charged with carrying them forward.

The most concrete expression of British support for its Native allies came through the retention of Fort Lernoult, Fort Miami (near present-day Toledo) and Fort Mackinac within the region the United States would later term the Northwest Territory. The Crown, without consulting officials in North America, decided to retain these forts the day before officially accepting the Treaty of Paris (September 3, 1783). In doing so, King George III responded to the concerns of fur trade merchants who requested at least two years to reorganize the trading operations that were centered on these three sites. The retention of these forts temporarily assuaged the fears of officials in the British Indian Department, who feared that a sudden British withdrawal would no doubt represent a dramatic betrayal of the Native Alliance that invited retribution. More significantly, the King’s order also presented an opportunity for an active British policy in the Great Lakes region.

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67 Johnson to Council of Six Nations and Allies, July 23, 1783, in ibid., 177.
68 Maclean to Haldimand, May 18, 1783, in ibid., 121
70 While the regional and territorial designation was commonly used after the Peace of Paris, the Territory Northwest of the River Ohio (aka Northwest Territory), was officially defined in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 and encompassed the lands that would become the states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota. The three British forts that remained in this region were Fort Miamis (near present-day Toledo), Fort Mackinac, and Fort Lernoult (Detroit). Three other forts (Fort Niagara, Fort Ontario, and Fort Oswegatchie), and a blockhouse at the north end of Lake Champlain were also retained in upstate New York.
After years of war, the population of Kentucky was much reduced and more distant from the Ohio River. The Shawnee and Lunaapeew also migrated away from the Ohio River, but these movements also fostered a strengthening of their alliances with other groups. A similar process of clustered residence patterns and stronger alliances also occurred among the various groups identified in the map key. Further congregation and alliance occurred among the Hoocąągra (Ho-Chunk, aka Winnebago) and Mamaceqtaw (Menominee) to the west of Lake Michigan, and the Anishinaabeg on the northern lakes. All of these alliances in the Ohio Valley and Great Lakes region had either formed or strengthened over the past two decades—and were broader and more integrated than they had been at any time since the Great Peace of Montréal.
In a letter to Home Secretary Lord North, Governor Haldimand proposed retaining the forts indefinitely to maintain a formal British presence among their Native allies.

Your Lordship will observe that the object of their general Confederacy is to defend their country against All invaders …. In case things should proceed to [war], the event no doubt will be the destruction of the Indians, but during the contest not only the Americans but perhaps many of His Majesty's subjects will be exposed to great distresses. To prevent such a disastrous event as an Indian war … cannot be prevented so effectually as by allowing the posts in the upper country to remain as they are for some time.73

In this way, forts and trading posts would support Native communities, dissuade Americans from risking war, and—as entertained in the initial negotiations of the Peace of Paris—create a Native “buffer zone” between British Canada and U.S. populations. In regard to the terms of the 1783 treaty, the British indicated that they would retain the forts until the United States fulfilled certain obligations of the Peace of Paris. These included the return of confiscated properties to Loyalists who fled the colonies and the payment of outstanding debts to Great Britain. The irresolution of these issues allowed the forts to remain instruments of British Indian policy, which pleased officials, traders, and agents in the region as well as ministers in Whitehall who intended to be ready in the likelihood that the American Republic faltered.74

The Revolution dislocated thousands of American Indians. Villages were destroyed, individuals and families were killed, and refugees were forced to rebuild communities in a new location or find a home among distant kin or like-minded allies. In this crucible of war, the sinews of a broad regional alliance grew stronger and proved able to keep the people of the United States at bay. While war was not the primary cause or source of this alliance, which was more rooted in historical and ancient associations than recent circumstances, it had been a chronic condition of life throughout the Ohio Valley and lower Great Lakes for three decades. The brief cessation of violence in 1783, and the slim hope that—with British support—some kind of peace might be achieved with the government of the United States, offered a new environment for the alliance to function.

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Despite its revolutionary implications, the War for Independence affirmed more than it altered the dynamics that had shaped the Ohio Valley for a generation. The 1783 Treaty of Paris and its initial consequences is a good case in point. Like the treaty that formally ended the Seven Years’ War in 1763, the second treaty changed the geopolitical map of North America and involved the surrender of imperial claims to lands west of the Allegheny Mountains. In the latter instance, the treaty also implied the dissolution of the Royal Proclamation Line of 1763—a stated goal of the American Revolution. Yet the Continental Congress found itself in the same position as King George III just twenty years earlier: needing to prevent the violence and disorder that a rush of land companies and squatters would bring to themselves and American Indian communities.

Just six months after the formal end of the war, the Continental Congress resurrected the idea of a proclaimed dividing line in the Ordinance of 1784—with the “property of the United States” on the west side of the line and the territories of what would become the first states of the new nation on the east. While the Ordinance did not explicitly restrict the movement of U.S. citizens into what had formerly been the Province of Quebec, it essentially reaffirmed the King’s earlier nullification of colonial charters beyond the Alleghenies. In doing so, Congress established the primacy of a nascent federal authority in matters relating to territorial claims, formal relations with American Indians, land policy, and the framework of national expansion. These matters, and the role of the federal government, would be further clarified and strengthened over the next few years through subsequent modifications of the Ordinance and in the drafting and ratification of the Constitution.¹

The end of the war also presented American Indians in the Ohio Valley and Great Lakes region with a familiar challenge: maintaining the alliances that had opposed the Long Knives since before the Seven Years’ War. This was complicated by the British withdrawal to the north and reduced access to trade items that were essential for effective village leadership, alliance building, and warfare. Yet the concentration of diverse villages that had resulted from shared retreats and migrations, as well as the combinations of warriors from different groups that had joined in common battle with the Long Knives, had created a basis for continued association and mutual support. The exhaustion and destruction of war had taken a toll, however, and calls for strengthening alliances were mitigated by slim but appealing hopes for peace. Much as had occurred in the 1760s, when the British displaced the French, these hopes empowered some reluctant members of wartime alliances to explore a separate peace with the United States. In short, an age-old dynamic of autonomous villages forming or withdrawing from alliances played out in a mixed response to the cessation of conflict.  

Even as older patterns and aspirations shaped parallel developments on both sides of the Alleghenies, the abiding concerns of Indigenous leaders and U.S. officials became more emphatic and took on more concrete forms. Village and alliance leaders in the Ohio Valley and Great Lakes, and political representatives in the new United States, soon embarked on concerted efforts to organize diverse groupings under the authority of a single representative council. Within a few years these would result in the Confederated Council Fire at the Wyandot town of Big Rock (Brownstown) in 1786, and the Constitutional Convention at Philadelphia in 1787. Though each was grounded in very different traditions, and resulted in different forums of representation and governance, both would define and exercise their authorities in opposition to the other. For the United States in the mid 1780s, land acquisition, diplomacy, war, and a regulated boundary with British North America were paramount concerns of national governance. The Confederated Council Fire was defined by a similar set of fundamental concerns: namely, defining and defending boundaries with the United States, diplomacy, warfare, and preventing land sales to the U.S. by individual communities or groups. The inherent opposition between these two national authorities derived from—and further contributed to—a sense within each representative system that its validity was dependent on achieving all its goals.

A Bordered Land

Over the next decade these opposing visions would be exercised in the expanse of territory between the southern shore of Lake Erie and the Ohio River—the geographic heart of the “Middle Ground” since before the Great Peace of Montreal in 1701. For the better part of a century the region had been variously coveted and invaded by imperial rivals, land speculators, squatters, and patriot armies, yet remained a collective homeland for an array of American Indian communities. A few years after the Revolutionary War, however, large stretches of the area had come to resemble the depopulated landscapes of the 16th and 17th centuries. Instead of a “middle ground” or borderland where different peoples mixed and came together (in commerce, conflict, and comity), this part of the

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Ohio Valley was now a bordered land: with American Indian, British, and French Canadien populations mostly concentrated along the north and northwest perimeter, and a few U.S. settlements and forts to the south and southeast along the arc of the Ohio River. The northern border roughly corresponded to the international boundary line that was defined in the 1783 Peace of Paris, but remained a nebulous concept. The British maintained forts and posts to the south of the line, British subjects lived and traded on both sides, as did American Indian communities—and the latter maintained connections to Native communities and use areas that extended throughout the Great Lakes and Ohio River basins. Moreover, small groups from towns and villages around the Detroit, Maumee, Sandusky, and upper Wabash river basins continued to travel and live seasonally in areas further south, and often visited Shawnee, Lunapeew (Lenape, or Delaware) and Ökwe'öwé (Seneca-Cayuga; aka, “Mingo”) who lived about half-way between Lake Erie and the Ohio River. (See Figure 4.4 in the previous chapter.)

These movements, and associations with the southernmost Shawnee, Lunapeew, and Ökwe'öwé were often associated with raids on U.S. settlements and riverboat traffic along the Ohio River. The attacks had the same material and martial objectives of similar ventures before and during the Revolutionary War—including the taking of horses and property as well as gaining honors by vanquishing an enemy—and continued the patterns of violence and vengeance that had long plagued both sides of the Ohio River. Yet through the mid-1780s they were a mostly one-sided affair, since Kentuckians were unable and unwilling to risk a retaliatory strike at any great distance to the north. With American Indians moving through and utilizing the region between Lake Erie and the Ohio, and Kentuckians holding close to their homes and settlements, these raids also had a broader strategic dimension; enforcement of a territorial boundary along the Ohio River that corresponded to Native understandings of where matters stood when the United States and Great Britain confirmed the Treaty of Paris in 1783.

In the mid 1780s, the Ohio River represented the only functional geographic boundary between the United States and the people who lived to the west of the Alleghenies. Over the next decade, however, the region would be defined by a contest to maintain or erase this southern border. Small militia campaigns from Kentucky and

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3 Chalagawtha was so-named because it was the principal town of the Chalagawtha Shawnee sept or division. Like other Shawnee towns, it included people from different Shawnee septs, as well as from other American Indian communities. For instance, two historically significant residents of Chalagawtha at this time included the war leader Wawayapiisenwah (Whirlpool, aka Blue Jacket) from the Peckuwe (Piqua) sept and the young warrior Tecumseh, who was Kispoko Shawnee. lived in the 1780s. Pressure from Kentucky raiders forced a move in 1787. Besides Chalagawtha, Peckuwe, and Kispoko, the other Shawnee septs are Thawegila and Mekoche. See Charles Callender, “Shawnee,” in Handbook of North American Indians, Volume 15: Northeast, eds. William C. Sturtevant and Bruce G. Trigger (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1978), 623-24; Sami Lakomäki, Gathering Together: The Shawnee People through Diaspora and Nationhood, 1600–1870 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), 84-86, 112-115; John Sugden, Blue Jacket: Warrior of the Shawnees (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), 73-76; and Stephen Aron, How the West was Lost: The Transformation of Kentucky from Daniel Boone to Henry Clay (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 49.

contentious meetings between U.S. officials and small groups of American Indian leaders in the late 1780s led to threatening responses from the Confederated Council. This in turn gave way to a new round of war that was fueled by powerful but differing conceptions of sovereignty, territory, culture, and natural or divine rights. These were existential matters for a growing Western Confederacy and its constituent members as well as for the Congress and U.S. citizens with direct interests in the region. Consequently, there was little to no possibility of compromise—particularly when one party or the other felt on the brink of achieving and validating its goals through military victory.\(^5\)

**Figure 5.1: Boundaries and Populations, mid 1780s.** While it does not reference the Wyandot, Odawa (Ottawa) and Bodéwadmi (Potawatomi) towns around western Lake Erie and southern Lake Michigan, this map shows approximate locations of Native population distributions to the north and west of the Ohio River. **Source:** Detail from Thomas Kitchin, *North America drawn from the latest and best authorities* (London: John Harrison, 1787). **Source:** Library of Congress.

**United and Divided**

In the United States, views on American Indians and their lands reflected a broad consensus: the former should move further west or north, and the latter incorporated into the commercial and political systems of the new nation. Within this broadly shared vision, however, lay important differences that reflected key political, regional, and economic divides. Through the 1780s, congressional leaders from the eastern seaboard and the Virginia Piedmont wanted to avoid costly wars and hoped to orchestrate an

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orderly transfer of American Indian lands to the federal government—which would then be surveyed and put up for sale to private consortiums or companies. In the western districts of New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, such plans ran afoul of a widely-shared resentment against land companies and a general sense that members of Congress looked to benefit directly from the policies they enacted. Similar attitudes prevailed in Kentucky, but were tinged with a fierce loathing of American Indians and a conviction that federal authority should be limited to protecting commerce on the Ohio River and using military force to help Kentuckians drive Native peoples out of the region.\textsuperscript{6}

In some respects, these divisions reflected the ongoing debates between Federalists and Anti-Federalists on the nature and course of the new nation; yet the tone of constitutional disagreements paled in comparison to the mutual contempt that infused rival opinions about western land policy, property rights, American Indians, and equality. Indeed, these matters threatened to divide the new republic before it even had a constitution. Between 1784 and 1788, a number of leading figures in Tennessee and Kentucky became increasingly “determined to free themselves from a dependence on Congress, as that body could not or would not protect their persons and property nor encourage their commerce.” Their complaints revolved around taxes, a lack of equal political representation, no federal assistance with defending against American Indian attacks, and the Congress’ inability to secure commercial access to the Mississippi River. By 1787, Revolutionary War General James Wilkinson became a leading advocate for establishing a separate western confederation and worked with the Spanish in Louisiana “for our admission to her protection as subjects.”\textsuperscript{7}

Leading political figures in the East sought to avoid all of these outcomes. As George Washington complained in 1784, “the rage for speculating in, and forestalling of Lands” caused men to “roam over the Country on the Indian side of the Ohio—mark out Lands—Survey—and even settle them. This gives great discontent to the Indians, and will unless measures are taken in time to prevent it, inevitably produce a war with the western Tribes.” To avoid such a war, Washington believed that Congress should work to purchase lands in what is now northeastern Ohio and develop a clear plan for their survey and disposition. Yet he fully expected a “disappointment” in this matter since “the Indians, [as he had] been told, will not yield to the proposal.” Consequently, Washington determined that the best way to avoid a costly war and establish strong relations with Native leaders (with an eye toward future land acquisition) required a strong exercise of federal authority against “ignorant” westerners. Congress, he believed, should declare

\textsuperscript{6} For an overview of these matters, see Kevin Patrick Kopper, “Arthur St. Clair and the Struggle for Power in the Old Northwest” (PhD diss., Kent State University, 2005), 82-93; and Bethel Saler, \textit{The Settlers’ Empire: Colonialism and State Formation in America’s Old Northwest}. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015) 13-22.

that anyone “who shall presume to mark—Survey—or settle Lands beyond the limits of the New States, & purchased Lands, shall not only be considered as outlaws, but fit subjects for Indian vengeance.”

Many American Indian leaders certainly agreed with Washington on part of his assessment: they did not wish to sell land, they despised land-jobbers and squatters for bringing violence, and they feared a renewal of the conflicts that accompanied the Revolution. On the other hand, other Native leaders and their communities shared some of Wilkinson’s predilections. At about the same time that Washington was arguing for more deference to federal authority and Wilkinson was hoping to establish political and commercial ties with Spanish Louisiana, a large delegation of Haudenosaunee, Shawnee, Chahta (Choctaw), Chikashsha (Chickasaw), and Lunaapeew (Lenape, or Delaware) met with Lieutenant Governor Francisco Cruzat in St. Louis. As Cruzat reported on the meeting, they complained that during the Revolutionary War

[T]he Americans, a great deal more ambitious and numerous than the English, put us out of our lands, forming therein great settlements, extending themselves like a plague of locusts in the territories of the Ohio River which we inhabit. They treat us as their cruellest enemies are treated, so that today hunger and the impetuous torrent of war which they impose upon us with other terrible calamities, have brought our villages to a struggle with death.  

This particular delegation, which numbered 260 individuals, came from communities between the eastern reaches of the Ohio to the Tennessee River Basin that had formed a wartime alliance in the late 1770s. With the Peace of Paris and the geopolitical shift that ensued, they had come to Cruzat to explore the possibility of opening a formal relationship with a different imperial power. This was not an act of diplomatic desperation or a sign of dependency. Rather, it was a strategic effort to establish a necessary alliance with an imperial power that was also wary of the British and the new republic to the east. Cruzat welcomed the delegation, as he had many others from south of the Ohio River over the past few years, but he could do little more than offer token gifts. Spain worried a great deal about the changed landscape of North America, and desired allies against the expected encroachments of U.S. citizens and British traders, but the Spanish colony of Luisiana did not have enough resources or personnel to sustain such an alliance.

### Seeking Order on Native Ground

The visit to St. Louis offers a window on three distinct ways that Indigenous communities would respond to a fragile new regime that was committed to the acquisition of Native lands. The one objective they all shared was to strengthen, or at

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10 Lakomäki, Gathering Together, 101-02; Martha Royce Blaine, The Ioway Indians (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1979) 68-70; and DuVal, “Independence for Whom?,” 104-06. Under the Spanish, the former French colony of Louisiana was administered as Luisiana.
least maintain, the ability to shape their futures in accordance with present needs and
inherited traditions. For many this meant staying in their villages and on their lands,
sustaining alliances that had developed over generations, and keeping the Long Knives at
bay. For others, geographic distance provided the best opportunity for peace and
autonomy, as was the case for the 1784 delegation to St. Louis and several other groups
that had chosen to rebuild their lives and communities in the area over the previous
decade. The third variation would reflect a commitment to working out a peaceful
accommodation with the United States. This approach was favored by a relatively small
number of civil leaders who held traditional roles as mediators, and whose communities
had endeavored to remain independent of exclusive alliances with either the British or the
patriot cause. Mediation would necessarily involve difficult (and perhaps impossible)
compromise, but if successful these leaders hoped to establish lasting terms for peace and
find a favored place for themselves within the post-revolutionary landscape.\footnote{11
Stephen Warren, The Shawnees and Their Neighbors, 1795-1870 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press,
2005), 17-18; Lakomäki, Gathering Together, 105-06; Lisa Brooks, “Two Paths to Peace: Competing
Visions of Native Space in the Old Northwest,” in The Boundaries Between Us: Natives and Newcomers
along the Frontiers of the Old Northwest Territory, 1750-1850, ed. Danel P. Barr (Kent: Kent State
University Press, 2006), 87-117; Helen Hornbeck Tanner, Atlas of Great Lakes Indian History (Norman:
Published for the Newberry Library by the University of Oklahoma Press, 1987), 92-95.

All of these positions, whether they implied conflict, migration, or
accommodation, would be complicated by two external factors: the sometimes
conflicting interests of U.S. citizens and political leaders, and the vacillating policies of
the British in the years immediately following the Peace of Paris. In the case of the
former, the latent hostility that existed between squatters, regional leaders, and eastern
political elites resulted in disunited policies that failed to take American Indian concerns
seriously and managed to offend at least one domestic interest group at every turn. British
policies had less potential volatility, but they still complicated the strategies of Native
leaders. In British North America, Provincial Governor Haldimand and members of the
British Indian Department viewed the Peace of Paris as a betrayal of their Indigenous
allies and an abrogation of the 1768 Treaty of Fort Stanwix. Officials in London
dispassionately concurred, but declined to resurrect a military alliance that might protect
Indigenous rights in the Ohio Valley and Great Lakes region. The result was a variable
middle course in which the British Indian Department supported erstwhile allies just
enough to dampen charges of wholesale abandonment (and the feared retaliations against
British subjects that might engender), but not so much as to encourage more conflict with
the United States. The general effect was a diminished alliance with new elements of
distrust and unpredictability.\footnote{12 Jon K. Lauck, The Lost Region: Toward a Revival of Midwestern History (Iowa City: University of Iowa

Independencies

Following the shocking news of the Peace of Paris, these various fault lines may
have been predictable—but they were not yet fully formed. In either case, a growing
number of American Indian leaders realized that the strongest way forward had to start
from a unified position that spoke with a single voice. In expectation of formal
negotiations with the new United States in the coming year, delegates from thirty-five
Native communities gathered at Upper Sandusky in the summer and fall of 1783. In
consultation with officers of the British Indian Department they assessed the common dangers that all Native communities faced, and worked to formalize a broad confederacy that accommodated new conditions and sought peace while affirming the basic goals of the alliances that had opposed the Long Knives in the recently ended war. Given the diversity of interests and cultures, this was a complex task—yet it was rooted in two simple convictions. First, that the territorial claims described in the Peace of Paris did not apply to the Indigenous peoples of the Ohio Valley and Great Lakes; and second, that formal relations with the United States must be channeled through a broad representative council that spoke for all. As the historian Robert Allen notes, the first action of this new council was to voice a fundamental diplomatic position: “a satisfactory peace settlement could only be realized by a general agreement between Congress, represented by all the American states, and the Indian confederation, represented by all the tribes.”

Such a declaration of independence did not square with the expectations of the Confederation Congress any more than the terms of the 1783 treaty between Great Britain and the United States made sense to the leaders who gathered at Sandusky. Yet for all concerned, the possibility of compromise or overlapping sovereignties was inconceivable. Having clear territorial boundaries in the Ohio Valley was as central to the development and exercise of federal authority in the United States as it was for the legitimacy of what would become known as the Confederated Council Fire. Given this fundamental impasse, each failure to exercise sovereignty or to nullify the other’s claim would bring the specter of war nearer—which would in turn present a riddle on how best to prevent, avoid, or win such a war. Disagreement on these matters would exacerbate the fault lines described above and hampered unified action on each side of the impasse. When conflict ensued, however, these fractures subsided almost completely in the case of victory—but opened wide after defeat.

Defining U.S. Sovereignty

While the Sandusky councils were underway, U.S. political leaders worked to develop a unified policy regarding western lands and peoples. A first order of business was to forestall the chaos that would ensue if land companies or states (wielding colonial charters with overlapping claims in the “Ohio Country”) made direct land purchases from American Indians. Toward these ends, the Congress of the Confederation issued a Proclamation in September 1783 that restricted all land acquisition authority to the “United States in Congress assembled,” and prohibited “making settlements on lands inhabited or claimed by Indians, [beyond] the limits or jurisdiction of any particular State.” While this proclamation echoed the Royal Proclamation of 1763, and reserved broad sovereign powers to the precursor of the federal government, it resurrected General Amherst’s conceit that government officials dictated to, rather than negotiated with, American Indians. The first congressionally authorized councils with specific Native groups in the Ohio Valley were intended to function as pro forma surrender ceremonies followed by large forfeitures of land. Nothing of the sort was imagined by the British in

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13 Allen, His Majesty’s Indian Allies, 59-64; quotation on p. 64. While most delegations came from areas to the south, southwest, and west of Lake Erie, the Council included groups from the Illinois River Valley, the Tennessee River Valley, the Ottawa River Valley, and throughout the Great Lakes.

1763, nor even attempted by Amherst, but the Revolution inspired a new kind of American Indian policy that was predicated on a very novel conception of treaties and international law.

The authority that Congress claimed over the Ohio Valley and other areas covered by the Peace of Paris was based upon the Continental Army’s victory over the British in North America. The territorial and jurisdictional authority that Great Britain transferred to the United States was itself acquired by the conquest of New France. However, what Great Britain and France understood as their sovereignty in North America, in regard to Native peoples, was limited to what might be described as preemptive rights of negotiation. The former Province of Quebec, for instance, was the region where all European powers recognized Great Britain’s exclusive right to negotiate with American Indian groups for establishing commercial relations or the acquisition of territory. Native peoples might interact or cooperate with another European power, but Great Britain had a recognized right to initiate relations within its territorial claims. By the standards of late 18th-century international law, these were the primary rights that the United States received in the Peace of Paris. Since none of the Native peoples north and west of the Ohio River had ever been conquered by any European power, let alone the new United States, this region was possessed, rather than “inhabited or claimed by,” American Indians. In short, the “right of conquest” that Congress claimed did not extend any further than the exclusive right to treat directly with American Indians.

Though peculiar by international standards, the initial efforts to acquire lands in the Ohio Valley reflected the confidence that came with defeating Great Britain and embarking on the establishment of a new kind of nation. Perhaps more significantly, it also grew out of desperate concerns over the fiscal crisis that years of war had imposed on the new nation. Veterans of the war, both regulars and militia, were still owed for months of unpaid service. The threat of mutiny over lack of pay was a common and serious threat during the war, but by 1782 veterans were on the verge of revolt in Vermont and elsewhere. A shortage of funds was compounded by the massive war-related debts the new nation owed for loans received from France, Spain, and the Netherlands, as well as the condition in the Peace of Paris that obligated the United States to assume the outstanding debts of the thirteen former colonies of Great Britain.

The only substantial asset the Congress claimed, by virtue of the Proclamation of 1783, was the land in what Americans referred to as “the Ohio Country.” The sooner it could be acquired, the sooner it could be used as collateral for more borrowing; and once it was converted into real estate and sold, the sooner Congress could start paying off its considerable debts. Moreover, the urgent concern about rebellious veterans would be

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15 At the time of the American Revolution, the Province of Quebec encompassed an area that extended northeastward from the Ohio River to include most of the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence river basins as well part of the Labrador Peninsula.
addressed with scrip that could be formally exchanged for land to the west of the Alleghennies or informally used as a kind of currency. Lastly, the transformation of American Indian land into U.S. farms would allow the depressed postwar economy to recover and give rise to a thriving agrarian nation. In short, land was viewed as a kind of specie that could rescue a cash-strapped economy and ensure the survival of a small republic in a world of powerful empires.  

“pen and ink witch-craft”

U.S. and American Indian conceptions of sovereignty, war, negotiation, and representation all collided in confounding ways during the first treaty council of the post-Revolutionary era. Held at Fort Stanwix in October 1784, the council included three Commissioners appointed by Congress and thirteen Haudenosaunee representatives. After listening to the Commissioners’ pre-written treaty terms, the Haudenosaunee speakers responded with statements that they were only authorized to establish terms of peace and could make no decisions regarding the disposition of lands. The Commissioners responded with an impatient denunciation, and sought to disabuse the Haudenosaunee of any sense that they were “a free and independent nation, and may make what terms you please. It is not so.” Backed by militias from New Jersey and Pennsylvania, the Commissioners told the Haudenosaunee,

You are a subdued people; you have been overcome in a war which you entered into with us without provocation, but in violation of most sacred obligations. The great spirit who is at the same time the judge and avenger of perfidy, has given us victory over all our enemies. We are at peace with all but you. You now stand out alone against our whole force.

The meeting at Fort Stanwix was not a treaty council so much as a shake down, in which the Haudenosaunee were told to forfeit their “claims” to a large swath of western New York, the northwestern third of Pennsylvania (including all lands west of the Ohio River), and much of what later became northeastern Ohio. Only a portion of this area was recognized by other Native groups as Haudenosaunee Territory, but the Commissioners defined the treaty boundaries through a decades-old notion that all peoples in the Upper Ohio Valley were subjects of—or represented by—the Six Nations. Even as the

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18 The idea of using land policy to foster an agrarian-based national economy is most closely associated with the geopolitical vision of Thomas Jefferson. Among many works on the subject, see Peter S. Onuf, *Jefferson’s Empire: The Language of American Nationhood* (Charlottesville: The University of Virginia Press), 53-79.

19 Phrase comes from a statement by the Odawa war leader Agwazhe'aa (Egushawa) in 1791, referencing the treaties of Fort Stanwix (1784), Fort Harmar (1786), and Fort Finney (1786)—which are discussed in the following pages. See Alexander McKee, *Minutes of Debates in Council on the Banks of the Ottawa, (Commonly called the Miamia of the Lake) November 1791* (Philadelphia: William Young, 1792), 11. Punctuation and spelling follows the original text. The reference to “Ottawa [River]” in the document title is a direct translation of several Indigenous names for what has come to be known as the Maumee River.

20 Each of the Six Nations of the Haudenosaunee were represented by two delegates. The thirteenth delegate was the renowned Onöndowága (Onondaga, or Seneca) war leader Gaiänt'wakê (Cornplanter), who became an advocate for good relations with the United States after the Revolutionary War.

Haudenosaunee representatives tried to explain they were only authorized to discuss matters related to establishing peaceful relations, the Commissioners insisted on a wholesale capitulation to their stated terms. Greatly outnumbered by the assembled militia, the Haudenosaunee representatives placed their marks on the document and delivered six hostages to the commissioners—an act that was originally intended as a guarantee of their desire for peace. In return, they were given a promise that the Commissioners would “order goods to be delivered to the [Haudenosaunee] for their use and comfort.”

When the Haudenosaunee returned to the Six Nations Council near Niagara, they were severely chastised. The Council quickly sent a message to the U.S. Commissioners, reminding them that the Haudenosaunee delegates were sent to begin negotiating a peace treaty. None were authorized to cede any lands, especially those not even claimed by the Haudenosaunee, and the Council could not accept the terms of the document the commissioners had drawn up. Western groups that utilized the ceded areas were furious with the Haudenosaunee and promptly disavowed the treaty. Upon hearing of these denunciations and disavowals, the Commissioners and Congress remained unswayed; the treaties, as they understood them, represented an honorable gesture by the conquerors to the conquered. From their perspective, the United States did not need permission to possess the land—but still wanted to establish peace through the courtesy of a formal meeting and the subsequent delivery of presents.

The pattern established at Fort Stanwix was repeated a few months later when a delegation of thirteen Wyandot, Lenape (or Delaware), Odawa (Ottawa), and Ojibwe (Ojibway, or Chippewa) met with U.S. commissioners at Fort McIntosh on the upper Ohio River. The Wyandot, Lenape, and Odawa who led the delegation came from communities around Upper and Lower Sandusky that had endeavored to remain neutral during the Revolutionary War, and now hoped to initiate a peaceful reconciliation with the United States. The U.S. commission, led by George Rogers Clark and backed by Pennsylvania militia, had already drawn up a draft document that described a vast cession of land and a statement that all signatories pledged “themselves and all their tribes to be under the protection of the United States and of no other sovereign whatsoever.” As was the case with the Haudenosaunee before, the delegation from Upper and Lower Sandusky came to negotiate a peace agreement, they were neither prepared nor authorized to affirm a pre-written document, let alone cede land. In the context of discussions regarding the residential and use areas of their various communities, however, they likely concurred with language in the treaty document that broadly described an area between the Cuyahoga River on the east and the lower Maumee River to the west as the expanse of land they shared with other Indigenous groups.

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For the U.S. commissioners, a general agreement on the common territory of these three allied Native groups became something quite different in the final treaty document. Lines were sharply delineated on a map, and “the United States allot[ed] all the lands contained within the said lines” to the “Indians who sign this treaty … and all their tribes.” More significantly, the treaty used these boundaries to define a vast cession of all “the lands East, South and West of the lines … to the United States.” To the north, a six-mile wide stretch of territory from the River Raisin to Lake St. Clair (approximately 190,00 acres), along with 120 acres around Fort Mackinac, was also “reserved to the sole use of the United States.”  

None of the signatories would have ever proposed such language; the area between the River Raisin and Detroit encompassed the villages of their close kin, for whom they did not speak, and the indeterminate stretch of territory “to the East, South and West” encompassed the territories of Shawnee, Myaamia (Miami), and Bodéwadmi (Potawatomi), as well as other Lunaapeew and Odawa, for whom they did not speak. The request, and then demand, that the American Indian delegation put its marks on the document was immediately resisted. Plied with liquor and repeated threats, the signatories “were influenced to the act [of putting down their marks], in order to save their lives: and that [the U.S. commissioners] told them, that every nation should be destroyed, who would not enter into the like agreement.”

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25 Quotation is from “Treaty with the Wyandot, etc., 1785,” 2: 8.
26 McKee, Minutes of Debates in Council, 9. In a letter to George Washington, Governor St. Clair described the “negotiation as both tedious and troublesome, and for a long time had an unpromising aspect, but it
The purpose of the Fort Stanwix and Fort McIntosh treaties was not to gain assent from—let alone negotiate with—the representatives named in a treaty. Rather, the goal was to create a document that described specific territorial boundaries and possessed the signatures of duly authorized U.S. commissioners as well marks of identified American Indian leaders. Once accepted by the Congress these documents effectively authorized the survey and disposition of lands in accordance with the Land Ordinances of 1784 and 1785. Much as had occurred with the British in 1763, however, the Commissioners and Congress overplayed their hands at each step. The treaties did not keep U.S. citizens from crossing the Ohio in the vicinity of the lower Muskingum or other points along the upper Ohio River. Rather, “a parcel of banditti who bid defiance to all authority”—as George Washington put it—viewed the recent agreements as a license to squat on lands before they were surveyed and sold. Nor did the councils result in an even temporary peace. In response to the recent treaty councils, and in retaliation for the new encroachments across the Ohio, groups of Shawnee, Lunaapeew (Lenape, or Delaware), and Ökwe'öwé (Seneca-Cayuga; aka, “Mingo”) warriors raided both sides of the river, and Kentuckians retaliated. Worse still, from the perspective of the Congress, the strategy of dealing with discrete groups and communities did not undermine the Western Confederacy. On the contrary, it would only become more unified through its rejection of the treaties.

Talking Past Each Other

In May 1785, less than four months after the Fort McIntosh treaty, a small party of U.S. representatives came to meet with a gathering of Shawnee, Ökwe'öwé, Lunaapeew, and Tsalaghi (Cherokee) at the Shawnee town of Wakatomika. The renowned war leader Kekewpelethy (Great Hawk, aka, Captain Johnny) gave the principal speech, and sharply denounced the manner in which the United States conducted treaties. “You know … Virginians, you kindled a Council Fire at Fort Stanwix … Afterwards you kindled another at Beaver Creek … [Both times] You told us that all the Country was yours—[then] Seiz’d and detained [our Brethren as] Prisoners” to make them agree. Knowing that the group before him wanted to “kindle another Council Fire,” Kekewpelethy made it clear that “we see your Intention—… your design is to take our Country from us[,]” “We remind you,” he continued, “that you will find all the people of our Colour in this Island strong[,] unanimous, and determined to act as one man in Defence of it, therefore be strong and keep your people … to your side of the Ohio.”

Punctuation and spelling follows the original text. The name and translation of Peteasuva comes from this document, but the word “peteasuva” does not match or approximate the etymology of Shawnee words for snake, serpent, or various types of specific snakes.
Another U.S. delegation came back to Wakatomika and other nearby Shawnee towns in November—asking to hold a general council at the Mouth of the Great Miami River in two months. This time they were addressed by the war leader and orator Peteasuva (Snake, aka Captain Snake). Addressing the “Brethren (of the thirteen fires),” he began by noting that a delegation of Wyandot and Lunaapeew from Upper Sandusky had recently brought “us the Sentiments of the Ten Great Nations who speak different languages, and live along the Great Lakes & their Confederates.” “Brethren,” he continued,

we are unanimous, and it is not right that you kindle fires among [small and discrete groups]. Therefore we inform you that at [Big Rock, aka Brownstown] is the Antient [sic] Council Fire of our forefathers, there is the proper place, and when we see you there we will take you by the Hand, which cannot be sooner than next Spring, as we must have time to hear from the other Nations to the Westward, nothing can be done by us, but by General consent, we act and speak like one man.

At the close of this brief but forceful message, Peteasuva sent the U.S. messengers away with a string of white wampum and a pipe as tokens of peace. 30

Like Peteasuva, most all the leaders of the Shawnee towns on the Mad and upper Great Miami rivers rejected U.S. entreaties to meet in council at the mouth of the Great Miami. Yet a substantial delegation of Mekoche Shawnee from Wakatomika sent messages to U.S. officials that they would attend the council in mid-January. As Sami Lakómäki notes, the Mekoche were motivated by traditional and historically specific concerns. Within the five Shawnee divisions or septs, the Mekoche had long represented the Shawnee as a whole in matters relating to peace—and their civil leaders had frequently advocated neutrality over the past two decades of conflict. However, in the wake of the Fort Stanwix and Fort McIntosh treaties, which claimed all Shawnee territories north of the Ohio River, there was almost no room for neutrality and little hope for peace. Yet this situation also made it “extremely important for Mekoche leaders to [validate their waning] authority by negotiating a peace with the United States.” 31 The Mekoche war leader Kekewepetelethe was chosen to lead the delegation, and to make certain that U.S. commissioners clearly understood the council was about “amicable matters” and would not touch on “any Engagements respecting Lands.” 32

The first day of the council, which also included representatives from the Sandusky Wyandot and Lunaapeew (Lenape, or Delaware), showed promise. Initial statements by the U.S. commissioners and the Mekoche delegation seemed to confirm

30 Quotations from the translated and transcribed speech of Peteasuva are from “Copy of Speech delivered at Wakitumekie to Amn Messengers Novr 8th 1785,” in Historical Collections and Researches Made by the Michigan Pioneer and Historical Society 24 (Lansing: Robert Smith & Co., 1895), 24-25; hereafter cited as Historical Collections and volume number. Punctuation and spelling follows the original text. The “Ten Great Nations … & their Confederates” refers to various communities and alliances of Wyandot, Anishinaabeg (Odawa, Ojibwe, Bodéwadmi, and Mississauga), Six Nations and Seven Nations Haudenosaunee, and Myaamia. Waktomika was situated on the Mad River, near present-day Zanesville, Ohio. Also see Sami Lakomäki, Gathering Together: The Shawnee People Through Diaspora and Nationhood, 1600-1870 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), 117-19.


32 Quotation from McKee to Johnson, 482.
that “everything past would be forgotten; that [Shawnee] proposals for collecting [and returning] prisoners [from the Revolutionary War] were satisfactory, and that we would be placed on the same footing as before the war.”33 On the second day, however, the U.S. commissioners presented a treaty document with the same bold terms that had been delivered at Fort Stanwix and Fort McIntosh. As an officer at the council noted in his journal, the Shawnee representatives

were told that as they had joined the English and taken up the hatchet against the United States, and … that the English … had ceded the whole of the country on this side of the lakes to the Americans; that they, the Indians, must now look up to the Americans, and ought to be thankful if allowed to occupy any part of the country.34

Kekewepelethe immediately protested that the Shawnee and their allies had never been conquered, and denounced the entire council. “God gave us this country, we do not understand measuring out lands, it is all ours.”35

After a brief conference amongst themselves, the commissioners chastised Kekewepelethe for being “unwise and ungrateful,” and warned that failure to affirm the treaty would result in a state of war within ten days that would involve “the destruction of your women and children.” The Shawnee were given another day to reconsider or depart with no agreement, and no presents. How many left with Kekewepelethe is unrecorded, but in their absence the elder Mekoche leader Moluntha became the primary Shawnee spokesperson at Fort Finney. As a hokima (a male civil, or peace chief), Moluntha was predisposed to peaceful resolutions and had long worked to avoid conflict with Kentuckians. The following day, under threat of an imminent war and surrounded by soldiers, Moluntha expressed regret about the previous day’s talk of war, apologized for the speech of Kekewepelethe, and asked for “pity on women and children.” Then Moluntha and other Mekoche leaders put their marks on the Treaty of Fort Finney, which stated that the Shawnee forfeited most of southwestern Ohio and southern Indiana to the United States, and agreed to reside within the boundaries defined at Fort McIntosh.36

The Opposite of Peace

Instead of producing a hoped-for peace that validated the diplomatic leadership of the Mekoche, the Treaty of Fort Finney brought violence and discord to Shawnee

34 Quotations from Ebenezer Denny, Military journal of Major Ebenezer Denny, and Officer in the Revolutionary and Indian Wars (Philadelphia: Historical Society of Pennsylvania, 1859), 73. Punctuation and spelling follows the original text.
36 Lakomäki, Gathering Together, 118-20. Quotations from Ebenezer Denny, Military journal of Major Ebenezer Denny, and Officer in the Revolutionary and Indian Wars (Philadelphia: Historical Society of Pennsylvania, 1859), 73. Also see “Butler’s Journal,” 524-25, 529-31; and Mann, “The Greenville Treaty of 1795,” 157-58. While Kekewepethe’s mark appears on the final treaty document, most—but not all—sources indicate that he was not present. Mann suggests that the mark is a forgery. Other prominent Mekoche Shawnee who put their marks on the document included Oweeconnee (Shade), Cawechile (Peace Woman) and Musquaconocah (Red Pole).
country. Upon its return from Fort Finney, the Mekoche delegation was roundly criticized for acting against its original charge to not entertain any requests about land, and for violating the principle that no land could be ceded without the agreement of all affected nations. The other Shawnee septs (Chalahgawtha, Thawikila, Kispoka, and Pekowi), and most Mekoche, immediately disavowed the treaty. In the coming months Kekewepetethe would be praised for adhering to the principles expressed during the November council at Wakatomika, while Moluntha lost prestige. The latter still worked for peace, however, and maintained communication with the British at Detroit and U.S. officials at Fort Finney. In early spring of 1786 he told the British “We never have been in more need of your friendship and good offices. We have been cheated by the Americans, who are still striving to work our destruction, and without your assistance they may be able to accomplish their ends.” Then a few months later he requested that the “chiefs” at Fort Finney “have patience” as he continued to do “all he [could] to fulfill the promises made … at the council fire.” These were not the actions of a turn-coat or a double-agent, so much as the efforts of a weakened hokima still trying to fulfill his role as a peacemaker. Yet his diminished circumstances, and his hope that peace might be won through separate appeals to the greatest adversaries on the continent, were clear signs that war was imminent and his goals unattainable.37

In the wake of the Fort Stanwix and Fort McIntosh treaties, increasing numbers of U.S. citizens had begun moving westward across the Allegheny and Cumberland mountains, or by flat boat down the Ohio River from Pittsburgh. The latter made easy targets for raids by Ökwe'öwé (Seneca-Cayuga; aka, “Mingo”) and Tsalagihí (Cherokee) warriors—who had maintained a pattern of low-level violence against settler incursions since the end of the Revolutionary War. After the Fort Finney Treaty, and as flotillas of flatboats made their way down the Ohio River during the spring freshet, Shawnee and Lunaapeew (Lenape, or Delaware) warriors from the upper Mad River also began attacks along the Ohio and into Kentucky. These actions quickly led to a general call for resistance against the Long Knives, and messengers were sent to the north and the west. By summer, large numbers of Bodéwadmi, Ojibwe, and Odawa had answered the call and were enroute to the Shawnee towns. At about the same time, forty-seven war canoes from villages and towns on the upper Wabash River poured into Vincennes after a nearby Piankeshaw village was attacked by Kentucky militia. The French Canadiens of Vincennes warned their U.S. neighbors, who found refuge inside Fort Patrick Henry, and then mediated a truce before a full-scale assault could begin. The episode ended with the destruction of some U.S crops as the warriors departed for home.38

In response to the near attack on Vincennes, General George Rogers Clark led a force of 1,200 Kentucky militia toward the Piankeshaw and Kiikaapoi (Kickapoo) towns around the confluence of the Vermillion and Wabash rivers. However, the ultimate target of the campaign was a planned attack on the Myaamia towns at the headwaters of the Wabash and Maumee rivers. As Clark led his force up the Wabash, General Benjamin Logan led a contingent of militia and U.S. Regulars toward the Shawnee towns on the Mad River. While Clark’s campaign was forced to turn back due to insufficient supplies and desertion, Logan’s force reached its mark in early October. Known as “Logan’s

37 Sugden, Blue Jacket, 71-72; quotations are from p. 72
38 Arthur J. Leighton, “‘Eyes on the Wabash’: A History of Indiana’s Indian People from Pre-Contact through Removal,” (PhD diss., Purdue University, 2007), 154-58.
Raid,” this second action proved more damaging since the Shawnee towns had been left undefended when their warriors went to support their allies against Clark. Logan’s forces destroyed food stores, burned thirteen towns and villages, took at least thirty captives, and killed ten—including the elderly Moluntha.³⁹

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Dueling Sovereignties

In December 1786, just a few months after the attacks on the Shawnee towns, representatives from most all of the groups in the Ohio Valley and Great Lakes region came together in council at Big Rock (Brownstown) to discuss a united response to U.S. treaties and military campaigns. The result was a document sent to Congress in early January in which the “United Indian Nations at the Confederated Council” noted their astonishment at not having been included in the Peace of Paris, and denounced the “partial treaties” of 1784, 1785, and 1786 “as void and having no effect.” They then informed the Congress that legitimate treaties with the United States would have to be “carried on … with the general voice of the whole confederacy, and carried on in the most open manner, without any restraint on either side.” After expressing their regret over recent violence along the Ohio River, the Grand Council proposed a council in the spring to negotiate a formal treaty of friendship and understanding with the United States. In order to establish trust and restore peace between their peoples, the Council also requested that Congress “order your Surveyors and others that mark out lands, to cease from crossing the Ohio, until we shall have spoken to you because the mischief that has recently happened has originated in that quarter. [W]e shall likewise prevent our people from going over until that time.”

As Native leaders worked to ensure that the Western Confederacy as a whole (rather than individual groups or leaders) dealt with the United States, Congress endeavored to complete a comprehensive plan for the administration of what was known as the Northwest Territory. In a series of three land ordinances in 1784, 1785, and 1787, the Confederated Congress reaffirmed the basic tenets of the Proclamation of 1783: namely, that the entire region between the Mississippi and Ohio rivers was under the authority of Congress, and that only agents of the national government could acquire lands from Native groups and subsequently survey them for sale or disposal. To ensure that this process did not give rise to unnecessary conflict, the 1787 “Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United States, North-West of the River Ohio” further declared that

The utmost good faith shall always be observed towards the Indians; their lands and property shall never be taken from them without their consent; and, in their property, rights, and liberty, they shall never be invaded or disturbed, unless in just and lawful wars authorized by Congress; but laws founded in justice and humanity, shall from time to time be made for preventing wrongs being done to them, and for preserving peace and friendship with them.


Figure 5.4 Organizing the “Northwest Territory”: Map illustrates three key features of the Land Ordinances of 1784, 1785, and 1787. The light green area corresponds to the geographic bounds of the 1784 Plan for the Temporary Government of the Western Territory, while the sectional grid survey corresponds to Thomas Jefferson’s original proposal for how the region would be divided into 10 new states. The inset illustrates the first area surveyed in accordance with An ordinance for ascertaining the mode of disposing of lands in the Western Territory (1785). All lands were organized into 36 square-mile Townships that were further divided into one-square mile (640-acre) Sections. Sections were often sold or granted in smaller divisions of 320, 160, 80, and 40 acres. This process established the cadastral survey system that was later applied to most of what is now the western United States. Current state boundaries are visible in light gray lines.

While this language reflected some discomfort in the Congress over recent conflicts, the primary focus of all three ordinances was on the process that would commence once “the Indian titles shall have been extinguished.” The 1785 Ordinance had already sought to regularize American settlement patterns through orderly grid surveys that prevented squatting, promoted town development, and ensured sufficient acreage for any agricultural enterprise. The 1787 Ordinance, which subsumed the previous two, also established the methods for creating new states and the process of their admission into the Union “on an equal footing with the original States in all respects whatever.” By assuring western settlers that their territorial or colonial status was temporary, and that they would become equal members of the Republic, the Northwest Ordinances of 1785 and 1787 redefined imperial expansion as a process of nation

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42 Ibid.
building, and westward migration as an exercise of full citizenship through property ownership. In effect, this process was intended to erase the vestiges of the 1763 Proclamation Line.\textsuperscript{43}

Even as the formal pronouncements of the Western Confederacy and the Confederation Congress sought to address some of the same issues, they both struggled to project a unified policy or voice. This was confirmed at the Treaty of Fort Harmar in January of 1789 which, due to a series of communication errors, occurred some eight months later than the Grand Council had initially proposed. Prior to the treaty council, a significant number of leaders from the Western Confederacy assembled at Upper Sandusky to confer and prepare for the journey to the treaty council site at the mouth of the Muskingum River. However, a proposal by some to compromise with the Americans and cede lands to the east of the Muskingum created a division and caused a brief delay. During this interim a forceful message came from Governor Arthur St. Clair (the head of the commission representing the United States), making clear his expectation that the forthcoming treaty council would essentially reconfirm the terms of the Fort Macintosh Treaty. For many of the members of the Western Confederacy, agreeing to or finding ways to compromise on the terms of a rejected treaty was out of the question. Consequently, representatives of the Myaamia (Miami), Bodéwadmi, and Shawnee, along with most of the Odawa and Lunaapeew (Lenape, or Delaware), and as many as half of the Wyandot, departed for their homes along the Detroit, Miami, Maumee and Wabash rivers, as did the Kanien’kehaha (Mohawk) leader Thayendanegea (aka, Joseph Brant)—who returned to his village near the Niagara Peninsula.\textsuperscript{44}

At the Fort Harmar council, which was almost exclusively attended by members of the Western Confederacy who were inclined toward compromise with the United States, the proposal for a boundary at the Muskingum River was rejected outright by St. Clair. Contrary to directions from the War Department, which placed an emphasis on preventing further cause for conflict or resentment against the United States, St. Clair insisted on full recognition of the four-year old Fort McIntosh land cession. Generous gifts seemed to tamp down the discord among the Confederacy delegates, but several still declined to put their marks on a formal document. St. Clair, for his part, forgot to bring a white belt of wampum that would have confirmed U.S. agreement to the terms and the conditions of peace they implied. Reports on such missteps and heavy-handedness on the part of St. Clair were soon brought to the Confederated Council by the delegates who left the Fort Harmar council early or did not put their marks on the treaty document. Not surprisingly, St. Clair’s actions and demands were alarming, and they only strengthened


\textsuperscript{44} At the time of the council at Fort Harmar, Arthur St. Clair was the Governor of the Northwest Territory. He had previously served as President of the Congress. This and the following paragraph are based on the following sources: Governor St Clair to the Secretary of War, January 18, 1789; and Governor St. Clair to the President, May 2, 1789” in \textit{The St. Clair Papers: The Life and Public Services of Arthur St. Clair}, ed. William Henry Smith (Cincinnati: Robert Clarke & Co, 1882), 2: 108-113; James McIntyre, “Fort Harmar, Ohio,” in \textit{Treaties with American Indians: An Encyclopedia of Rights, Conflicts, and Sovereignty}, ed. Donald L. Fixico (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC Clio, 2008), 420; Celia Barnes, \textit{Native American Power in the United States, 1783-1795} (Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2003). 128-132; Colin G. Calloway, \textit{The Victory with No Name: The Native American Defeat of the First American Army} (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 58-59; White, \textit{Middle Ground}, 443-446.
the majority position within the Confederacy. Yet the document that St. Clair brought back to Congress was received as a sufficient basis for U.S. claims to much of the Ohio Valley, and news of the council soon brought surveyors and a number of squatters. In sum, the Fort Harmar council exacerbated the very conditions that the Western Confederacy and the Congress had sought to alleviate—and ensured that more violence would ensue.

**Free Consent and Just War**

Shortly after President Washington’s inauguration in the spring of 1789, Secretary of War Henry Knox provided a grim assessment of conditions in the Northwest Territory. “[T]he deep rooted prejudices, and malignity of heart, and conduct reciprocally entertained and practiced on all occasions by the Whites and [American Indians] will ever prevent their being good neighbours.” This historical dynamic, as Knox saw it, had all the markings of a perpetual and indiscriminate cycle of violence. “With minds previously inflamed,” he noted, “the slightest offense occasions death, revenge follows which knows no bound. The flames of a merciless war are thus lighted up which involve innocent and helpless with the guilty.” Because Knox placed a great deal of faith in the primacy of the new federal government and the authority of the presidency, he expected that peaceful resolution would likely require the force of “Government [to] keep them both in awe by a strong hand, and compel them to be moderate and just.”

Like Washington, Knox had almost equal disdain for backwoods Euro-Americans and American Indians, but exercising a “strong hand” on the former was likely more difficult and certainly more politically fraught than war on the latter. The right approach, he reasoned, was to renegotiate all previous treaties, as well as directly negotiate a treaty with the Myaamia (Miami), Lunaapeew (Lenape, or Delaware) and Shawnee along the Wabash and upper Maumee rivers. While he did not acknowledge the Confederacy as a legitimate counterpart in these proposed treaties, Knox believed that a more generous compensation for land with specific groups—coupled with firm promises to protect retained lands—would establish enough distance between them and encroaching settlers to foster peace. In an echo of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, and with a clearer sense of international law, he suggested and dismissed a counter argument that war was the only answer. “The Indians being the prior occupants, possess the right of the soil. It cannot be taken from them unless by their free consent, or by the right of conquest in case of a just war. To dispossess them on any other principle, would be a gross violation of the fundamental laws of nature, and of that distributive justice which is the glory of a nation.”

In the spring of 1789, as Myaamia, Shawnee, and Lunaapeew warriors began another season of deadly raids on both sides of the Ohio River, Secretary Knox and other officials in the War Department became increasingly alarmed. From their perspective, the Treaty of Fort Harmar may have caused consternation within the Western Confederacy—but that could be alleviated with a new council and a wider distribution of presents.

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Instead, all of the terms ratified by the U.S. Senate were being violently flaunted by groups that were receiving material support from the British at Detroit—which itself was located within the territorial boundaries of the United States. For Knox, these conditions certainly met the criteria in the 1787 Northwest Ordinance for initiating “just and lawful wars.” As he noted in a letter to Governor St. Clair, Knox wanted the United States “to exhibit to the Wabash [and other] Indians our power to punish them for their hostile depredations, for their conniving at the depredations of others, and for their refusing to treat with the United States when invited thereto.”

Toward these ends, Knox appointed General Josiah Harmar to lead a mixed force of 320 regulars along with 1,100 Pennsylvania and Kentucky militia, and deliver a “sudden stroke by which their towns and crops may be destroyed” along with all who stood in the way. High expectations of an easy triumph, however, soon gave way to a terrifying defeat. Under the leadership of the Myaamia war leader Mihšihkinaahkwa (Little Turtle) and the Shawnee war leader Waweyapiersenwah (Whirlpool, aka Blue Jacket), Harmar’s forces were routed in three separate engagements and forced to retreat back to Fort Washington (present-day Cincinnati). It was a stunning and embarrassing defeat that cost American treasure and resulted in more than 230 killed and wounded.

The following year President Washington commissioned St. Clair to lead another campaign to the upper Wabash River. After assembling approximately 600 regulars and another 1,400 volunteers and militia, he set out from Fort Washington in October for the Myaamia town of Kiihkayonki (aka Kekionga, near present-day Fort Wayne, Indiana). By the time they reached the headwaters of the Wabash on November 2, however, St. Clair’s total force had declined to just under 1,500—largely from illness and desertion. As they established their camp on the bluffs above the river, a force of 1,100 mostly Myaamia, Shawnee, and Lunaapeew (Lenape, or Delaware) warriors prepared for an assault the next morning. Led by Mihšihkinaahkwa, Waweyapiersenwah, and the Lunapeew war leader Buckongahelas, they attacked at dawn and completely surprised the U.S. encampment. As the militia fled in terror, the regular troops formed battle lines but were quickly encircled. The artillery was captured and spiked, and only a few battalions managed to hold off attacks by making repeated bayonet charges. After just a few hours, almost the entire force was destroyed—with 632 killed, 264 wounded, and 37 civilian laborers killed or wounded. Still more were captured and taken away from the field of battle, as were many of the camp followers. In all, St. Clair lost 97% of his entire force in

47 Wiley Sword, President Washington’s Indian War: The Struggle for the Old Northwest, 1790-1795, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1985), 134-37. Quotations are from Secretary of War to Governor St. Clair, September 12, 1790, in ASP, Indian Affairs, vol. 1 (Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1832), 100.
48 Harvey Lewis Carter, The Life and Times of Little Turtle: First Sagamore of the Wabash (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1987), 92-94; Calloway, The Victory with No Name, 63-68; Sword, President Washington’s Indian War, 139-142, 156; and George Ironstrack, “Mihši-maalhsa Wars Part II – The Battle of the Kiihkayonki,” Aacimotaatiyankwi: A Myaamia Community Blog <https://myaamiahistory.wordpress.com/2014/03/31/the-mihsi-maalhsa-wars-part-ii/> (accessed January 8, 2016). While the British provided material and occasional strategic support, they made it clear that they would not countenance the idea of a military alliance; see Nelson, A Man of Distinction among Them, 157-58. As a younger man, Waweyapiersenwah was known as Sepettekenathé.
a single engagement. Estimated Native casualties were the inverse of the U.S. losses, and amounted to approximately 3%—with perhaps 25-30 wounded and 3-5 killed.\footnote{Calloway, \textit{The Victory with No Name}, 115-29.}

**Exercising Sovereignty**

The back-to-back victories over Harmar and St. Clair instilled confidence throughout the Western Confederacy, and bolstered the position of those who had refused to participate in or recognize the Fort Harmar and Fort McIntosh treaties. Looking south to the Ohio River and east toward the Alleghenies they could envision a vast landscape free of U.S. troops and citizens, and open to Native resettlement. Brief but damaging raids by mounted Kentucky militia in the coming months put a check on such dreams, but did little to diminish the resilience of the broader Confederacy. The defeat of St. Clair also impressed the British, who had sent advisors to the Myaamia villages prior to the battle, and opened a more generous supply of trade goods and gifts. In the early 1790s the British also helped organize a number of large councils at different population centers on the Maumee River. These gatherings provided the space for leaders within the Confederacy to consult with each other and the British regarding a range of issues related to accommodating and assisting the communities hardest hit by militia raids to preparing for the next U.S. invasion.\footnote{Calloway, \textit{Victory with No Name}, 146-50; Gregory Evans Dowd, \textit{A Spirited Resistance: The North American Indian Struggle for Unity, 1745-1815} (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 118-21; White, \textit{Middle Ground}, 455-56.}

On this last score the British were of two minds—or rather two voices. Officers in the British Indian Department like Matthew Elliott, Alexander McKee, and William Caldwell who had extensive ties among the Native communities of the Great Lakes and Ohio Valley, spoke positively of a British-Confederacy military alliance. So too did Detroit-based Lt. Governor John Graves Simcoe, who continued to advocate for establishing the “Indian Buffer State” that was initially proposed during the Peace of Paris. Yet British officials in London and the Governor General in Montreal were not willing to directly engage with U.S. forces, and occasionally disavowed their support for a Confederacy-led war—especially when imperial concerns over French threats in Europe or Spanish activities west of the Mississippi River made conciliating the United States an appealing if temporary strategy.\footnote{Allen, \textit{His Majesty’s Indian Allies}, 85-86; Larry L. Nelson, \textit{A Man of Distinction among Them}, 149-59.}

Washington, Knox, and Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton counseled among themselves in the wake of St. Clair’s debacle, and proposed that Congress should fund a larger and better-prepared force against the Western Confederacy. Eschewing an over reliance on “disgruntled” and “unruly” militiamen “of poor quality and low morale,” Congress approved the creation of the Legion of the United States—with a core of 5,000 regular troops that would be specifically trained and equipped for “Indian Warfare.” Major General Anthony Wayne was appointed commander of this new army, and by the winter of 1792-93 the entire force had assembled for basic training at Legionville (present-day Baden, Pennsylvania), very near the site where George Washington had met with Guyasuta almost forty years before. Drawing on his Revolutionary War experiences, and using the errors of Harmar and St. Clair as counter-examples, Wayne prepared his troops to operate as a large mobile force. Emphasizing careful planning and supply, as
well as combinations of artillery, cavalry, infantry, and small raiding parties, Wayne sought to create an army that was “suitable to the Country and Service for which they were intended.” In preparation for an invasion of the Wabash and Maumee River communities, Wayne moved the Legion to Fort Washington in early May.52

As Wayne began assembling and training the Legion in western Pennsylvania, a Grand Council of the Western Confederacy was convened amidst the cluster of towns and villages in an area that French traders had dubbed “the Glaize.” Situated at the confluence of the Auglaize and Maumee rivers, and about half-way between the Myaamia population center at the headwaters of the Maumee and the mostly Odawa villages near the Maumee Rapids, the Glaize was a “composite community” that had become what Helen Hornbeck Tanner called “the headquarters for the militant Indian confederacy protesting American advance northwest of the Ohio River.” While the populations of the main towns were primarily Shawnee, Lunaapeew, and Myaamia, the whole array of villages and towns in the area included people from various Indigenous communities, British traders, and French Canadien settlers, as well as Euro-American and African American captives and adoptees. In its composition, then, the Glaize neatly captured the diversity of the Western Confederacy and of the region. The Glaize was also blessed with silt-rich soils that supported hundreds of acres of gardens, cornfields, and pasture areas that stretched for miles along the river banks. This bounty made the Glaize a crucial resource for the Confederacy, since extra stores of food could support warriors on their way to and from battle, help sustain communities that had been attacked by the Long Knives, and feed large gatherings of the Confederacy.53

The assemblage of representatives that came to the Glaize was even more diverse than the host community, and included Shawnee, Wyandot, Lunaapeew (Lenape, or Delaware), Myaamia, Odawa, Bodéwadmi (Potowatomi), Ojibwe (Ojibway, or Chippewa), Waayaahantawo (Ouiatenon, or Wea), Thâkiwa (Sauk, or Sac), Meskwaki (Fox), Haudenosaunee, Mvskoke (Muscogee or Creek), and Tsalaghi (Cherokee)—with some coming from as far away as present-day Quebec, Ontario, Tennessee, Missouri, and the upper Great Lakes. As the Shawnee leader Musquaconoca (Red Pole, or Painted Pole) described it, this “Council fire” drew together a vast web of communities—at the physical and metaphorical “center of our Country, [in which] is placed the Heart of the Indian Confederacy.” “It was here within the Grand Council,” the Lunaapeew leader Buckongahelas noted, that “the sentiments of all the Nations” were clarified. Where “All of us are animated by one Mind, one Head and one Heart and we are resolved to stick close by each other & defend ourselves to the last.” Energized by the defeats of Harmar

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53 Quotation from Tanner, “The Glaize in 1792: A Composite Indian Community,” Ethnohistory 25:1 (Winter 1978), 15-39; quotation is from p. 15. There were six main towns at the Glaize: three Shawnee, two Lunaapeew (Lenape, or Delaware), and one mostly Myaamia. The rest of the towns and villages, including the British trader’s, were generally more diverse.
and St. Clair, the Western Confederacy had reached a level of unity and strength that made it an independent power in North America.  

While the formidable potential of the Confederacy was certainly felt by its most ardent participants, British and U.S. officials recognized its strength as well. To the British, who were formally represented at the Grand Council (as a key member rather than a guiding partner), the Western Confederacy was an essential ally that could help reshape the post-1783 geopolitical landscape of North America. Assisting and supporting the aims of the Confederacy could serve two aims: undermining U.S. commercial interests in the Great Lakes and its lucrative fur trade, and confining the political boundaries of the new Republic to the Ohio River. In the United States, the growing independence and strength of the Confederacy presented a grave threat to the young nation’s future. An inability to prevent American Indian attacks along the Ohio River, or to convert U.S. claims on the Northwest territory into surveyed parcels of land, created resentment within western settler communities that only made the secessionist schemes of Wilkinson and others all the more plausible. News of St. Clair’s defeat also exacerbated political divisions in the East, where Anti-Federalists complained of the expense and seeming purposelessness of a war against people with “as much right to their hunting-grounds as we have to our cities or our farms.” In short, all parties agreed that the future prospects of the region—and even the continent—hinged on how fully the Confederacy was able to exercise political and territorial sovereignty. 

As the Grand Council drew to a close, one key disagreement needed resolution before the body as a whole could reach consensus and come “to one Mind.” Haudenosaunee representatives believed that the Muskingum—rather than the Ohio—was a more viable eastern boundary between the Western Confederacy and the United States. Depopulated of its Indigenous residents, and beginning to fill with land surveyors and squatters, it was not a region the Confederacy could recapture or securely control. The outnumbered Haudenosaunee soon withdrew their public concerns and the Grand Council ultimately reached consensus on an Ohio River boundary, then formally resolved to invite U.S. representatives to a conference the following summer. Secretary Knox agreed to send a Commission, which met with the representatives of the Grand Council in August 1793 on the lower Sandusky River. After several speeches and much discussion, the Grand Council proposed the conditions for peace they had formalized the previous October: recognition of the Ohio River boundary, and the application of all unspent funds from the treaties of 1784-1786 to assist in relocating U.S. citizens to their side of the

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54 Quotations are from “Indian Council at the Glaize, 1792,” in The Correspondence of Lieut. Governor John Graves Simcoe, 5 vols., ed. E. A. Cruikshank (Toronto: The Ontario Historical Society, 1931), 1:220 and 229; Also see Timothy D. Willig, Restoring the Chain of Friendship: British Policy and the Indians of the Great Lakes, 1783-1815 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2008), 37-40. 

Chapter Five

Ohio. The Commissioners balked, but did offer to consider a compromise boundary somewhere between the Ohio River and the Great Lakes. This notion was rejected outright and, because the representatives from the Grand Council did not believe the Commissioners even had the authority to make such a proposal, the council promptly dissolved into acrimonious irresolution.56

Alaamhsenwa: A Shifting Wind57

A few months before the Commissioners departed for Lower Sandusky, General Wayne received a triad of directives from Secretary Knox: refrain from offensive operations, prevent incursions from U.S. citizens into areas contested by American Indians, and prepare for a prolonged campaign in the likelihood that negotiations with the Grand Council failed. Wayne had little faith in the Grand Council or the U.S. Commission, and suspected the meeting was a ploy by the former to delay war until late summer when conditions would be more favorable to the Confederacy. Given his expectations, and the order from Knox, Wayne intended to use the early summer months to lay the groundwork for a general invasion. Outbreaks of smallpox and influenza among his troops slowed these preparations, however, and the campaign into the heart of the Confederacy did not commence until October 7—when the scourges of the summer had passed and official news of the failed council reached Fort Washington.58

Despite the delay, the Legion moved at a slow and methodical pace that followed a carefully scripted plan. In order to prevent any part of his force from becoming over extended, or encamped without protective fieldworks, Wayne ordered each day’s march to end by midday. This schedule allowed for the construction of a defensive perimeter well before dark, provided opportunities for scouting the vicinity and the route ahead, and ensured that soldiers would be rested and in good order by “Revellee.” The first weeks of the campaign were also intended to strengthen order and discipline in the field, and provided ample opportunities for troops to become more proficient in creating the basic infrastructure of depots, guarded camps, forts, and stream crossings for what would become a 200-mile supply train to the lower Maumee River.59 Such preparations failed their first test, however, when a combined force of Shawnee, Myaamia, and Odawa attacked and routed a convoy near Fort St. Clair (present-day Eaton, Ohio) on October

57 Alaamhsenwa (aka “the Wind”) is the Myaamia name applied to General Anthony Wayne—in large part because Wayne seemed to move his various forces wherever he chose. The Anishinaabeg (Odawa, Ojibwe, and Bodéwadmi) called him Noodin or Chi-noodin, which also means “the Wind.”
17, 1793. Along with the loss of vital stores and pack animals, the Legion suffered 13 killed, 11 captured, and a similar number of wounded out of a company of 90 men.60

In response to the attack, Wayne ordered the formation of “super convoys,” large pack trains escorted by 500 troops. This proved a time-consuming enterprise, and effectively stalled the campaign at Fort Greene Ville (present-day Greenville, Ohio)—some eighty miles north of Fort Washington. After two months the Legion was ready to move again, and Wayne sent a detachment twenty-five miles north to establish Fort Recovery at the headwaters of the Wabash River and the site of St. Clair’s Defeat. While this marked the terminus of the Legion’s campaigning for 1793, the fort was lightly garrisoned and remained vulnerable to attack through most of the following spring. By late May, however, Fort Recovery had grown in size and importance. With supply lines from the Ohio River more secure, and attacks by small groups of Confederacy warriors less frequent, vast amounts of stores arrived at Fort Greene Ville—which came to resemble a walled village covering fifty-five acres. From these well-stocked and protected confines, “super convoys” were assembled and sent north under heavy guard. In early June Fort Recovery was ready to become the forward operating base for Wayne’s campaign, and clearly presented an imminent threat to the Confederacy.61

As the Legion strengthened its forward position, the Western Confederacy held a council of war in mid-June at the Glaize. Though not as large as the Grand Council from a year before, the gathering was energized by demonstrations of active support from the British. A few months earlier, Governor General Lord Dorchester told a gathering of Confederacy representatives that conflict over the Great Lakes region was imminent. The cause for war, as Dorchester explained, stemmed from the United States’ refusal to treat with Indigenous nations according to international norms and a failure to establish a clear boundary line between the United States and British North America. Given “the manner in which the people of the United States rush on, and act, and talk …, I shall not be surprised if we are at war with them in the course of the present year; and if so, a line must then be drawn by the warriors.” Dorchester’s speech—and Wayne’s establishment of winter quarters at Fort Recovery—coincided with an increase in the distribution of supplies and weapons at Detroit and the Glaize, as well as a flurry of new messages and meetings between officials in the British Indian Department and Confederacy leaders. Lt. Governor Simcoe also agreed with a recommendation from the Indian Department to construct modest fortifications at strategic sites to the south of Detroit, which soon resulted in the construction of Fort Miamis at the foot of the Maumee Rapids as well as a blockhouse on Maumee Bay and another near Frenchtown on the River Raisin.62

60 Carter, Little Turtle, 126; Sword, President Washington’s Indian War, 250; Gaff, Bayonets in the Wilderness, 162-66.
61 Painted Tobacco and A. M. McKee to Chiefs of the Huron, June 9, 1794, in Historical Collections, 20 (Lansing: Wynkoop, Hallenbeck, Crawford, Co., 1912), 358; Nelson, A Man of Distinction among Them, 167-69; President Washington’s Indian War, 255-256. Gaff, Bayonets in the Wilderness, 184-186. Fort Greene Ville was named after the Revolutionary War hero Major General Nathanael Greene. At the time of its establishment, the fort and the community that grew up around it were known as Greene Ville; see Simmons, “An Orderly Book from Fort Washington and Fort Hamilton, 1792-1793,” 125-44. By the spring of 1795, however, the facility was referred to as Fort Greenville in Wayne’s correspondence.
62 Lord Dorchester quoted in “Reply of his Excellency Lord Dorchester to the Indians of the seven Villages of Lower Canada, as Deputies from all the Nations who were at the general Council held at the Miami, in the Year 1793; except the Chawauous, Miamis, and Loups,” 278-79, in Treaty of amity, commerce, and
All of these actions inspired a renewed faith in the British-Confederacy alliance, and assuaged the concerns of the Anishinaabeg (Odawa, Ojibwe, and Bodéwadmi) from the northern Great Lakes. During the Sandusky council the previous summer, they disagreed with an insistence on the Ohio River as the only acceptable boundary with the United States. The idea seemed indefensible, especially given the languishing support of the British over the previous decade. Following that council, the northerners largely excused themselves from the concerns of the Western Confederacy. Given their distance from the Ohio Valley, and relative independence from the various alliances that had formed in the Detroit region and Ohio Valley over the previous century, this disagreement and subsequent withdrawal is hardly surprising. Yet, by the same token, their return to the council grounds at the Glaize clearly reflects the galvanizing effects of Wayne’s campaign and British demonstrations of support. Perhaps the most telling and immediate consequence of these changes is measured by the number of warriors who came from the northern Great Lakes to fight the Long Knives: out of a Confederacy army that totaled 1,500, the northern Anishinaabeg alone accounted for at least half that number.63

Bolstered by supplies, weapons and provisions from the British, as well as a small number of troops, the emboldened Confederacy determined to strike Wayne’s army before it could advance from Fort Recovery. Since a direct assault was not possible, war leaders devised a plan to attack super convoys in order to gain supplies and isolate the garrison. A siege would follow, in which the Western Confederacy would use the eight U.S. cannons that had been hidden after the defeat of St. Clair, and then attack Wayne’s forces as they retreated south. On the morning of June 30, a supply convoy that had encamped outside Fort Recovery the night before was attacked and quickly routed. As many as seventy soldiers and contractors were killed, wounded, or captured, while the large pack train was taken along with the entire herd of cattle then grazing outside the fort. This initial success proved fleeting, however. The search for the hidden cannons was fruitless, since all but one had been recovered and refurbished by Wayne’s forces over the preceding months. Consequently, the fort had far more artillery than expected and the Confederacy had none. This critical fact was not yet clear as the siege perimeter was taking shape, but it became apparent when several clusters of northern Odawa and Ojibwe warriors decided to rush the fort. Their disorganized charges were effectively repulsed by substantial artillery and musket fire, which resulted in a number of casualties as well as an ignominious retreat. Though hardly catastrophic, this loss made it clear that the initial strategy was no longer viable and that a prolonged engagement would only

63 Willig, Restoring the Chain of Friendship, 54-56; Sword, President Washington’s Indian War, 270-75; Carter, Little Turtle, 129-30; White, Middle Ground, 465-66; Michael A. McDonnell, Masters of Empire: Great Lakes Indians and the Making of America (New York: Hill and Wang, 2015), 314-15. Along with the Anishinaabeg from the northern Great Lakes, Lunaaapeew (Lenape, or Delaware) from west of the Mississippi sent messages that they would join in the battle—with support from the Spanish—and the Waayaahtanwa (Ouiatenon, or Wea) on the Wabash River repudiated their separate agreements with the United States and sought readmission to the Confederacy. None, however, arrived at the Glaize by mid-June.
weaken the Confederacy. By dawn the next day, the assemblage of American Indian and British forces withdrew and most all of the northern groups soon departed for their home villages.\textsuperscript{64}

In terms of losses and gains, the battle at Fort Recovery may have been a draw, but it proved a strategic defeat that revealed unacknowledged weaknesses within the Western Confederacy and its alliance with the British. While members of the British Indian Department offered frequent advice and assistance, and some joined forces with the Confederacy at Fort Recovery, the recent pronouncements of civil and military officials proved mostly hollow. Many, and perhaps all, in the Confederacy had made the decision to attack Fort Recovery with the understanding that 1,500 militia and regulars would be joining them in the coming days. That understanding proved false, and may have resulted from a miscommunication, but in either case the British did not fully match

their words with deeds. In the aftermath of the battle, such reluctance on the part of the British was interpreted as a decisive—and disheartening—reason for the failure to dislodge Wayne’s forces.\textsuperscript{65}

Withdrawal rather than victory, and the casting of blame that ensued, also exposed key divisions within the broader Great Lakes alliance. The northern Anishinaabeg were allies, but not integral members of the Western Confederacy, and they were more likely to operate independently of the strategies developed by Myaamia, Shawnee, and Lunaaopeew (Lenape, or Delaware) war leaders. The actions of the northern Odawa and Ojibwe who rushed the fort is understandable in that light—as is the chagrin of those who watched the debacle unfold. Yet it is likely that a more significant divide occurred between these allies in the week before the battle. A member of the British Indian Department who fought at Fort Recovery reported that, during their southward trek to Fort Recovery, some Odawa and Ojibwe had “committed depredations and ravished the women in the [Shawnee and Lunaaopeew] villages” on the lower Maumee River. If this report is true, then it likely explains a subsequent charge by the northern Anishinaabeg that some Shawnee and Lunaaopeew took revenge by firing into their erstwhile allies who charged Fort Recovery.\textsuperscript{66}

**Mikaalitioni Taawaawa Siipionki (Battle of the Maumee River/Fallen Timbers)**\textsuperscript{67}

Four weeks after the attack on Fort Recovery, Wayne launched the final stage of the long-planned campaign against the Western Confederacy. Departing Fort Greene Ville on July 28, the Legion headed north to Fort Recovery then pushed on to the Glaize. Over the course of this eighty-mile march into the heart of the Confederacy, small detachments were sent out to terrorize small villages. These actions, along with the methodical approach of the Legion, quickly depopulated the Auglaize River basin and sent refugees fleeing toward the north and west.\textsuperscript{68} The final stretch of Wayne’s march proved so rapid, however, that the residents of the Glaize were entirely caught off guard and fled just a few hours before the first troops arrived. Consequently, Wayne’s forces entered the hastily abandoned population center without incident, and readily helped

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themselves to the bounty that had been left behind. A junior officer was particularly struck by the “rich low lands in high cultivation … [for] about six miles on each side [of the Auglaize and Maumee Rivers, … [with an] abundant quantity of vegetables [that] will extend the subsistence of the army and if we move rapidly will save us from danger on the score of provision.”

Now situated in the very heart of the Western Confederacy, Wayne and his officers congratulated themselves on their success. To ensure this strategic victory, the Legion spent eight days (August 9-17) transforming the council grounds of the Confederacy into Fort Defiance: a “strong stockade fort, with four good block houses, by way of bastions” to serve as Wayne’s forward base of operations. As this work was underway, Wayne learned from spies and recent captives that Confederacy forces were regrouping on the lower Maumee River at the Odawa villages near Roche de Boeuf (“Buffalo Rock;” present-day Waterville, Ohio)—a large limestone formation at the head of the Maumee River Rapids—which was just a few miles upriver from the 250-man British garrison at the recently constructed Fort Miamis. These various matters were summarized in a letter to Secretary of War Henry Knox on August 14, in which Wayne also announced that the Legion would make “a forward move to-morrow morning” toward the Roche de Bouef—“in the vicinity of which the fate of the campaign will probably be decided.” Though Wayne expressed concern that “the best and most recent intelligence” made it clear that “the enemy … possessed … ground very unfavorable for [our] cavalry to act in …, I do not despair of success.”

Because Wayne believed it “proper to offer the enemy a last overture of peace,” in the hope that it might “spare the effusion of much human blood,” he sent a message on August 13 to the “Delawares, Shawanees, Miamis, Wyandots … and to all other nations of Indians, northwest of the Ohio” requesting a peace council. Wayne promised that his

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69 Calloway, Victory with No Name, 114-15; Smith, ed., From Greene Ville To Fallen Timbers, 265-74. Owens, Mr. Jefferson's Hammer, 25-26.
70 Wiley Sword, President Washington's Indian War: The Struggle for the Old Northwest, 1790-1795, 273-83; Carter, The Life and Times of Little Turtle, 124-35; Gaff, Bayonets in the Wilderness, 241-53. Quotations are from Smith, ed., From Greene Ville to Fallen Timbers, 272 and 274. Wayne used even more effusive language in a letter to Secretary of War Henry Knox: “The very extensive and highly cultivated fields and gardens show the work of many hands. The margin of those beautiful rivers—the Miamis of the Lake (or Maumee) and Auglaize—appear like one continued village for a number of miles both above and below this place; nor have I ever before beheld such fields of corn in any part of America from Canada to Florida;” Wayne to Knox, August 14, 1794, in Henry Howe, Historical Collections of Ohio in Two Volumes, an Encyclopedia of the State (Cincinnati: State of Ohio, 1907), 1:545.
71 Sword, President Washington’s Indian War, 298-300; Gaff, Bayonets in the Wilderness, 302-04; Nelson, A Man of Distinction among Them, 158-63; Paul David Nelson, “General Charles Scott, the Kentucky Mounted Volunteers, and the Northwest Indian Wars,1784-1794,” Journal of the Early Republic 6 (Autumn 1986): 241. The term Roche de Boeuf (Buffalo Rock), which describes a large rock in the Maumee River near the head of the Maumee Rapids, was also rendered “Roche de Bout” which means “End Rock.” Though both terms are applicable, the former is more common in primary sources and is used here. Quotations are from copy of a message enclosed in Major General Wayne to the Secretary of War, August 14, 1794, in ASP, Indian Affairs, vol. 4, 490. The British had stationed 160 regulars at Fort Miamis, plus a hundred militiamen from Detroit and the River Raisin. Lt. Colonel William Caldwell commanded a mixed company of 53 Detroit militiamen, while Captain Charles Reaume led a company of 37 habitants from the River Raisin; see Le Roy Barnett and Roger Rosentreter, Michigan’s Early Military Forces: A Roster and History of Troops Activated Prior to the American Civil War (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2003), 44.
forces would leave the villages and fields around The Glaize unmolested if his message received a positive response and—upon the settlement of an acceptable accord—return the villages to all who were “lately settled at this place.” The message’s clear implication that this was an all-or-nothing offer, along with a boast that the Legion could easily rout the Confederacy and destroy all of its towns and villages, created both worry and resentment among Confederacy leaders.72

Shortly after this message was sent and received, a council was held near Roche de Bouef on August 14. The aged Mihšihkinaahkwa (Little Turtle) spoke first, advocating for a direct peace settlement with General Wayne. Though he was greatly respected as a war leader, Mihšihkinaahkwa feared the consequences of the coming battle. Alaamhsenwa (the Wind), as the Myaamia referred to Wayne, could not be dislodged or defeated by the Western Confederacy in its present circumstances. Moreover, recent visits to Detroit convinced him that the British would not directly engage the Mihs-i-maalhsa (Long Knives; i.e., Americans or Kentuckians) or provide sufficient material support to Confederacy warriors. With considerable foreboding, he stated that Keešihiwia (Creator) “does not want to see the bloody tomahawk among his children. He will hide his face in a cloud, if they refuse to talk to the white chief.”73

Though his status allowed Mihšihkinaahkwa to be the first to speak in council, and some number certainly shared his doubts about the British, his words were met with complete silence. The next speaker was the Odawa leader Mizise-zide (Turkey Foot), who spoke for the Bodewadmi, Odawa, and Shawnee members of the Western Confederacy. As the Odawa leader Kinjoino later recalled, Mizise-zide replied to Mihšihkinaahkwa with a call to take the war path of the Long Knives …. Chenosa (Chenoten) [General Wayne], the great war chief, will walk in a bloody path toward the sunrise … [a]nd the great chief will not come again. The Manitou gave us this country and he bids us bloody the trail of our enemies. The Manitou is great. He is good. Will the Braves of his red children fight? Will they defend the council fires and the graves of their fathers?”

Mizise-zide received a positive response to these closing questions, and all subsequent speakers fully echoed his call for war. Near consensus became unanimous when Mihšihkinaahkwa, as well as Kinjoino and others who preferred to council for peace, affirmed their support for the greater will of the Confederacy.74

72 Copy of message enclosed in Major General Wayne to the Secretary of War, August 14, 1794: “To the Delawares, Shawanese, Miamies, and Wyandots, and to each and every of them, and to all other Indians, northwest of the Ohio it may concern,” document enclosed in Ibid.
74 Quotations are from Howard, “The Battle of Fallen Timbers as Told by Chief Kin-Jo-I-No,” 39-40.
On the morning of August 15, with Fort Defiance nearly complete, General Wayne moved a large part of his army toward the Maumee River Rapids. By midday on the 18th, the 3,500-strong force of U.S. regulars and Kentucky cavalry reached the vicinity of Roche de Boeuf and began construction of Fort Deposit on the western bluffs overlooking the upper Rapids. Now within striking distance of the Confederacy, Wayne held back for another two days to complete basic fortifications, stow equipment that would not be needed on the field of battle, and give his men rest. The delay also had another tactical purpose. Wayne knew that many of the Confederacy’s warriors would fast and purify themselves before engaging in combat, and thus a respite at Fort Deposit would unduly prolong the fasting period and consequently weaken his adversaries.75

By the close of their council at Roche de Bouef, Western Confederacy leaders were already aware that the Legion had commenced its march toward the lower Maumee River. Runners were immediately sent north to request support from the Anishinaabeg (Ojibwe, Odawa, and Bodéwadmi) who had departed after the engagements at Fort Recovery. Many were too far away to make it back in time to join their southern kin and allies, and some who were still relatively near may have declined the request. Consequently, the number of warriors the Confederacy was able to call on amounted to 1,400—rather than the 1,800 who were at Fort Recovery in early July. Besides a smaller force, the Confederacy also had to contend with a shortage of supplies and food. The failure to capture the stores at Fort Recovery, and the Legion’s subsequent occupation of the Glaize, had created a dire situation. Many of those who fled the Glaize were already refugees, having lost their crops and stores to U.S. raiding parties during the summer. Now they, along with their recent hosts, were crowded among the villages and towns near the Maumee River Rapids—where their presence sorely taxed the resources of the surrounding area. Consequently, the energies of Confederacy warriors and their families were divided by preparations for a consequential battle and the basic needs of shelter, food, and hygiene.76

Howard was the government interpreter among the Odawa who lived in Aabitanagaajiwan (aka Halfway Village, or Kinjoino’s Village) at the head of the Maumee Rapids in the 1820s. Though an old man at that time, Kinjoino had long been an Ogimaa (leader, chief) who continued to use—and readily recalled—the same formal diction and metaphors that characterized the speeches at the council of August 14, 1794. It is likely that Howard’s use of the word “Chenoten” derives from chi-noodin, which means the Wind or Big Wind (see note 56 above). For other accounts of this council, and preparations for the coming battle, see Sugden, Blue Jacket, Warrior of the Shawnees (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), 173-175, 191-192; Carter, The Life and Times of Little Turtle, 61, 125, 131, 132, 134; Sword, President Washington’s Indian War, 215-218, 287, 297-298, 319, 330; and Bryce Blair, “The Battle of Fallen Timbers and the Treaty of Fort Greeneville: Why did Anthony Wayne Win Both and Could he have Lost?” (Master’s thesis, University of Toledo, 2005), 68-69. For more on Kinjoino, see Robert F. Bauman, ed., “The Last Ottawa: A Selection from the Dresden W. H. Howard Papers,” Northwest Ohio Quarterly 24:1 (1952): 3-9.

75 The reference to Citadel comes from Smith, ed., From Greene Ville To Fallen Timbers, 286. On the march to Roche de Boeuf and the two-day waiting period before the battle, see Blair, “The Battle of Fallen Timbers,” 50-51, and Sugden, Blue Jacket, 173-74.

76 Sword, President Washington’s Indian War, 302-05; Gaff, Bayonets in the Wilderness, 302-04; Sugden, Blue Jacket, 161-168; Sword, President Washington’s Indian War, 275-76; Owens, Mr. Jefferson’s Hammer, 27-28. The combined forces that composed the Confederacy at the Battle of Fallen Timbers included Shawnee led by Waweyapiersenwah (Whirlpool, aka Blue Jacket), Lunaapeew (Delaware) led by Buckongahelas, Myaamia led by Mihšihkinaahkwa (Little Turtle), Odawa led by Agwazhe'aa (Egushawa) and Ngig (Little Otter), and Wyandot led by Stayegtha (Roundhead), as well as northern Anishinaabeg
Badly outnumbered and short on resources, the Western Confederacy still had a strategy for victory. Given the terrain along the west bank of the Maumee, which limited the travel to a narrow corridor along high wooded bluffs, the Army’s approach route was essentially predetermined. Recently arrived captives and deserters further provided information on the composition and distribution of Wayne’s forces, which confirmed the decision of Confederacy leaders to focus on a specific site for the primary engagement: namely, an area about halfway between Roche de Boeuf and Fort Miamis where a tornado had created a jumble of downed timber. The site provided excellent cover and concealment, and nullified the effectiveness of cavalry and massed charges by much larger forces. The relative proximity of Fort Miamis was another important factor since it could prove a source of additional supplies and protection, if necessary. All of these factors, if fully exploited, supported the Confederacy’s basic battle plan—which was to ambush the Legion’s forward units, then quickly force them back on the main body of the army. As occurred previously with St. Clair and Harmar, this action was expected to cause a disorderly retreat and force Wayne to remove further south. In such a scenario, there was every expectation that victory on the battlefield would inspire more communities to join the Confederacy in the coming months.\footnote{Horsman, \textit{Expansion and American Indian Policy}, 218-20; Blair, "The Battle of Fallen Timbers,” 52-53.}

Initially, the battle seemed to go according to plan. Under the direction of Odawa war leaders Agwazhe’aa (Egushawa) and Ngig (Little Otter), multiple small groups of Confederacy warriors were hidden amongst the downed timber and arranged in a long arch that roughly followed the bluff line. When enough soldiers had come within the broad sweep of the Confederacy warriors, the latter intended to pour out from cover and sweep around the forward elements of Wayne’s army. Before this trap could be sprung, however, a group of warriors made a premature attack on the advanced guard of 150 Kentucky mounted militia. Others quickly joined in and the Kentuckians fled in panic. As Confederacy war leaders had expected, the mounted militiamen crashed through the first line of trailing infantry, who briefly held their ground, then all rushed back toward the main force. What seemed like the beginnings of a rout quickly stabilized when the pursuing warriors encountered the right wing of Wayne’s army, where massed infantry had formed to receive the attack. After a few exchanges, the Western Confederacy forces withdrew toward the rest of their compatriots, but the scattered and thin lines of the Confederacy’s left wing could not long maintain a defensive position.\footnote{Sugden, \textit{President Washington’s Indian War}, 295-299; Gaff, \textit{Bayonets in the Wilderness}, 301-07.}

A different scenario unfolded on the Confederacy’s right wing, which was mostly composed of Wyandot and Odawa from Detroit and Sandusky, as well as Canadian militia under the command of Captain William Caldwell.\footnote{In 1791 the Province of Quebec was partitioned into Upper Canada and Lower Canada, with the former encompassing what is now the Province of Quebec and the Labrador region of what is now the Province of Newfoundland and Labrador. Upper Canada covered the southern tier of present-day Ontario—from the mouth of the Ottawa River to the border with Minnesota. Due to an influx of Loyalists from the United States and emigrants from the British Isles, by the early 1790s the population of Upper Canada included a growing number of people of British origin. Given this political and demographic shift, the term}}
initial pursuit of the Kentuckians, they held their ground amidst the downed timber as several companies of Legionnaires pushed toward their position. The regular infantry that opposed them was ordered to fix bayonets and charge directly into Confederacy positions. Wayne had long favored this tactic, and regularly trained his troops in how to make repeated bayonet charges into clusters of enemy fighters. With the addition of artillery and a fresh group of cavalry that gained the flanks of the Wyandot and Odawa warriors, the infantry pressed harder with their bayonet charges and concentrated fire. The Confederacy forces were soon routed, and forced into a general retreat. As Kinjoino recalled, the bayonet charges were decisive in the battle and sealed the demise of the Western Confederacy.

We were driven by the sharp end of the guns of the Long Knives, … through the woods and swamps to the end of the hill …. We could not stand against the sharp end of their guns, and we ran to the river, swamp, thickets, and to the islands in the river covered with corn. Our moccasins trickled blood in the sand, and the water was red in the river. Many of our braves were killed in the river by rifles from the other side, but some got away and escaped to Fort Miami[s]. Many could not get in there but fled to the River Raisin, and many more to … [Detroit].

Confedera fighters from all sides of the battlefield retreated toward Fort Miamis, where they hoped to obtain shelter and support from the garrison. Yet to their alarm, the gates were closed and no relief was offered. Major William Campbell, who commanded the garrison, did not dare provide open support for the Confederacy with such a large American force in the vicinity. “[A]t last it became so serious,” he later reported, “that I thought it was high time to stand to our Arms, fill up the gaps in our Abatis and shut out all communication from the Fort, by fixing our Chevaux de Frise.”

With damning suddeness, Campbell’s actions confirmed all the doubts that Mihšihkinaahtkwa (Little Turtle) had expressed about British support—and that many in the Western Confederacy shared but hoped were not true. Even more than the battle itself, the confoundment that Confederacy warriors experienced at the closed gates became the most salient memory of defeat. The Kanien’kehaka (Mohawk) fur trader Teyoninhokarawen (aka John Norton) learned that the conduct of the British Fort dispirited the Confederates much more than the issue of the battle, which they had fought with very inferior number, and in a disadvantageous position, without considerable loss; this they considered as a misfortune that might be repaired with glory, –another time; but the former, they did not know how to remedy.

In terms of casualties, the Battle of Fallen Timbers was close to a draw, with U.S. losses recorded at forty-four killed and about ninety wounded, and Confederacy losses

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“Canadian,” rather than “Canadien,” will be used to reference militias and general populations. “Canadien” will only refer to specific francophone populations.  
81 Howard, “The Battle of Fallen Timbers,” 46-47. Punctuation and spelling follows the original text. 
82 Quoted in Allen, *His Majesty’s Indian Allies*, 52. 
about the same. In strategic and material terms, however, it was a complete victory for the United States. Not only did the Legion of the United States win the field, it occupied the heart of the Confederacy. After the battle, Wayne’s forces followed retreating Confederacy warriors then encamped near Fort Miamis. General Wayne subsequently paraded before the fort and harangued Major Campbell, but nothing came of the affair. Neither man had orders to engage the other’s forces, nor were they inclined to risk their honor to start an unauthorized war between their nations. Instead, U.S. forces destroyed some crops and a few structures in the immediate vicinity of the fort, then returned toward Roche de Boeuf and Fort Defiance. At the first locale they destroyed crops, pillaged and burned the abandoned villages, and then desecrated cemeteries. Much the same occurred with the towns, villages and crops around the Glaize (except in the general vicinity of Fort Defiance), and thus Wayne both destroyed and “gained possession of the grand Emporium of the hostile Indians of the West without [much] loss of blood.”

Reckoning

The full measure of the U.S. victory and the Western Confederacy’s defeat would take place over the coming months and year. As the garrison at Fort Defiance wrought destruction throughout the Glaize, most of the Legion moved on to the forks of the Maumee River and began constructing Fort Wayne in the heart of the Myaamia population center of Kiihkayonki (Kekionga). Completed within six weeks, the fort was garrisoned with 100 soldiers and the remainder of Wayne’s force moved to his headquarters at Fort Greene Ville. With their main population centers having been destroyed or occupied by U.S. forces, as many as 3,000 refugees remained at Swan Creek through the fall where they received rations and material support from the British Indian Department. Others moved north to live with Anishinaabeg kin and allies, or travelled west to join those who had already distanced themselves from the United States and the decades-long war with the Long Knives. The vast majority of the communities that belonged to the Confederacy remained in the region, however. Through the fall and early winter their leaders struggled over a collective response to their displacement and the Legion’s entrenched positions on their former council grounds.

In the weeks after the defeat at Fallen Timbers, a peace faction began to develop among village leaders who supported the Western Confederacy but were not part of its core leadership. While some must have held the same doubts that Mihšihkinaahkwa (Little Turtle), Kinjoino, and others had previously felt about the British, they formally supported the decision to fight against General Wayne. Yet concerns about the immediate and short-term welfare of their communities became more pressing in the weeks.


following the battle. With the loss of crops, homes, food stores, tools, materials and more, the prospect of continuing the war into the winter months seemed pure folly. Yet renowned war leaders such as Waweyapiersenwah (Whirlpool, aka Blue Jacket), Buckongahelas, Agwazhe'aa (Egushawa), Nagohquangogh (from a Myaamia village on the St. Joseph River), and PKoum-Kwa (aka Pacanne, from the Myaamia village at the Maumee-Wabash portage) all considered extending the war.  

To foster these latter sentiments, Governor Simcoe called for a council at Big Rock (Brownstown) in mid-October to restate British support for the Western Confederacy. On the first day of the council he urged the gathered leaders to negotiate a truce with Wayne—rather than a formal peace—and then resume the war alongside British troops in the spring. Simcoe’s proposal was championed by Thayendanegea (aka, Joseph Brant), who led a sizable Haudenosaunee delegation, but the last word of the day belonged to the Wyandot leader Tarhe who—as the chief representative for the keepers of the ancient Council Fire—spoke on “behalf of all Nations here.” “We have long expected your assistance,” Tarhe told Simcoe, and reminded him that “You have always told us Father, you expected orders from the Great Father over the Great Lake.” “[W]e now request of you,” he continued, “to tell us whether it is in your power to assist us now. We have long been fighting for our Country and we will be ready immediately as soon as you let us know that your Warriors are ready to join us.”  

As much a diplomatic rebuff as a hopeful test of Simcoe’s pledge, these words also conveyed a sad weariness. In a brief speech that closed the four-day council, Tarhe reminded Governor Simcoe that “we have been now eleven years fighting; you always gave us reason to hope for your assistance. We are now low spirited by waiting so long, and we are nearly at the end of our expectations.” In truth, the Sandusky Wyandot were already at the end of their expectations. They suffered heavy losses at Fallen Timbers, where three of their four principal leaders were killed—leaving Tarhe as the only, though badly wounded, survivor. And like most of the Anishinaabeg, including the Bodéwadmi (Potawatomi) and Odawa (Ottawa) to the south and west of Lake Erie, the Sandusky Wyandot lived beyond the treaty claims of the United States. A failure to treat directly with Wayne could very well lead to the razing of their towns and further loss of land.  

Such calculations were not universal, however. Through the fall months, small groups of mostly Lunaapeew (Lenape, or Delaware) and Shawnee warriors attacked Wayne’s supply convoys to the south, as well as patrols outside the Legion’s forts. In early March a group of Shawnee warriors that likely included the young Tecumseh began harassing forts and settlements around the mouth of the Scioto River, and became

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87 “Proceedings of a Council at Brown’s Town, October 11th 1794,” in *Historical Collections*, 25 (1896), 40-46; quotation on p. 44. Also see “A sketch of a speech from the Wyandot chiefs, in the behalf of all their confederates, some time ago; about the 10th October, 1794,” in *ASP, Indian Affairs*, vol. 1, 548; Witgen, *Restoring the Chain of Friendship*, 55-57; and Heath, *William Wells*, 221-223.  
embroiled with Kentuckians who were making retaliatory strikes to the north of the Ohio. While these activities reflected what had been the will of the most adamant defenders of Confederacy lands and communities, they were not condoned by other members of the alliance. More than anything, the attacks by the Shawnee—particularly around the mouth of the Scioto River—grew out of a continuing commitment to retaining an Ohio River boundary with the United States as well as a deep identification with the area that dated back at least 2,000 years. For the militant Lunaapeew, who moved into the Ohio Valley from the east and had received permission from the Sandusky Wyandot to live in the region, their actions reflected a multigenerational effort to make their rightful place among the Shawnee, Wyandot, and others. To accede to any of the treaties of the previous decade, or affirm them in a new treaty with General Wayne, was to forfeit their new homeland for an uncertain future in an unknown place.

Even as these small-scale attacks were ongoing, a broader movement for peace developed within various elements of the Western Confederacy. More than a decade of wrangling over decisions about treaties and war had tested the limits of the Confederacy, and the overwhelming success of Wayne’s campaign caused renowned war leaders to lose patience with increasingly evasive officials in the British Indian Department and regret their own advocacy for engaging the Legion at Fallen Timbers. Wawayapiersenwah (Whirlpool, aka Blue Jacket), Buckongahelas, Agwazhe'aa (Egushawa), and others now saw wisdom in the words of Mihšihkinaahkwa (Little Turtle) when he spoke of Keešihiwia (Creator) hiding “his face in a cloud, if [his children] refuse to talk to the white chief [Wayne].” The concerns of these war leaders—like those of the young Tecumseh—were specific to their situations and goals, and not their positions within the larger Confederacy. All of these men were in their fifties and sixties, a stage in life when successful war leaders had transitioned to civil concerns, and all wanted to ensure that their people could rebuild their homes and replant their crops in peace. Even though such a path would come with U.S. demands to accept a land cession along the lines of the Fort Stanwix treaty, that prospect offered more possibilities than an unwinnable war fueled by British rations. By January 1795, all of these men had either made, or were preparing to make, individual queries to Wayne about initiating a peace council.

Other shifts were already underway that made the likelihood of a peace council more certain. Though unknown to Confederacy leaders, the reticence of British officials was largely the result of an early December notification that representatives of Great Britain and the United States had negotiated “The Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, Between His Britannic Majesty and the United States of America.” More commonly known as the Jay Treaty, it resolved several issues dating back to the Revolutionary War—including the abandonment (by July 1796) of British forts in the

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89 Anthony Wayne to Timothy Pickering, March 8, 1795, and Wayne to Pickering, June 17, 1795, in Campaign into the Wilderness: The Wayne-Knox-Pickering-McHenry Correspondence, v. 4, ed. Richard Knopf (Columbus: Ohio State Museum, 1955), 4: 12, 60; also see Edmunds, Tecumseh, 42-43.
90 Schutt, Peoples of the River Valleys, 180-82; Lakomäki, Gathering Together, 129-133.
Northwest Territory. While news of the treaty caused British officials at Detroit to further limit their support of the Confederacy, it also made Wayne more eager to engage Native leaders. Though still not formally ratified, the negotiated treaty ensures that the U.S. would not initiate any military actions that could offend or even provoke Great Britain. This key limitation was compounded by a few other challenges. Enlistment terms were ending for some of Wayne’s troops, as well as for volunteers and militia, which weakened his force and made it more difficult to supply and man the string of forts from the Ohio to the Maumee. Moreover, the destruction of Native crops and stores eliminated the possibility of a lengthy occupation by a wartime army.

These constraints were not as dire as those faced by Confederacy leaders, but they brought some urgency to Wayne’s effort to complete the second purpose of his campaign: a general treaty of land cession with all the members of the Confederacy that carried forward the basic terms first presented at Fort Harmar. Wayne was greatly assisted in this latter charge by Antoine Lasselle and François Navarre, two traders from the Canadien settlement on the River Raisin who were well known among the Native communities around western Lake Erie. Lasselle had fought with the Confederacy and been captured by Wayne’s forces, while Navarre hoped U.S. officials would certify his land claims on the River Raisin. Though each man had acquired different allegiances, they knew each other well and were similarly ensconced in many of the same Native communities. They were also very opportunistic, and began carrying supplies to the U.S. forts as well as trading with soldiers and officers through the winter. These activities increased as the fur-trading season began in early March, and eventually resulted in a common market of sorts that supplied diverse needs and provided important channels of communication between Native leaders and General Wayne and often served as translators.

Within this arena of commerce and potential diplomacy, Mihšíkhinaahkwa (Little Turtle) and Waweyapiersenwah (Whirlpool, aka Blue Jacket) opened direct

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92 On Jay’s Treaty, see Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick, *The Age of Federalism: The Early American Republic, 1788-1800* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 406-430; Barnes, *Native American Power*, 200-02, 205; and Nelson, *A Man of Distinction among Them*, 171-72, and 178. The negotiations that resulted in Jay’s Treaty had no bearing on Wayne’s campaign, or the General’s decision not to engage Major Campbell at Fort Miamis. However, they did shape British policy in the region in two ways. On the one hand, Henry Dudas, the Secretary of State for War, urged Governor Simcoe and the Indian Department to increase support for the Western Confederacy in hopes that a defeat of Wayne’s army would give Britain more leverage in its treaty negotiations with the United States. Yet Great Britain would not contribute any troops to the effort—since to do so would end the treaty negotiations altogether. With the French Revolutionary Wars then cleaving Europe, Whitehall was more concerned with keeping the United States out of the fray than it was in correcting the shortcomings of the 1783 Peace of Paris.


communications with General Wayne and began to successfully lobby other Western Confederacy leaders to consider peace negotiations. By early spring a majority had consented to treat with General Wayne, and sent messages that they would attend a grand council at the newly designated Fort Greenville in early summer. While the decisions to meet in council with General Wayne were determined by the members of specific communities and not a group of delegates, as had occurred in previous meetings of the Grand Council, those who did gather at Greenville broadly reflected the leadership of the Confederacy. There were dissenters, however, including a large number of Shawnee and some Lunaapeew (Lenape, or Delaware) who had chosen to move further west or north to Upper Canada, but from Wayne’s perspective the assembly was a more than “full meeting and representation … of the different tribes … [around] the council fire of the United States.” Unlike previous treaty councils, in which U.S. commissioners dictated to a few representatives from discrete communities, the validity of the Treaty of Greenville required a broad (but not necessarily universal) application of its terms to the members of the Confederacy.95

In a further break from previous U.S. treaty councils, Wayne took great pains to follow Indigenous protocols of gift giving and the use of kinship terms that demonstrated a commitment to peaceful relations. At times speaking as an “elder brother” to his “younger brothers,” Wayne emphasized that all were children of a common “father” – President George Washington. As the historian Andrew Cayton has noted, General Wayne was not practicing artful subterfuge. Rather, he was engaging in the “performance of consent.” “Wayne wanted much more than land and peace, he wanted genuine consent to the establishment of American sovereignty north of the Ohio River.” Such consent, gained through the ritual formalities of a treaty council, legitimized U.S. governance and “was as critical to winning a complete victory as any sword, musket, or cannon.”96 The council at Fort Greenville was about more than peace, however, since “complete victory” was also tied to an affirmation of the Fort Harmar Treaty. On this point the treaty council became a true negotiation, in which Mihšihkinaahkwa (Little Turtle) took the lead. After pointing out to Wayne that the Fort Harmar treaty did not involve most of the groups then gathered at Fort Greenville, and encompassed the homelands of the Myaamia, the Bodewadmi along the southern tier of present-day Michigan, and numerous groups in the Wabash and White River basins, Mihšihkinaahkwa made it clear that U.S. insistence on the full terms of the Fort Harmar Treaty would effectively destroy all the diplomatic successes of the Greenville council.

95 Schutt, Peoples of the River Valleys, 184-86; Lakomäki, “‘Our Line:’ The Shawnees, the United States, and Competing Borders on the Great Lakes ‘Borderlands,’ 1795–1832,” Journal of the Early Republic, 34 (Winter 2014), 609. Quotation from “Minutes of a Treaty with the tribes of Indians called the Wyandots, Delawares, Shawanese, Ottawas, Chippewas, Patawatamies, Miamies, Eel River, Kickapoos, Piankeshaws, and Kaskaskias, begun at Greeneville, on the 16th day of June, and ended on the 10th day of August, 1795,” in American State Papers: Documents, Legislative and Executive, of the Congress of the United States, Vol. 4, Indian Affairs (ASPIA), no. 1 (Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1832), 564. On the change from Fort Greene Ville to Fort Greenville, see note 61 above.
Wayne ultimately concurred, and the various Confederacy leaders compromised on the cession of some areas in what soon became the southwestern quadrant of Ohio.\textsuperscript{97}

\begin{figure}[h!]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{Figure56.png}
\caption{Figure 5.6: Treaty of Greenville Land Cessions, 1795. Aside from the large expanse of land in present-day Ohio and part of Indiana, the Treaty of Greenville included a number of non-contiguous land cessions. These generally encompassed lands around military forts, portage sites, or trading posts. The six-mile wide stretch of land from the River Raisin to Lake St. Clair was an informal military district rather than an area slated for prompt survey and sale. It was a hold-over from the Fort McIntosh Treaty (1785), and served as a barrier to British interests in the area. With the exception of lands in the immediate vicinity of military forts, all of the non-contiguous land cessions were included in subsequent treaties and effectively remained unceded and unsurveyed until after the War of 1812.}
\end{figure}

Consent and the Seeds of Discontent

The twelve years between the 1783 Peace of Paris and the Treaty of Greenville was tumultuous and transformative. Through costly wars, a treaty with Great Britain and another with the Confederacy, the United States achieved much of the territorial sovereignty it had claimed at the close of the Revolution. The exercise of that sovereignty would soon encroach on the “general boundary line” of the Greenville Treaty, as land speculators, squatters and settlers extended the grid of property ownership to the north and west. In the process, hard pressed Native communities became more reliant on treaty annuities—the annual payments of cash and goods that served as compensation for ceding lands to the United States. While annuities, rather than lump sum payments, put less strain on a deeply indebted U.S. Treasury, regular annual payments were also intended, as Secretary of War Timothy Pickering noted to Wayne, “to secure the good

will of the Indian Tribes by making it their interest to be our friends, by their dependence on our yearly bounty, … [and thus] create an obligation of which they would feel the force."

None of these developments were the intended goals of Mihšihkinaahkwa, Waweyapiersenwah (Whirlpool, aka Blue Jacket), Buckongahelas, Agwazhe’aa (Egushawa), and other Confederacy leaders who placed their marks on the treaty document. They wanted an end to decades of conflict, a formally recognized separation between their lands and expanding U.S. populations, and a measure of autonomy to shape their own futures in a challenging new context. On this last score, some even believed that—in the wake of the British withdrawal—a new order might be established in which the United States assumed the old role of Onontio. All of these hopes and expectations, in one form or another, carried forward the concerns of past generations and fit within the oscillating dynamics of what Richard White called “republics” and “alliances.” In the immediate wake of the Greenville Treaty, the “republican” condition prevailed, with a village or associated villages pursuing an independent course to find opportunity in challenging circumstances. In time, however, alliances would develop much as they had in previous generations—when the needs and concerns of specific communities were most threatened.

These dynamics would unfold in new ways over the next two decades, but they would enlarge on a key aspect of the Treaty of Greenville. In the wake of its defeat at the Battle of Fallen Timbers, the Confederacy could not avoid a large cession of land. Yet the treaty did establish the precedent in the United States of negotiating directly with the multiple groups regarding their collective lands. This was not a small matter, and it had been a key principle of the Confederacy since the 1784 Treaty of Fort Stanwix. The condition would be eroded over the next decade and a half, however, as specific groups sought a separate peace with the United States and federal officials aggressively pushed them to cede large tracts of lands. Yet the principle of common lands within a broad alliance would become increasingly central to Indigenous relations with the United States and Great Britain in the coming years, and proved central to a new period of revitalization and resistance prior to and during the War of 1812.

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Chapter Six

“I want to live in peace on our land”: Crisis and Renewal in the Borderlands of Nation and Empire, 1795-1810

Though set within a common and relatively brief chronology, the subjects of this chapter are mostly presented as overlapping episodes rather than sequential stages of historical development. The consequences of the Battle of Fallen Timbers and the 1795 Treaty of Greenville affected all communities in the Ohio Valley, but their varied responses grew out of different experiences and histories. For Native peoples, the old dynamics of discrete communities, common alliances, and cultural revitalization continued to shape responses to British and U.S. interests—but occurred in the midst of acute crises brought on by land cessions, growing U.S. populations, and resource depletion. British imperial and U.S. national agendas were recalculated in ways that both followed and diverged from patterns established during the Revolutionary War. By the early 19th century, irresolution of old issues and changing conditions in the region made the prospect of a new war in the western Ohio Valley seem increasingly imminent. These circumstances also gave rise to a borderland community of mostly French Canadiens who drew on century-old relations and experiences to gain more autonomy in a changing Indigenous and geopolitical landscape. To better follow the complex array of interests and experiences of the period, as well as the transformative contexts in which they occurred, different sections focus on specific populations and developments. By the end of the chapter, however, the combination of these various developments become centered on the Detroit River area and lower River Raisin.

Regardless of their location or level of participation in the recent war with the United States, all Indigenous communities in what is now northwestern Ohio, southeastern Michigan, and northern Indiana suffered in the aftermath of Fallen Timbers. South and east of what became the Greenville Treaty line, hastily abandoned villages had been destroyed by U.S. troops. North and west of the line, in the Maumee River basin and along the headwaters of the Wabash, most villages remained inhabitable—but some had been looted and their crops burned. All of this damage, of course, had come during and after several weeks of holding large councils and preparing for war. Both activities overtaxed local resources, even as the British increased supplies to the Glaize and Roche de Boeuf. Consequently, the Confederacy was already dependent on British assistance by the time Wayne had won the battle at Fallen Timbers. In defeat their needs became more acute through the fall and winter of 1794-95, when as many as 3,500 people survived mostly on British rations in temporary villages along Swan Creek and Maumee Bay. Most of these refugees were Shawnee, Lunaapeew, and Odawa from the Glaize and Roche de Bouef, but they included families and groups from throughout the Confederacy. Some remained at Swan Creek until early 1796, including a number of Shawnee led by

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Kekewepelethy (Great Hawk, aka Captain Johnny)—who subsequently moved across Lake Erie to Upper Canada.²

Most of the people who sought refuge on the lower Maumee River returned to the vicinity of their former village sites in the spring of 1795, choosing to continue their lives where agriculture was more reliable and connections with other returnees more readily sustained. Given the destruction of the recent war and the relative proximity of the Greenville Treaty line, however, this decision would lead to a host of challenges. These became increasingly apparent over the next five years as U.S. citizens pushed into the vast expanse of ceded lands. The newcomers rapidly killed off game populations in long-used hunting areas and closed off regular travel routes to the south and the east. As an editor of Harrison’s memoir would later observe, these changes soon led to a “general discontent among the Indians, caused by the scarcity of game, the rapidly-advancing skirmish line of white settlements—the sure forerunner of a denser population—upon their hunting-grounds.” The increasing proximity of Euro-American settlements and trade houses also brought an increased traffic in liquor, which deeply troubled most village leaders as it became the scourge of their dispirited communities.³

Living with the Treaty of Greenville

The Greenville Treaty annuities (annual payments of various trade goods, tools, agricultural implements, and seed) affected the political and social dynamics of these resettled Native communities in significant ways. Although the treaty was signed by a broad array of leaders from the Confederacy, the annuities were not directed through a Grand Council or any other collective body. Rather, they were given to specific signatories who then distributed them within their communities. In this way, at least, the United States became an Onontio or “father” of sorts to groups that ceded land and professed allegiance. Leaders who did not sign the treaty were thus less able to meet the physical needs of their people, or provide access to goods that fostered the reciprocal exchanges that held a community together. In this regard, as in many others, the period after the Treaty of Greenville variously undermined or altered social cohesion within villages, and caused deep fractures throughout the formerly “United Indian Nations.”⁴

The Shawnee provide a clear illustration of this process, and the difficulties associated with any effort to unify increasingly fragmented communities. M’kative-kašee (aka Catahecassa, Black Hoof), the Mekoche war leader-turned-diplomat, was a signatory

of the Greenville Treaty and recognized by the United States as the primary representative of all the Shawnee. Along with the Mekoche civil leader Biaseka (Wolf), he hoped to use his formal relations with U.S. officials to gain support for developing the town of Wapakoneta at the head of the Auglaize River into a place where all five Shawnee divisions could “gather together” again as one nation. With access to annuities and a history of Mekoche rapprochement with the Americans, M’katiwe-kašee and Biaseka seemed to possess sufficient resources to accomplish their vision.\(^5\)

Yet a general sense of Shawnee national identity did not translate into an allegiance to Mekoche leaders. Moreover, the emphasis that U.S. policy placed on the adoption of Euro-American agricultural practices—and its acceptance by these Mekoche leaders, caused a great deal of consternation. U.S. officials and Christian missionaries insisted that men should plow, plant, harvest, and own their crops. Yet this fundamentally undermined basic social relations within treaty groups, and bolstered the resistance of groups that refused to treat with the United States. The inversion of Indigenous gender roles, in which women managed agricultural production in accordance with age-old practices, threatened the social position of women and challenged men to forego their traditional measures of community worth; namely, hunting and war. These were not small matters, and they often found expression in subsequent challenges to U.S. authority and treaty signatories.\(^6\)

Most Shawnee had stayed away from the Greenville council, and chose to pursue a degree of self-sufficiency and autonomy. As noted above, some moved to Upper Canada while others departed for present-day Missouri where the Spanish had previously granted lands to their Hathawekela, Kispoko, and Pekowi relatives. Others preferred to remain within the territories they had defended, and established villages between the Maumee and the Wabash River. Among the latter was the mostly Kispoko community led by Tecumseh (Shooting Star), who vehemently opposed the Greenville treaty and frequently denounced the plans of M’katiwe-kašee and Biaseka. After spending the better part of three years within Shawnee territories that had been ceded in the 1795 Treaty, Tecumseh accepted an invitation to build a town among Lunaapeew (Lenape, or Delaware) allies on the west fork of the White River in 1798.\(^7\)

\(^{5}\) Sami Lakomäki, *Gathering Together: The Shawnee People through Diaspora and Nationhood, 1600–1870* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), 132-35. The name and translation of “Biaseka” used here comes from treaty documents and U.S. reports on councils with Shawnee representatives. The meaning and pronunciation of “Biaseka” remains unclear, however, since the word “wolf” in the Shawnee language is rendered as m’wewa and roughly pronounced as m’way-wah.


Chapter Six

Figure 6.1: Indigenous Population Centers after the Treaty of Greenville, ca. 1795-1800. Superimposed circles and ovals encompass primary residential and use areas of former Confederacy groups relative to the northwestern extent of the Greenville Treaty Line (identified on the map as “Indian Boundary Line” in the lower right-hand corner of the image). Village and town areas concentrated along the Wabash and White rivers are contained in the large circle in the lower left. The small oval to the right encompasses the Mekoche Shawnee town of Wapakoneta, while the oval in the center surrounds the Myaamia (Miami) town of Kiihkayonki (Kekionga) and associated villages. Around the western end of Lake Erie (top right-hand corner of image) are the mostly Odawa, Wyandot, and Lunaapeew (Lenape, or Delaware) villages of Lower Sandusky, the mostly Odawa towns and villages on the Lower Maumee River and Maumee Bay, and the mostly Wyandot, Bodewadmi (Potawatomi), and Shawnee communities around the Detroit River. The broad oval in the upper center corresponds to Bodëwadmi populations on the St. Joseph River and the southern end of Lake Michigan. The small circle in the lower right encompasses the mostly Wyandot towns around Upper Sandusky. Source: detail from John Cary, “A new map of part of the United States of North America: exhibiting the Western Territory, Ken-tucky, Pennsylva[n]ia, Maryland, Virginia &c” (1805). Courtesy of New York Public Library.

The Detroit River Boundary

As former elements of the Confederacy adjusted to the new U.S. regime of forts, annuities, and treaty boundaries, parallel shifts were occurring among Indigenous, Canadien, British, and Euro-American populations in the Detroit River area. In compliance with the Jay Treaty, the British abandoned Detroit in 1796 and built Fort
Amherstburg at the mouth of the Detroit River’s main channel. Located beside the small township of Malden (which included Loyalists who fled north after the Revolution, employees and retirees of the British Indian Department, several traders formerly based at Detroit, and a number of Shawnee associated with Kekewpelethy), the fort replaced Detroit as a military and administrative center for Upper Canada and the upper Great Lakes. From Amherstburg, British officials also kept tabs on U.S. activities and maintained relations (through trade and informal councils) with Native communities on the other side of the international boundary. These included the Wyandot across the river at Big Rock (Brownstown) and Maguaga, Odawa around Maumee Bay, Ojibwe along Lake St. Clair and the southern shore of Lake Huron, and Bodéwadmi (Potawatomi) to the west of Lake Erie and around southern Lake Michigan, as well as other members of the former Confederacy who lived to the north, west, and southwest.

Individuals, families and small delegations from these communities also continued to frequent Detroit, which the Irish travel writer Isaac Weld described in October 1796 as “crowded with Indians of one tribe or other” who came to trade, work, or visit during the day, but were “turned out of the town [each night], and the gates shut upon them.” Whether or not this nightly escort was viewed as an affront, according to Weld it seemed of a piece with a general lack of U.S. hospitality. “The American officers here,” he wrote, “have endeavored to their utmost to impress upon the minds of the Indians, an idea of their own superiority over the British; but as they are very tardy in giving these people any presents, [the Native visitors] do not pay much attention to their words.” By “presents,” Weld meant annuities, which always seemed to arrive later than promised at U.S. posts throughout the region. This chronic tardiness largely stemmed from the lack of U.S. naval and commercial vessels on Lake Erie until 1796, and the continuing British dominance of lower and upper Great Lakes transportation and trade. At the time of Weld’s visit, Fort Lernoult (aka Fort Detroit) was still mostly supplied by the overland routes that moved north from the Ohio River and through the posts on the Maumee River. Regardless of the reasons, the results did not redound well for the United States. Even the once-feared General Wayne was mocked with a new name by the groups that received their annuities at Detroit. Instead of Noodin or Chi-noodin (the Wind),

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8 Historians in the United States and Canada frequently refer to Fort Amherstburg as “Fort Malden,” but this is an anachronism. Fort Amherstburg was destroyed by the British in September 1813 prior to their retreat from the 2nd Army of the Northwest. The ruins were subsequently occupied by U.S. forces and a smaller scale fort was reconstructed on the site and named Fort Malden. Following the Treaty of Ghent in 1814, which formally ended the war, the British reoccupied the fort—which continued to be known as Fort Malden. In the present study, “Fort Amherstburg” is used in reference to the facility prior to September 1813—and the town of Malden is identified as a distinct community.

9 Willig, Restoring the Chain of Friendship, 61-63; Allan K. McDougall and Lisa P. Valentine, “Treaty 29: Why More Became Less,” in: Papers of the Thirty-Fourth Algonquian Conference, ed. H.C. Wolfart (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2003), 244-247. The Shawnee in Malden would subsequently move to Chenial Encarté, a substantial tract of land that encompassed Walpole Island along the northeastern shore of Lake St. Clair. Known as the Shawnee Reserve in later years, it had been acquired by the Crown in a 1796 treaty from Ojibwe and Odawa communities for Great Britain’s Indigenous allies during the recent wars.
Wayne was derisively referred to as “General Wabang [Waaban], that is General Tom-
morrow.”

Such missteps gave further incentive to the British for providing gifts and food to
Native visitors, who invariably brought information about their communities, U.S.
officials and policies, and the development of new settlements in the Ohio Valley.
Stopping in Detroit and Amherstburg also had particular benefits for these visitors, since
it provided an opportunity to receive both annuities and gifts, do some trading, and glean
information about the disposition of U.S. military officials and the British Indian
Department. Yet there was another, more long-standing reason for Native peoples to
come to the Detroit River area: namely, to trade and socialize with the Canadien
communities that had been in the area for the better part of a century. Weld estimated that
“two thirds of the [500] inhabitants of Detroit are of French extraction, and the greater
part of the [1,500] inhabitants of the settlements on the river, both above and below the
town, are of the same description.” Because Detroit was an entrepôt for the entire Great
Lakes region, a large number of the French who resided in the town were “engaged in
trade” that included furs from the north, dry goods from Lower Canada, and
manufactures from across the Atlantic. However, most exchanges occurred on a local or
regional scale, and moved through a network of mostly Canadien, Métis, Indigenous, and
(to a lesser extent) British connections.

Such relationships were never merely transactional, and many of the traders with
ties to the Detroit River area lived among or had married into various communities within
the Confederacy. Several also played important roles in assisting the British and the
Confederacy prepare for the northward march of Wayne’s army while some, like Antoine
Lasselle, fought at Fallen Timbers. In the aftermath of the battle, Canadien, Métis, and
bicultural British traders like George Ironside (Scottish-Shawnee) advised individual
Confederacy leaders prior to the treaty council at Greenville. Not surprisingly, these men
also served as interpreters during the month-long council, and a fair number were listed
as official witnesses on the final treaty document. It was such men, their families, and
their kin that Indigenous visitors from communities around the Great Lakes—and even as

10 Willig, Restoring the Chain of Friendship, 63; Allen, His Majesty’s Indian Allies, 88-90; Guillaume
Teasdale, “Old Friends and New Foes: French Settlers and Indians in the Detroit River Border Region,”
Michigan Historical Review, 38 (Fall 2012): 37-38. Quotations are from Isaac Weld, Travels through the
States of North America and the Provinces of Upper and Lower Canada, during the Years 1795,1796, and
U.S. and British shipping around Lake Erie in the late 18th century, see J. B. Mansfield, ed., History of the
11 Willig, Restoring the Chain of Friendship, 63; Allen, His Majesty’s Indian Allies, 90-91; Teasdale, “Old
Friends and New Foes,” 38-39; Weld, Travels, 187; Lisa Philips Valentine and Allan K. McDougall,
“Imposing the Border: The Detroit River from 1786 to 1807,” Journal of Borderlands Studies, 19 (Spring
2004), 13-15; Susan Sleeper Smith, “The Social and Political Significance of Exchange, in Rethinking the
Fur Trade: Cultures of Exchange in an Atlantic World, ed. Sleeper Smith (Lincoln: University of Nebraska
Press, 2009), 83-88; Catherine Cangany, Frontier Seaport: Detroit’s Transformation into an Atlantic
Entrepôt (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014), 43-44; Dennis M. Au, “The River Raisin: A
Comparative Portrait,” Le Journal 27 (Summer 2011), 3. Population figure for Detroit comes from Peter
Gavrilovich and Bill McGraw, The Detroit Almanac: 300 Years of Life in the Motor City (Detroit: Detroit
far west as the Mississippi River—came to visit, trade, and exchange gifts before or after making their way to Detroit and Amherstburg.\textsuperscript{12}

\textit{Canadien Continuity}

Many of these connections stretched back across several generations, and persisted through five decades of war. This was particularly true around western Lake Erie and the major river valleys to the southwest and west—i.e., the heart of the former \textit{Pays d’en Haut}. During Pontiac’s Rebellion (1763-65), Obwandiyag (Pontiac) and other Indigenous leaders from the Detroit River area received advice and assistance from these \textit{Canadien} communities. By the end of that brief war, British officials ultimately realized that peace required emulation of the diplomatic and material exchanges that had long nurtured Indigenous-French relations in the region. These efforts proved successful when they followed or augmented the commercial and social relationships of \textit{Canadien} traders, and when they approximated Native conceptions of Onontio. In the latter regard, the British succeeded best during the American Revolution when the Crown’s fight with the rebellious colonies coincided (much like France’s war with the British and Long Knives a generation earlier) with the territorial and marshal concerns of American Indians in the Ohio River Valley.\textsuperscript{13}

During the subsequent conflicts of the late 1780s and early 1790s, the northward displacements of Indigenous communities from the vicinity of the Ohio River pushed the center of a renewed Native-British alliance toward the population centers around the Detroit River, western Lake Erie, the Maumee River, and the upper Wabash River. These locales formed a tight constellation of allied interests that developed common strategies, provisioned war parties, and maintained healthy exchange networks in a time of intermittent war. Fort Lernoult and the town at Detroit, as well as the immediate surroundings, were important in all three regards.\textsuperscript{14} British officials requisitioned firearms for Native warriors and helped plan campaigns that included soldiers and rangers from the Indian Department. European trade goods also came to the Great Lakes in the form of British supplies and gifts, as well as through \textit{Canadien} or Métis traders with close relations in the region. While military support and trade were central to the British-Confederacy alliance, these activities were largely sustained by the labors of the 2,000 \textit{habitants} (settlers, or residents) whose ribbon farms fronted both sides of the Detroit River and the River Rouge. Along with a smaller number of British farmers, they

\textsuperscript{12} F. Clever Bald, \textit{How Michigan Men Helped Make the Treaty of Greenville} (Ypsilanti: University Lithoprinters, 1945), 213-221; Teasdale, “Old Friends and New Foes,” 46-47; Carter, \textit{The Life and Times of Little Turtle}, 140-44; Sugden, \textit{Blue Jacket: Warrior of the Shawnees} (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), 185-90; Willig, \textit{Restoring the Chain of Friendship}, 35-38. Though numbers and attributions are not precise, at least eight men from the River Raisin and Detroit signed the Treaty of Greenville as witnesses, and three more were listed as official interpreters. Many others were present at the negotiations, but were not noted by name in official records or did not sign the treaty document; see Le Roy Barnett and Roger Rosentreter, \textit{Michigan’s Early Military Forces: A Roster and History of Troops Activated Prior to the American Civil War} (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2003), 47.


\textsuperscript{14} The British built Fort Lernoult in 1778-79 to replace the aging facilities of Fort Pontchartrain du Detroit.
produced more than enough grain, produce, and meat for themselves, the denizens of Detroit, and military personnel. Their surpluses also filled the larders of traders and—through British purchasing agents—supplied large conferences of the Confederacy as well as Indigenous communities displaced by war.\textsuperscript{15}

While Canadien farmers, traders, and merchants were important to the British-Confederacy alliance, their actions were not wholly partisan. This was particularly true of the Canadien and Métis traders who were instrumental in bringing General Wayne and Indigenous leaders together in the months after the Battle of Fallen Timbers and during the Greenville treaty council. For the dozen or so traders who were present at the Greenville council, facilitating the treaty process helped ensure the continuation of their livelihoods and social relations. After Fallen Timbers it was clear that trading in the Ohio Valley and the lower Great Lakes would require licenses from the United States—and it was rightly assumed that assisting General Wayne’s efforts to hold a successful treaty council would bring certain advantages. Moreover, helping Myaamia, Lunaapeew, Bodéwadmi, Odawa, and Shawnee leaders navigate the beginnings of the new regime would sustain continued relations among the communities in which these Canadiens had long resided and traded. As Dennis Au notes, these traders knew that if they “played their cards right with the Americans there was a considerable profit to be made.”\textsuperscript{16}

\textit{La Rivi\`{e}re aux Raisins} and the Detroit River Borderland

It would be wrong to see these men and their families as merely two-faced profiteers, working both sides of a transaction to their own benefit. To function well in the fur trade over a long period of time required close attention to the fundamental virtues of reciprocity and kinship. To cheat or dupe the people with whom one traded, and who were often relatives, was a recipe for personal and financial disaster. Likewise, playing General Wayne and other U.S. officials for fools was not a game with long-term prospects for success. Rather than two-faced, men like Antoine Lasselle maintained a singular perspective that looked in two directions: southward toward the United States and eastward to British North America, but always focused on maintaining or augmenting connections in the fur trade. In truth, they were privateers; people who sought a degree of success and independence in the land they inhabited without directly offending those who might claim their loyalties. Competition between leading trade families like the Navarres and the Lasselles, as well as the different political and personal relations that shaped their livelihoods, might cause one or the other to improve relations at different times with the United States, Great Britain, or particular Indigenous communities and their alliances. Yet such proclivities, even when they pointed in opposite directions, came from people who shared a primary identification with—and loyalty to—the same French-speaking, Catholic community.\textsuperscript{17}


\textsuperscript{17} At the time of the Legion’s advance toward the Maumee River, and in the aftermath of Fallen Timbers, fear of Wayne’s army and resentment of British governance over \textit{habitant} communities around western
All of these circumstances and conditions, and the fealty to a historically and culturally distinct community, represent the fundamental hallmarks of a borderland community. Occupying an indeterminate zone between British North America and an expanding United States, Canadiens along the Detroit River and around western Lake Erie were separate from and connected to these two rival powers. Variously distrusted and solicited by U.S. and British officials, the French-speaking population of the region endeavored to maintain its independence by exploiting, soliciting, and protesting the attentions of both powers in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. This strategy was compounded by a third, and even more complex dynamic: maintaining relationships with Indigenous communities in the former Pays d’en Haut. The Wyandot, Odawa, and Bodéwadmi who relocated to the Detroit River area at the same time as the French (after the Great Peace of Montréal in 1701), are a good case in point. Unlike their Canadien neighbors, these were not borderland people per se. Rather, they continued to occupy a revered central position within an array of Indigenous communities across much of what is now the Upper Midwest. As such, they embodied the fears, resignations, and ambitions of the former Confederacy as different groups struggled to adjust to the new U.S. regime. Like the French-speaking population, the Wyandot, Odawa, and Bodéwadmi leaders alternately engaged U.S. and British officials. Yet their concerns were far more regional than local, and did not readily align with the specific concerns of their Canadien neighbors.18

Fraught with so much complexity, maintaining this Canadien borderland presented a host of challenges in the decade and a half after the Treaty of Greenville. Nowhere was this truer than among the community of habitants and traders who lived along the River Raisin, which in 1795 was the largest Canadien settlement outside of Lake Erie reached a peak—with the Navarres and McDougalls (a Scottish-French family) pushing for an alliance with the United States. The sources on the disagreements within the River Raisin community over this matter all come from the correspondence of British and U.S. officials, who generally disparaged Canadiens and identified them as passionate advocates or enemies of the letter writer’s cause. In sum, the correspondence suggests two things: in the midst of a possible war there were pronounced divisions within the River Raisin community; the fears of government and military officials caused them to exaggerate—and misidentify—the intensity of the individuals who were pro-British or pro-American. See Michael Power, “Father Edmund Burke: Along the Detroit Frontier, 1794-1797,” Historical Studies: The Canadian Catholic Historical Association (1984), 29-46; Patrick Tucker, “From Fallen Timbers to the British Evacuation of Detroit, 1794-1796: The Roman Catholic Priest Who Was a British Agent,” The Michigan Historical Review, 37 (Spring 2011): 41-76; and Bald, How Michigan Men, 212, 218. On primary loyalty to kin and community, also see Gitlin, The Bourgeois Frontier, 62.

Detroit—and certainly the most independent population center in the region. Because of its position on the main route between Detroit and the lower Maumee River, along with connections to the west, the River Raisin settlement was a place of great strategic interest. At the time of General Wayne’s campaign, the lower Raisin was considered a way-station and a causeway for a possible U.S. invasion of Detroit, a bulwark and supply area for the British defense of Detroit, and a rendezvous area for Confederacy warriors and refugees. Interest in all these strategic factors would return and intensify in the first decade of the 19th century, as would a spate of appeals from Indigenous, U.S., and British interests for support and assistance from the habitants sur la Rivière aux Raisins (inhabitants on the River Raisin).19

At the Border of Historical Change/À la frontière du changement historique

The origins of the Canadien community on the River Raisin, and its subsequent development, reflect the larger historical processes that shaped the old Pays d’en Haut from the Seven Years’ War to the War of 1812. Prior to the French surrender of Detroit in September 1760 and the subsequent Peace of Paris in 1763, habitants acquired rotures (a kind of inheritable or transferable land lease) through the semi-feudal seigneurial system of New France. Through petitions to the commandant of Fort Pontchartrain, individuals received a roture for a long lot or ribbon farm that fronted the Detroit River—for which they paid rent to the King in the form of taxes collected by the royal notary. By the early 1760s these relatively narrow parcels (between 380 ft. and 950 ft. wide, and 7,600 ft. deep) had taken up twenty miles of Detroit River frontage and were beginning to spread up the River Rouge and the Ecorse River. This process of land distribution and use was formally ended with the Treaty of Paris (1763) which, among other things, dismantled the seigneurial system and transformed land grants to land titles. Any expectations that these changes might lead to a new market for land were largely dashed by the Royal Proclamation of 1763, which forbade “any Purchases or Settlements whatever, or taking Possession of any of the Lands” west of the Appalachians or within the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin, without “especial leave and License” from the King.20


While some previously undeveloped parcels in the Detroit area were put up for sale, and existing long lots were divided or changed hands, a pent-up desire for more land grew as a new generation came of age. This was partly alleviated in the late 1760s when most of the Bodéwadmi (Potawatomi), Odawa, and Ojibwe communities moved away to locales on the Huron, Rouge, Saline, and Thames rivers, as well as the shores of Lake St. Clair and Maumee Bay. Before leaving the Detroit area, however, their leaders made land transactions with several Canadien and some Anglo-British buyers for the former village sites in the Detroit area. These transactions generally followed established practices from the French era, but they violated the Royal Proclamation of 1763 and thus failed to garner a formal authorization from the commandant of Fort Detroit (which had been an essential requirement in New France).

British officials in Detroit were neither able nor willing to restrict these transactions, since they were loath to foster any cause for resentment among the established Canadien and increasing British communities. Instead, a legal technicality was used as workaround: the commandant issued a formal statement that acknowledged a transaction had occurred, but also noted that he did not have the authority to certify a legal deed for the land. This process functioned well enough, and by the late 1770s the holders of informal titles within the former Native village sites had marked out long lots and either “sold” the land or put it under cultivation. At the close of the American Revolution, a new inflationary market developed as British merchants began acquiring uncertified “deeds” on both sides of the Detroit River, with the expectation that they could later sell these lands under a revamped British system or—if necessary—within a future U.S. market. During this inflationary period, François and Jacques Navarre decided to move to the lower River Raisin where they could establish themselves in a more affordable situation and bring their trade closer to the Ohio Valley. Between 1783 and 1785 these two landless grandsons of a royal notary began acquiring tracts of land from a Bodéwadmi community that had previously moved from Detroit (where they very likely had known the Navarre family for several generations) to the upper River Raisin basin. Other Canadiens would follow, acquiring land from the Navarres or the Bodéwadmi, and a community of habitants along with a handful of traders began to form on both sides of the river by 1785.

Dating from the end of the Revolutionary War and the first post-war conflicts in the Ohio Valley, the initial development of the River Raisin community was not a simple matter of historical coincidence. Located thirty miles south of Detroit, the River Raisin provided more ready access to the growing concentration of Indigenous communities in the upper Ohio Valley as well other groups to the west and southwest. The terms of the

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21 Fort Detroit, in the British era, refers to the same French facility known as Fort Ponchartrain du Détroit. On the distinction between Fort Detroit and Fort Lernoult during the British era, see note 14 above.

1783 Peace of Paris also promised a new degree of independence for this mostly Canadien population, since the River Raisin flowed through the territorial claims that Great Britain had ceded to the United States. While the Crown retained de facto jurisdiction over the area until ratification of the Jay Treaty in 1796, British restrictions on land acquisition to the west and north of the Detroit River no longer had any legal basis in a Provincial Court. By the same token, the Congress’ restriction against all private land purchases from American Indians—as spelled out in the Land Ordinances of 1784, 1785, and 1787—had little to no bearing in a region where Native residents did not recognize (let alone acknowledge) the sovereignty claims of the United States.

Between international treaties and the paper claims of Great Britain and the United States, the habitants along the River Raisin had found a fair degree of independence by the late 1780s. Over the next few years, British merchants also began acquiring parcels from Indigenous groups and Canadiens on the Huron, Raisin, and Maumee rivers, which created a “local market in illicit [land] deeds” that enjoyed the tacit approval of the notary public’s office in Detroit. This development brought a degree of certainty to land holders and purchasers on the lower River Raisin, which was further augmented in the early 1790s after the disastrous campaigns of generals Harmar (1790) and St. Clair (1791). These twin defeats at the hands of the Confederacy convinced Lieutenant Governor Simcoe and officials in the British Indian Department that the terms of the 1783 Peace of Paris would soon be revisited, and the boundary with the United States pushed southward. Such an expectation fostered growing confidence in Upper Canada about the future security of land values around western Lake Erie, as did an increasing demand for agricultural staples from the North West Company’s rapidly expanding network of fur trade posts between Lake Superior and Lake Manitoba.

Though not insignificant, the independence that habitants gained on the River Raisin was based on fragile contingencies. Namely, the weak exercise of British sovereignty, a relatively stable market in which land retained or increased its value, the willingness of some Indigenous communities to engage in small-scale land transactions, and a general feeling that all parties continued to receive what they considered a fair deal. These conditions proved short lived, however, and began to unravel completely in 1794. Having commenced negotiations with the United States on what became the Jay Treaty, British officials wavered in their support of the Western Confederacy and gave up their hopes for a southern extension of British sovereignty around Lake Erie. The following summer, as the Treaty of Greenville councils were underway, British syndicates worked feverishly to obtain large tracts of land to the south and west of the Detroit River with an eye toward profiting from the coming U.S. land market. Plying Native leaders with liquor, presents and false promises, these would-be land barons sewed resentment among Indigenous alliances, Canadiens at River Raisin, and other small land-holders who viewed their property in terms of agricultural production and family patrimony rather than parcels of real estate. In another regard, however, the large treaty councils and the

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established presence of Wayne’s army proved a boon of sorts to the traders and habitants on the River Raisin—who could now access a new market at the various forts as well as a substantial customer base of soldiers, camp followers, and sutlers.²⁵

**A Canadien home in the Territory of Michigan**

Wayne’s victory at Fallen Timbers, followed by the Treaty of Greenville and the Jay Treaty, effectively destroyed the informal land market that had developed under the British, but created a unique opportunity for the community along the River Raisin. Even before the Jay Treaty had been signed in London, and months before Fallen Timbers, François Navarre saw the United States as the best guarantor of his and other Canadiens’ property rights. In May of 1794 he travelled to Fort Greene Ville to request that General Wayne petition Congress to recognize Navarre’s land deeds—which he presented to Wayne—and those of his family and neighbors. Wayne was not in a position to act on such a request, and did not address the matter during the treaty council the following year. Undaunted, Navarre and other Canadien landholders sent three petitions of their own to Congress between 1796 and 1800 that variously sought legal title to their current lands (as formerly construed by French and British property systems), inquired about the availability of more lands for purchase by their increasing populations, requested that Congress distinguish between the small holdings of Canadiens from the large tracts claimed by British syndicates, and made clear that the petitioners had rejected British offers of land in Upper Canada to instead pursue the “opportunity of gaining the rights of citizenship, under a free Government.”²⁶

By 1802 these would-be patriots received a positive response, and a promise that a special commission would work directly with the habitants on the River Raisin and other nearby waterways. The process was delayed at the outset, however, since the District of Detroit (which at the time encompassed the six-mile wide Treaty of Greenville land cession that extended from the River Raisin to the shores of Lake St. Clair) still lacked a formal administrative center. Aside from the small garrison at Fort Lernoult, Detroit was little more than a fortified village surrounded by cultivated lands. The mostly French-speaking population retained its close ties with communities on the other side of the Detroit River (as did their English-speaking neighbors and nearby Indigenous groups), where Amherstburg had quickly become the commercial center of the region. Matters were further compounded by the structure and organization of territorial

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governance. Until 1805, present-day Michigan was part of the vast Indiana Territory, which also encompassed the present states of Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, and part of Minnesota. With the territorial capital at Vincennes, some 400 miles and several days travel to the south, the Detroit area was only marginally connected to the federal government.27

These demographic and economic patterns remained in place after Michigan became a separate territory in 1805, but elevation of Detroit to a territorial capital promised to bind the town’s and the district’s fortunes to the United States. As the Democratic-Republicans of the County of Wayne noted in a petition read before Congress in early December 1804, territorial status for Michigan was essential in a polyglot community that bordered Upper Canada, had few ties to the United States, and almost no experience with republican government. As they put it,

the frequent transfer of their allegiance from the French to the English, and from the latter to the U.S., has left them destitute of all patriotic Attachment to either. The regular & moderate exertion of authority blended with justice, would perhaps fix their wavering attachments …, strengthen ties of dependence on the general government … [and enable] our Citizens … better to estimate the admirable administration of its laws.28

Similar arguments had been made in previous petitions over the past four years, and had also noted the importance of establishing secure land titles and clear legal codes, but this last plea put matters in a more nationalistic light. The argument proved effective, and within a month resulted in an “Act to divide the Indiana Territory into two Separate governments” – which created the Territory of Michigan and set its formal establishment date of June 30, 1805.29

To administer the new territory, Jefferson appointed William Hull as Governor, Augustus Woodward as Chief Justice, and Stanley Griswold as Secretary. Together, Hull, Woodward, and two other federal judges would also constitute the Detroit Land Board— to work in tandem with the already established Detroit Land Office. Toward these ends, the Land Board designated a Land Office Commission to examine and rule on the property claims of habitants within Detroit and in the vicinity of the River Raisin. Just weeks before Governor Hull, Justice Woodward, and Secretary Griswold took office, however, much of Detroit was destroyed in a fire. Given the complex nature of property titles and land claims in and around the town, and the desire of the new territorial officers

28 “To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States in Congress Assembled [December 6, 1804],” in Documents Relating to the Erection of Wayne County and Michigan Territory (Detroit: Burton Historical Collection, Detroit Public Library, 1922-1923), 35.
to enlarge and reconfigure Detroit, the Commission’s early work was focused almost entirely on making a “definitive and judicious adjustment” of pre-existing property boundaries and their ownerships in order to accommodate a completely new layout of the territorial capital. Yet despite this additional work, the promised review of property claims on the River Raisin began by the fall of 1805.  

The Commission was led by Frederick Bates, who was the receiver of public monies at the Detroit Land Office when President Jefferson named him one of Michigan’s three territorial judges. Most of the habitants were represented by Detroit attorney George McDougall, who spoke fluent French and English, was related through his mother to the Navarres, and had recently been appointed Notary Public for the newly established District of Erie (a jurisdiction that roughly corresponded to the current boundaries of Monroe County). Bates and McDougall knew each other well from previous work and residence in the Detroit area, and the latter seems to have operated as an adjunct of the commission. Through late 1805 and much of 1806, the Commissioners and McDougall interviewed landholders, examined land deeds, and visited habitants to verify claims. The process was complex, and involved sorting through past verbal agreements, tangled genealogies, and rough descriptions of boundaries. Yet there was a good deal of comity in the process, and everyone involved seemed to be working toward a broadly acceptable resolution.

The tenor and desired outcome of the commission’s work was affirmed by Justice Woodward in a March 1806 report to Congress. “There are cases in the history of nations,” he wrote, “in which a wise Government will cover with the shroud of oblivion that which is past, and place the hand of rigor only on that which is to come; and [the work of the commission] is one of those cases.” Instead of seeking ways to deny the land claims of people who had been in the region for generations, Woodward championed an approach that confirmed the property rights of new citizens—much as had recently occurred in what had previously been French New Orleans. Woodward’s sentiments were subsequently affirmed by Secretary Griswold who, in almost all other matters, was a bitter political rival of the Chief Justice. After replacing Bates on the commission in early 1807, he wrote President Jefferson about the nature of property claims on the River Raisin and elsewhere in Michigan Territory. “[I]t should be recollected, … That The farms are cultivated, that the occupants are natives, born on the soil which they now


31 McDougall’s appointment as Notary Public can be found in MHC, vol. 36, 30

32 A fair sense of the breadth and character of the Land Board’s work along the River Raisin can be gleaned from the multiple reports and testimonials in the proceedings of the Land Board for the years 1805, 1806, and 1807 that are collected in American State Papers: Documents, Legislative and Executive, of the Congress of the United States; Public Lands (Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1832), 295-301, 322-327, 334-337, and 342-345.
claim, feeling that soil to be their home, as it is indeed the only home they have on earth, and the only source of their subsistence.”

Figure 6.2: “Plan of Private Claims in Michigan Territory, As Surveyed by Aaron Greeley, d. Surveyor, in 1810” This map depicts adjudicated property claims on the River Raisin and adjoining areas. (Courtesy of the Archives of Michigan)

The commission’s final report resulted in a new piece of legislation that made a specific exception to the Northwest Ordinance’s bans against preemption and the making of private contracts with American Indians for land acquisition. In “An Act Regulating the Grant of Lands in the Territory of Michigan” (1807), Congress stipulated that all properties in “actual possession, occupancy, and improvement” before 1796, and within territory “to which the Indian title has been extinguished,” could be claimed by their owners through preemption rights. The clause about extinguished “Indian title” did fulfill an essential condition of the Northwest Ordinance, but in this case it technically

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34 “An Act Regulating the Grant of Lands in the Territory of Michigan,” in U.S. Statutes at Large 2 (1845), 438.
applied to the six-mile wide cession of land between the River Raisin and Lake St. Clair that was part of the Greenville Treaty. Perhaps in expectation of new land cession treaties, recognized property boundaries on the south side of the River Raisin were also included in the Act. The saga of the petitioners continued, however, as they sought recognition of lands they had acquired for the future use of their children—but had not occupied or improved before 1796. Eventually, the habitant communities received near complete satisfaction when most of these claims were recognized by Congress between 1807 and 1811. Moreover, their land patents retained the original survey methods of the French long lot or ribbon farm system—despite the stipulation in the 1785 Land Ordinance that a cadastral survey system would be applied to the lands within the original bounds of the Northwest Territory.\(^{35}\)

The general tendency toward accommodation allowed the commission to complete its work in a timely manner, even as their efforts were shaped by larger concerns. First among these was a sense that a drawn-out and overly complicated process could present the British with an advantage in the Detroit River region. As the Commissioners of the Land Board noted in a report dated September 1, 1807, failure to accommodate the land claims of habitants within U.S. territory would leave “those people … completely ruined, and [they] would be compelled to the leave the country and cross over to the British side, where each of them may receive, gratis, from that Government, two hundred acres of land in fee simple.”\(^{36}\) While the loss of the French population would hurt the territorial economy and prove a boon for Upper Canada, it could also present a strategic threat to the United States. As Secretary Griswold noted in his letter to President Jefferson in January 1807, failure to confirm the habitants’ “Just claims” would cause people who would otherwise become “the most satisfied and quiet citizens in the Union” to despise the United States.

Griswold viewed this as a particularly urgent matter, since U.S. officials were planning for a new land cession treaty council that would involve a large swath of southeastern Michigan Territory. Officials in Detroit, Vincennes, and Chillicothe (then the capital of Ohio) were also growing increasingly concerned about a growing alliance of American Indians that opposed further treaties and Griswold feared they might seek to forcefully derail the council. Lastly, he expected the British at Amherstburg would encourage Native leaders (through gifts and suggestions of a future alliance) to stay away from the treaty council. In short, the elements that had given rise to conflict in the past seemed to be coming together again. In this context, contented French-speaking citizens would “form an invaluable barrier for the united States [sic] on this northwest frontier against [American Indians], with whom they are on the most intimate and friendly terms, and whom they can influence more than any other people or nation on earth.” Moreover, as he pointedly reminded the President, “[t]heir friendship is to be highly valued on this


\(^{36}\) Commissioners of the Land Board to the Secretary of the Treasury, September 1, 1807, in “Land Claims in Michigan,” American State Papers, Public Lands, 593.
account, and their chagrin and enmity are to be as greatly dreaded. I should consider every Canadian, truly attached to the United States, better than a regular Soldier supported at the public expense, to protect this frontier.”

Figure 6.3: Cadastral Survey and Long Lots on River Raisin. While this map post-dates the actions of Congress between 1807 and 1811, it neatly represents how U.S. land systems accommodated Canadien long lots along the River Raisin. The map also indicates the locations of three reservations: Wyandot to the north, upriver from their former village of Big Rock (Brownstown); Bodéwadmi (Potawatomi) at the forks of the River Raisin, and Odawa (Ottawa) on Maumee Bay. With the exception of the Wyandot lands, which were previously centered around the site of Brownstown on this map, these lands were reserved as part of a larger land cession in 1807. Source: detail from Orange Risdon, Map of the surveyed part of the territory of Michigan (1825). Courtesy of Michigan State University Map Library.

Griswold’s theories were never fully tested, since the habitants’ seventeen-year effort to be recognized and to function as a distinct community proved successful within

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37 Griswold to Jefferson, January 30, 1807, in Territorial Papers, 83; spelling and punctuation as in the original.
a few months. Nevertheless, the dynamics that concerned him and the other Commissioners only intensified over the next few months. By May of 1807 it became clear to U.S. officials that the Ojibwe and Odawa around Saginaw, and some Bodéwadmi communities nearer to Detroit, were growing closer to the anti-treaty alliance. The following month brought news of the *Chesapeake—Leopard* Affair, in which the crew of the *HMS Leopard* attacked and boarded the *USS Chesapeake* near Norfolk, Virginia, British sailors boarded the *Chesapeake*, and seized four alleged deserters from the Royal Navy. The event raised cries for a new war with Great Britain and—especially in the Great Lakes and western Ohio Valley—the budding American Indian alliance.38

If nothing else, the developments of 1807 highlighted the broad arena of competing interests in which the *habitants* on the River Raisin were situated—and would have to contend. Most U.S. military installations, trading posts, and settlements were concentrated to the south, in the Maumee River basin and adjoining drainages. Nearby Indigenous groups were located to the northeast and southeast, between Maumee Bay and Detroit, to the west and northwest on eastward flowing streams and rivers including the River Raisin, while more distant groups regularly came to the Detroit River area from the west and southwest. The other significant nodal point in the *habitants’* world was occupied by the British at Fort Amherstburg, who retained a significant military, political, and commercial presence.

Because the River Raisin was situated at a midpoint between the nearest elements of these various groups, the *habitants* necessarily remained engaged with all three—but this proved increasingly difficult as the *Canadiens* became more secure within a U.S. context. For the British, the doubts they held about the River Raisin community in the 1790s gave way to resentment as *Canadien* traders increasingly brought Indigenous furs and even British trade goods to U.S. markets. A growing number of Indigenous leaders who maintained ties with the British, and refused to acknowledge the rights of a single group to sell lands, knew that the River Raisin community benefitted from close relations with the United States and would clearly benefit from the 1807 Treaty of Detroit. And lastly, U.S. officials and traders doubted the loyalty of some *Canadiens* who seemed to move too easily between Native communities, U.S. settlements and posts, and the mixed French and British populations on the Canadian side of the Detroit River. Such connections had defined the *habitants’* world for the better part of a century, but they were becoming increasingly difficult to maintain as tensions grew between the British, the United States, and a resurgent Native confederacy. Their best future, as far as most residents of the River Raisin could tell, lay with the United States—but they could ill afford to offend any party.39

**Treading an Uncertain Path**

As the *habitants* endeavored to gain legal title to their lands from the United States in the decade and a half after Fallen Timbers, most of the Indigenous groups with whom they traded had embarked on a halting and more uncertain path. Small groups and

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38 All of these matters are discussed more fully in the subsequent section of this chapter.
individuals from the former Confederacy, as well as communities further west and southwest, retained their connections with the British along the Detroit River borderland. While the destitute came for gifts to sustain them, most came to trade furs, dressed hides, honey, beewax, fish, venison, maple sugar and wild rice for cured meats, rum, cloth, decorative items, an array of European wares, or the services of a blacksmith. In this way gifts and exchanges sustained communities and their longstanding relations with the British. By the late 1790s and early 1800s, however, trade and trust had diminished considerably from just a decade before. This partly stemmed from the pressures that new U.S. settlers brought on the resource bases that sustained Native communities and their abilities to trade, but it reflected other changes as well. Former members of the Confederacy who lived near the Greenville Treaty line, and sought to cultivate better relations with U.S. officials, increasingly preferred to trade at U.S. posts. At the same time, changing policies made the British less forthcoming and generous in their trading. Most of this was caused by debts accrued in ongoing European wars as well as the relative peace that followed ratification of the Jay Treaty, both of which brought a general policy of economy to Fort Amherstburg and sharp reductions in military and Indian Department personnel in Upper Canada.  

As material and diplomatic exchanges between American Indians and the British were declining, the United States made a concerted effort to increase trade in the lower Great Lakes. This movement was partly triggered by Napoleon’s acquisition of Spanish Louisiana in 1800 and the possibility that the French might block U.S. access to the Mississippi River as well as renew their old position within the former Pays d’en Haut. To thwart a possible resurgence of the French imperial designs in North America, President Jefferson sought to strengthen commercial and diplomatic relations with Native leaders through the implementation of the “factory system”—which involved a series of trading forts with a federally authorized trader, or “factor,” who would manage trade with American Indian communities and serve as a representative of the U.S. government. The factory system, much like the trade licensing that occurred under the French and British regimes, was intended to ensure that quality materials would be sold at set prices. While the factories displaced and intentionally undersold private traders, Jefferson wanted to avoid giving cause for resentments among American Indian communities. This in turn would help cultivate commercial and diplomatic relations by cutting into the declining British trade and preempting any expected French inroads into the Ohio Valley.

There is some irony in Jefferson’s advocacy of a quasi-imperial policy that undermined private traders, but the factory system represented a key instrument for realizing his vision of an “empire for liberty;” a nation of agrarian free holders expanding “without blot or mixture” across the continent. As he noted in a letter to Indiana Territorial Governor William Henry Harrison in February 1803, the factory system was a valuable tool for acquiring land. “To promote this disposition to exchange lands,” he

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40 Allen, His Majesty’s Indian Allies, 92-93; White, Middle Ground, 484, 501-02; Dowd, A Spirited Resistance, 116-122. Established in 1791, the Province of Upper Canada encompassed southern Ontario from northern Lake Superior to the border with present-day Quebec (then known as Lower Canada).  
wrote, “we shall push our trading houses, and be glad to see [American Indians] run in debt, because we observe that when these debts get beyond what the individuals can pay, they become willing to lop them off by a cession of lands.” To acquire lands through this process was dependent upon taking trade away from the British, and thus the first factories in the Northwest Territory were established at Fort Wayne and Fort Detroit in 1802. When the acquisition of the Louisiana Territory negated the French threat in 1803, cutting into British trade became a central policy concern and new factories were established at Sandusky, Chicago, Mackinac, and Green Bay to make inroads against traders and engagés from the Hudson’s Bay Company and North West Company.42

William Henry Harrison: “In pursuance of the President’s directions”43

Jefferson’s expectations for the factory system were not met, except around Fort Wayne and, to a lesser extent, Fort Detroit. For the most part Native peoples continued to trade with people they knew, which included the British at Fort St. Joseph, Canadiens in the Detroit River area and around western Lake Erie, the fur company posts to the west of Lake Michigan, and some unlicensed U.S. traders.44 Acquiring land still remained the main concern, regardless of the success or failure of the factory system, and Jefferson’s primary instrument would be his young protégé Harrison. Just months after receiving Jefferson’s letter on trade, debt, and land cessions, Governor Harrison sought to expedite the land acquisition process by calling for a treaty council at Fort Wayne. At issue was a 1.2 million-acre swath of land known as the Vincennes Tract in southeastern Indiana Territory where Harrison had located his home and the territorial seat of government. The United States believed the area was included in the Treaty of Greenville cessions, but this interpretation was openly rejected by the Myaamia leader Mihšihkinaahkwa (Little Turtle), the Lunaapeew (Lenape, or Delaware) leader Buckongahelas, and others who initially refused to attend the council at Fort Wayne. Angered by what he considered stubborn insolence, Harrison threatened to withhold all annuities from any who remained absent.45

This strong-arm approach ultimately convinced a small representation of Myaamia, Lunaapeew (Lenape, or Delaware), Bodéwadmi (Potawatomi), and Shawnee to come from villages and towns in what is now northeastern Indiana and southwestern Michigan. Tensions remained high, however, and on several occasions the council threatened to fall apart. The Shawnee delegation argued that the council was a simple pretense to take land, and stormed off after Harrison issued a strong threat against them. The Lunaapeew leader Buckongahelas accused part of the Myaamia and Bodéwadmi delegations of making claims on territories where they had no direct interests. The

43 Quotation from William Henry Harrison to Secretary of War Henry Dearborn, August 26, 1805, in The Papers of William Henry Harrison, 1800-1815 (microfilm), ed. Douglas E. Clanin (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Society, 1999); quoted in Owens, Mr. Jefferson’s Hammer, 100.
44 Bergmann, The American National State, 186-94.
45 Owens, Mr. Jefferson's Hammer, 62-66.
Shawnee from Wapakoneta returned with a proposal to delay the council and meet with the President in Washington, but Harrison dismissed the idea while the Bodéwadmi pushed to finish the current council. In the end, Harrison garnered the assent of twelve representatives (two Myaamia, two Kiikaapoí [Kickapoo], four Lunaapeew, three Shawnee, and four Bodéwadmi). Once the treaty was ratified by the Senate in December, there was no mention of annuities and payments since the U.S. government still considered the Vincennes Tract a part of the Greenville Treaty and thus already paid for. The only compensation that Harrison agreed to involved the cession of a large salt spring on the Saline River in present-day southeastern Illinois, for which the signatory groups collectively received an annual allotment of up to 150 bushels of salt.46

When news of this final detail became widely known, the resentments shared by some of the representatives at the Fort Wayne council became even more wide-spread and threatened to diminish the authority of the signatories within their villages and towns. To stanch the fallout from the 1803 Treaty, Harrison took a slightly different tack in 1804 when dealing with Buckongahelas and other Lunaapeew (Lenape, or Delaware) for another land cession below the confluence of the Wabash and Ohio rivers in southern Indiana Territory. To partly address the complaints of Buckongahelas at the 1803 council and thus patch what might become a troubling breech between the Lunaapeew and the United States, the 1804 treaty provided for the distribution of $3,000 worth of supplies, tools, and instruction in “agricultural and domestic arts” to the Lunaapeew. Harrison also crafted the final treaty language to suggest that the Lunaapeew representatives were the sole owners of the land—even though he knew their previous residence in the area had come with the permission of the Myaamia (Miami).47

Harrison also knew that the small number of Piankeshaw who lived within the ceded lands were preparing to move west of the Mississippi River—as were some of the Lunaapeew in the area who, as Harrison told Jefferson, “had not deep attachments to the land in question.” The Piankeshaw, on the other hand, “Set a higher value on [the lands,] from their ancestors having resided on them for Many generations.” While these were not matters that Harrison would have shared with the Piankeshaw or the Lunaapeew, he did want to forestall any complaints the Piankeshaw might have about the Lunaapeew receiving compensation for lands in southern Indiana Territory. Consequently, he convened a brief meeting with the Piankeshaw about a week before his council with the Lunaapeew. In return for a forfeiture of all land claims in the Indiana Territory, Harrison promised to send $700 in goods to the departing Piankeshaw once they arrived in their

46 Robert M. Owens, “Jeffersonian Benevolence on the Ground: The Indian Land Cession Treaties of William Henry Harrison,” Journal of the Early Republic, 22 (Autumn, 2002), 419-420; White, Middle Ground, 496-97; Michael Galbraith and Angela M. Quinn, Akima Pinsiwa Awiiki (Chief Jean-Baptiste de Richardville House) National Historic Landmark Nomination (2012), 21-22; “Treaty with the Delawares, etc., 1803,” in Kappler, ed., Treaties, 64-65. All of the Myaamia and two of the Bodewadmi leaders were also designated as representatives of the Waayaahtanwa (Ouiatenon, or Wea), Piankeshaw, and Kaskaskia from the lower Wabash River and areas to the west.
new homes, plus $2,000 worth of provisions, livestock, tools, money, and merchandise to be paid over ten years.48

Harrison’s mixture of angry denunciations and attention to the concerns of particular Native groups or leaders, as evidenced in the 1803 and 1804 councils and meetings, made him a superb agent of Jefferson’s desire for American Indian lands. By 1805 he had concluded six treaties that involved the cession of 6.5 million acres. The duplicitous and presumptuous manner in which he conducted these transactions was widely condemned by groups that had been excluded from or refused to abide by the treaties, by the members of the communities that signed on to the treaties, and even by the signatories themselves. In regard to the latter, Richard White notes that such condemnations had limits. “[C]hiefs could ill oppose such cessions in principle since their own generosity—their ability to act as chiefs—depended on the annuities the treaties yielded. And as Harrison pushed his treaties, chiefs signed from fear that if they refused, chiefs of other villages would gladly make the cessions in their stead.”49

Some leaders from diasporic groups like the Shawnee and Lunaapeew, who had moved into the western Ohio Valley and did not have ancient or longstanding associations with the region, also viewed treaties as an instrument to acquire a secure land base that was independent of the permissions they had received from the Myaamia, Wyandot, and others. By the same token, some Myaamia and Bodéwadmi (Potawatomi) leaders participated in treaties to ensure that they could retain authority within specific areas of deep meaning and usefulness for their people. Even when such goals were achieved, however, their reserved lands were eventually surrounded and invaded by a flood of squatters, surveyors and settlers who undermined Native communities in myriad ways.50

As ceded lands became honeycombed by U.S. newcomers, Native leaders made “heavy complaints of ill treatment” to Harrison. This first became apparent to the new governor as early as 1801 in the then still unceded portions of southernmost Indiana Territory. In an early report to Secretary of War Henry Dearborn, Harrison wrote “their people have been killed—their lands settled on—their game wantonly destroyed—and their young men made drunk & cheated of the pelties which formerly procured them necessary articles of Cloathing [sic], arms and ammunition to hunt with.” Harrison expected these sorrowful conditions would become more common with subsequent land cessions, but he most feared what these developments might portend for the United States. “All these Injuries the Indians have hitherto borne with astonishing patience,” he informed Dearborn, “but although they discover no disposition to make war upon the United States at present—I am confident that most of the tribes would eagerly seize any

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49 Owens, “Jeffersonian Benevolence on the Ground,” 422-25. Quotation from White, Middle Ground, 496.
favorable opportunity for that purpose—[especially] should the United States be at war with any of the European nations who are known to the Indians.”

Figure 6.4: Land Cessions, Territorial and State Boundaries, ca. 1809. Except for some lands included in the Treaty of Greenville, all cessions to the west of the Ohio state line were obtained by Governor William Henry Harrison between 1803-1809. The 1805 Fort Industry Treaty, which ceded much of northern Ohio, was effected by Commissioner Charles Jouett who—like Harrison—was a confidant and protégé of Thomas Jefferson. The Treaty of Detroit, in which Governor William Hull represented the United States, retained a number of small reserves around village sites, but the broader land cession would be contested through the end of the War of 1812.

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52 See “Treaty with the Wyandot, etc., 1805,” and “Treaty with the Ottawa, etc., 1807,” both in Kappler, ed., Treaties, 2: 77-78, and 92-95. Hull detailed his efforts and offered oblique observations on Native councils with British officials at Amherstburg, in nineteen letters to Secretary of War Dearborn during the months of November and December 1897. These are compiled in MHC, vol. 40 (Lansing: Michigan Historical Commission, 1915), 212-242. Also see Jouett and Hull to Dearborn, December 24, 1808, in ibid., 237-238. On Charles Jouett, see Ann Durkin Keating, Rising Up from Indian Country: The Battle of Fort Dearborn and the Birth of Chicago (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012), 61-65; and Henry
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Tecumseh and Lalawethika

Out of the fragmented and demoralizing conditions of the early 1800s, the latent vision of a Native Confederacy with a common homeland began to grow among the communities within the upper Wabash and White River basins. Two of the most persistent and passionate champions of this vision would be the Kispoko Shawnee brothers Tecumseh and Lalawethika (Rattler, or Noise Maker), whose lives deeply mirrored the experiences of many Native communities in the former Pays d’en Haut over the previous three decades. They were born in the years before the American Revolution, when the Shawnee defended their ancient homeland along the Ohio River against the Shēmanēse (Long Knives). Their father Puckeshinwau was killed in the Battle of Point Pleasant in 1774, and over the next decade their family lived amidst the violence and displacement that plagued what is now southern Ohio. Between 1779 and 1783 they were forced to move three times after their villages had been destroyed, and eventually relocated northward to the upper reaches of the Mad and Scioto river drainages among Wyandot and Lunaapeew (Lenape, or Delaware) communities. By the time of this third move, when Tecumseh was fifteen and Lalawethika just eight years old, they had experienced the full effects of conflict and dislocation, as well as frequent association with other displaced communities. They were Shawnee, but they were also the children of the polyglot world of refugees and alliances in the Ohio Valley—with bitter enmities toward the Shēmanēse.53

As Tecumseh and Lalawethika became young men their lives continued to reflect the tumult that shaped their communities and the region, but they took different if complementary paths. Tecumseh became a warrior in 1783, when he joined a small band of Shawnee raiders who attacked flatboats and small stations on the Ohio River. Six years later he went south with his older brother Cheeseekau and another ten Shawnee to live and fight with the Chickamauga (Lower Cherokee) against U.S. settlers along the western foothills of the Appalachian Mountains. After Cheeseekau was killed in battle, Tecumseh became the leader of this small band of Shawnee warriors. They returned north in 1790, and Tecumseh participated in the campaigns that resulted in the defeats of St. Clair and Harmar. He was also present during the Battle of Fallen Timbers, where his older brother Sauwauseekau was killed. In the following months Tecumseh likely joined fellow Shawnee in relocating to Swan Creek, and may have briefly moved to Upper Canada. Like the majority of his fellow Shawnee, he also refused to attend the Greenville Treaty council. By the late 1790s Tecumseh had achieved some renown among the Shawnee and former members of the Confederacy as an honored warrior, a village leader, and a steadfast opponent of any treaties and land cessions conducted by specific communities or village leaders.54

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Over the same period, Lalawethika’s life was less eventful but equally representative of conditions in the Ohio Valley. Hampered by a self-inflicted wound that left him blinded in one eye as a youth, he never seemed destined to achieve the status or recognition that his brothers gained. R. David Edmunds speculates that Lalawethika, who was one of the youngest children in a large family, was particularly affected when his mother Meethoataaskee and youngest sister moved with other Shawnee and Mvskoke (Muscogee or Creek) to Missouri in 1779. Cheekeekau, who was fifteen years older than Lalawethika, provided for his family members but showered most of his attention on Tecumseh. Their older sister, Tecumapease, served as a surrogate mother for her younger brothers—but was already beginning a family of her own. What effect these circumstances had on Lalawethika is unknowable, but in his late teens he began to abuse alcohol and developed a penchant for empty braggadocio. He did join other Shawnee at the Battle of Fallen Timbers, but in the years that followed he was primarily known as a poor husband, a shaman of little repute, and a chronic drunkard. In many respects, his personal life had come to embody the social pathologies that developed in a world shaped by dispossession, violence, uncertain harvests and hunts, and increasing dependence on treaty annuities. Yet his personal trials would ultimately result in a vision that inspired others to resist the conditions that were undermining lives and families, and causing many to leave their homelands for areas far to the west.

Tenskwatawa: A Vision and a Purpose:

In the early spring of 1805, in his brother’s village near the White River, Lalawethika fell into a profound stupor. Whether the result of drunkenness, an unidentified sickness that was plaguing the community, or both, he remained comatose for several days and was given up for dead. While funeral preparations were underway, he suddenly awoke—to the amazement of all who were tending to his body. Once he gained full composure, he explained that the Master of Life had presented him with a powerful vision of two possible paths or futures: one that would restore the bounties of past ages and promised a heavenly afterlife for the deceased, and another that presented a magnified reflection of current conditions that ultimately led to destruction and a hellish afterlife. Lalawethika also acquired a new name, Tenskwatawa (the Open Door), and had been instructed by the Master of Life to teach all Indigenous communities to live as one united people, to renounce social evils such as drunkenness and spousal abuse as well as the growing dependency on annuities and U.S. trade goods. His recovery from what looked like death gave credence to his vision, and his teachings resonated within communities that were on the verge of existential crisis. His vision and teachings, which also included the performance of specific dances, rituals, and prayers, spread rapidly

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55 The reason why Meethoataaskee left her children in 1779 is unknown. Her departure followed the destruction of the Shawnee town of Chalahgawtha (Chillicothe) where her family lived. She was accompanied by her youngest daughter, and they were part of a large group of Shawnee, Mvskoke, and other refugee/migrants that headed west. Since the Shawnee were a patrilineal society, her former husband’s closest kin were already helping to raise her family—and thus her departure was not an abandonment. See Edmunds, Tecumseh and the Quest for Indian Leadership (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1984), 21-22.

across many communities through the rest of the year and into the next.57

The man and his vision achieved a new level of excitement and renown in the spring of 1806, when Tenskwatawa announced that the Master of Life would cause a total solar eclipse just a few days before the summer solstice. Presaging a time of significant change, the sun would darken, the birds would fall silent, and the stars would appear. This announcement came after Governor Harrison chastised a group of Lunaapeew (Lenape, or Delaware) for their growing adherence to Tenskwatawa’s teachings. “If he is really a prophet,” Harrison chided, “then ask of him to cause the sun to stand still,” or make some other miracles, to prove “that he has been sent from God.” Whether or not Harrison was aware that a solar eclipse was predicted for June 16, it is likely that Tenskwatawa had learned of the event from the owner of an almanac in a nearby Shaker community or from a scientist scouting areas to best view the phenomenon. In either case, Harrison’s words could not have been more poorly chosen – or more miraculous.58

While covering the sun greatly enhanced Tenskwatawa’s reputation, his visions and the teachings they inspired had already become the cornerstones of a rapidly growing movement. Shortly after his first vision, he and his brother Tecumseh moved their village to a site near the abandoned ruins of Fort Greenville. Within a year the village had become a town that could accommodate the large crowd that came to witness the prophesied eclipse. The great gathering at Greenville clearly centered on the solar phenomenon, and the opportunity to test or affirm the word of a prophet. Yet the crowd mostly reflected the widening appeal of Tenskwatawa’s teachings and the deep chord they struck among struggling peoples in need of a promising path toward a hopeful future. There were other visionaries in the region at this time, particularly among the Lunaapeew and the Shawnee, and all were drawing from a tradition of cultural revitalization that stretched back since time out of memory. Yet the teachings of Tenskwatawa were more fully steeped in concerns about the material and cultural independence of Indigenous communities as well as the unity of all American Indians within a broadly shared land base. In short, he preached a salvation that brought collective empowerment across a wide region and among diverse groups.59

Tenskwatawa shared his teachings with many visitors, including a group of Shaker missionaries who proclaimed “that God, in very deed, was mightily at work

57 Edmunds, The Shawnee Prophet, 32-38; Dowd, A Spirited Resistance, 126-29; Alfred A. Cave, Prophets of the Great Spirit: Native American Revitalization Movements in Eastern North America (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2006), 63-66, 85-87. In a subsequent representation of this vision, the Master of Life is identified as the First Person—who was created by the Great Spirit; see Captain J. Dunham to Governor Hull, May 20, 1807, in Maria Campbell Hull and James Freeman Clarke, Revolutionary Services and Civil Life of General William Hull (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1848), 314.


among the Indians.” Yet only brief parts of his teachings were recorded. One of the fullest and earliest expressions comes from the Odawa warrior and visionary Nmegos (Trout, aka “Le Maigouis”), an early and close adherent of Tenskwatawa whose words were surreptitiously transcribed by a British officer in early May 1807. Nmegos brought the lessons he absorbed at Greenville to the Odawa town of Waganakising (aka L’Arbe Croche; present-day Harbor Springs, Michigan), a few miles south of the Straits of Mackinac. He preached of apocalyptic doom for Native peoples if they did not return to traditional lifeways and holdfast to the gifts of Gichii Manidoo (the Great Spirit, Creator). To guide right behavior, Namegos conveyed a series of restrictions that included abstinence from alcohol (specifically whiskey from the United States), a rejection of marriage with non-Indigenous people, and a marked decrease in the use of non-essential trade goods. Native peoples were also encouraged to renew a respectful relationship with the animal spirits and to clothe themselves in animal skins. Unity and alliance were also essential, since Tenskwatowa’s vision was directed to all Native peoples, and thus Gichii Manidoo insisted that none “were to go to War against each other. But to cultivate peace between your different Tribes, that they may become one great people.”

Channeling the voice of the Master of Life, Namegos clearly identified the primary source of the challenges facing Native peoples around the Great Lakes. Noting the various peoples who had come to North America, he told his listeners that the Master of Life had made the British and French, as well as the Spanish to the west—and they were all to be regarded as friends.

But the Americans, I did not make. They are not my children, but the children of the Evil Spirit. They grew from the scum of the great water [ocean], when it was troubled by the Evil Spirit, and the froth was driven into the woods, by a strong east wind. They are numerous, but I hate them. They are unjust. They have taken away your lands, which were not made for them.

Though Americans carried the germ of evil, the Master of Life made it clear that Native peoples were still responsible for separating themselves from “Traders or other white men” as much as possible. Moreover, they needed to contend with the workings of “Evil Spirits” among themselves, especially as manifested in the form of witches or selfish leaders who were too friendly with the Americans. The teachings given to Tenskwatawa, “whom I [the Master of Life] have … awakened from his long sleep,” would provide the means for seeing the world as it should be, and the pathway toward reforming their lives in accordance with the world as it was first given to them.

These teachings and the movement they inspired represented a direct challenge to established “annuity chiefs” (i.e., leaders that signed treaties with the United States and

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then distributed annuities to their communities), who deeply resented Tenskwatawa and sought to undermine his appeal. He explicitly identified them as agents of “Evil Spirits,” and called them out for undermining all Native communities—including their own, whom they professed to lead with trade goods and agricultural implements they received from the United States. Within the context of Tenskwatawa’s vision, treaty signatories were guilty of two essential sins: helping measure out land that was given to all Native peoples by the Creator, then selling it to people for whom it was “not made;” and for adopting “the different manners, customs, animals, vegetables, &c.” that were made for the “whites on the other side of the [ocean].”

Though profound, the disagreement between Tenskwata and the annuity chiefs was grounded in a common understanding that land and culture were inseparable—and that changes in one necessarily involved changes in both. Tenskwatawa advocated a process of revitalization that corrected the problems of the present by cultivating behaviors and beliefs that comported with, and restored, inherited traditions and conditions. The Mekoche Shawnee leader M’katiwe-kašee (aka Catahecassa, Black Hoof), on the other hand, viewed the “farming Business” and “raising Cattle & hogs” as a way to compensate for the scarcity of game animals and to thrive in new circumstances. The ultimate goal was not to assimilate to U.S. norms and beliefs, but to become a strong and increasing population and thus “an independent people.”

“The obtaining lands”

A simple rejoinder to M’katiwe-kašee (aka Catahecassa, Black Hoof) would surely be that such a changed people and landscape would no longer be Shawnee. In fact, this was the stated goal of U.S. policy: to simultaneously acquire Indigenous lands and “civilize” American Indians through the efforts of missionaries and agricultural instructors—and thus save them from their own superstitions and likely extinction. As Thomas Jefferson noted in 1803, a civilization program “will enable them to live on much smaller portions of land…, and thus a coincidence of interests will be produced between those who have lands to spare, and want other necessaries, and those who have such necessaries to spare, and want lands.” To acquire land peacefully, however, he stated that the government must “promote among the Indians a sense of the superior value of a little land, well cultivated, over a great deal, unimproved, and to encourage them to make this estimate truly.” Over time, Jefferson expected that “our settlements and theirs [would] meet and blend together, to intermix, and become one people. Incorporating themselves with us as citizens of the U.S., this is what the natural progress of things will of course bring on.”

In a letter to Senator James Jackson in February 1803, President Jefferson stated that he was “alive to the obtaining lands from the Indians by all honest & peaceable

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means … as fast as the expansion of our settlements." Yet he concurred with Jackson’s impatience on the pace of land cessions up to that point and expressed that he was willing to authorize “strong pressure … to obtain lands.” The spate of treaties that Harrison completed over the next few years suggests that “pressure” quickly outpaced “honest and peaceable means” as the driver of U.S. American Indian policy. One reason for the change stemmed from the ratification of the Louisiana Purchase, which made removal rather than civilization a viable component for obtaining lands. As Jefferson noted later that year in a letter to Andrew Jackson, “acquisition of Louisiana … [would] open an asylum for these unhappy people, in a country which may suit their habits of life better than what they now occupy, which perhaps they will be willing to exchange with us.”

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The eight land cession treaties that Governor Harrison completed between 1803-1805, and the one in 1805 by Commissioner Charles Jouett (another confidant and protégé of Jefferson’s), created divisions and deep consternation among Native groups to the northwest and west of the Greenville Treaty line. This was increasingly apparent, and worrisome, to the British stationed at Fort Amherstburg between 1805-1807. As individuals and bands from the former Confederacy became more frequent visitors, British military officials and Indian Department agents recognized the dangerous signs of prolonged hardship and discontent. When visitors expressed frustrations with the Americans and U.S. claims to their lands, British officials and traders knew that these complaints also implied a criticism of their own cautious neutrality. Agents encouraged their erstwhile allies to count on more gifts and rations at the King’s Posts, and to continue their relations with the clandestine trade of British traders operating in U.S. territory. Indian Department agents also promised they would soon have more to give their friends, and spoke of the benefits of maintaining mutual goodwill and the advantages of a British-Native alliance if called for in the future. Most who heard these words remained skeptical of such an alliance, and often reminded the British of the closed gates at Fort Miamis. They nevertheless welcomed the expectation of more trade and supplies, if only to support their efforts to maintain some distance from the U.S.

These interactions at Fort Amherstburg corresponded with the rising influence of Tenskwatawa and the large numbers of people who came from as far away as the


Mississippi River and the north shore of Lake Superior to gather at Greenville. By the spring of 1807 his vision had taken form within a movement that insisted on an end to land cession treaties, and implied the abrogation of those that had already been completed. In the midst of these developments, Tecumseh began to take a more forceful approach toward U.S. authorities—and pushed closer toward an outright dismissal of all treaties. The clearest expression came when Captain William Wells, the commander of Fort Wayne, became exasperated with the thousands of pilgrims who were moving in and out of Greenville. In an effort to assert his authority, he sent a message in President Jefferson’s name telling Tecumseh to vacate his village at Greenville and leave “the land of the United States immediately.” In response, Tecumseh sent a message back stating that “The Great Spirit above has appointed this place for us to light our fires and here we shall remain… The Great Spirit above knows no boundary, nor will his red people acknowledge any.” While Tecumseh’s reply made no reference to a particular treaty, the fact that he spoke from the site of the Greenville Treaty council and within the bounds of its primary land cession, added dramatic clarity to his statement.69

By mid-September Tecumseh had grown weary of the tensions surrounding his community at Greenville, and led a small delegation to speak with Ohio Governor Thomas Kirker at the state capitol in Chillicothe (the former site of Chalahgawtha). Accompanied by Wawyapiersenwah (Whirlpool, aka Blue Jacket), who both advised and supported Tecumseh, he explained and defended the nature of the movement inspired by his brother’s vision. In a compelling and often dramatic speech before a large crowd, Tecumseh stated his opposition to further land cessions but insisted that the Greenville community was not a threat to U.S. citizens or their government. Its only purpose was to live according to the will of Müyaataalemeelarkwua (the Great Spirit, or the Finisher).70 Allegations to the contrary were the work of the Mekoche leaders at Wapakoneta who spread distrust and hatred, and men like William Wells. “When we want to talk friendly with him,” Tecumseh complained, “[Wells] will not listen to us—and from the beginning to end his talk is blackguard. He treats us like dogs.”71 Such opposition had taken a toll, however, and Tecumseh announced that the community of Greenville would soon be moving west to the confluence of the Tippecanoe and Wabash rivers. Governor Kirker was duly impressed with the delegation, and restated the basic elements of Tecumseh’s oration in a letter to President Jefferson. He also noted that the delegation “gave me every satisfaction I could ask and … their lives are peacable and the doctrines the[y] profess to Practice are such as will do them honor if the[y] continue to be sincere and so far they have given me no cause to doubt it.”72

Kirker’s assessment of Tecumseh likely reflected a mutual desire to avoid the

70 The term “Müyaataalemeelarkwua” and its translation comes from C. C. Trowbridge, Shawnee Traditions (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1939), 40. Trowbridge’s work was based on interviews with Tenkwatawa in 1824.
71 Sugden, Tecumseh, 5-7; quotation from p. 7. Also see Heath, William Wells and the Struggle for the Old Northwest, 317-19.
kind of tension that surrounded the community at Greenville, and the planned move to the Tippecanoe River must have eased both men’s concerns about the near future. Yet Kirker’s view stood in sharp contrast to the growing concerns of political and military observers in Fort Amherstburg, Detroit, Vincennes, and Washington, D.C. Indiana Territorial Governor Harrison, who had once admired the “Indians … astonishing patience” with U.S. settlers, was now preoccupied with his earlier prediction that they would someday “make war upon the United States … should [we] be at war with any of the European nations who are known to the Indians.” Officers of the British Indian Department had come to a similar conclusion. As officers learned more about the excitement around Tenskwatawa, and hosted growing numbers of visitors who came for presents and trade, they developed a cautiously optimistic sense of Native support for the British in the likelihood of a war with the United States.

Looming Crises

The trigger for both of these assessments occurred in June 1807 when the British commander of the warship HMS Leopard fired on the frigate USS Chesapeake off of Norfolk, Virginia. The U.S. vessel was subsequently boarded, four British-born sailors were taken away and charged with desertion, and then impressed into duty on the Leopard. While the event occurred within the coastal waters of the United States, its origins lay in the Napoleonic wars of Europe. The Royal Navy was plagued with desertions, which often occurred when sailors jumped ship in a U.S. port and signed on with the merchant marine. From the U.S. perspective, the boarding of the Chesapeake also coincided with a recent Order in Council that barred neutral countries from trading with France and its allies. This action came in response to a similar edict from France, and was intended to bolster the British blockade of French-controlled ports on the Atlantic and Mediterranean coasts. Since the United States was a neutral nation with an extensive carrying trade, the Order in Council was focused on keeping U.S. registered ships from trading with France and its allies. President Jefferson insisted that U.S. neutrality in the conflict guaranteed the right to trade freely with belligerent and neutral parties alike, and denounced impressment of U.S. sailors as an abrogation of this right.

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The issues related to the Order in Council had already become part of the recently negotiated Monroe-Pinkney Treaty, which had been drafted to replace the expiring terms of the Jay Treaty and address commercial relations. Consequently, the potential for some resolution already seemed to be at hand. Among other things, the Monroe-Pinkney Treaty defined the rights of neutrals in times of war and clarified the terms of trade between Great Britain and the United States, but British negotiators refused to abandon impressment—which was recognized as a basic right by the Admiralty Courts and clearly applied to British-born sailors who, regardless of their status in the U.S. merchant marine, were life-long subjects of the Crown by virtue of their birth. For Jefferson, who received the signed treaty document in early 1807, ending impressment was an essential condition and he declined to put the treaty up for ratification by the Senate. In the absence of any treaty, the boarding of the _Chesapeake_ was not a direct violation of international law—particularly during a time of war. Yet in the United States it was received as a violation of national sovereignty as well as the principle of free trade, and thus amounted to an indirect abrogation of the Jay Treaty. On all counts, then, it was deemed an act of war that had been long expected.

The _Chesapeake_ Affair capped a year of growing tensions between Great Britain and the United States, and led to cries for war in Congress. No such declaration came, but the ire that was felt in the East found sharp expression in the Ohio Valley. In a formal address to the territorial General Assembly on August 17, Governor Harrison took up the _Chesapeake_ Affair directly—which he furiously denounced as a clear example of British tyranny and violence. However, he soon pivoted to the more immediate concerns of his audience and “our situation … in the contest which is likely to ensue; for who does not know that the tomahawk and scalping knife … are always employed as instruments of British vengeance [which is] … organizing a combination amongst the Indians within our limits, for the purpose of assassination and murder.”

Two weeks after this address, President Jefferson sent a long message to Secretary of War Dearborn that honed more closely to the views of Harrison and his fellow westerners than it did the concerns of eastern politicians. Free trade and commerce with Europe were urgent concerns, as was the threat of a war with Great Britain, but Jefferson always saw the future of the United States in terms of territorial expansion and land acquisitions. And it was toward these matters that Jefferson addressed his letter to Secretary Dearborn, and effectively spelled out U.S. policy in the West for the next several years. Jefferson admitted to Dearborn that he initially viewed “the workings among the Indians of [the Northwest as having] proceeded from their prophet chiefly, and … [were] a transient enthusiasm, which, if let alone, would evaporate innocently; although visibly tinctured with a partiality against the United States.” However, in light of the _Chesapeake_ Affair and recent messages from agent Charles Jouett and Michigan Territorial Governor William Hull about meetings between British officials and growing

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numbers of Native visitors at Malden, Jefferson had a complete change of mind and directed the Secretary to “immediately prepare for war in that quarter.”

The president also instructed Dearborn to have governors Hull and Harrison inform the various chiefs of the several tribes in that quarter; to recall to their minds the paternal policy pursued [by us] … towards improving their condition, & enabling them to support themselves & their families: that a misunderstanding having arisen between the US and the English, war may possibly ensue; that in this war it is our wish the Indians should be quiet spectators, not wasting their blood in quarrels which do not concern them: that we are strong enough to fight our own battles, & therefore ask no help; and if the English should ask theirs, it should convince them that it proceeds from a sense of their own weakness which would not augur success in the end.

Jefferson then noted that, despite the folly of such a position, “some tribes are already expressing intentions hostile to the United States [and] we think it proper to apprise them of the ground on which they now stand; for which purpose we make to them this solemn declaration of our un-alterable determination.” In chilling language, he threatened if ever we are constrained to lift the hatchet against any tribe, we will never lay it down till that tribe is exterminated, or driven beyond the Mississippi. Adjourning them, therefore, if they wish to remain on the land which covers the bones of their fathers, to keep the peace with a people who ask their friendship without needing it, who wish to avoid war without fearing it.

The U.S. reaction to the Chesapeake Affair also convinced the Governor General of Canada, Sir James Craig, that war could be imminent. This in turn led to increased outreach to American Indian leaders, which resulted in the councils that Jouett and Hull had reported. Yet these visitors recalled the betrayal at Fort Miamis, and doubted whether the British were prepared for another war with the United States. By the end of the year, however, Craig had transferred more personnel and funding to the Indian Department in Upper Canada, where agents gave presents and held several councils with Native leaders. As Craig put it, the goal of this new attentiveness was two-fold: to restore “a confidence” in the British; and to communicate the Governor’s desire to actively work with Native communities to thwart “the Americans … obvious intention of ultimately possessing” all their lands. From Craig’s perspective, such an alliance was an absolute necessity. Failure

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in these matters would leave all of Upper Canada open to invasion from the United States, and might even result in former Native allies being “employed against us.”

In the midst of warnings from the United States and solicitations from the British, Odawa, Ojibwe, Wyandot, and Bodéwadmi (Pottawatomi) representatives from around western Lake Erie met in a treaty council with Governor Hull at Detroit in November 1807. In accordance with instructions from Secretary Dearborn, Hull only invited “Chiefs of such Indian Tribes or Nations, as are actually interested” in meeting with him to ensure that the council did not have undue complications. Hull commenced the proceedings with language from Jefferson’s August letter to Dearborn, and made it clear that a key purpose of the treaty was to “confirm and perpetuate the friendship, which happily subsists between the United States and the nations aforesaid,” and for the “Indians [to] acknowledge themselves to be under the protection of the United States, and no other power, and will prove by their conduct that they are worthy of so great a blessing.”

U.S. officials certainly hoped to prevent a new British-Native alliance in the Detroit River area, but the primary focus of the treaty was a vast cession of approximately six million acres that encompassed most of the southeastern portion of Michigan Territory. While the scale was significant, so too was the location—since the ceded lands bordered Upper Canada as far north to Lake Huron. Incorporating such a large area into the federal domain was intended to present a bulwark against future British encroachment in two ways; by acquiring large swaths of land from groups that had a long history of close relations with the British, and by establishing the framework for converting these lands into private property. There were other concerns that followed from these two goals, and Hull complained of “great difficulties” in arranging the council and refining the terms of the treaty. Among these were the “influence of the Prophet [Tenskwatawa], of our neighbours [the British Indian Department and garrison] on the other shore, of the [British land syndicates that had acquired] large Tracts … within the boundaries described in the Treaty, of the French people and others, who have made Settlements on these Lands, and of … Vile and despicable” critics and political rivals in Detroit who sought “to prevent a measure which in my opinion will greatly promote the Interest of the United States, and the comfort and happiness of the Indians.”

Because the Treaty of Detroit encompassed the entire area between the River Raisin and Lake St. Clair that had been included in the Treaty of Greenville (1795), Hull also tried to accommodate an older agreement the Wyandot had with General Anthony Wayne about retaining the lands that encompassed their village sites and adjacent use.

80 H. Dearborn to Gov. Hull, January 27, 1807, American State Papers: Documents, Legislative and Executive, of the Congress of the United States, Vol. 4, Indian Affairs, no. 1 (Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1832), 748.
82 For the concerns of U.S. officials and Governor Hull’s thoughts about the treaty council, see Hull’s correspondence as collected in Hull and Clarke, Revolutionary Services, 306-11. Quotation is from Hull to Dearborn, November 4, 1807, in MHC, vol. 40, 212-213; spelling and capitalization follows the original.
areas. Toward these ends, the treaty council discussions excluded Big Rock (Brownstown) and Maguaga from the larger land cession. This specific element of the treaty also comported with the terms for the other signatories, who all retained small reserves around their primary villages and the “privilege of hunting and fishing on the lands ceded” until they became private property. However, the boundaries of the retained areas, as well as the usufruct “privilege[s],” were subject to one final condition: “in all cases they [were] to be located in such manner, and in such situations, as not to interfere with any improvements of the French or other white people.” For the six million acres of ceded lands, the signatory groups received a proportionate share of the combined total of $10,000 of “money, goods, implements of husbandry, or domestic animals,” and a $2,400 annuity of the same “forever.”

The treaty was a remarkable coup for Hull and the United States, but it soon became a liability that was first manifested among the Wyandot. Unlike their kin at Sandusky, who largely ignored the teachings of Tenskwatawa and shunned the British, the Wyandot at Big Rock (Brownstown) and Maguaga were situated directly across from Fort Amherstburg and remained the traditional keepers of the Council Fire for significant regional alliances or confederacies. For reasons of disposition and location, they proved amenable to various and sometimes conflicting interests—including U.S. officials, the British Indian Department, habitants, the other Indigenous groups that participated in the Treaty of Detroit, and different communities in the movement associated with Tenskwatawa. However, their earlier willingness to work with Governor Hull faltered when the Wyandot learned that the treaty document ratified by the U.S. Senate in late January 1808 made no mention of the reserved lands around Big Rock and Maguaga. It took a year of persistent communication with Hull and other U.S. officials, as well as sending a delegation to Washington, D.C., until they finally received some temporary satisfaction from President Jefferson in a letter dated January 31, 1809. Jefferson explicitly acknowledged the Wyandot understanding of the agreement with General Wayne, as well as the reasons it had not been committed to writing before his death in 1796, and promised to have “the agreement … committed to writing … respecting the reserves for the [I]ndians, and you shall have a copy of these writings which shall be firm and good to you forever.”

83 “Treaty with the Ottawa, Etc., 1807,” in Kappler, ed., Treaties, 93-94. Also, Hull and Clarke, Revolutionary Services, 306-11. Both Governor Hull and Judge Woodward had previously written President Jefferson that “the case of the Wyandot Indians deserves the consideration of the Government,” and advocated for reserving lands around village sites within the Greenville Treaty cession area; Hull and Woodward to Jefferson, October 10, 1805, in American State Papers, Public Lands, vol. 1, 231. For the location of the lands eventually retained by the Wyandot, Bodéwadmi, and Odawa in the general vicinity of the River Raisin, see Figure 6.2 above. The Ojibwe constituted the majority of the representatives at the council, but most of their village areas were to the north of the ceded area. Consequently, the terms of the treaty that dealt with unceded village sites did not involve them to the same degree as the other groups.

84 The divisions among the Sandusky and Detroit River Wyandot dated back to the first half of the 18th century, and were often manifested in opposing responses to the development of particular alliances. In the late 18th and early 19th century, the Sandusky Wyandot were more receptive to working with the United States than the Detroit River Wyandot. See White, Middle Ground, 147, 194-95, 198-99, 201. The Wyandot understanding of the 1807 treaty council is reviewed in “Speech of Indian Chiefs to Governor Hull, September 30, 1809,” Historical Collections, vol. 40, 304-07. Jefferson would later affirm this understanding in January 1809; see “Speech of Thomas Jefferson to the Indians,” MHC, vol. 40, 274-76.
Though rooted in their specific circumstances, the distress and alarm the Wyandot felt after the treaty was widely shared. Odawa and Bodéwadmi leaders who were not present at the council were deeply upset with the treaty, and criticized their representatives over the scale of the land cessions. Beyond the Detroit River area, the treaty was widely viewed as an audacious violation of Indigenous sovereignty; an opinion that attracted even more people to align themselves with Tenskwatawa and Tecumseh, and brought a growing number of visitors to Malden. By March 1808, Wyandot, Odawa and Bodéwadmi leaders met to discuss whether to formally disavow the treaty—and whether some of the signatories should be punished or killed.\textsuperscript{85}

No immediate actions resulted from this meeting, aside from Wyandot efforts to retain their villages and surrounding lands, and all were again represented at another treaty council in November 1808 with Governor Hull at Big Rock (Brownstown), along with two Shawnee representatives from Wapakoneta. Instead of vast cessions of land, however, this council was a more straightforward affair that involved U.S. acquisition of the rights-of-way for constructing two federal roads across unceded lands in northwestern Ohio. While construction of new roads would address important administrative, economic, and military concerns of the United States, the routes would also ease travel for Native users and would not require a substantial land cession. Consequently, this treaty council neither undermined nor inflamed the anti-treaty alliance in the Detroit River area that had grown over the previous summer.\textsuperscript{86}

The 1808 treaty council at Brownstown presented no difficult challenges to the signatories, but it was soon followed by disturbing news from Washington. On February 28, 1809, just a month after President Jefferson affirmed the Wyandot effort to retain their village sites and adjoining use areas, Congress passed An Act for the relief of certain Alibama and Wyandott Indians. The Act reduced the boundaries that encompassed Big Rock (Brownstown) and Maguaga, and converted the agreement for retaining lands in perpetuity to a 50-year lease from the United States. The Wyandot were understandably distraught, and appealed directly to Governor Hull and President James Madison for some remedy. “Father we were astonished when you told us there was a small tract of land at Browns Town and Maguawgo, for our use for fifty years. And a vacancy in the middle between the villages.” They explained to Hull that these changes had taken areas where “[w]e have made valuable Improvements thereon, which have cost [us] both labor and expenses; And what is more … the land that covers the bones of our fathers … [and] are our sole dependence for cultivation and Hunting.” Along with restoring the boundaries they had previously discussed in conversation and correspondence with General Wayne, Governor Hull, and President Jefferson, the Wyandot made it clear that they expected to “enjoy and have our land forever.” To make


\textsuperscript{86} While the Treaty of Brownstown is often referenced as an authorization for the construction of Hull’s Road within Michigan Territory, this is not the case. By the ratified terms of the 1807 Treaty of Detroit, the route from the Maumee River to Detroit followed an ancient and still used “trace” only traversed ceded lands. In their efforts to retain their village of Big Rock (Brownstown) and Maguaga, which lay on the route used by Hull, the Wyandot apparently offered to give the right-of-way within and near their villages to the United States. This matter of a “gift” is touched on in “Speech of Thomas Jefferson to the Indians,” which also notes a reciprocated “token of [U.S.] good will the sum of a thousand dollars.”
their concerns more amenable, however, they did offer one possible concession: a willingness to accept a term of 100 years, with the understanding that their descendants and the United States would revisit the issue after that time.87

As much as this sudden turn was a direct assault on the Wyandot, it also violated the fundamental tenets of the universe. “It surprises us,” they informed Hull, “that Our Great Father the President … [s]hould take as much upon himself as the Great Spirit above; as he wants all the land on this Island [North America]—… we think he takes the word out of the mouth of the Great Spirit above [as if] he is omnipotent and master of us all; and every thing in this world[.]”88 These latter statements expressed a fundamental sentiment about the indivisibility of place, identity, community, and the continual workings of Creation that had been (and remains) a defining ethos of Indigenous world views since time out of memory. As land cession treaties became more common with the United States, such references to the will and manifestations of the Creator or Great Spirit were frequently employed to explain the concerns and hesitations of Native leaders. Such language was also fundamental to the broader vision and appeal of Tenskwatawa, as well as to the shared concerns of the Bodéwadmi, Odawa, Ojibwe, and Wyandot who were contemplating their own alliance against further land cessions after the 1807 treaty. Though some leaders within all of these groups remained hesitant about Tenskwatawa and Tecumseh, their basic affinities with that growing movement only increased.89

Prophetstown

To create distance from the turmoil of the summer and fall, and move closer to western groups that more fully embraced Tenskwatawa’s visions, Tecumseh, his brother, and Main Poc—a war leader and shaman among the Mshkodésik Bodéwadmi (Prairie Potawatomi)—began the process of organizing and building a new town near the mouth of the Tippecanoe River. Initially just 100 people were on hand during the winter of 1807-1808 to help with the process. That number increased in spring, however, as more people moved away from Greenville or came from communities to the west and north. Most of the early arrivals were ardent followers of Tenskwatawa, or were part of extended families that either opposed their annuity chiefs or came from groups that eschewed treaties. Many younger people who had come of age since the Treaty of Greenville were especially attracted to Tenskwatawa’s vision, and embraced the opportunity to make the world anew. Young warriors who had no battles or triumphs to speak of also embraced prescribed purification rituals as a preparation for battling against

88 Quotations from “Speech of Indian Chiefs to Governor Hull,” 305-306. The Detroit River Wyandot did not concede these issues until an 1818 treaty with the United States.
89 Sugden, Tecumseh, 222-223; Dowd, A Spirited Resistance, 143-44; Cave, Cave, Prophets of the Great Spirit, 112; Lakomäki, Gathering Together, 147-148.
“evil forces”—a term that many associated with the Americans.⁹⁰

As the town grew, so too did the interest of British officials at Fort Amherstburg and U.S. officials in Washington and Vincennes. Tenskwatava’s teachings started as a movement to revitalize Native communities and prevent further treaties, but always implied more. To the British, this movement suggested a core around which to develop another alliance against the northward expansion of U.S. settlements and a likely invasion of Upper Canada. To the U.S., any movement to end treaty making was a threat, particularly if it was organized around a broad alliance with growing numbers of warriors. These notions crystalized between 1807-1808, as U.S. and British officials interacted with or received reports on Tenskwatava and Tecumseh. Agents of the British Indian Department learned more about the excitement that was developing around Tenskwatava from the growing numbers of people who came for presents and to trade, while Tecumseh’s militant tone became better known to U.S. officials through his exchanges with Captain Wells at Fort Wayne. This information was then filtered through the context of the Chesapeake Affair, as well as the past two generations of contest and conflict in the Ohio Valley.⁹¹

The tone of Jefferson’s letter to Secretary Dearborn certainly reflected all of these influences, as did the renewal of British expectations that the alliance of the early 1790s might return. Yet the response to Jefferson’s letter, which was communicated by Hull and Harrison to various councils with Native leaders, was received by many as a goad to resist further U.S. encroachments rather than a fearsome threat. Perhaps the best measure of this defiance occurred through the fall of 1808, when some 5,000 Native people came through Malden to receive gifts from the King’s bounty and to trade. Their leaders held private conversations with officers in the Indian Department on the subject of a pending war with the U.S., a renewal of the Confederacy, and a restored alliance with the British. A number of leaders agreed to travel to their neighboring communities with messages regarding the need to prepare for war and to strengthen relations with each other.⁹²

Tecumseh, who served as the primary war leader of the multi-ethnic community at Prophetstown, also made his first formal visit to the British at Fort Amhersburg in June 1808. In his meeting with British officers, he spoke of his planned journeys over the next few years to visit with forty distinct nations about his brother’s teachings and the need to resist U.S. expansion. He welcomed the positive interest of the Indian Department and agreed to promote an alliance with the British as well as a renewed Confederacy during his various travels. The Wyandot at Big Rock (Brownstown), in recognition of the esteem the British had shown Tecumseh, presented him with a magnificent belt composed of 11,550 grains of wampum that they had recently received from the British. This potent instrument of alliance would travel with him through the next few years as he made trips

⁹¹ Jortner, Gods of Prophetstown, 142-45; Willig, Restoring the Chain of Friendship, 210-213; Owens, Mr. Jefferson’s Hammer, 204-215; Allen, His Majesty’s Indian Allies, 112-15; Patrick Bottiger, “Prophetstown for Their Own Purposes: The French, Miamis, and Cultural Identities in the Wabash–Maumee Valley,” Journal of the Early Republic (Fall 2013), 30-35.
⁹² Dowd, A Spirited Resistance, 132-138; Calloway, The Shawnees and the War for America, Edmunds, Tecumseh, 137-153; Allen, His Majesty’s Indian Allies, 117-20.
as far east as the Haudenosaunee, as far west as the Osage on the other side of the Mississippi, to the northern Great Lakes, and as far south as the Mvskoke (Muscogee or Creek). While his diplomatic ventures would not always bear fruit, he was generally well received by groups that had participated in the previous Anglo-Native alliance as well as the French alliance before.\(^{93}\)

### A Treaty without Peace

In the midst of rising tensions over the possibility of another war with Great Britain and a Native alliance, the United States proposed a new treaty council at Fort Wayne for a large cession of lands in eastern and south-central Indiana Territory. Councils were held at Fort Wayne in September 1809 with many of the same Myaamia, Bodéwadmi (Potawatomi), Lunaapeew (Lenape, or Delaware), and Waayahtanwa (Ouiatenon, or Wea) leaders who attended the 1803 treaty council. Governor Harrison again represented the United States, in what was his first treaty council since 1805. Aside from Mihšihkinaahkwa (Little Turtle), who had signed multiple land-cession treaties since 1795, none of the other representatives objected to the treaty. However, all the Myaamia leaders from other towns opposed the treaty and with one voice they reminded Harrison that when signing the 1795 treaty they vowed never to sell any more lands in the Wabash River Valley. Moreover, they insisted that none of the other groups at the council had a right to sell the lands in question. At several junctures over the next few days, other delegations also expressed strong opposition to more land cessions, and at times their number represented a sizeable majority. Yet Harrison persisted, and fell back on a basic strategy of focusing on one group at a time—beginning with those who had the weakest historical connection to the proposed cessions.\(^{94}\)

As Robert Owens suggests, this 1809 Fort Wayne Treaty council saw Harrison at “the zenith of [his] negotiating style,” in which he utilized “all his most effective tactics.” As he had done with the same groups in 1803, Harrison coerced attendance at the council by threatening to withhold annuities from the 1795 treaty. Once the council had begun, he took “bribery and exploiting divisions … to new heights. Both at the intertribal and intratribal levels, he masterfully and ruthlessly divided and conquered his opponents.” When he had struck deals with all of the groups except the Myaamia, he then played on the small and large resentments that individual Myaamia leaders had toward their peers, and used these to fracture their unity with the promise that those who promoted the treaty would be designated as the primary recipients of annuities. In the end Harrison managed to cobble together an agreement in four separate treaty documents that, if combined into one, would not have received the support of most delegates—and would have been completely rejected by the Myaamia. Instead, the Fort Wayne treaties of 1809 ceded 2.9 million acres to the United States.\(^{95}\)

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\(^{94}\) This and the following paragraph draw from Owens, “Jeffersonian Benevolence on the Ground,” 405-435. This treaty also included a delegation of Kiikaapoi (Kickapoo) – who were represented by Myaamia at the 1803 Fort Wayne treaty council.

\(^{95}\) Ibid., quotations from pp. 431-432. Also see the following from Kappler, ed., *Treaties*: “Treaty with the Delawares, etc., 1809,” 101-02; “Supplementary Treaty with the Miami, etc.,” 103; “Treaty with the Wea,” 103-04; “Treaty with the Kickapoo,” 104-05. Patrick Bottiger notes that “the Miami factions signed the treaty because they realized that they could not allow Little Turtle to use the treaty to define himself as the
Chapter Six

Tecumseh and Tenskwatawa had tied their efforts at forming a new Confederacy to the prevention of any more treaties. Pressed by people from some of the groups involved with the 1809 treaties, as well as others from around the region, they were obliged to intervene or their movement would seem powerless. Yet they needed to be cautious. Aggressive action could lead to unnecessary loss of life, since the nascent confederacy was not militarily prepared. Moreover, a premature or ill-advised effort to forcefully implement the wider goals of the confederacy could give the British pause. With these concerns in mind Tecumseh convened a council at Prophetstown that developed a limited, two-pronged strategy. Their direct response to the United States would be limited to preventing surveyors from entering and marking off ceded lands. Treaty signatories were engaged more directly, however, and threatened with death if they did not disavow the treaty and seek to reclaim the ceded lands. These actions and threats alarmed Harrison, and compelled him to call for a meeting with Tecumseh at Vincennes in August 1810.96

The Turn Toward War

Tecumseh agreed to come, but the meeting was filled with tension and did little more than demonstrate how differently the two men viewed matters. In a much-quoted speech, Tecumseh told Harrison that

The being within, communing with past ages, tells me that once, nor until lately, there was no white man on this continent; that it then all belonged to red men, children of the same parents, placed on it by the Great Spirit that made them, to keep it, to traverse it, to enjoy its productions, and to fill it with the same race, once a happy race, since made miserable by the white people, who are never contented but always encroaching.

He further clarified that “Indians … may sell [land], but all must join. Any sale not made by all is not valid. The late sale is bad. It was made by a part only. Part do not know how to sell. All red men have equal rights to the unoccupied land.” Harrison disagreed, stating that the Myaamia did own the land and could sell all, and that Native peoples were not a single people. Subsequent exchanges went untranslated, and were poorly understood by both men, but Tecumseh did make it clear that if the treaty was not cancelled then he would head to the Wyandot Council Fire in Big Rock (Brownstown) to formally call for a broad alliance of Native communities and the British.97

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Chapter Six

Tecumseh did travel to Big Rock and then Fort Amherstburg in November 1810, along with close to 2,000 Odawa, Bodéwadmi (Potawatomi), Hoocągra (Ho-Chunk or Winnebago), Thâkîwa (Sauk, or Sac) and Shawnee. After the customary distribution of supplies, Captain Matthew Elliott, who had been with the Indian Department since the Revolutionary War, arranged a formal council with Tecumseh and the other Native spokesmen. Tecumseh declared that he and the warriors had received from the Wyandot the wampum belt that had been given to them by the British after the defeat of the French in the 1760s. To Elliott’s surprise, Tecumseh then stated that he was ready to go to war against the United States. On behalf of the tribes represented at the council, he announced: “We are now determined to defend it [our country] ourselves, and after raising you on your feet leave you behind but expecting you will push forwards towards us what may be necessary to supply our wants.”

Elliott later noted that he was fully convinced “that Our Neighbours are on the eve of an Indian War, and I have no doubt that the Confederacy is almost general, particularly towards the Quarter in which the Prophet resides.” Yet official British policy was adamant that hostilities should be prevented until diplomatic conditions, and British preparations, were sufficient. Some of this was communicated to Tecumseh and the other leaders, but it did not deter them from continuing on the course they had set. During the spring and summer of 1811, American settlements along the lower Wabash were plagued by sporadic raids, and in July about 300 people allied with Tecumseh came in to Vincennes as a show of force. Harrison ordered three companies of militia to stand by, and tensions eventually subsided without incident. In an effort to dissuade Tecumseh from aggressive action and present a demonstration of military strength, Harrison invited Tecumseh to return in a few weeks for a formal meeting and to witness a special review of a much larger militia force. Tecumseh thanked the governor for the offer of hospitality, and stated he would return in a few weeks as he embarked on a long journey to the south. In doing so he issued a veiled threat of his own, telling Harrison the purpose of the southern journey was to invite Mvskoke (Muscogee or Creek), Chickamauga (Lower Cherokee), Chahta (Choctaw), and Chikashsha (Chickasaw) into his growing alliance.

The militia that Tecumseh returned to see was substantial, but was not a threat Prophetstown and allied communities. Harrison knew this better than Tecumseh, and he had been cajoling officials in Washington with a barrage of letters to allow him to draw on more troops. At about the same time that Tecumseh had come for this latest visit to Vincennes, Harrison finally received authorization from Secretary of War William Eustis for the use of troops to enforce the Treaty of Fort Wayne. Eustis cautioned, however, that Harrison should only move on Prophetstown “if the prophet should commence, or seriously threaten hostilities[, only then] he ought to be attacked; provided the force under your command is sufficient to ensure success.” Harrison replied that he wished his “instructions were such as to march … immediately to the Prophets Town,” but readily concurred that he still needed more troops.

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98 Allen, *His Majesty’s Indian Allies*, 115-117.
100 Eustis to Harrison, July 17, 1811, 537-38; Harrison to Eustis, July 24, 1811, 657; and Harrison to Eustis, August 6, 1811, 671; all in Esarey, *Messages and Letters*, vol. 4; Jortner, *Gods of Prophetstown*, 181-84.
Through early summer Harrison was able to call up militia from the territories of Indiana and Illinois, who assembled and trained at Vincennes. A sizeable contingent of regular infantry, volunteers, and rangers also came up from Kentucky. In late August Harrison finally received formal confirmation from President James Madison to proceed with an attack on Prophetstown, even though Madison held “a strong presumption that hostilities will not be commenced by the Indians.” Harrison likely agreed with Madison’s statement, but did not feel constrained by any sense of honor it might have implied. Instead, he hurried his plans and by late September his force had grown to 1,300 U.S. infantry under Colonel John Boyd, and about 700 volunteers from Indiana and Kentucky that included cavalry, riflemen, and rangers.

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Chapter Six

After nearly six weeks of traveling up the Wabash, with a long stop to build Fort Harrison near present-day Terre Haute, Harrison’s forces finally arrived within a mile of Prophetstown on November 6 and encamped for the night. Throughout the long march, Harrison and Tenskwatawa had sent emissaries to each other and both were well apprised of the other’s actions and preparations. Tenskwatawa repeatedly asked to negotiate with Harrison rather than fight, and focused on fortifying Prophetstown against the U.S. forces rather than attacking them in a vulnerable locale along the march. A final council was held at Harrison’s camp that evening, but mutual distrust prevented any resolution. That night, as the historian Alfred Cave suggests, two Hoocąągra (Ho-Chunk or Winnebago) men who were spying on the U.S. camp were apparently shot by a sentry. 103

When word of the shootings reached Prophetstown, a contingent of Hoocąągra warriors initiated a dawn attack that penetrated the U.S. encampment, then became a general but disorderly assault as more warriors from various groups arrived. With ammunition running out, and under attack by cavalry, they retreated back to Prophetstown where Tenskwatawa ordered a general evacuation. The U.S. regulars and Kentucky militia sustained heavy casualties, with more than sixty killed and at least 125 wounded, and the camp was in disarray. Harrison feared that another attack might be imminent, perhaps from the Myaamia and Bodéwadmi who had warned Harrison not to bring war into their country, or from Tecumseh himself. Consequently, he prepared for an orderly withdrawal and retreat. After scouts discovered that Prophetstown had been abandoned, Harrison sent a detachment of cavalry to destroy the buildings, crops and property, and then join the retreat back to Fort Harrison and then Vincennes.

The Battle of Tippecanoe, as it came to be known in the United States, had no real strategic consequence and was essentially a draw: U.S. casualties were likely higher than Native losses, but Prophetstown was destroyed. Harrison would later boast of the battle, but his actions and their ineffectual results received heavy criticism in Kentucky and southern Indiana. Tenskwatawa must have lost face as well, since the inconclusive battle and the destruction of Prophetstown called his prophetic leadership into question. Yet the battle strengthened his position, as Prophetstown was rebuilt and the arrival of more supporters caused the town to grow. Moreover, the U.S. invasion greatly disturbed all of the communities in the Wabash River Valley, including those who most resented Tenskwatawa and Tecumseh, and former opponents found common ground with a growing Native Confederacy. Before Harrison set out for Prophetstown, in what he expected would be a decisive first strike in a short war, Illinois Territorial Governor Ninian Edwards wrote approvingly that “If we are to have a british war … then the more severely we now punish the Indians when we can fight them single handed the more they will be deterred—and the more difficult of course will it be to rally them against us.” The opposite proved the case. The Native-British alliance was greatly augmented by the news from Prophetstown, and the war that Edwards hoped to avoid had effectively commenced. 104

Chapter Seven

The Coming of War and the Battles of Frenchtown

Following the military engagement at Tippecanoe, it was clear to all concerned that a larger war was imminent. This expectation necessarily involved hard choices about whether such a fate should be engaged or avoided. If the former, then actions to organize and bolster alliances became paramount. If the latter, then commitments to remain neutral needed to be clarified and defended against the entreaties of belligerent parties. In either case, these decisions involved frequent reevaluation as the dynamics of war shifted. This proved especially true in the fall of 1812 when the Detroit River region became the center of the war in the region, and the first theater of the much larger War of 1812.

The Pull of War

The Battle of Tippecanoe and the abandonment of Prophetstown may have been a military draw, but these events coincided with a marked shift in Tenskwatawa’s movement. The failure of his professed ability to protect warriors from U.S. bullets, along with his prediction of a complete victory over Harrison’s forces, demonstrated that Tenskwatawa was fallible—even disastrously so. Yet the movement he inspired had come to depend less on allegiance to him than the common experiences that defined the alliance of communities his vision inspired. These foundations remained after the events of November 1811, and were certainly present in the rebuilding of Prophetstown over the following year, but they had been tilting more decisively toward war since Tecumseh’s visit to Fort Amherstburg a year before. In the weeks after the destruction of Prophetstown, a number of war leaders took more prominent roles within the various groups that had recently been gathered at Prophetstown. These included Main Poc, who had strong ties with communities from southern Lake Michigan to the Mississippi, the Kiikaapooi (Kickapoo) war leader Pakoisheecan from the Illinois River Valley, and others from Hoocąągra (Ho-Chunk or Winnebago), Thâkîwa (Sauk, or Sac), and Meskwaki (Fox) towns to the west and southwest of Lake Michigan. Tecumseh’s return from the south in January 1812, as the rebuilding of Prophetstown was underway, only bolstered this increasingly martial orientation.¹

Through the late winter and early spring of 1812, small bands of Bodéwadmi, Kickapooi, and Hoocąągra warriors who had fought against Harrison’s troops on the Tippecanoe River began a series of small-scale revenge attacks. Usually operating separately from each other, these groups destroyed buildings, took stores, and killed a total of forty-six individuals. Much of their ire was focused on newer settlements or clusters of homes in the western Ohio Valley, but their reach also extended to Chicago.

and Kaskaskia in the Illinois Territory and eastward into the state of Ohio. In late January Tecumseh met with Harrison to distance himself from these attacks and state that he wished to establish peaceful relations among all Indigenous groups and with the United States. A group of Hoocąągra leaders who were not associated with the attacks also visited Harrison a few weeks later. This meeting, along with the previous statements from Tecumseh, had a particularly strong effect on the Governor—who reported to Secretary Dearborn that he fully expected peace to return to the Indiana Territory.2

Through the early spring all parties sought to tamp down the potential for more conflict, and a “grand council” was called for at the main Myaamia (Miami) town on the Mississinewa River. It proved a large and diverse gathering that included Wyandot, Ojibwe, Odawa, Bodéwadmi, Lunaapeew, Myaamia, Waayahtanwa (Ouiatenon, or Wea), and Piankeshaw representatives, as well as Shawnee, Kiikapooi, and Hoocąągra leaders associated with Prophetstown. The meeting also included a small contingent of U.S. and British observers. Most of the representatives came from specific communities that had either maintained connections with U.S. officials since 1795, had kept their distance form Tenskwatawa’s movement, or both. The council itself played out as a series of accusatory speeches to which Tecumseh replied individually. While the Wyandot delegation, led by Shetoon (Isadore Chaine)—a leader among the Sandusky Wyandot—also chastised Tecumseh and Tenskwatawa for the trouble they caused, he spoke with the forgiving tone of an elder brother.3

Tecumseh responded that he too preferred peace, and condemned the recent scourge of attacks on remote settlements. On this score, he shifted responsibility away from himself and to the Bodéwadmi representatives. Even though they had blamed the “pretended prophet” for leading “foolish young men of our tribe” to such “mischief,” Tecumseh reminded the Bodéwadmi that they held more sway over their relatives than anyone else at the council. These mutual attributions of blame clouded the purpose of the council which, as Little Turtle stated, was to demonstrate “that we all appear of one mind, that we all appear to be inclined for peace; that we all see that it would be our immediate ruin to go to war with the white people.” Tecumseh concurred with this basic sentiment, but added two conditions: his growing community would not adopt “the habit of selling land to the white people that did not belong to them,” nor would they suffer “an unprovoked attack on us” without vowing to “die like men.”4

Tecumseh might have assuaged the concerns of some at the council, and his desire for peace on the terms he noted was entirely consistent with previous statements. Yet his concerns were more strategic than hopeful. In May of 1812 a war between the United States and Great Britain was more than likely, but all parties—including those

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3 Cave, Prophets of the Great Spirit, 130-32.

who met beside the Mississinewa—were still assessing their best options in a narrowing future while peace and war remained in the balance. The tension and uncertainty that led to this council placed all Native leaders in a similar position, and Tecumseh likely hoped to gain tacit support from a revered leader like Pacanne—who hosted the council. Knowing well that the older Myaamia leader was a frequent adversary to Mihšihkinaahkwaa (Little Turtle), resented Harrison and U.S. treaties, and remained committed to protecting Myaamia lands and communities, Tecumseh likely hoped that Pacanne might consider an alliance with the British. The council also provided an opportunity for a secret meeting with Shetoon, who was working within his own community to displace the pro-American Tarhe as the rightful leader of the Sandusky Wyandot. Shetoon also saw in Tecumseh an important ally in his efforts to strengthen relations with the Detroit River Wyandot and the British. He had previously assisted Tecumseh with acquiring supplies, food stores, and weapons from the British in February, and was now carrying a message from the British that the time had come to consolidate their forces and plans at Malden.5

“a mere matter of marching”:

When Tecumseh departed the council grounds along the Mississenewa, Michigan Territorial Governor William Hull, who had recently accepted a commission as Brigadier General of the recently established Army of the Northwest, was enroute to Dayton, Ohio. Hull’s was tasked with organizing 1,200 recently called up militia from Ohio, 275 U.S. Infantry from Vincennes, a volunteer troop of light cavalry, two companies of rangers from Cincinnati. As President Madison noted in his orders to Hull, the purpose of this new army was four-fold: construct an overland supply and transportation route from southern Ohio to western Lake Erie, establish a strong military presence at Detroit and bolster defenses at Mackinac, prepare to invade Upper Canada in expectation of an imminent war declaration, and maintain control of Lake Erie once British and American Indian forces had been defeated or dispersed.6

Though complex, these objectives were part of an even larger military strategy developed by Secretary of War Dearborn over the winter of 1811-1812. Along with the Army of the Northwest, Dearborn’s plan called for two more armies that would comprise part of a three-pronged invasion of Canada. As Hull secured Michigan, subdued a Native-British alliance, and severed British access to the upper Great Lakes, his position would be bolstered by two nearly simultaneous invasions. In this scenario, the Army of the Center was would cross the Niagara River, destroy a smaller British-Haudenosaunee alliance, take control of the entire Niagara Peninsula, and thus isolate all of Upper Canada from Lower Canada. The Grand Army of Canada, under the command of General

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Dearborn, would take a longer invasion route up the Champlain Valley into Lower Canada, then take Montréal—and thus defeat the British in North America.  

Dearborn’s strategy presented a compelling script for victory, but it did not come together as scheduled or planned. The reasons were manifold, but largely stemmed from a general lack of military preparedness, and political factionalism. Under President Jefferson a policy of neutrality and parsimony had caused the military and navy to deteriorate—a process that continued through most of President Madison’s first term. With a small officer corps and few troops, the United States relied heavily on volunteers and militias. This in turn required time for recruitment and—in some instances—a slow and confused mobilization under the direction of inexperienced officers. Delays and complications were inevitable in these circumstances, but they were compounded by regional political interests. In the Northeast, where Dearborn was to lead the invasion of Lower Canada, Federalists represented a strong political majority. This early political party not only opposed the Jeffersonian Republicans (aka Democratic-Republican Party), but vehemently denounced a war with Great Britain that would damage the nation’s maritime economy. Moreover, they saw in the planned invasion of Canada a dangerous manifestation of Jefferson’s well-known expansionist tendencies. This regional resistance caused Dearborn to scuttle his original war plan, which called for massing all U.S. forces in the Champlain Valley and besieging Montréal, severing connections to the Atlantic and the interior, and waiting for the collapse of British Canada. Recruiting, marshalling and staging such a large army in an openly defiant region was not possible, and forced Dearborn to favor the three-pronged approach. Yet even then he was hard pressed to find sufficient volunteers and militias to join his smaller army in the Northeastern theater.

Jingoism and overconfidence masked some of these challenges in the build-up to war, and fueled the arguments of Jeffersonian Republicans during congressional debates over a war resolution. When Speaker of the House Henry Clay convened the debate over President Madison’s war message in early June, he was already on record for advocating an invasive war. Two years earlier, as a U.S. Senator from Kentucky, he stated that “it is absurd to suppose we shall not succeed in our enterprize [sic] against the enemy’s provinces, … the militia of Kentucky are alone competent to place Montreal and Upper Canada at our feet.” Madison’s new Secretary of War William Eustis echoed these sentiments at the beginning of debates in 1812 when he reportedly said, “We can take the Canadas without soldiers, we have only to send officers into the province[s] and the people, disaffected towards their own government will rally round our standard.” A few months later, Thomas Jefferson neatly summarized the sentiments and expectations of the “War Congress” in a letter to Pennsylvania legislator William Dunne. We “should expect disasters” in war, he wrote,

if we had an enemy on land capable of inflicting them. [B]ut the weakness of our enemy there will make the acquisition of Canada this year, as far as the neighborhood of Quebec, … a mere matter of marching; & will give us

experience for … the final expulsion of England from the American continent.\textsuperscript{9}

Such confidence certainly harmonized with the drums of war, but it could also foment domestic discord. This proved the case in Baltimore just days after Congress authorized the formal declaration of war, when a mob destroyed the offices of a Federalist newspaper that condemned what would be a “highly impolitic and destructive war.” When the paper reopened another mob formed and rushed to the publisher’s office, which was defended by a group of supporters. In the midst of the stand-off, shots were fired into the crowd and two men were killed. One of the paper’s defenders was subsequently beaten to death and another left crippled for life.\textsuperscript{10}

Though a dramatic illustration of the kind of public violence that occurred during the Early Republic, the “Baltimore Riots” also demonstrate that the U.S. declaration of war exposed passionate disagreements over the purpose and wisdom of the war. Much like the divisions among Indigenous communities in the western Great Lakes and the river valleys to the south, the United States was clearly marked by differences that were expressed through regional concerns, political and material calculations, exuberant pride, and sharp disagreements. These distinctions were even present among various advocates for war as well as in the different theaters where conflict occurred.\textsuperscript{11}

All supporters of the war resolution, and even most critics, could agree that the actions of the British Navy were flaunting free-trade principles and deliberately harming U.S. shipping and agricultural exports. How that corresponded to an invasion of Canada was a different matter. A compelling argument was made that invading Canada would force British concessions on the sea, but Federalists countered that such a war would further jeopardize trade and likely bring punishing retributions from Great Britain. In the South, maritime commerce was also important, particularly in relation to agricultural exports, but the war took on a different strain. Gaining control of navigable rivers flowing to the Gulf and “opening” new lands west of the Appalachians neatly dovetailed with ongoing conflicts with the Mvskoke (Muscogee or Creek) and other Indigenous groups. As in the Northeast, this theater of the war also had an anti-imperial dimension. In this case, however, it was directed against Spanish Florida—which was viewed as a weak interloper in the region, a shelter for the Mvskoke, and a tacit British ally.\textsuperscript{12}


\textsuperscript{11} The divisions that both informed and were created by the War of 1812 are fully explored in Taylor, \textit{The Civil War of 1812}.

\textsuperscript{12} For an overview of various theaters of the war and the motives that shaped specific campaigns, see Hickey, \textit{War of 1812}, 126-58; David S. Heidler and Jeanne T. Heidler, \textit{The War of 1812} (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2007), 73-86; and Taylor, \textit{The Civil War of 1812}, 6-12. Also see Tom Kanon, “Before Horseshoe: Andrew Jackson’s Campaigns in the Creek War Prior to Horseshoe Bend,” in \textit{Tohopeka:}}
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A Western War

Maritime issues like British impressment of American sailors and restrictions on U.S. trade with Europe and European colonies also carried weight in the Ohio Valley, but the push for war in Ohio, Kentucky, and adjoining territories was rooted in far more regional concerns that extended back to the Seven Years’ War. More than “Free Trade and Sailors’ Rights,” westerners railed about an ongoing “ANGLO-[NATIVE] WAR” and, like Representative Felix Grundy of Kentucky, wanted to “drive the British from our Continent” to finally stop their “intriguing with our Indian neighbors” and to bring more territory—as well as the proceeds of the Canadian fur trade—into the United States. Grundy was just one of the many so-called western War Hawks, who proved the most passionate supporters of the war resolution. A number of these War Hawks were appointed military officers during the war, and their constituencies provided a large number of the U.S. regulars, volunteers, and militias that served in 1812 and 1813. This commitment was unmatched by any other region, and it was fully manifested in the geographic focus of the Army of the Northwest—which would be the first and, until October, the only U.S. army to engage hostile forces.13

The British regulars and Canadian militias that would oppose Hull also had distinct concerns in this theater of the War. Unlike the defensive forces along the Niagara Peninsula and around Montreal, who were primarily concerned with preventing an invasion from the United States, officers in the British Army and in the Indian Department still advocated for a semi-independent American Indian “buffer state”—as proposed at the end of the Revolutionary War. For the confederacy of American Indians that allied with the British, conflict with the United States related to more existential questions of territory, culture, and autonomy. In every case, and for every participant, the War of 1812 in the Great Lakes region was about ending (and winning) what David Curtis Skaggs and Larry L. Nelson have termed the “Sixty Years’ War for the Great Lakes.”14

Hull’s Road to War

General Hull’s army set out from Dayton on June 1, the same day Madison sent his War Message to Congress. As it proceeded north, the army cut a crude road over prairies, across streams, and through dense stretches of forest. Though it followed well-known paths that had been used for countless generations, the road had to support the passage of an army, its artillery and vast assortment of impedimenta, as well as hundreds of cattle and horse teams. A daily pace of creating nine or ten miles of passable road,

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often in midst of heavy summer rains and mud, took a heavy toll on the militiamen who did most of the work. They were also assisted by U.S. regulars, but the latter were mostly responsible for building a string of blockhouses and supply depots to support the subsequent use of the road. As the army continued northward, however, these became temporary posts that were garrisoned by the sick, exhausted, and injured. Pushing through the heavily wooded and muddy tangle of the vast Black Swamp that encompassed the southeastern half of the Maumee River basin proved the most challenging stretch. By the time the Army of the Northwest had crossed the Maumee Rapids at the end of June, a significant number of draft animals had been worked to death, much of the equipage was in some state of disrepair, and the able-bodied force had been reduced by a few hundred.15

Given these circumstances, Hull was greatly cheered to discover that the packet boat *Cuyahoga* was at the mouth of the Maumee River. To speed the march to Detroit and bring relief to his army, the small schooner was hired on July 1 to transport supplies and baggage along with approximately forty infirmed officers and soldiers as well as a few officers’ wives. The remainder of the army continued north and encamped a few miles south of the River Raisin. Before dawn on July 2, General Hull received a dispatch from Secretary of War Eustis that the United States had declared war on June 18.16 An officer was immediately sent to hail the *Cuyahoga* from the shore and prevent it from sailing past the Royal Navy Dockyard on the main channel of the Detroit River, but the small schooner had already passed. A few hours later, as Hull’s army was approaching the River Raisin, the *Cuyahoga* was intercepted by the Provincial Marine. The commander of the garrison at Fort Amherstburg had received notice of the U.S. war declaration five days earlier, and sent a bateau with half a dozen sailors and an equal number of Shawnee warriors to take what became the first prize of the war. Besides valuable equipment, stores, and prisoners, the boat was also carrying Hull’s official papers—which included regimental returns, correspondence with Secretary Eustis, and other materials that detailed the strategy of the Northwestern Army and its imminent invasion of Upper Canada.17


16 Secretary Eustis had frequently been in contact with Hull during the course of the northward march. These messages were usually sent by courier, and Hull had already received messages on June 24 that Eustis had sent on June 18. However, Eustis sent word of the war declaration by the U.S. postal service—which explains the additional delay in this instance.

17 Historians and sources vary on the details regarding the capture of the *Cuyahoga*. Military historian Steven Rauch identifies the small Provincial Marine vessel as a gunboat, while others refer to it as a longboat or a bateau. The number of British sailors is usually identified as six, though the total crew is often referenced as twelve—with some sources noting that the other six were American Indians (and probably Shawnee). See Lucas, *Journal*, 17-18; “Return of Prizes by HM Vessels on Lake Erie,” in Cruikshank, ed., *Documents Relating to the Invasion of Canada and the Surrender of Detroit, 1812* (Ottawa: Government Printing Bureau, 1912), 232; William K. Beall, “Journal of William K. Beall, July-August, 1812,” *American Historical Review*, 17 (July 1912): 787-789; Quimby, *The U.S. Army in the War of 1812*, 28; Rauch, *The Campaign of 1812*, 19; and Antal, *A Wampum Denied*, 36-37.
That evening Hull’s army encamped near the center of Frenchtown on the south bank of the River Raisin. Though wary of possible ambushes near the Huron River, and no doubt concerned about the fate of the Cuyahoga, General Hull and his army felt welcome in the first sizeable community they had seen since early June. Given the habitants’ general success in gaining U.S. recognition of their land titles, and the prospect that final surveys would soon be completed and recorded, they firmly supported the aims of Hull’s army. In a strange twist of fate, however, the maps of their land claims were in the possession of the surveyor Aaron Greeley—who had been captured earlier that day while aboard the Cuyahoga. When the habitants eventually learned that Greeley and his maps were in British custody, they were forced to put their expectations on hold for the duration of the newly declared war. While news of this event likely deepened their hopes that—as Hull boasted—the war would be brief and the victory complete, it also brought additional clarity to the very personal motives behind their support for the war.18

The habitants of the River Raisin, and their Bostonnois neighbors (newer English-speaking arrivals from the United States), had already begun preparing for war while Hull’s army was still assembling in Ohio. Since mid-May, when eighty volunteers from the Frenchtown area were organized into a militia company, they had trained and drilled on a fairly regular basis. To defend Frenchtown as well as support any U.S. military needs in the area, a stockade near the center of the community had been fortified with a blockhouse and two more stockades were built in outlying areas. However, the most direct support for Hull’s army came through the efforts of several small details that were assigned the task of improving sections of the route between Maumee Bay and the Huron River. Lastly, another twenty men from the Frenchtown area assisted a cavalry unit from the Detroit militia in patrolling outlying settlements and guarding the mail. It is likely that these men, as well as others who interacted with nearby Native communities or conducted business on both sides of the Detroit River, were the source of the newest intelligence Hull received about movements and preparations of the forces that would oppose him.19

More than a place of brief respite, Frenchtown was a strategic locale. From a military standpoint, the “trace” or beaten path from the Maumee Rapids to Detroit—which was initially surveyed and mapped by James McCloskey shortly after the 1808 treaty council at Big Rock (Brownstown)—was the most critical section of the entire


19 Au, “‘Best Troops in the World,’” 109-110, 112; Brian Leigh Dunnigan, “To Make a Military Appearance: Uniforming Michigan’s Militia and Fencibles,” Michigan Historical Review, 15 (Spring, 1989), 32-33. Also see Au, War on the Raisin: A Narrative Account of the War of 1812 in the River Raisin Settlement, Michigan Territory (Monroe, Mich.: Monroe County Historical Commission, 1981), 10-11. The main stockade, which was known as the Wayne Stockade, blockhouse, and new stockades were destroyed by the British in August 1812 to prevent any subsequent use by U.S. forces.
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The decision to invade Canada by land, and thus develop the trace into a crude road along the western shore of Lake Erie, was largely determined by the strong positions of Fort Amherstburg and the Royal Naval Dockyard at the mouth of the Detroit River—which commanded the navigable channel to Detroit and would allow British vessels to easily sweep any U.S. maritime force from western Lake Erie. Consequently, the settlement at Frenchtown was one of the most strategically important locales in Hull’s invasion plan. As one of the few populated areas along the entire route, Frenchtown and the farms that fronted the lower River Raisin helped provision the Army of the Northwest—and they were expected to keep supplying Detroit in the coming invasion of Canada. The local militia force also helped with the routing and construction of the road, offered some additional protection along the sections to the north and south of Frenchtown, and provided information about nearby American Indian communities as well as developments at Fort Amherstburg. All of these qualities, as well as the information provided by the habitants, were integral to Hull’s plan. Yet the strategic importance of the small settlement could also be exploited by allied British and Native Confederacy forces, who soon made it the Achilles heel of the Army of the Northwest.21

By the time Hull’s army arrived in Detroit on July 5, he had already learned of the Cuyahoga’s fate. Yet he remained confident that his army would still be able to conquer the western districts of Upper Canada. From the reports of scouts and spies, and conversations in Detroit among people he knew well from his time as the territorial governor, Hull learned the general composition of British forces on the other side of the river. These included an artillery detachment, 300 infantry, an unknown number of Canadian Militia, and as many as 400 warriors allied with Tecumseh. The vessels and crews of the Provincial Marine represented the one advantage the British possessed, but it was not enough to offset Hull’s much larger army which, combined with the infantry and artillery garrisoned at Fort Detroit, numbered approximately 2,000.22

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20 James McCloskey was an obvious choice for this task since he was personally and politically connected to both Governor Hull and Chief Justice Woodward, had conducted surveys of Detroit after the town burned in 1805, and maintained close relations with leading residents of Frenchtown. As a Captain in the U.S. Army, McCloskey participated in the invasion of Canada. He was not present during the surrender of Detroit, however, since General Hull had sent him to request troops from the governors of Ohio and Kentucky. He returned to Detroit at the end of war to serve as Deputy Quartermaster of Fort Shelby prior to and during the Treaty of Springwells (1815). In 1825 he was convicted of embezzlement during his tenure at the Bank of Michigan and subsequently moved to Indiana. See Cecil K. Byrd et al, eds., An Exhibit to Commemorate the One Hundred Fiftieth Anniversary of the Beginning of the War of 1812 (Bloomington: Lilly Library, Indiana University, 1962), 37; Catherine Cangany, Frontier Seaport: Detroit’s Transformation into an Atlantic Entrepôt (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014), 159; James McCloskey to Augustus B. Woodward, June 10, 1808, MHC, vol. 37, 419-420 and note. 89; “Appointment of James McRosky [sic] as Surveyor,” December 26, 1808, MHC, vol. 37, 419; Peter Godfroy and John Smith, “Certificate,” September 21, 1821, MHC, vol. 12, 578-79.


 Shortly after arriving in Detroit, or perhaps while enroute from Frenchtown, Hull briefly attended a council at Big Rock with representatives from several Indigenous nations. The gist of the meeting involved a reiteration of Hull’s earlier statements about the importance of Native “neutrality” in the war, with a warning that siding with the British would only “involve them in the calamities of war.” The United States, on the other hand, was “sufficiently strong” to fight its own wars “and did not wish to disturb their tranquility by asking their assistance.” The council included Myeerah, some of the Bodéwadmi, Ojibwe, and Shawnee leaders from the 1807 and 1808 councils, Tarhe from the Sandusky Wyandot, and representatives from a few neutral groups in the broader region. Though some at the council had previously expressed an interest in the movement centered on Prophetstown, most were vehemently opposed to Tenskwatawa and all preferred to abstain from any conflict involving the United States. Hull’s visit was brief and the council continued for several more days, but he left with a sense that he had undermined the British-Native alliance and secured the cooperation of Myeerah, Tarhe,
and Jim Blue Jacket—the elder son of Waweyapiersenwah (Whirlpool, aka Blue Jacket)—along the all-important route between Detroit and the Maumee Rapids.\(^{23}\)

**Invasion, Retreat, and the Road to Frenchtown**

Three days after arriving in Detroit, Hull received a letter from Secretary Eustis dated June 24 authorizing an invasion of Upper Canada. “Should the force under your Command be equal to the enterprize [sic],” Eustis wrote, then “consistent with the safety of your own posts, you will take possession of Malden, and extend your conquests as circumstances justify.” The Secretary also cautioned Hull to manage his forces with the understanding that no reinforcements would be forthcoming in the foreseeable future. The ordered invasion began on July 12 and, once he had landed, Hull issued a formal proclamation stating that he came not to conquer but to offer “the invaluable blessings of Civil, Political, & Religious Liberty and their necessary result, individual, and general, prosperity.” The size of the invading army, and misgivings about a war that would divide the deeply connected communities along theDetroit River, apparently caused most of the local militiamen to return to their homes and hunker down with the rest of the civilian population. Rather than press this advantage, however, Hull chose to remain near the landing area and the town of Sandwich. Since his primary objective was Fort Amherstburg, rather than the towns, hamlets and farms of Essex County, he did not want to move until all his artillery arrived from Detroit and was made ready for transport across the fifteen miles of uneven ground between Sandwich and Fort Amherstburg.\(^{24}\)

Delayed but still unopposed, and concerned that many of the U.S. regulars and most of the militia were not sufficiently prepared to carry off a concerted campaign and siege, Hull drilled his troops at what became an informal training base near Sandwich. A preliminary foray was made toward Fort Amherstburg on July 16 when a large advance guard led by Colonel Lewis Cass was sent forward to assess British strength. It was turned back after a fierce fight near the bridge over the River Canard by a combination of British regulars, Canadian militia, and Native warriors. The subsequent movement of British gunboats to the vicinity of the river mouth further bolstered the British position, and the planned route of Hull’s army was effectively blocked about five miles north of

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\(^{23}\) While setting out from Urbana, Ohio, Hull had sent a message to various Native leaders from Maumee Bay to Lake St. Clair requesting a council around the beginning of July. However, it is not clear from his correspondence if he briefly attended the council while enroute to Detroit, or some days after his arrival. Hull to Eustis, July 21, 1812, in *MHC*, vol. 40 (Lansing: Michigan Historical Commission, 1915), 419-420. Also see Antal, *A Wampum Denied*, 44; Sugden, *Tecumseh*, 281-283; and Sugden, *Blue Jacket: Warrior of the Shawnees* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), 218-220, 257-260. Waweyapiersenwah, who died in 1810, lived in a village that he established in the late 1790s just north of Big Rock on the Detroit River. In the waning years of his life he became a close counsellor of Tecumseh. John Steckley has suggested that more appropriate renderings and translations of “Myeerah” [*amęˀyeh ire – on water, he walks*], “Tarhe” [*orhé – swan; which is also a cognate with the Guyohkohnyo (Cayuga) word for crane and may reflect the Guyohkohnyo population that lived among the Wyandot at Upper Sandusky*], and “Stayeghtha” [*Hostayehtak – “He carries bark”*]. In order to maintain some consistency with the frequent references to these men in the historical record, the narrative will use the more common—if inaccurate—renderings of their names. John Steckley, communication with the author, October 7, 2017.

Fort Amherstburg. Stymied at the River Canard, with his army still entrenched at Sandwich and the carriages for the artillery needing more repairs and modifications than expected, Hull’s invasion soon became little more than a large occupation of a small community.\textsuperscript{25}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{25} Carter-Edwards, “The War of 1812 along the Detroit Frontier,” 34; Quimby, \textit{The U.S. Army in the War of 1812}, 37-38; Sugden, Tecumseh, 283-85; Antal, \textit{A Wampum Denied}, 50-51.}
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The tenor of the campaign took a dramatic turn for the worse in early August, when Hull received news that Fort Mackinac had been taken more than three weeks earlier by a combined force of approximately fifty British regulars, 150 Métis traders, engages, and voyageurs, 300 Anishinaabeg (Odawa and Ojibwe) who were trading at nearby Fort St. Joseph, and another 100 or so Dakhóta (Dakota), Mamaceqtaw (Menominee), and Hoocąągra (Ho-Chunk or Winnebago) who had come from the western Great Lakes to fight with the British-Native alliance. This news drastically changed the invading army’s situation in Upper Canada, as well as Fort Lernoult and the town of Detroit, since all were now vulnerable to an attack from the north. As Hull later described his feelings at the time, “the surrender of Michillimackinac opened the northern hive of Indians, and they were swarming down in every direction.” Moreover, the “desertion of the [Canadian] militia had ceased” and reinforcements of British regulars were pouring into Fort Amherstburg from the east. On August 7, he ordered a complete retreat to Detroit—less than three weeks after the invasion had begun.26

In the period between receiving word about the surrender of Fort Mackinac and the decision to retreat across the river, General Hull sent urgent messages to Secretary Eustis, Governor Return Meigs, and Kentucky Governor Charles Scott requesting more troops and supplies. He soon learned that a large shipment had already been sent by boat along the southern shore of Lake Erie and would soon arrive at Maumee Bay. From there it would be off-loaded and hauled north along the route Hull’s army had taken just six weeks earlier. Independent of the shipment by boat, or any of Hull’s recent dispatches, Governor Meigs had also sent a supply train guarded by 100 Ohio militia and U.S. regulars.27 Even as these two pieces of welcome news arrived, however, Hull also learned of a significant setback that could directly threaten both relief efforts: the Wyandot at Big Rock (Brownstown) had abandoned their stated position of neutrality. Though worrisome, the news could not have been a complete surprise. Myeerah had frequently expressed his exasperation with U.S. intransigence regarding the 1807 Treaty of Detroit and, at the recent council in Big Rock, protested the routing of Hull’s road so near the Wyandot villages for fear that it could invite attack as well as complicate important relationships with relatives and traders on the other side of the river. From Hull’s perspective the reasons mattered far less than the timing of the news, since Big Rock was situated at the crossing of the Huron River on the route from Maumee Bay to Detroit, and it was the main access to and from Malden.28

Centering the Native Alliance

The Wyandot of Big Rock and Maguaga had long-standing reasons to be reticent about any perceived, let alone actual, connections to the United States in the period between the Battle of Tippecanoe and Hull’s invasion of Canada. Yet they did not easily abandon the neutrality they had repeatedly professed for several years. This was also true of the Sandusky Wyandot affiliated with Stayeghtha (Bark Carrier, aka Roundhead) and

27 Quimby, *The U.S. Army in the War of 1812*, 38; Rauch, *Campaign of 1812*, 22
Teotrontore (more commonly Sou-neh-hoo-way, or Splitlog), who had been closely associated with Tenskwatawa and Tecumseh for several years. Another group of Wyandot who were led by Warrow (a younger brother of Stayegtha and Teotrontore), and lived on the south side of the Detroit River between Fort Amherstburg and Sandwich, were also reticent to take sides in the war. Only Tarhe (Crane), the leader of the Wyandot still at Sandusky and the titular leader of the various Wyandot communities, had expressed clear opposition to the British and support for the United States.29

With the long-expected war now under way, and a growing number of American Indians coming in to Malden from the west, north, and east, remaining neutral was becoming less tenable by the day. For the Wyandot, any collective decision they made regarding war, peace, or neutrality carried additional weight. As the traditional Keepers of the Council Fire, as well as caretakers of the Great Calumet (ceremonial, or peace pipe) that opened important councils, and holders of the great wampum belts from past alliances, their decisions held particular significance for other Native communities as well as British and U.S. interests. Division among the Wyandot might weaken some of the bonds within the Native Confederacy, while a unified declaration would—at the very least—effect on the early course of the war. Within this indeterminate calculus, two other factors were at play. First, the Wyandot along the Detroit River were conflicted over whether to maintain neutrality or support the British (and thus did not include Tarhe in their deliberations). Second, their communities were all based in the central theater of the war and collectively numbered at least 1,700—which was roughly the same number as the population of Detroit.30

At a large council in Malden that included Stayegtha (Bark Carrier, aka Roundhead), Teotrontore (more commonly Sou-neh-hoo-way, or Splitlog), Warrow, and Myeerah, Tecumseh made forceful and compelling arguments that an alliance with the British offered the only means for protecting Native lands, communities and futures. These were followed by strong appeals from Colonel Henry Procter, the new officer in command of Fort Amherstburg, who expressed a firm commitment to Tecumseh’s alliance, referenced the increasing support and provisions that were coming to bolster his Majesty’s allies, and made note of the recent news from Mackinac as well as the growing numbers of warriors and their families that had answered Tecumseh’s call and were coming to Malden. These arguments ultimately convinced all to join the alliance, except Myeerah—who recalled the British abandonment of the Native Confederacy in the 1790s, reiterated his stance on absolute neutrality, and promptly made his returned to Big Rock. The British, Tecumseh, other leaders of the growing Native alliance, and the Wyandot who remained, all expected that Myeerah would be coerced to support the U.S. or, if he refused, that his community would be attacked. With these concerns in mind, and still hoping for the Wyandot to present a unified front, they determined to force an evacuation of Big Rock and brought all the remaining Wyandot back across the Detroit River. In short, Myeerah forfeited the neutrality he professed to Hull because he was kidnapped by his own people. Yet he would also accept his changed circumstances, and willingly

performed the duties of a Wyandot war leader in the coming months—including at the River Raisin.31

The Road to Frenchtown

Cut off from the north and forced back to Detroit by an emboldened enemy, the Army of the Northwest could only look to the overland route from Maumee Bay for supplies and reinforcements. While Hull was still in Sandwich, British and Native leaders crossed the river to Big Rock, both to bring Myeerah and his community over to Malden as well as to guard against any movements along the southern access route to Detroit. In the first days of August, Hull received notices from the River Raisin that the supplies and escort sent by Governor Meigs had arrived in Frenchtown, and that a sizable contingent of warriors led by Tecumseh and the Wyandot war leader Stayeghtha (Bark Carrier, aka Roundhead) had crossed over to Big Rock from Malden. In response to this news, Hull ordered 150 Ohio Volunteers and 50 Michigan Militia to depart Sandwich on August 4 and march to Frenchtown, where they would combine with the soldiers already there to escort the supplies to Detroit. While crossing Brownstown Creek about three miles north of Big Rock, the Americans were surprised and attacked by two dozen or so warriors under the leadership of Tecumseh. In a brief engagement followed by a disorderly retreat, the would-be escort suffered eighteen killed and twelve wounded to just one killed among the attacking warriors. Another seventy Americans were listed as missing—including most of the militia forces—but were ultimately accounted for in the following days.32

News of the defeat at Big Rock likely factored into Hull’s decision to withdraw from Sandwich to Detroit on August 7, but the matter of opening a line of transport to Frenchtown remained a distinct and vital concern. On August 8, with the entire army in Detroit, Hull sent a detachment under the command of Lt. Colonel James Miller that was composed of 280 U.S. Infantry and an assortment of 310 cavalry, artillery and infantry from the Ohio Volunteers and Michigan Militia. The British-Native alliance had also bolstered its position along the western side of the Detroit River, and included a combination of 200 Shawnee, Wyandot, Bodéwadmi (Potawatomi), Odawa, and probably most of the Dakota, Mamaceqtaw (Menominee), and Hoocąągra (Ho-Chunk or Winnebago) who had come down from Mackinac. These were joined by units from the 41st Regiment of Foot and the Essex Militia, who together numbered about 150 men. Initially situated at different locales along the route to Frenchtown, the various elements of the combined Native and British force came together near the Wyandot village of


32 James Dalíba, A narrative of the battle of Brownstown: which was fought on the 9th of August, 1812, during the campaign of the north western army under the command of Brigadier General Hull (New York: D. Longworth, 1816), 7-9; “Brig-General Hull to The Secretary of War, August 4, 1812,” in Documents Relating to the Invasion of Canada and the Surrender of Detroit, 1812 (Ottawa: Government Printing Bureau, 1912) 115-17; E. A. Cruikshank, General Hull’s Invasion of Canada in 1812 (Ottawa: Royal Society of Canada, 1908), 254-58; Johnson, “The Wyandot Village of Maguaga,” 25-26.
Maguaga on August 9 after receiving intelligence on the position and route of the U.S. detachment.  

The ensuing Battle of Maguaga (aka Battle of Monguagon) would prove costly for the United States, with a total of eighty-two casualties (eighteen killed and sixty-four wounded) and the loss of supplies that had been stashed prior to the battle. While there was no recorded tally of Native casualties, initial estimates from U.S. combatants suggested the number may have been as high as forty. The British ultimately counted a total of four killed and fifteen wounded among the 41st Regiment and the militia, as well as two more who were briefly taken prisoner. Despite these uneven numbers, the battle itself was a tactical victory for the U.S. because the British-Native alliance withdrew while the Americans held the field. Yet this proved a small and hollow victory, since the hurried march and subsequent battle had left Colonel Miller’s force without supplies as well as too spent and exposed to risk another engagement—either enroute to the River Raisin or on a subsequent return to Detroit.

On August 14 Hull ordered one last attempt to link up with Frenchtown via a circuitous western route toward Gabriel Godfroy’s trading post on the Huron River, where a detachment from Detroit would rendezvous with an escort from Frenchtown led by Captain Henry Brush of the Ohio Volunteers. However, this effort came to naught for two reasons: the route proved difficult and slow; the detachment of 400 troops did not have provisions for even a brief stay in the field; and the Ohio Volunteers at Frenchtown were panicked by rumors of an imminent attack from nearby American Indians and suspected that Canadiens within the Michigan Militia would not resist—and perhaps welcome—the attackers.  

As the U.S. position continued to unravel along the Detroit River, and Hull waited in vain for a definitive message from Godfroy’s or Frenchtown, the British continued to receive more reinforcements from the east. The U.S. invasion at Niagara was still delayed, in large part because General Dearborn had yet to fully marshal his forces in the Champlain Valley. These circumstances allowed Major General Isaac Brock to leave...
the eastern theaters to take charge of the growing forces at Fort Amherstburg, which were then under the command of Colonel Henry Procter of the 41st Regiment. Arriving at the Royal Dockyard on August 13 with a contingent of 50 regulars and 150 volunteers, Brock inferred from U.S. dispatches captured at Maguaga and Big Rock that Hull was short on supplies, his command was in disarray, he feared an attack by large groups of American Indians from the north and the west, and that he pinned all his hopes on reinforcements from the south and news of U.S. victories to the east. Armed with this information, Brock determined to take immediate advantage of Hull’s growing insecurities. A battery was installed at Hull’s recent headquarters in Sandwich, and two warships were anchored nearby. On the morning of August 15, Brock sent a message to Hull that exaggerated the position of the British-Native alliance in terms that most comported with Hull’s fears, and called for a complete surrender by 3:00 o’clock that afternoon. Hull refused and British artillery commenced a sustained bombardment of Fort Detroit at 4:00 o’clock, which was returned in kind.

Neither Brock nor Tecumseh and the various elements of the Native alliance had enough people to capture Detroit without significant losses, let alone sustain a prolonged siege. Through subterfuge, however, they managed to convince Hull that he was facing an overwhelming force. By giving the cast-off red coats of the regulars to the militia, lighting a multitude of camp fires at night, and moving various groupings of regulars, militia and warriors to different locales, the shifting combinations of British and Native forces created an illusion that (when viewed from the ramparts of Fort Detroit) looked as if a vast army was assembled on opposite side of the Detroit River. Brock also allowed the Americans to capture some false correspondence about British concerns regarding the imminent arrival of thousands of Native warriors, and what they would do to U.S. civilians, soldiers, and officers alike. It also helped that Hull was made aware of Brock’s arrival on the Detroit River, since the presence of the Major General in this theater meant that the U.S. offensives to the east had either failed or not yet commenced.

This psychological warfare was augmented the following morning by another round of shelling from the British, which was not returned by the Americans, and a subsequent message from Brock that played to Hull’s fears about uncontrollable Native warriors attacking the garrison and the civilian population. The successful landing of British forces at Springwells, as well as a growing concentration of American Indian forces to the west and southwest of Fort Detroit, made it clear to Hull that his position was effectively surrounded except for the town immediately to his north. Short the 400 troops who had yet to return from the aborted effort to reach Frenchtown, and with a significant number of his command either too ill to fight or having recently deserted, Hull determined that he could not engage an overwhelming force in the field and would not subject the civilian population to a long siege. Consequently, he chose to surrender his army, Fort Detroit, and the Territory of Michigan out of “a sense of duty, and a full conviction of its expediency … [since] it was impossible for me to sustain my situation.”

that was planned to coincide with Hull’s campaign. See Alan Taylor, *The Civil War of 1812* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2010), 182.

“The bands of [American Indians] which had then joined the British force,” he added defensively, “were numerous beyond any former example.”

Less than five weeks after Hull delivered his proclamation at Sandwich, the Army of the Northwest had surrendered to the British and the Union Jack flew over Detroit for the first time in sixteen years. Given the minimal loss of life on every side, the magnitude of the defeat was extraordinary. The British took nearly 600 prisoners who were transferred to Lower Canada for indefinite internment, and acquired artillery, weapons, supplies and food stores. Some of these prizes were kept in place or moved to Fort Amherstburg, but a good deal was transported across Lake Erie to strengthen the defenses at Niagara. In addition, the British gained possession of the supplies and food stores under guard at the River Raisin and the Maumee Rapids.

The day after Hull’s surrender, Captain William Elliot of the First Essex Militia arrived in Frenchtown with a small detachment to present the terms of surrender at the Frenchtown garrison. He also carried a letter from Colonel Duncan McArthur, the commanding officer of the Ohio Volunteers, ordering Captain Brush to abide by the terms of surrender. Stunned and angered, Brush declared the documents to be forgeries and had Elliot locked in the stockade. By that afternoon, however, soldiers who had fled Detroit confirmed that news of the surrender was true. Brush convened a meeting of officers later that evening, and all agreed to retreat rather than surrender—then departed that night for Ohio with as many stores as they could carry. Colonel John Anderson and Captain Hubert LaCroix of the 2nd Regiment of Michigan Militia declined to leave their properties and homes in Frenchtown and released Captain Elliot from the stockade the following morning. Angered by his treatment Elliot arrested both men, then designated Captain François Lasselle to oversee the surrender of all remaining arms and supplies.

In the days after the surrender of Frenchtown, Native groups came from both sides of the Detroit River to (in the words of Captain Peter Latouche Chambers of the 41st Regiment of Foot) “Pillage[, ] Ravage and destroy” the properties of civilians and former militia who supported the Army of the Northwest. Most of their ire was directed toward “Yankee” or Bostonnois (English speaking, non-Catholic arrivals from the United States) households like Anderson’s, which caused the owners to flee and seek refuge in Ohio through the following year. To help calm this situation, Colonel Matthew Elliott and Tecumseh visited the River Raisin to variously speak with Native leaders and habitants. While Tecumseh had good relations with a number of people in Frenchtown, the concerns of both men were more tactical than personal since there was nothing to gain in making strong enemies among any community in the Detroit River region. However, some Wyandot had different neighborly concerns since they had long known the Canadien families that made up the majority of Frenchtown—and thus keenly resented

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the benefits the *habitants* received from the 1807 treaty and their decision to support Hull’s invasion.\(^{41}\)

While the high concentration of American Indians in the vicinity of the River Raisin soon diminished, tensions often lay just beneath the surface through the rest of the summer and fall of 1812. During this time Frenchtown served as an important procurement center for the British commissariat—as well as an informal and less than voluntary supplier to American Indian fighters enroute to and from Ohio and Indiana Territory. The River Raisin also served as a fairly regular base of operations for Tecumseh and his closest associates. From the Frenchtown area they moved to and from battle sites to the south and west while maintaining regular contact with the British at Fort Amherstburg and American Indian villages to the west and north.\(^{42}\) The lower River Raisin was also a destination and a throughway for more distant groups within the new Confederacy as they came to or from Detroit and Malden. Consequently, *habitants* frequently had to contend with strangers (i.e., people with whom they had no relations either through distant kinship or trade) who felt no particular obligations to this *Canadien* community. It did not help that most of these people came as groups of warriors, at times with prisoners in tow who may well have been known to some of the *habitants*.\(^{43}\)

“expecting you will push forwards towards us”\(^{44}\)

With the British now focused on establishing some level of administration in Michigan and preparing for another American campaign, various parts of the new Confederacy were carrying out an offensive war against the United States. The first major attack had already occurred on August 15, when Fort Dearborn (present-day Chicago) was evacuated in accordance with orders from General Hull. Years of difficult relations between the garrison and nearby Bodéwadmi (Potawatomi) communities on the Kankakee River, along with the recent U.S. declaration of war, had created an explosive situation. As the evacuating column was moving through the dunes near the shore of Lake Michigan, it was attacked by a much larger force of Bodéwadmi. Within half an hour most of the sixty-six U.S. regulars and militia, along with most of the twenty-seven associated family members who evacuated with them, were dead and the rest made captive. Less than three weeks later a small war party of Shawnee, Lunaapeew (Lenape, or Delaware), and Bodéwadmi from the Prophetstown area attacked Pigeon Roost in Indiana Territory, killing twenty-three people. A day later a larger force of Bodéwadmi, Waayahtanwa (Ouiatenon or Wea), Shawnee, Kiikaapoi (Kickapoo), and Hoocąągra


\(^{44}\) Allen, *His Majesty’s Indian Allies*, 115-117.
(Ho-Chunk or Winnebago) warriors laid siege to Fort Harrison (present-day Terre Haute, Indiana). They were ultimately repelled, but soldiers were killed and two supply wagons taken. On September 5, Fort Madison on the western shore of the Mississippi River (in present-day Iowa), was attacked and placed under temporary siege by Thâkiwa (Sauk), Meskwaki (Fox) and Hoocąągra (Ho-Chunk or Winnebago).45


These various assaults stemmed from a common desire to reclaim and defend

Indigenous lands, and most were tied in one way or another to groups that had been associated with Tenskwatawa’s movement since before the move to Prophetstown. Yet there was no collective strategy, nor did they involve the British or the diverse array of warriors in the Detroit River area. However, this changed after Bodéwadmi from the Elkhart, Tippecanoe, and Illinois rivers began a siege of Fort Wayne in late August. With the fall of Detroit, Fort Mackinac and Fort Dearborn, the war leader Winamac (who had previously led Bodéwadmi warriors at the Battle of Tippecanoe) recognized the importance of removing the last significant fort in the western Ohio Valley. After several days of small attacks on targets outside the fort, and a failed ruse to bring armed warriors inside the walls, a siege was established on September 4. After a few days, messengers were sent to Detroit, Fort Amherstburg, and several Native towns requesting British artillery, soldiers, and more warriors. All was agreed to by the British and Native war leaders, but the British had to delay until after September 10 when a temporary truce between the United States and Great Britain expired.

The consolidation of British, Canadian, and Indigenous forces on the Detroit River with Native groups to the southwest represented a full manifestation of American fears about the British-Native alliance. Because the threat was so immediate, military leaders were forced to rely on an army of mostly untrained militia and volunteers who were promptly ordered to march north from Cincinnati on August 29—before Winamac had sent his appeal to Detroit. Under the command of William Henry Harrison, who had recently been appointed a Major General of the Kentucky Militia, the bulk of the army reached Piqua, Ohio, within a few days and advanced units arrived in the vicinity of Fort Wayne on September 11. With reports that a 2,000-strong army was close behind, the siege was lifted the next day before U.S. troops arrived.

Unaware that the siege had lifted, the promised assistance from the Detroit River finally departed on September 14. The assembled force included 150 infantry, an artillery unit, 100 Canadian militia, 800 warriors from the Detroit River led by the Wyandot war leaders Stayeghtha (Bark Carrier, aka Roundhead) and Splitlog, another 200 Ojibwe and Odawa from Michilimackinac, as well as several officers and 47 men from the River Raisin who had been hired as drovers. After a long portage around the Maumee Rapids, a mixed detachment of British and Native forces nearly stumbled into a large army of U.S. regulars, volunteers and militia—part of the 2nd Army of the Northwest that had been assembled in response to General Hull’s multiple requests for reinforcements. Under the command of Brigadier General James Winchester, the army was now on its way to retake Detroit. After a few small engagements between scouts from both sides, the British refused to engage such a large force and most of the British-Native alliance returned to the Detroit River without incident. The Ojibwe and Odawa departed for home, however,

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47 Edmunds, *The Potawatomis*, 191; Skaggs, *William Henry Harrison and the Conquest of the Ohio Country: Frontier Fighting in the War of 1812* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 2014), 99-100, 123-24; and Quimby, *The U.S. Army in the War of 1812*, 95-99. During Harrison’s northward march, his army had been augmented by several units of Ohio Militia and numbered 2600 by the time the siege was lifted.
as did some other members of the Native alliance.\footnote{48}

As autumn arrived the British-Native alliance effectively withdrew from any sustained offensive operations. This was a consequence of several strategic concerns: namely, diminishing supplies, the retention of military personnel and resources for the conflicts on the Niagara Peninsula, the departures of Native warriors to their home communities, and the proximity of General Winchester’s army. In contrast, General Harrison launched a scorched earth campaign immediately after his arrival at Fort Wayne. Divisions of Kentucky militia units composed of cavalry and infantry were dispatched to the upper Wabash River, the Elkhart River (in northeastern Indiana Territory), and the Eel River.\footnote{49}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{map.png}
\caption{Routes and Movements of U.S. Military Forces in the Fall of 1812. Closely adapted from a map in Steven J. Rauch, \textit{The Campaign of 1812} (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 2013), 25.}
\end{figure}


\textsuperscript{49} This and the following paragraph are informed by Skaggs, \textit{William Henry Harrison and the Conquest of the Ohio Country}, 125-133; Robert M. Owens, \textit{Mr. Jefferson’s Hammer: William Henry Harrison and the Origins of American Indian Policy} (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2011), 223-25; Quimby, \textit{The U.S. Army in the War of 1812}, 113-16; Arthur J. Leighton, ““Eyes on the Wabash”: A History of Indiana’s Indian People from Pre-Contact Through Removal” (PhD diss., Purdue University, 2007), 293-96.
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Despite orders to avoid certain towns that had not supported conflict with the United States, the militias either could not discern—or did not discriminate—between different communities. Along with Bodéwadmi towns whose warriors participated in the siege of Fort Wayne, Myaamia, Lunaapeew, and Bodéwasmi communities that had kept their distance from the British-Native alliance also suffered the destruction of their homes and crops. A similar round of attacks took place a month later, primarily focused on the Bodéwadmi towns around the southern end of Lake Michigan. Finally, a third expedition composed of 600 cavalry was sent to attack the Myaamia and Lunaapew towns on the Mississinewa River in December. Colonel John Campbell, who led the expedition, reported the killing of at least 38 American Indians, and the taking of 118 prisoners. Many of the prisoners were rescued in a counterattack, but the loss of homes and food stores was devastating for the survivors—who soon moved to the Detroit River and joined the British-Native alliance. Among these refugees was P'Koum-Kwa (Pacanne), who could no longer hone to a policy of neutrality.

As these raids were underway, Winchester made preparations for a winter encampment below the Maumee Rapids while Harrison established his headquarters at Upper Sandusky. By this time, the command of the 2nd Army of the Northwest had been transferred from General Winchester to Harrison, who President Madison appointed a U.S. brigadier general. The appointment followed intense pressure from political leaders and militia officers in Kentucky, who greatly preferred the younger Harrison over the genteel veteran of the Revolutionary War. Winchester retained his rank, but his new command was limited to the left wing of the army—which was composed of the 17th U.S. Infantry, a detachment of the 19th U.S. Infantry, and four regiments of Kentucky volunteer militia. A smaller center column was placed under the command of General Edward Tupper, which consisted mostly of Ohio militia along with some Kentucky mounted riflemen. Tupper’s command was primarily responsible for transporting materials and fortifying Hull’s route from earlier in the year, but forward units did engage with a large foraging party on the lower Maumee River in early November. Along with coordinating the supply and movement of the Army of the Northwest, Harrison commanded the army’s right wing, which consisted of three separate militia brigades from Virginia, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, the 2nd Regiment of Light Dragoons.50

The First Battle of Frenchtown

The situation in Frenchtown changed in late fall and early winter, when reports came in to Fort Amherstburg that part of the reconstituted Army of the Northwest was slowly making its way along the lower Maumee River. While the news was hardly unexpected, the encounter with Tupper’s scouts triggered an immediate concern about the material and strategic importance of Frenchtown. If the U.S. forces became entrenched at the River Raisin, it could lead to the loss of Michigan and jeopardize the security of Upper Canada. With this new threat, the British-Confederacy alliance determined to make the settlement a forward line of defense or—if circumstances warranted—to

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remove or destroy its resources before they fell into U.S. hands. By the second week of January, when word came that a large U.S. force was settling in below the Maumee Rapids, a contingent of as many as 200 mostly Bodéwadmi and Wyandot warriors headed to Frenchtown. They joined up with the two small companies of the Essex militia (numbering about fifty men) that were already situated in Frenchtown. Along with an artilleryman and a light canon, the augmented force made preparations for an expected U.S. attack.\footnote{Squire Robert Reynolds, “Narrative,” in 1812; The War, and its Moral: A Canadian Chronicle, ed. William F. Coffin (Montreal: John Levell, 1864), 208; Antal, A Wampum Denied, 160-63.}

Thirty-five miles to the south, Winchester’s army established a defensive winter camp near present-day Perrysburg, Ohio, on January 10, 1813. While his command had numbered close to 2,000 men in late summer, it was down to fewer than 1,300. Much of the decline was attributable to desertion or dismissal—which largely stemmed from a widespread and intense dislike of General Winchester and a propensity among Kentucky volunteers to eschew the precepts of military discipline. However, many of those who did not reach the Rapids had either become incapacitated by injury or illness and left behind at a rear post. Winter was especially brutal, and the effort to find and build a suitable encampment in the wet and freezing tangle of the Black Swamp took a heavy toll. The conditions were compounded by diminished rations and a lack of winter clothing, since most of Winchester’s army only had the now tattered garments they were using in the heat of July and August. Exposure and disease took a deadly toll through December, accounting for a further decline in Winchester’s command. After four-and-a-half months of hard travel, repeated setbacks in the Black Swamp, and a few minor engagements with allied American Indian and British fighters, the remaining men under Winchester’s command were malnourished, poorly clothed and profoundly dispirited.\footnote{Quimby, The U.S. Army in the War of 1812, 124-25, 130-32; Cruikshank, “Harrison and Proctor,” 149-50; Antal, A Wampum Denied, 154-56. Elias Darnell, A Journal Containing an Accurate and Interesting Account of the Hardships, Suffering, Battles, Defeat and Captivity of Those Heroic Kentucky Volunteers and Regulars Commanded by General Winchester, in the Years 1812-13. Also, Two Narratives by Men That Were Wounded in the Battles on the River Raisin and Taken Captive by the Indians, 2 ed. (Philadelphia: Lippincott, Grambo, and Company, 1854), 31-40.}

While it was obvious that his forces needed to recuperate, Winchester also knew his men required some “progressive operations” or his command would falter altogether. After months of wearisome duty, the militiamen had nearly finished the terms of their service and showed no inclination to extend their enlistments. Indeed, many had recently come close to deserting—and nearly all the militia despaired Winchester. For men who boasted during their send-off from Kentucky that they would conquer the “ancient enemy … of Americans and Kentuckians” (i.e., the alliance of British and American Indian interests that pre-dated the Revolutionary War), the prospect of more hunger, fatigue, and idleness was unacceptable. In short, incessant hardship and prolonged inaction had brought the left wing of the Army of the Northwest to the verge of collapse.\footnote{G. Glenn Clift, Remember the Raisin! Kentucky and Kentuckians in the Battles and Massacre at Frenchtown, Michigan Territory, in the War of 1812 (or: Kentucky Historical Society, 1961), 46-49; Winchester quotation from Winchester to Harrison, 17 January 1813, in Messages and Letters of William Henry Harrison, vol. 2, ed. Logan Esaray (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Commission, 1922), 314. Quotation on “ancient enemy” is from the speech made by Captain William Lewis just before the battle of}
Such a fate was soon averted, however, when a messenger from Frenchtown arrived in Winchester’s camp on January 13, 1813. He reported that the British had begun rounding up suspected U.S. sympathizers and confiscating stored foodstuffs, livestock and portable property for use at Fort Amherstburg. Moreover, the messenger stated that all French-speaking habitants were to be taken across the Detroit River to Canada and Frenchtown burned to the ground. The following day another resident of Frenchtown arrived with much the same story, and Winchester decided to send scouts to assess the situation. Two days later he received a promising report: the military force at Frenchtown arrived January 18, 1813, in which he referenced the send-off speech of Kentucky Representative Henry Clay in Georgetown the previous August; in “Recollections of the Late War, the River Raisin Battle,” Kentucky Yeoman (Frankfort), May 7, 1833; reprinted in Federal Writers’ Project. Military History of Kentucky, Chronologically Arranged (Frankfort, KY: State Journal, 1939), 82. Also see James A. Ramage and Andrea S. Watkins, Kentucky Rising: Democracy, Slavery and Culture form the Early Republic to the Civil War (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2011), 101-02.
was hardly formidable, none of the reported confiscation and rounding up had actually occurred, and the settlement on the River Raisin still held an abundance of resources and supplies that could help support the U.S. forces through the winter. That same evening, January 16, the decision was made to send a force to take Frenchtown. The following morning 550 men from the 1st and 5th Kentucky Volunteer Militia Regiments were assembled and sent north under the command of Lt. Colonel William Lewis of the 5th Kentucky Volunteers. Soon afterwards, Winchester dispatched another 110 militiamen from the 1st Kentucky Volunteer Rifle Regiment, and the two forces joined up that evening at the north end of Maumee Bay (near present-day downtown Toledo, Ohio).

The combined force set off in the early morning hours of January 18, using the frozen and snow-dusted shoreline of Lake Erie as a road to the north. A few miles south of Frenchtown the Kentuckians were joined by as many as 100 habitants—many of whom served in the Michigan militia the previous summer—and the entire force came together just south of the frozen River Raisin around three o’clock in the afternoon. Facing them, on the north side of the river, the Essex Militia was positioned behind the cover of houses, structures, and fences within the village of Frenchtown. On the west and east ends of the village, Bodéwadmi and Wyandot warriors took up similar but less protected positions. The Essex militia opened fire with its lone artillery piece, which was answered with shouts and a three-pronged rush of Kentuckians and habitants across the river. They soon took control of the north bank and forced the defenders to retreat from the central core of Frenchtown. The Essex militia briefly held its ground at the north edge of Frenchtown where, as Kentucky rifleman William Atherton recalled, “they made a stand with their howitzer and small arms, covered by a chain of enclosed lots and a group of houses, having in their rear a thick brushy wood filled with fallen timber.”

Efforts to outflank the allied Canadian militiamen and Confederacy warriors proved unsuccessful, and the fighting devolved into a series of fierce skirmishes through the denser woods to the north. Fallen timber offered protection for a fighting retreat, which was now aimed toward making a successful escape to the Wyandot village of Big Rock (Brownstown) while forcing the Kentuckians to pay as dearly as possible for their ensuing victory. In “the woods the fighting became general and most obstinate,” as one Kentuckian described this part of the battle, “the enemy resisting every inch of ground as they were compelled to fall back.” Over the course of two miles the slow-moving battle continued until darkness fell, with the retreating forces taking cover to fire on the pursuing Kentuckians, then dashes to another protective area before the pursuers could regroup or return accurate fire. It was this part of the battle that brought the most casualties to the U.S. side, which all told lost thirteen killed and fifty-four wounded.

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54 Winchester, “General Orders,” Camp Miami Rapids, 16 and 17 January 1813, James Winchester Papers, Burton Historical Collection, Detroit Public Library; Darnell, A Journal Containing an Accurate and Interesting Account, 45-48; Robert B. McAfee, History of the Late War in the Western Country (Bowling Green, OH: Historical Publications Company, 1919), 223-26; Naveaux, Invaded on All Sides, 103-112; Au, War on the Raisin: A Narrative Account of the War of 1812 in the River Raisin Settlement, Michigan Territory (Monroe, MI: Monroe County Historical Commission, 1981), 25-27.

55 Quotation is from William Atherton, Narrative of the Suffering & Defeat of the Northwestern Army, under General Winchester: Massacre of the Prisoners, Sixteen Months Imprisonment of the Writer and Others with the Indians and British (Frankfort, KY: A.G. Hodges, 1842), 36. For a detailed summary of the early part of the battle, see Naveaux, Invaded on All Sides, 112-120.
Records for the Essex Militia are spotty, and no written accounting was made for Native losses, but the Canadians suffered at least one casualty (whether killed or wounded is uncertain). American Indian casualties were greater, but the numbers are not clear. Some were certainly killed since Kentucky militiamen boasted of mutilating and scalping at least a few corpses. Traces of blood were also found along the paths taken by retreating American Indians, either from wounded individuals or the bodies of dead fighters who were taken away by their comrades.\footnote{One member of the Essex Militia, and two American Indians were also taken prisoner by the Kentucky forces. Atherton, Narrative of the Suffering, 37; Darnell, Journal, 42-43; Antal, A Wampum Denied, 163-64; Au, War on the Raisin, 28-29. Clift, Remember the Raisin!, 53-55; Benson J. Losing, The Pictorial Field-Book of the War of 1812 (New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1869), 313-315; Naveaux, Invaded on All Sides, 120-21.}

Word of the victory soon reached General Winchester, who rejoiced at the initial news and immediately concurred with a request from Colonel Lewis for more troops. Four companies of U.S. Regulars (17\textsuperscript{th} and 19\textsuperscript{th} U.S. Infantry) were assembled, along with some militiamen, and the force of about 300 headed off to Frenchtown—which they reached before dawn on January 20. The decision to attack Frenchtown, as well as
assemble the bulk of his command so close to Fort Amherstburg, came with considerable risk. Yet for Winchester the die was cast. The victory at Frenchtown seemed to confirm his initial decision to send troops to the River Raisin, while the number of casualties (which numbered roughly ten percent of the original force sent to Frenchtown) precluded any chance of a quick withdrawal back to the Maumee Rapids. As Winchester wrote to Harrison, he both feared a counter attack from Fort Amherstburg; admitting that his position “was not very favourable for defence.” Yet he also welcomed such an action, boasting that if the enemy tried “to retake this place … he will pay dearly for it.” Though Winchester’s decision “alarmed” Harrison (and contravened his standing orders), he averred that it was right of Winchester to bolster Lewis’ forces at Frenchtown. Consequently, Harrison accelerated the plans for a winter invasion of Upper Canada and quickly mobilized 360 of his own troops to aid Winchester at Frenchtown.57

The Second Battle of Frenchtown

Hopeful expectation trumped anxiety as Winchester’s forces settled into Frenchtown, but across the Detroit River another sentiment prevailed: decisive urgency. Sometime after midnight on January 19 news about the loss of Frenchtown first reached Colonel Henry Procter, the commander of Fort Amherstburg. Aware of Harrison’s build-up at Upper and Lower Sandusky, and Winchester’s movements along the lower Maumee River, Procter regarded the force that attacked Frenchtown as the opening act in a planned invasion of Detroit and Canada. To counter such a strategy, he “deemed it requisite, that, [the Enemy] should be attacked without Delay, and with all, and every Description of Force, within my Reach.”58 The goal was to destroy or at least dislodge Winchester’s forces before they could be joined by the right wing of the Army of the North West, and to reestablish a forward position against U.S forces.59

Procter quickly dispatched a company of regulars, some artillerymen, and the twenty-eight members of the Provincial Marine to Big Rock, where they met up with some of the retreating American Indian fighters from the previous day’s battle. By the 20th, more regulars from the 41st Regiment of Foot and Royal Newfoundland Fencibles, as well as Canadian militiamen and members of the British Indian Department, came in from Detroit and Fort Amherstburg. All told, this British and Canadian force amounted to 595 men and included six pieces of artillery. At Big Rock they were joined by a confederated force of American Indians that were then wintering on both sides of the Detroit River, and included Wyandot, Shawnee, Bodéwadmi, Odawa (Ottawa), Ojibwe, (Chippewa), Lunaapeew (Lenape, or Delaware), Myaamiaki (Miami), Hoocąągra (Ho-


59 Antal, A Wampum Denied, 166-67. Various primary and secondary sources refer to the army under Harrison’s command as the “Army of the North-West,” the “army of the north west,” “Army of the North West,” “Army of the Northwest.” For the sake of simplicity, “Army of the Northwest” is used in this study.
Chunk or Winnebago), Mvskoke (Muscogee or Creek), Kiikaapoi (Kickapoo) Thâkiwa (Sauk, or Sac), and Meskwaki (Fox) fighters. Though each group had formidable war leaders, they formally deferred to the Wyandot as the “elder brothers” in the Confederacy and keepers of the ancient Council Fire, and their most renowned war leaders: Stayeghtha (Bark Carrier, aka Roundhead), Teotrontore (more commonly Sou-näh-hoo-way, or Splitlog), and Myeerah (Walk-in-the-Water). Numbering at least 600, and perhaps as many as 800, this was one of the largest and most diverse assemblages of American Indian warriors in the entire war. On the 21st the British, Canadians and American Indians moved en masse to Swan Creek, where they spent part of a restless night before heading toward Frenchtown about five miles to the southwest.  

Arriving before dawn on the 22nd and unnoticed by the American sentries, the allied forces gathered into their battle positions about 250-350 yards to the north of Frenchtown. Arrayed in an arc along the wooded stretch of Mason Run, the allied forces were organized into three large groupings: British regulars and artillery were positioned across the center; about 200 yards to their right (west) was a somewhat dispersed clustering of mostly Anishinaabeg (Odawa, Ojibwe, and Bodéwadmi), Myaamia, and some Canadian militia; and another 250 yards to the left (east) of the center position a large number of mostly Wyandot and Shawnee fighters held the forward position, with Canadian militia and artillery to their rear. The American forces, which at this time numbered 934 able-bodied men, were primarily situated in two locales. Approximately

Figure 7.7: Second Battle of Frenchtown: Early Actions on January 22, 1813. Image is closely based on a painting by Tim Kurtz on display outside the Visitor Center at River Raisin National Battlefield Park.

700 soldiers from the Kentucky militia regiments were encamped within the center of Frenchtown, with defensive positions staked out behind the puncheon fences along the north side of the village as well as the garden fence lines to the east and west. In the open field to the east, about 160 regulars from the U.S. 17th Regiment slept behind a hastily constructed series of breastworks. The remainder of the U.S. forces were scattered throughout the Frenchtown community, in barns or homes, while General Winchester slept at his temporary headquarters in the home of François Navarre on the south side of the River Raisin—less than a mile to the west of Frenchtown proper. A small number of habitants from Frenchtown and nearby settlements were also prepared to defend the village, and added to the U.S. forces.61

Just as the British forces in the center readied their attack, reveille sounded on the U.S. side and soon after a sentry spotted the Red Coats in the dim pre-dawn light. He fired a shot into the forward line that killed the lead grenadier, and the report of his musket sent the just-awakened U.S. forces scrambling for their battle positions. Almost immediately, the British opened up with their artillery and the infantry pushed forward from their center position. As they drew within range of Frenchtown, they fired a powerful volley at what, in the still dark distance, had seemed to be a line of soldiers on the opposite end of the field of battle. Assuming they had the advantage, the British then made a fierce charge toward Frenchtown, but the target of their fusillade proved to be the puncheon fence behind which the protected Kentuckians could fire at will. With the British artillery still overshooting the mark, and the puncheon fence providing ample protection, the Kentuckians were unscathed and unrelenting. After twenty minutes the British were forced to retreat, leaving a number of fallen comrades behind who were shot by Kentucky marksmen as they struggled to crawl through two feet of crusted snow.62

Matters went quite differently on the American’s right flank. There the Canadian militia quickly adjusted the aim of their artillery, and soon wreaked havoc on the more exposed position of the U.S. 17th Infantry. As canon fire tore through the encampment and shattered breastworks, the exposed U.S. regulars also had to contend with militiamen and Wyandot fighters that had taken possession of some nearby buildings from which they fired at will into the American encampment. The U.S. regulars struggled to hold their ground, but eventually faltered when mounted warriors came around their right flank. An attempt was made to send a few companies of Kentucky militiamen to the aid of the 17th Infantry, but the effort ultimately proved disastrous. General Winchester, who had just arrived from his headquarters, ordered the infantrymen to fall back to the north bank of the river where they could rendezvous with the Kentuckians. Together they made a brief stand, but were soon overwhelmed by the pursuing Canadian, Wyandot and Shawnee fighters. After a frantic retreat to the south side of the frozen river, where some made another weak stand, the American position disintegrated entirely. All who were gathered near the south bank were swept up in the ensuing chaos, including Winchester and several officers. Fleeing pell-mell toward the south, and hampered by the poor

footing on the ice-crusted snow, many were run down and killed in fairly short order. Others managed to continue for a mile or two along Hull’s Road, but few escaped their pursuers—who now included a large contingent of American Indian forces that had swept around the west and south side of Frenchtown. Of the approximately 400 U.S. forces who were caught up in the rout, about 220 were killed and another 147 were captured. Only thirty-three managed to escape and return back to the Maumee River.63

Figure 7.8: Second Battle of Frenchtown: Closing Battle Actions on January 22, 1813. Image is closely based on a painting by Tim Kurtz on display outside the Visitor Center at River Raisin National Battlefield Park.

The actions to the east and south of Frenchtown were barely perceived by the British regulars and the Kentuckians still entrenched behind the fence lines. Instead they remained locked in what, for them, seemed to be the main battle area. Over the course of two hours, the British regrouped and made two more frontal attacks, but the Kentuckian position was too strong. The third and last attack proved the most costly, and brought total British casualties among the 41st Regiment of Foot and Provincial Marine to 182 (24 killed and 158 wounded), a number that was perhaps four times greater than the total losses suffered by the entrenched Kentuckians. As the British pulled back and evaluated their weakening situation, many of the Kentuckians took a simple breakfast in the midst of a relative lull in the fighting. While waiting for news from the warriors that had routed the 17th and 19th U.S. Infantry, as well as those who had apparently positioned themselves on the south side of Frenchtown, Colonel Procter suddenly found himself face-to-face with General Winchester, Winchester’s young son Marcus who served as his aide-de-camp, and Colonel Lewis—all in the custody of Stayeghtha.64

Procter soon pressed his opposite for outright capitulation, but Winchester averred—since he was now a prisoner and could not give orders to those still engaged in battle. When told that his men would otherwise be burned out of their position, and attacked by a much larger force of American Indians, General Winchester agreed to send a message encouraging the Kentuckians still within the pickets of Frenchtown to surrender. When they received the message, the Kentuckians balked. Feeling themselves on the verge of victory, they still believed the battle could be won. As Private Elias Darnell later recalled, “Some plead[ed] with the officers not to surrender, saying they would rather die on the field!”65 These were brave words, and Major George Madison of the Kentucky 1st Regiment was committed to holding out long enough to influence the terms of surrender. After some back-and-forth with the British over the disposition of prisoners, protection from Confederacy warriors, and care of the wounded, Madison formally surrendered. While Colonel Procter viewed Winchester’s surrender as unconditional on all forces under his command, Madison’s terms were unremarkable and entirely in accord with Procter’s expectations. In either case, the Kentuckians’ position was untenable. Their ammunition was low, they were completely hemmed in on the south, British artillery was in position to fire enfilade through their defensive lines, and Confederacy warriors were firing into the heart of Frenchtown while preparing to set it on fire. In short, Madison had two choices: to surrender to the British or, as he put it, “be massacred in cold blood.”66

64 Casualties among the 41st Regiment of Foot were particularly high, and amounted to nearly half of those who took the field on the morning of the January 22, 1813. See Antal, A Wampum Denied, 174, and Au, War on the Raisin, 42.
65 Quotation from Darnell, Journal, 48.
66 Robert B. McAfee, History of the Late War in the Western Country, (Bowling Green, Ohio: Historical Publications Company, 1919), 235-36; Darnell, Journal, 54-55; Atherton, Narrative of the Suffering, 53; Cruikshank, “Harrison and Proctor,” 160-61; Clift, Remember the Raisin!, 69; Antal, A Wampum Denied, 169-74; Naveaux, Invaded on All Sides, 189-202; Au, War on the Raisin, 40-44. Also “Augustus B. Woodward to Colonel Henry Procter, Detroit, February 2, 1813,” and “Affidavit of Medard Labadie, February 13, 1813,” both in American State Papers: Documents, Legislative and Executive, of the Congress of the United States, Vol. 4, Indian Affairs, no. 1 (Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1832), 367 and 371—hereafter cited as ASP.
The battle was costly for the British regulars and Canadian militia, whose combined losses of 24 killed and 161 wounded amounted to nearly a third of all the forces under Procter’s command at Frenchtown. For the U.S. forces, however, their loss was an unmitigated disaster. Of the 934 who heard the morning’s reveille, all but the thirty-three who managed to escape to the Maumee Rapids were either dead, wounded, or prisoners of war. A preliminary count on the evening of the 22nd put the number of American dead at 218, while the number of ambulatory prisoners who were marched off to Fort Amherstburg was tallied at 495. Approximately sixty wounded prisoners were unable to make the journey, and they were attended by thirty of their fellows who stayed behind. Aside from the thirty-three who evaded capture during the desperate retreat from the River Raisin, approximately sixty-six were reported missing. Some were likely dead but their bodies remained undiscovered, while the rest had become captives within various American Indian encampments. Based on later counts of prisoners that passed through Fort Amherstburg, it seems that most all of these captives were eventually turned over to the British.67

A Confederacy Victory

The undisputed victor at the River Raisin was the Native Confederacy. While their casualty numbers remain unknown, American Indian fighters fared much better than their British and Canadian allies in every respect. The Wyandot and Shawnee war leaders who directed the attack against U.S. regulars on the east side of Frenchtown quickly turned the fight into the sort of running battle they preferred. Moving “in scattered order,” groups of warriors took advantage of small areas of cover and harassed the edges of the U.S. position. As the soldiers gave ground they were driven toward the river, then all were nearly surrounded. Brief efforts by some U.S. regulars and Kentucky militiamen to make a joint stand were short-lived, and their retreats were channeled southward along Hull’s Trace to a series of awaiting ambushes. All of this went in accordance with a basic strategy that eschewed the massing of forces, emphasized the actions of small groups working in concert with others, and sought to disorient the enemy with small random strikes from several directions. Once the attack was joined by many of the Bodéwadmi, Myaamia, Odawa, and Ojibwe fighters that had swept around the west side of Frenchtown, the fate of the “Long Knives” was more than sealed.68

The small clusters of regulars and Kentucky militia that managed to get as far as the prairie and woods to the south of the River Raisin were exhausted, low on


ammunition, or had abandoned their cumbersome muskets to improve their chances of flight. Their efforts to make a final stand, flee, or bargain for their lives usually ended with the same fatal result. Native warriors were not in a position to safely hold many prisoners, nor were they disposed to spare the lives of men who would kill them at the first chance. Moreover, they were expected to atone for the deaths and destruction their communities had suffered over the past few months and years at the hands of people with whom many had been in conflict for generations. This sentiment was particularly acute among the Bodéwadmi and Myaamia whose villages had been attacked just a month before—perhaps by some of the very same men that were now running, fighting, and begging for their lives. In short, the Kentuckians and the U.S. regulars (who hailed mostly from Kentucky and southern Ohio) were in the hands of the “ancient enemy” they sought to destroy—and wished to destroy them. Most were killed outright, which accounts for the high death toll and relatively low number of wounded and captured from this part of the battle.69

The Native Confederacy was also responsible for ending the battle and bringing about the surrender of the Kentuckians still entrenched within Frenchtown. While the presentation of General Winchester to Colonel Procter shifted the British focus from assessing their losses to demanding U.S. surrender, the decisive victory on the south side of the River Raisin allowed for a new concentration of American Indian fighters around Frenchtown. As Winchester later recalled, this development convinced the Kentuckians to give up their arms and take “the opportunity of surrendering themselves as prisoners of war” to the British—or lose the battle to “the [American Indian warriors], who were then assembled in great numbers.” At this point the Kentuckians were already receiving sniper fire from the rear and soon realized the impossibility of their situation. The longer they tried to hold out, the more certain “the buildings adjacent would be immediately set on fire”—and they would be cut down while trying to escape the flames.70

Leaving the Field

For Procter, the U.S. agreement to surrender to his forces was an important triumph—but returning to Fort Amherstburg became a matter of great urgency. He knew that U.S. forces under General Harrison were already enroute to the River Raisin, and there was some expectation that they might arrive within a few hours. Given the condition of his own troops, Procter had no spirit for another engagement at Frenchtown. With his able-bodied forces outnumbered by the large contingent of U.S. prisoners, Procter could hardly defend his position while guarding hundreds of men who would turn on their captors at the first opportunity. Moreover, the large number of grievously

69 On the recent American attacks against Bodéwadmi and Myaamia villages in southwestern Michigan and northern Indiana, see Edmunds, The Potawatomis, 189-95; and Skaggs, William Henry Harrison, 123, 134-35; and Quimby, The U.S. Army in the War of 1812, 94. While the men from the 19th and 17th U.S. Infantry who fought at the River Raisin came from the same regiments as those who attacked the Myaamia and Bodéwadmi, they served under Winchester and did not participate in Harrison’s December campaigns.

70 Quotations are from Winchester to Harrison, January 23, 1813, in John Brannan, ed., Official Letters of Military and Naval Officers of the United States During the War with Great Britain in the Years 1812, 13, 14, & 15, with Some Additional Letters and Documents Elucidating the History of That Period (Washington: Way & Gideon, 1823), 133.
wounded British regulars and militia needed care. In short, Procter’s victory over Winchester necessarily became a hurried retreat.\textsuperscript{71}

Once the Kentuckians within Frenchtown had grounded their arms and surrendered, the decision to return to Fort Amherstburg was set in motion. British wounded were placed on sleighs and rushed back to the fort while all of the American prisoners who could walk were assembled and counted—then ordered to march to Canada. The sixty or so who were too badly wounded to make the eighteen-mile march to Fort Amherstburg, along with the thirty who stayed behind to care for them, were sheltered in a few homes. A guard of two militia officers and three interpreters from the Indian Department remained behind. Along with the assistance of some habitants, they were nominally charged with preventing escapes as well as intervening with any American Indians that might come into the settlement. Procter had agreed to send back any available sleighs the next day to transport the wounded prisoners to Amherstburg, but the Americans and the British fully expected that U.S. troops would arrive from the south before that became necessary.

Colonel Procter’s information on the location and movement of Harrison’s forces was vague, but it proved remarkably accurate. While the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Battle of Frenchtown was still underway, Procter received word that a large U.S. force was marching along the frozen surface of Lake Erie—just eight miles south of Frenchtown. This report was later deemed erroneous, but a battalion of U.S. regulars that Harrison had sent north from the Maumee on the 21\textsuperscript{st} was on the ice at that time, though perhaps not so close. By the time the Kentuckians were about to surrender, however, the relief battalion was within two hours of the River Raisin. Harrison was several hours behind with two more battalions of Ohio and Kentucky militia, and it is possible that a substantial force of 900 could have arrived at Frenchtown by nightfall. However, after encountering several escapees from the rout of the U.S. 17\textsuperscript{th} Infantry and Kentucky militia, Harrison and his officers halted their marches. After convening together, they “unanimously determined that as there could be no doubt of the total defeat of Genl. Winchester there was no motive that could authorize an immediate advance but that of attacking the enemy who were reported to be greatly superior in numbers and were certainly well provided with artillery.” Though Harrison’s reasoning is understandable in light of circumstances and incomplete information, the decision to hold back proved fateful.\textsuperscript{72}

\textsuperscript{71} This and the following paragraph are informed by The John Hunt Memoirs: Early Years of the Maumee Basin, 1812-1835, ed. Richard J. Wright (Maumee Ohio: Maumee Valley Historical Society, 1979), 42-44; Byfield, “A Common Soldier’s Account,” 17-18; Allen, His Majesty’s Indian Allies, 142; Au, War on the Raisin, 45-46; Clift, Remember the Raisin!, 74-76; and Antal, A Wampum Denied, 174-77.

\textsuperscript{72} Procter’s information came from a Canadian militia scout who reported seeing a large military force on the ice. This sighting was later deemed a Fata Morgana—a kind of mirage across an expanse of ice or water that enlarges and alters the shape of a distant object—of a few Wyandot drovers moving livestock north from the Sandusky area. Given the nature of a Fata Morgana, which presents enlarged reflections of objects beyond the horizon, this may well have been a sighting of the more distant American forces. The report to Procter is described in John Norton, The Journal of Major John Norton, 1816 (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1970), 316-17. On the movements and decisions of Harrison’s troops on January 21-22, see Harrison to Secretary of War, January 24, 1813, in Messages and Letters of William Henry Harrison, 331-34; quotation is from p. 332. Also see Lossing, The Pictorial Field-Book of the War of 1812, 363-64; and Au, War on the Raisin, 46-48.
Chapter Seven

Reckoning

Like the prisoners and their five-man guard, the habitants who remained in Frenchtown as well as the group of American Indians encamped a few miles north at Stony Creek also expected that some part of Harrison’s force would arrive by nightfall. Accordingly, the members of the Indian Department planned to slip away to Fort Amherstburg before U.S. troops arrived. The wounded prisoners would then become the responsibility of their countrymen (as they certainly preferred) rather than the overtaxed British, and the habitants of Frenchtown could start the process of cleaning up and sorting through their losses. In short, the last piece of what might be called Procter’s “victorious retreat” would be finished. This likely scenario would also have been expected by the group of Confederacy fighters who had withdrawn a few miles to the north. The following morning they would have kept an eye on the U.S. forces arriving from the south, but prudence and a desire to fight another day would prevent any from directly engaging Harrison’s forces.  

By first light there was no sign or news of a U.S. relief force, and so the able-bodied prisoners began readying their wounded comrades for the trip to Fort Amherstburg. By this time, however, the Canadian and Indian Department guards already knew that no such journey would take place. In the absence of U.S. troops from the south, a pre-dawn council at Stony Creek had determined to complete the victory that had been cut short by the U.S surrender to the British. Soon after the guards learned of this decision, most departed Frenchtown. Since they had no real authority over the actions of their Native allies, there was nothing they could do without endangering themselves. The last remaining interpreter from the Indian Department conveyed the news to Captain Nathaniel Hart, one of the U.S. wounded. In answer to Hart’s concerned question about what “the Indians intend[ed] to do,” the interpreter replied “They intend to kill you.” When Hart then asked the man to intervene in some way, the interpreter replied that doing so would effectively make him an ally of the U.S. and thus “they will as soon kill [me] as you.” The promised sleighs had not arrived and any that may have been en route would certainly have been warned off—either by the departed guards who were themselves heading along the road or across the ice back to Fort Amherstburg, or the American Indians still at Stony Creek.

The event that became known as the “River Raisin Massacre” was not a sudden burst of collective violence. Rather, it began as a somewhat incredulous confirmation that no U.S. forces had arrived. It then progressed to a fairly deliberate taking of valuables and able-bodied captives, that was later punctuated by the killing of the most severely wounded survivors of the previous days’ battles. According to witness accounts from habitants and prisoners, in the first hour or so after daybreak the number of American

73 Darnell, Journal, 57-60; Starkey, European and Native American Warfare, 28-29.
74 Quotation from Thomas P. Dudley, Battle and Massacre at Frenchtown, Michigan, January 1813 (Ann Arbor: Scholarly Publishing Office, University of Michigan Library, 2004), 3. Also see Au, War on the Raisin, 44; and Clift, Remember the Raisin!, 85-86. While there are no recorded accounts of why the promised sleighs did not arrive from Amherstburg, there are several likely reasons. Two guards, along with an officer, had left Frenchtown around dawn and may well have met the sleighs on the road north of town or on the ice of the Detroit River. It is also possible that the sleighs may have been turned back at Big Rock (Brownstown) or Stony Creek, where they would have learned from the American Indians still gathered there about the ensuing events at Frenchtown.
Indians that had come in to Frenchtown was fairly small—with the few who spoke English engaging with some of the men who were taking care of the wounded. As Dr. Gustavus Bower later described the morning, “They did not molest any person or thing upon their first approach, but kept sauntering about until there were a large number collected, (say one or two hundred) at which time they commenced plundering the houses of the inhabitants, and the massacre of the wounded prisoners.”

Even then, the killings followed a method that—however brutal—might be described as utilitarian. The wounded who could not travel were the primary victims, and they were killed with a suddenness that betrayed little or no emotion. The same could be said of the looting, the taking of able-bodied prisoners, and the burning of buildings and structures—behaviors that Dr. John Todd, a surgeon with the Kentucky 5th Regiment Volunteer Militia later described as a kind of “orderly conduct.” A sense of deliberate order did not diminish, and perhaps intensified, the sense of horror that many survivors would later describe. Indeed, the most vivid recollections related to the systematic nature of the killings and resulting treatment of the remains. Men were killed with just one or two blows, their bodies quickly stripped of clothing and often scalped, and the bloody corpse left where it had fallen. In places, recalled Elias Darnell, the ground was “strewed with the mangled bodies, and all of them were left like those slain in battle, on the 22d, for birds and beasts to tear in pieces and devour.”

By late-morning most of the Confederacy warriors had departed toward Big Rock with the spoils and captives, which had been denied them by the terms of surrender worked out between the British and U.S. officers. The killing of the badly wounded also completed what had been left unfinished the day before, and allowed a number of warriors who had not taken a coup to fulfill their vows of revenge on the Long Knives for attacks both old and new. All of the structures and buildings that had survived the previous days’ battles were also destroyed, leaving the core area of Frenchtown in utter ruin. The number of men who were killed in Frenchtown that morning is unknown, nor is there any clear accounting of the straggling prisoners who were cut down on the road to the north. Plausible estimates range between thirty and eighty killed, with most counts putting the number closer to sixty. The number of surviving captives is equally unclear. Over the next several days most of the latter were either turned over to the British at Amerstburg or ransomed in the streets of Detroit. Several were taken to their captors’ villages, with some destinations as near as the River Rouge and others as far as the Straits of Mackinac. In accordance with the precepts of a “mourning war,” these men could expect two fates: kind treatment and adoption by the kin of an individual who had been killed by the Long Knives (and thus fill the place of the deceased); or killed as


76 “Statement of John Todd, M.D., 24 April 1813,” in op. cit., 373-74; Darnell, Journal, 62. Accounts of the events of January 23, 1813 were compiled in a large document entitled “Spirit and Manner in which the War is Waged by the Enemy: Communicated to the House of Representatives, July 31, 1813,” in ASP, Military Affairs, vol. 1, 339-382. This document also included other complaints about British actions in other theaters of the war, but most of the testimonials related to the events on the River Raisin. For an overview of the various accounts, see Clift, Remember the Raisin!, 80-91.
atonement. In either case the decision about their fate was generally left to the nearest female kin of the deceased.\textsuperscript{77}

\textbf{Remember the Raisin!}

The events of January 23, 1813, became known as the “River Raisin Massacre” in the United States, and quickly grew into one of the most famous and longest lasting echo of the battles of Frenchtown. In March of that year, President James Madison devoted a good portion of his Second Inaugural Address to a condemnation of American Indian warriors and British forces, drawing on centuries-old tropes about “the hatchet and the knife,” “indiscriminate massacre,” “torture and death,” and the “blood of the vanquished.” In this and other such accountings, the “massacre” took on a transformative significance. In Ohio and especially Kentucky, “Remember the Raisin!” became a recruiting slogan for more militia volunteers to join an army that was only recently on the verge of collapse because of desertions and a lack of reenlistments. In subsequent battles, including the Battle of the Thames where Tecumseh fell, it became a rallying cry that would later be celebrated in print alongside other slogans of the war like “Free Trade and Sailors’ Rights” and “Don’t Give Up the Ship.”\textsuperscript{78}

Unlike General Hull’s embarrassing defeat and surrender the previous summer, the death and capture of so many Americans at Frenchtown did not lead to widespread criticism of U.S. military leadership. Instead, as Madison’s Second Inaugural made clear, “British commanders”—and particularly Procter—were entirely at fault for having “extorted victory over the unconquerable valor of our troops” by the threat and example of “massacre.” In other words, Frenchtown was not a fair fight because, as Harrison made clear in a letter to Secretary of War James Monroe, “the British have no intention to conduct the war (at least in this quarter) upon those principles which have been held sacred by all civilized nations.”\textsuperscript{79}

These were not new sentiments and, like the events at Fort William Henry some two generations before, they had as much to do with oft repeated tropes about “Indian atrocities” as they did the recent events at Frenchtown. Since before the Revolution, the specter of “[Native peoples] … exercising their wonted barbarities”—to quote George Washington—inspired numerous military campaigns into the Great Lakes region, excused most every defeat suffered by U.S. forces, and explained decades of informal conflicts west of the Appalachian Mountains between Americans and Native communities. In this context the magnitude of U.S. losses on the River Raisin was not a


\textsuperscript{79} Madison, “Second Inaugural;” Harrison to Secretary of War, February 11, 1813, in \textit{Messages and Letters}, 2:359. Also see Owens, \textit{Mr. Jefferson's Hammer}, 128-87.
strike against the war effort, but an affirmation of the need to fulfill Thomas Jefferson’s vow that “In war, they will kill some of us; we shall destroy all of them.”

General Hull had expressed all of these sentiments during his short-lived invasion of Canada, when he issued a proclamation addressed to the “INHABITANTS OF CANADA!” “If, contrary to your own interest, and the just expectations of my country, you should take part in the approaching contest,” Hull warned, then “you will be

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considered & treated as enemies, & the horrors & calamities of war will stalk before you.” He further vowed that

If the barbarous & savage policy of Great Britain be pursued, and [Native warriors] are let loose to murder our Citizens, & butcher our women and children, this war, will be a war of extermination. The first stroke of the Tomahawk, the first attempt with the scalping knife, will be the signal for one indiscriminate scene of desolation. No white man found fighting by the side of an Indian, will be taken prisoner. Instant destruction will be his lot.81

Such expressions were almost verbatim repetitions of century-old views on American Indians and warfare, but they were colored by the wars of the late 18th century. From the period of the American Revolution and through the War of 1812, American Indians were also viewed as both the subjects and the agents of British tyranny. When American Indians did not abide the norms of European standards of warfare, the British were at fault for not exercising sufficient control; conversely, the British were deemed weak and dishonorable whenever they relied on the support of American Indian fighters. The killings of wounded soldiers at the River Raisin, which U.S. government officials and the general public widely but erroneously believed to have occurred while “British officers and soldiers silently and exultingly contemplated the scene,” was presented as one of the most dramatic examples of British tyranny. The “River Raisin Massacre” was a bloody confirmation that Americans were fighting what many called a “Second War of Independence,” and to remember the Raisin was to redouble the effort to finally destroy the twin menace of “British tyranny” and “Indian perfidy” that had plagued eastern North America since before the Declaration of Independence.82

To the Victors

Despite frequent U.S. pronouncements to the contrary, the alliance between the British and the Native Confederacy did not have a senior partner. They shared a common set of goals (to halt and reverse the northwestward expansion of U.S. settlements, to sustain the British fur trade, and affirm a collective American Indian sovereignty in the Great Lakes region), but the alliance was also marked by a latent distrust on both sides. As the Shawnee war leader Tecumseh reminded Colonel Procter, the British had twice abandoned an alliance with American Indians—first at the Peace of Paris that ended the American Revolution in 1783, and later at the decisive Battle of Fallen Timbers in 1794 that eventually led to a vast cession of lands in Ohio. Understandably, Tecumseh was “afraid that [the British] will do so again.” Procter acknowledged as much in his correspondence with his superiors, noting that any “aid we may expect from the Indians will always be in proportion to their confidence in our strength and which they are too

sensible is but small.” Yet British officers also complained that their allies were “fickle,” did not appreciate the larger strategic goals that guided British military actions, and often abandoned the field of battle when their own designs were accomplished.\(^{83}\)

For the Confederacy warriors at Frenchtown, the hasty departure of British forces to Fort Amherstburg was not “fickle,” but completely understandable. However, Procter’s desire to take care of his wounded and remove a large number of prisoners before Harrison’s troops arrived was a British concern that did not readily align with the personal or collective objectives of the American Indians who remained. For them the battles on January 18 and 22 were not distinct from the subsequent taking of captives, destruction of Frenchtown, and killing of wounded prisoners. When the expected U.S. troops failed to arrive, the status of the able-bodied prisoners from the previous day’s battle remained unchanged—with one exception. Unlike their fellows in Fort Amherstburg, who were subject to British authority, these men belonged entirely to those members of the Native Confederacy who claimed them as their own. The same was true of the wounded, as well as of the property of the habitants.

As noted above, the able-bodied prisoners had particular value in the form of ransom, adoption, or a retribution killing. While the second and third alternatives followed age-old practices that sought to rebalance a household, family or community that was still mourning a loss, the first alternative was more akin to plunder. Unlike U.S. soldiers and Kentucky militiamen, Confederacy fighters did not draw from a ready set of stipends, bonuses, or payments for the risks they took. Their communities might receive gifts from the British, and any family members who travelled with them to Malden obtained some material support, but otherwise a warrior received little more than ammunition, some rations, and presents. Consequently, victory in battle came with an implicit expectation to plunder. This not only compensated for past dangers or losses, but served as a point of honor for warriors who were expected to return to their communities with gifts and resources. Strategically, plundering also weakened the enemy’s position and often served as direct retribution for the destruction of American Indian towns by U.S. troops, militias and vigilantes. While taking prisoners to a captor’s home village could also achieve these various ends, obtaining ransom for a healthy and valued captive was more akin to the compensatory purposes of plunder.\(^{84}\)

The burning and looting of Frenchtown was also directly related to the previous day’s fighting. Just when the British called for a truce to initiate the process of surrender, the core of the village was nearly surrounded by Confederacy fighters and the Kentuckians were on the verge of being burned out. In short, what would have been the final stage of the 2\(^{nd}\) Battle of Frenchtown was thwarted. The surrender denied the Confederacy a potent victory they were about to claim, and left intact a community and an array of structures that would be of great tactical significance to Harrison’s army. Burning and looting the village center thus made good on the purposes and prospects of

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the previous day’s battle, and forced the *habitants* to flee toward communities around Sandusky Bay or to seek refuge with relatives and acquaintances at Detroit.\(^85\) Destruction of the town also served as punishment to the *habitants* for making a definitive alliance with the U.S. In doing so they rejected an earlier plea for assistance from Stayeghtha (Bark Carrier, aka Roundhead) and Myeerah (Walk-in-the-Water), who hoped to draw on the history of good relations between nearby American Indian communities and the *habitants* of Frenchtown. The appeal for aid was also couched in a threat, however, and once Frenchtown effectively declared itself for the United States, the Wyandot and their allies readily determined that “we will not consider you in future as friends, and the consequences [will] be very unpleasant.\(^86\)

The killing of the wounded at Frenchtown was horrific for those who died as well as the U.S. soldiers who witnessed the killings, and certainly traumatized many of the latter. Yet in both respects it was not unlike the many killings of disarmed combatants that had occurred at the hands of Long Knives and American Indians since well before the American Revolution. Just a few months earlier General Hull had threatened “instant destruction”—with no chance of imprisonment—to any “white man found fighting by the side of an Indian;” the fate of the latter was too obvious to state. The Kentuckians who were surrounded by the combined forces of American Indians on January 22 expected a similar fate at the hands of American Indians—and thus preferred to die fighting. Instead of the frenzied mass killing that the Long Knives might have feared, the event known as the “River Raisin Massacre” only struck the badly wounded. The methodical nature of the killings, coupled with the unexpected suddenness of the deadly blows, appalled the survivors—but was nevertheless understood as atonement for recent events. More than random acts in a multi-generational “blood feud,” the killings of the U.S. combatants were meant to correspond to specific American Indian losses in the previous days’ battles as well the death and destruction that accompanied attacks on several Bodéwadmi and Myaamia towns a few months earlier. A number of the Bodéwadmi and Myaamia who were in Frenchtown on January 23 came from these same villages, and certainly knew that the attacks had come from the comrades of the U.S. Regulars they encountered on the River Raisin.\(^87\)

The most gruesome aspects of the killing and destruction that occurred on January 23, 1813, involved the mutilation of corpses. The taking of scalps was widely noted by survivors and later commentators, who accused Procter of paying bounties for each scalp. No bounties were offered by Procter, and even his harshest U.S. critic—Michigan Territorial Judge Augustus Woodward—attributed the violence on the 23\(^{rd}\) to “an ignoble revenge on [the] prisoners” that needed no cash incentive. However, scalping had a much broader significance than revenge or retaliation for specific wrongs. In many respects a scalp taken from an enemy was something like a service medal—a demonstration of prowess and a mark of honor to be displayed in a ceremony and dance upon the warrior’s return home. While scalps could be kept as a sort of personal trophy, in which the slain

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\(^86\) *Barbarities of the Enemy*, 132.

foe’s power became a possession of the victor, they were also incorporated into a community’s ceremonial life. After a series of Victory Dances (aka “Scalp Dances”) following a successful conflict, scalps were often left as offerings at grave sites. Among the Hoocąągra (Ho-Chunk or Winnebago) and other groups, they were also incorporated into war bundles, objects that were “the focus of important ceremonies … [involving] a series of supernatural beings associated with war.”

By far the most galling and intentionally offensive action was the mutilation and dismemberment of the dead. Though interpreted as a frightful warning to the inhabitants of Frenchtown and subsequent U.S. troops that would soon be coming into the area, this was primarily about affecting the afterlives of the vanquished. Habitants were threatened against burying the bodies so that the violated corpses remained in the open to be picked over and scattered by animals, without the rites of burial and the ceremonies that would bring peace to the dead or their communities. As much as any other action, this violation of the dead was directly related to the actions of Kentucky militiamen on January 18 as well as troops under Harrison’s command the previous summer and autumn.

Mkadebnesi (Blackbird), an Odawa war leader from Waganakising (L’Arbe Croche), explained such actions to the British in the summer of 1813. “[L]ast spring we fought the Big Knives and we lost some of our people there,” he noted, but when “we retired the Big Knives got some of our dead. They were not satisfied with having killed them, but cut them into small pieces. This made us very angry.” As long as a conflict is underway, Mkadebnesi told his young warriors that it is alright “to kill and scalp,” but the Americans often “did mischief.” In describing raids on evacuated towns around southern Lake Michigan, Mkadebnesi recalled that “the Big Knives destroyed all our corn. This was fair [in war], but … they did not allow our dead to rest. They dug up their graves, and the bones of our ancestors were thrown away and we could never find them to return them to the ground.” In response to British suggestions that it would be best if the Odawa focused on the “fair” aspects of war, and not offend U.S. sensibilities, Mkadebnesi had a ready answer. “I have listened with a good deal of attention … [but] if the Big Knives, after they kill people of our colour, leave them without hacking them to pieces, we will follow their example. They have themselves to blame.” “The way they treat our killed,” he continued, “and the remains of those that are in their graves in the west, makes our people mad when they meet the Big Knives.” While such actions and reasoning could only inflame a desire among Americans to “Remember the Raisin!,” for Mkadebnesi and other Confederacy fighters they represented an extreme form of victory: one that vanquished the enemy and mitigated the effects of recent violations of their own dead.

A number of prominent war leaders like Tecumseh, Mookmaanish (Odawa), and Zhabné (aka Shabbona; Bodéwadmi) had publicly condemned the killing of people who had either surrendered or were non-combatants, but these were not blanket statements to be applied in all cases. The notable instances where these men counseled against violence of this sort occurred in two contexts. The first related to a broader war where killing unarmed enemies would complicate wartime strategies by inflaming unnecessary cycles

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89 Mkadebnesi (Blackbird) quotations from “Speech of Blackbird to Claus, July 15, 1813,” in Cruikshank, “Harrison and Procter,” 141-42.
of revenge. The second applied to potential victims from groups against whom a warrior held no particular animosities. To harm or kill such a person was a random and anonymous act of violence that brought no honor and simply created enemies where none existed. The violence that occurred on January 23 did not really fit these conditions. Both dispassionate and intimate, the killing of “Long Knives”—and the desecration of the dead—was directly tied to recent violations of Native moral codes. This last matter received direct confirmation from the Anglican priest, John Strachan, who noted that “American troops under General Winchester killed an Indian in a skirmish near the river Au Raisin, on the 18th January 1813, and tore him literally into pieces, which so exasperated the Indians that they refused burial to the Americans killed on the 22d.”

Zenith of the Confederacy

The battles of Frenchtown, and the subsequent killings and destruction on January 23, capped a six-month stretch of military success for the Native Confederacy that included the engagements at Big Rock (Brownstown) and Maguaga, participation in the siege and capture of Detroit, engagements with small detachments of U.S. troops on the lower Maumee, and the gathering of important intelligence for the British at Fort Amherstburg as well as for Tecumseh and other Confederacy leaders in the Detroit River area. In concert with these earlier actions, Frenchtown proved a smashing victory that marked the highpoint of the Confederacy’s strength during the War of 1812. The first U.S. Army of the Northwest had been completely defeated just eight weeks after the official declaration of war, and the left wing of the reconstituted army was annihilated at Frenchtown a little more than 5 months later.

In the ensuing months, groups of Confederacy warriors were able to move at will through present-day Michigan and northwestern Ohio, where they kept a close eye on Harrison’s stalled army on the lower Maumee as well as on nearby settlements. As spring approached and Procter received new reinforcements at Fort Amherstburg, hopes ran high within the Confederacy that a joint offensive with the British might drive the Americans into southern Ohio. Such a victory would restore much of the territory that had been lost since the mid 1790s, and thus achieve the vision that Tecumseh conveyed to Harrison in 1810; namely, “to tear up” past treaties, “stop this evil” of coerced land cessions, and restore “for the red men … a common and equal right in the land, as it was at first, and should be now—for it was never divided, but belongs to us all.” The dream of an independent Native territory had never seemed more real.

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The War of 1812 occurred in multiple theaters and, in so far as the Northwest is concerned, involved two distinct wars. This chapter covers the final year of the war in the Northwest, its relation to other theaters, the terms of peace that were established between the United States and Great Britain, and between the United States and Native communities in the Great Lakes and western Ohio River Valley.

While the Confederacy’s prospects seemed to broaden, General Harrison concentrated his command at the Maumee Rapids. It was there, a few miles upstream and across the river from the site of Fort Miamis, that construction of Fort Meigs had commenced just ten days after the battles of Frenchtown. Drawing on the lessons he learned while serving under General Anthony Wayne, Harrison concentrated on protecting supplies for a planned invasion of Upper Canada, sheltering his diminishing command (which shrank to just 700 by winter’s end as enlistment periods for Virginia and Pennsylvania militia service expired and volunteers returned home), and providing a northern assembly point for new recruits. Given its relative proximity to Fort Amherstburg, as well as its prominence as the headquarters of the Army of the Northwest, Fort Meigs became the focus of a new offensive by the British-Native alliance. After delays caused by a series of storms, a siege was established at Fort Meigs on April 28 by a combined force of approximately 530 British regulars and 460 Canadian militia under the command of General Procter and 1,250 Confederacy warriors primarily led by Tecumseh and Stayeghtha (Bark Carrier, aka Roundhead).

The weather-caused delays allowed Harrison to assemble and move 300 additional troops to the nearly finished fort in mid-April, and 1,200 Kentucky militia arrived soon after the siege began—which brought the combined U.S. forces to approximately 2,300. Weeks of cold rain had also softened the earthen ramparts and makeshift embankments that had been thrown up within the fort’s perimeter. These absorbed most of the British ordnance and left the rest of the fort complex relatively undamaged. Aside from the ineffective bombardments, the siege involved one significant battle. On May 5, a detachment of newly arrived Kentucky militia along with some U.S. infantry attacked the British batteries and attempted an assault on the main British-Confederacy encampment near the former site of Fort Miamis. Both efforts failed horribly, particularly after the bulk of the Kentuckians pursued clusters of Native warriors who easily lured the whole force into the dense woods. As they shouted

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“Remember the Raisin!” the disorderly attackers were channeled toward waiting groups of warriors and cut down. In total, the U.S. losses (which were mostly suffered by the Kentuckians) numbered close to 150 killed and 170 wounded, with more than 500 wounded and able-bodied taken prisoner. For many of the American Indian warriors, the defeat of the Kentuckians fulfilled their expectations of the campaign and large numbers departed on May 7—as did the Canadian militia, who needed to tend to their farms. With his command greatly reduced and his ordnance nearly gone, Procter was forced to lift the siege on May 9 and returned to Fort Amherstburg. Although the Confederacy won its battle, and suffered few casualties, the lifting of the siege ultimately proved a strategic victory for Harrison and signaled a change of fortune for the British-Confederacy alliance.2

The siege of Fort Meigs demonstrated that Procter’s limited artillery was not capable of dislodging an entrenched U.S. position, and also confirmed that the Native preference for subterfuge and swift strikes was not sufficient for siege warfare. Procter and Tecumseh debated the value of attempting another siege, with Procter arguing that it would prove ineffective. Because maintaining the British-Confederacy alliance was too important, however, he assented to Tecumseh’s desire to try again. A second assault and siege was attempted on Fort Meigs in late July, and another on Fort Stephenson (at Lower Sandusky) in early August. The siege on Fort Meigs was even less successful than the first, while the attack on Fort Stephenson resulted in significant British casualties. These failures weakened the alliance, which was already suffering from a lack of supplies for British troops, Canadian militia, and the large number of Confederacy warriors and their families based near Fort Amherstburg and Malden. Moreover, siege warfare exasperated the Native Confederacy since, as Stayeghtha put it, it was like trying to fight a “ground hog under the ground” that refused to come out. There was no honor and no gain in such an encounter. Dispirited and with British supplies running low, most of the Confederacy warriors and their families returned to their villages and prepare for the coming harvest.3

After the failed siege of Fort Stephenson, Procter’s only option was to consolidate his forces around Fort Amherstburg. After months of chronic shortfalls in supplies and troops, which Governor Prévost was increasingly directing toward the defense of Lower Canada, there was little to do but increase foraging patrols on both sides of the Detroit

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2 Spencer, “The Gibraltar of the Maumee,” 108-129; Skaggs, William Henry Harrison, 158-62; Nelson, Men of Patriotism, Courage & Enterprise!, 61-68; Sandy Antal, A Wampum Denied: Procter's War of 1812, 2nd ed. (Kingston [Ont.]: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2011), 221-23; John Sugden, Tecumseh: A Life (New York: Holt, 1997), 330-34. Following the battle about a dozen wounded prisoners were killed by three or four warriors, but these action were reportedly halted by the interventions of Tecumseh, the Thâkiwa (Sauk, or Sac) war leader Mahkate: wi-meši-ke:hke: hkwa (also Ma-ka-tai-me-she-kia-kia-k, or Black Hawk), and Superintendent Matthew Elliott of the British Indian Department; see Sugden, Tecumseh, 336-338; Timothy D. Willig, Restoring the Chain of Friendship: British Policy and the Indians of the Great Lakes, 1783-1815 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2008), 37-40; and Black Hawk, Life of Black Hawk, or Ma-ka-tai-me-she-kia-kia: Dictated by Himself, ed J. Gerald Kennedy (New York: Penguin Classics, 2008), 103-04.

River to sustain British, Canadian, and remaining Confederacy forces as best as possible. There was no time to languish, however, since the war in the western theater had shifted to a critical maritime contest for control of Lake Erie. Consequently, Procter ordered the bulk of his forces to assist the Provincial Marine in the preparation and arming of vessels at the Royal Naval Dockyard. Since the outbreak of the war the small fleet adjacent to Fort Amherstburg had limited the movement and supply of U.S. forces, and did more to stymie U.S. offensive operations than anything Procter had attempted since the spring thaw. With Harrison having now amassed 5,000 troops in the vicinity of Maumee Bay and Lower Sandusky, it was imperative that the British retain control of the lake.4

Battle of Lake Erie

Through the summer of 1813, Commander Robert Heriot Barclay of the Royal Navy worked to prepare and refurbish the vessels at the Royal Dockyard, as well as train a hodge-podge assortment of seamen, merchant sailors, and British infantry in managing the craft and their guns. His task was further hampered by U.S. victories on the Niagara Peninsula, which endangered shipments from eastern Lake Erie and caused his superiors to retain personnel and resources in the eastern theater of the war. At Presque Isle (Pennsylvania), a small U.S. fleet had been under construction through most of the year and, with the arrival of a few additional vessels, Master Commandant Oliver Hazard Perry had ten ships under his command by late July. Though Barclay’s fleet only numbered six vessels, he was still able to move freely around the lake since a sand bar had developed across the mouth of the harbor at Presque Isle. This prevented Perry from moving his largest vessels, and Barclay from moving in for an attack, but the British managed to blockade the U.S. fleet for nine days in late July.5

Barclay ultimately had to withdraw due to a lack of provisions and a threatening storm which allowed Perry enough time to move his vessels over the bar using a process known as “cameling.” Two pairs of simply-built barges were towed out to Perry’s fleet, and each pair was situated on opposite sides of Perry’s two large brigs. These barges or “camels” were then flooded almost to the waterline, attached to a brig, and secured together by strong lines running beneath the keel. To lift the ships, the “camels” were emptied of water and each brig gently skirted the bar as it headed in to open water. The U.S. fleet first sailed to Sandusky Bay, where it gained more personnel and supplies, and then moved to an anchorage at Put-in-Bay on South Bass Island.6

From this vantage Perry was able to maintain a loose blockade at the mouth of the Detroit River and force Barclay to come to him for battle. With his vessels as ready as they could be, and after receiving a last-minute addition of sailors and officers, Barclay chose a favorable wind and sailed out to meet Perry on the morning of September 10. With the wind coming out of the northwest, the U.S. fleet struggled for two hours to form

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a line and a frustrated Perry ordered a return to Put-in-Bay. Before the order could be executed, however, the wind shifted 180 degrees. Perry quickly reversed his order and now—with the wind at his back—proceeded to close on the enemy. The British triumphed in the first engagement, and fully expected the U.S. fleet to surrender. Perry instead chose to leave his incapacitated flagship and was rowed to his second brig, the *Niagara*, where he hoisted his flag and recommenced the Battle of Lake Erie. Mostly unscathed, the *Niagara* and two small gunboats were able to sail past and fire at will on the badly damaged British fleet. Barely able to maneuver, and their remaining guns greatly outmatched by the unscathed ships under Perry’s command, the British were cut to pieces and eventually surrendered by mid-afternoon.7

**Figure 8.1: Routes and Movements of Military and Naval Forces in the Spring and Summer of 1813.** Closely adapted from a map in Richard V. Barbuto, *The Canadian Theater, 1813* (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 2013), 33.

**Denouement**

With this victory, the U.S. could move supplies and troops at will on western Lake Erie. The British and their Native allies, however, were almost completely cut-off

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from the rest of Upper and Lower Canada. The only viable route to the east involved a long and difficult land route up the Thames River Valley. With his situation now crystal clear, Procter immediately began preparing for a mass overland retreat from Detroit, Fort Amherstburg, and Malden to Burlington Heights (present-day Hamilton, Ontario) at the western end of Lake Ontario. As the British began organizing and packing military stores, baggage, and supplies for transport on small vessels to Sandwich and the mouth of the Thames, they were interrupted by Confederacy leaders who had not heard the report of Barclay’s defeat. Seeing these sudden preparations, they chastised Procter for abandoning the alliance and accused him of cowardice. Speaking for many, Tecumseh demanded that Fort Amherstburg and its artillery be left to the Confederacy to defend themselves against the U.S. The rejoinder to this demand came with crushing news; all the fort’s artillery had been used by the British squadron that had just fallen to Commodore Perry, and U.S. naval control of Lake Erie made any position in the Detroit River area indefensible. With their position now untenable, and their British allies focused on a long and difficult retreat, many in the Confederacy soon decided to leave for their home villages with the hope that they might fight another day at another place. Of the approximately 3,000 warriors then in the vicinity of Malden, only a third would ultimately choose to join the British retreat and make a stand against Harrison’s army somewhere along the Thames River. On the coming days a fair number returned to their homelands in the north, but more than half crossed over to Big Rock (Brownstown) before dispersing to their various communities or moving to a new locale to await a change in the winds of war.8

When General Harrison received the news of Perry’s victory, a sizeable part of the 5,000-strong Army of the Northwest was encamped on the Portage River near Sandusky Bay. Knowing that Procter would be making hasty preparations for a retreat, Harrison immediately sought to press his new advantage. To speed the process, he chose to leave most of his army’s artillery behind—thus simplifying the transport process across the lake and ensuring his forces would be as light and mobile as possible in their pursuit of Procter. Available boats were sent up the Maumee River to ferry soldiers from Fort Meigs, while those encamped on the Portage River made ready for a departure from present-day Port Clinton, Ohio. It took ten days to organize, equip, and ready these various elements of the Army of the Northwest, along with 250 American Indian allies. Among the latter were Wyandot, Lunaapeew (Lenape, or Delaware), and Onöndowága: (Seneca) from Upper Sandusky, as well as Shawnee from Wapakoneta. Except for a regiment of Kentucky mounted volunteers, who travelled around the western shore of Lake Erie, all of Harrison’s army arrived at the Bass Islands between September 20 and 22. After a two-day delay caused by foul weather, the entire force was then moved to Middle Sister Island on September 25. The following day, Commodore Perry and General Harrison reconnoitered the mouth of the Detroit River and discovered that the last elements of Procter’s command were just then evacuating Fort Amherstburg. They

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On the morning of September 27, with his entire army crowded onto a small, 8.5-acre island and making ready for the invasion of Canada, Harrison issued a General Order that made pointed reference to the events of January 1813 along the River Raisin.

The General entreats his brave troops to remember that they are sons of sires whose fame is immortal: that they fight for the rights of their insulted country, whilst their opponents combat for the unjust pretensions of a master.

Kentuckians! --remember the river Raisin, but remember it only whilst the victory is suspended. The revenge of a soldier cannot be gratified of a fallen enemy.\footnote{“General Order,” in John Brannan, ed., *Official Letters of Military and Naval Officers of the United States During the War with Great Britain in the Years 1812, 13, 14, & 15, with Some Additional Letters and Documents Elucidating the History of That Period* (Washington: Way & Gideon, 1823), 224-225.}

The message served as both an inspiration and a warning for the coming days. The first sentence neatly encapsulated the basic tenets of President Madison’s war message from the previous year. Namely, that the Army of the Northwest was charged with defending the honor and freedom of the United States against the aggressions of the same King George III, and the same kind of British-Native alliance, that had inspired their fathers to fight in the Revolutionary War. Harrison then turned to the more immediate passions that would inspire the pursuit and conflict in the days to come; namely, revenge for those who died at Frenchtown. The last line of the order, which alluded to mutilation of the dead, likely had several meanings for General Harrison. Like most every senior officer, he viewed such behavior as dishonorable. Yet he also knew that men under his command had taken these actions in previous engagements, and that the practice was not an uncommon expectation among the various Kentucky militia units then assembled on Middle Sister Island. Moreover, Harrison also knew that mutilation of the dead would elicit fierce retributions from Native warriors—and thus unnecessarily prolong the war. Lastly, Harrison expected that the General Order would still be ignored by some—and likely wanted to ensure that he was on record as forbidding the practice in case there was some future inquiry on the conduct of the war.\footnote{Robert M. Owens, *Mr. Jefferson’s Hammer: William Henry Harrison and the Origins of American Indian Policy* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2011), 227-230; Skaggs, *William Henry Harrison*, 164, 193, 201-202, 212-213.}

As the Army of the Northwest was making its way across Lake Erie, Colonel Richard M. Johnson’s Kentucky Mounted Riflemen travelled around Maumee Bay was heading north toward Detroit. Along with former Michigan militiamen from the Frenchtown settlement they met along the way, Johnson’s regiment arrived at the River Raisin on September 27. On the north side of the river, near the area that had been the core of Frenchtown, they found the remains of a dozen or so bodies and placed them in a
mass grave. These were likely the remains of the Kentuckians who had been killed during the First Battle of the River Raisin, and were buried together on January 19. Sometime in the ensuing weeks or months, as Confederacy warriors moved through or sojourned in Frenchtown, these remains were disinterred and scattered as retribution for the previous treatment of Native remains at Frenchtown on January 18 and attacks on Native communities along the upper Wabash the previous December. It is very likely that these were the same set of remains that was reburied in June 1813 by a small detachment Johnson had sent to Frenchtown for that purpose. In either case, the burial or reburial of these remains must have deeply affected Johnson’s men deeply as they competed their task, conducted a brief ceremony, then rode north to avenge the dead and their desecration.12

By the time Johnson’s volunteers arrived in Detroit, the troops that had been ferried over from Lower Sandusky were establishing garrisons at Detroit, Sandwich (present-day Windsor, Ontario), and Fort Amherstburg—and the army’s lead forces were already moving up the Thames River. A week later, on October 4, the bulk of the army—which now included Johnson’s regiment—came within striking distance of the retreating British-Native Confederacy near Moraviantown (present-day Chatham, Ontario). The following afternoon Harrison arrayed his combined forces, which numbered more than 3,500, against an allied force of the 450 infantrymen and militia who were well enough to bear arms, and another 500-800 Confederacy warriors. Rallying to the cry of “Remember the Raisin!” Johnson’s mounted riflemen took the lead and instantly routed the British forces who tried to make a stand in the middle of the road. Confederacy warriors, using the cover of wooded marshlands, managed to hold off the onslaught for about thirty minutes before withdrawing. Because the battle was so brief, casualties were low and generally equal on all sides—but the U.S. victory was absolute. Along with the lopsided numbers arrayed against each other, the best measure of the outcome is in the accounting of British captured. Because these included men who were too ill or weak to bear arms, the total number of prisoners taken from the field outnumbered Procter’s actual fighting force by more than 100. In a matter of minutes, as British Colonel Robert Young noted in one of the earliest reports of the brief battle, “General Procter’s army [was] completely annihilated.”13

Procter and some of his staff managed to escape capture, as did a mixed group of panicked soldiers, camp followers, and the infirm. Together they numbered 200, and their pell-mell retreat eventually gave way to a hasty but disordered march toward Burlington Heights at the western end of Lake Ontario (present-day Hamilton, Ontario). American

Indians generally left the Thames River in two directions, with most heading toward their homes to the northwest and west, while perhaps 400 took the road eastward toward Lake Ontario. Given the magnitude of the defeat, the fleeing British believed that U.S. forces were in pursuit, and might even attack Burlington Heights. However, such fears proved unwarranted. General Harrison certainly hoped to capture Procter, and sent a detachment on what proved a fruitless endeavor, but his army was not prepared for a long campaign—let alone an assault against fortified positions on the Niagara Peninsula. Though Harrison’s stores were temporarily filled with pillaged supplies, these would be soon depleted while traversing the more barren and less populated areas along the eastward route, especially with winter coming soon. An even more pressing concern related to the sixty-day enlistment period of most of the Kentucky militias, who were anxious to return south for harvest.\(^\text{14}\)

Despite failing to capture Procter and his command, the Battle of the Thames was an enormous triumph for Harrison’s forces. Though casualties were low on all sides, the U.S. scored a significant tactical victory. Harrison’s army recovered six cannon near Moraviantown, and had found two 24-pounder field artillery pieces while traveling up the Thames. Along with this artillery, U.S. forces also captured the better part of 5,000 small arms—most of which having previously been “taken by the enemy at the surrender of Detroit, at the river raisin and Colo. Dudley’s defeat.”\(^\text{15}\) The capture of nearly all the stores of the retreating British provided a welcome boost for Harrison’s command in the Detroit River area, while victory on the battlefield promised a less taxing winter in terms of further war preparations. Sweeping the British and the Native Confederacy from Amherstburg was certainly the most significant result of the battle, and completely altered the strategic calculus of the war in the Northwest Theater. The British-Native alliance was severed, and two of the most renowned leaders of the Native Confederacy—Tecumseh and Stayehgtha—were among the dead. While their bodies were reported hidden or removed from the battle area, other corpses (believed to be theirs) were mutilated, then stripped of flesh, hair, clothing, and accoutrements to become prized trophies of war. For all its suddenness and short duration, the victory on the Thames was viewed by Kentuckians and the rest of Harrison’s army as the finale of a long, violent struggle against their “ancient enemy … of Americans and Kentuckians.” “To them,” as the Canadian historian Sandy Antal states, “Procter and Tecumseh represented the final obstacle to occupation of the old Northwest. This immense territory was opened up for settlement largely through the blood of the hardy Kentuckians.”\(^\text{16}\)

\(^{14}\) Harrison’s concerns can be gleaned from several testimonial letters that defended him against charges that he was negligent in failing to pursue and capture General Procter. See “Extract from the Deposition of Major [John] Chambers, [n.d.],” 566; “Extract from the Deposition of Colonel [C. S.] Todd, [no date],” 566; “Extract from Lewis Cass to Harrison, August 31, 1817,” 566-67; “Extract from Governor Isaac Shelby to Harrison, April 21, 1816,” 567-569; all in Messages and Letters of William Henry Harrison, vol. 2. Part 2. Harrison’s initial battle report in “Harrison to John Armstrong, October 9, 1813,” op. cit. 558-65.

\(^{15}\) Harrison to Armstrong, 565.

\(^{16}\) Antal, A Wampum Denied, 348-49. Quotation on “ancient enemy” is from the speech made by Captain William Lewis just before the battle of January 18, 1813, in which he referenced the send-off speech of Kentucky Representative Henry Clay in Georgetown the previous August; in “Recollections of the Late War, the River Raisin Battle,” Kentucky Yeoman (Frankfort), May 7, 1833; reprinted in Federal Writers’ Project. Military History of Kentucky, Chronologically Arranged (Frankfort, KY: State Journal, 1939), 82.
The Kentuckians who were at the Battle of the Thames knew they would be celebrated as heroes when they returned home, and several parlayed their service into successful political careers in their home state. They had avenged their fellows who died at Frenchtown and Fort Meigs, proven the boasts of Henry Clay, and now the great Tecumseh who had so long opposed them was dead. On the return south, however, these triumphant sentiments would be tempered by a somber task: giving the rites of sepulture to the prisoners who were killed on January 23. For more than seven months their remains, along with the bodies of the few who died within the core area of Frenchtown, had been left in the open and scattered by hogs. The Native warriors who did the killing on the 23rd most certainly warned the habitants against “burying the dead,” and later reports from the settlement confirmed “that the Indians would [still] not suffer it.” Some corpses were buried or at least covered by the habitants along the river bank or the woods on the south side of the Raisin where U.S. casualties were heaviest, but on the north side of the river only the bodies of a few officers and the remains of two men who had perished in a torched house were surreptitiously buried. Consequently, the burnt out remains of Frenchtown’s core area still presented a horrid scene and a haunting warning near Hull’s Trace.  

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Au, War on the Raisin, Naveaux, Invaded on All Sides, 288-89; Clift, Remember the Raisin!, 101-103. Quotations from report of Ensign Isaac L. Baker to General Winchester, February 26, 1813 in American State Papers: Documents, Legislative and Executive, of the Congress of the United States, Vol. 1, Military
On October 15, five regiments of Kentucky militia, led by Governor of Kentucky Isaac Shelby, returned to the River Raisin. As Major William Trigg recalled soon after, “over the field of battle at that place a scene was presented that will be long affecting to the sensibility of Kentuckians—the unburied bones or our countrymen were everywhere to be seen.” Governor Shelby then directed a large detail to perform “the melancholy duty of interring the remains! By [them] and some others of the army, the remains of sixty-five were collected and buried in the best manner our situation would permit, with the customary honors of war.” Trigg then closed with an observation that it “is some consolation to think that they are buried by the hands that had first, in some degree, revenged their death.”

Fractured Alliance

The Battle of the Thames was not the final death knell of the Native Confederacy, but it did lead to a dramatic fracturing of the alliance. A number of communities from western Lake Erie to southern Lake Michigan withdrew from the ongoing conflicts, while groups from west of Lake Michigan allied with the British to repel U.S. incursions at Fort Mackinac and Fort Prairie du Chien on the Upper Mississippi. Northern Anishinaabeg (primarily Odawa and Ojibwe) also travelled eastward to fight with the British military and Kanien’kehaka (Mohawk) against U.S. forces along the Niagara Peninsula. By late November 1813, Governor Prévost (with the support of Secretary of War Henry Bathurst) pushed forward plans to reconstitute the British-Native alliance in Upper Canada and Michigan. The following February, Prévost and other officials hosted lavish councils in York (present-day Toronto) and Montreal that included leaders from various groups of Odawa, Ojibwe, Shawnee, Lennapeew (Lenape, or Delaware), Hocacagre (Ho-Chunk or Winnebago), Kiikaapo (Kickapoo) Thâkîwa (Sauk, or Sac), Meskwaki (Fox), and Haudenosouneee (Iroquois), and honored the memory of Tecumseh with the presence of his son Paukeesa as well as his sister Tecumapease.

At a council in York, Naiwash, the Odawa war leader and fervent ally of Tecumseh, presented Prévost with a black belt of wampum that called for a renewal of war in the west. Prévost responded in lengthy but positive terms. Noting that “Our Great father considers you as his children,” he affirmed that together “we must make great exertions … [to] preserve what we hold and recover from the enemy what belongs to us.” With your “undaunted courage” and “the assistance of my chiefs [officers] and warriors [soldiers], we shall drive the Big Knives from of all your lands the ensuing summer.” Prévost then shared the promising news that, with the collapse of Napoleon’s army in Europe, “our Great Father will give us more warriors [soldiers] … who will join us in attacking the enemy and will open the great road to your country.”

Affairs, no. 1 (Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1832), 370; hereafter cited as ASP, vol. number, and subtitle, (i.e., ASP, vol. 1, Military Affairs.).


19 Sugden, Tecumseh’s Last Stand, 195-97; Antal, A Wampum Denied, 384-88.

not share it at the time, the British already had a plan to recapture Detroit and regain control of Lake Erie. Two strike forces with a combined strength of nearly 1,800 would move along the shore of Lake Erie and destroy the iced-in fleets of the U.S. Navy, while another would race overland by sleighs and capture Malden, Sandwich, and Detroit. The goal was to complete both operations by the end of February, but an unusually warm winter stymied both plans. Without sufficient lake ice the U.S. fleet could not be approached and would be able to set sail if necessary, and a lack of snow made sleighs useless as the overland route became a vast stretch of mud.\footnote{Drummond to Sir George Prévost, February 19th 1814, “Historical Collections,” vol. 15, 492-93; Antal, A Wampum Denied, 378-79. It is worth noting the profound effect that climate had on the course of the War of 1812 in the Great Lakes. Like the brutally cold winter of 1812-13 that so challenged Winchester’s forces, the warm winter of 1813-14 undermined British war plans to retake the Detroit River area. An extreme shift in the El Niño Southern Oscillation (El Niño/La Niña) resulted in a very strong La Niña in 1812-1813 that was followed by an equally strong El Niño the next winter. The proximity and intensity of these two climate events has few equals over the past three centuries. See Joëlle L. Gergis and Anthony M. Fowler, “A History of ENSO Events Since A.D. 1525: Implications for Future Climate Change,” Climatic Change 92 (February 2009): 343-387.}

Following the abandonment of both winter strikes, Lieutenant Governor George Drumond proposed sending a detachment of troops recently transferred from Europe to escort “about 200 warriors … to their brethren in the westward, with an ample supply of Powder & Ball.” In expectation of this delivery, about 1,200-1,300 warriors aligned with Main Poc came near Detroit “where they waited sometime in expectation that the British Troops would return.” However, this expedition also came to naught after the Battle of Longwoods, where U.S. troops routed a British and Native force on the upper Thames River. With the area around London still contested and the Thames River Valley made barren by U.S. foraging parties, Drumond’s plan became untenable. As Matthew Elliott explained, Native leaders refused
to proceed with the ammunition on the ground that our regular troops do not advance further than the Settlements on the River Thames, and of course would be of no use in protecting their friends, in the enemie’s country. The Americans might hear of these supplies being sent to the Indians & the consequence would be fatal, perhaps to their whole Tribes. – They would therefore rather suffer for want of ammunition, than endanger themselves or their families.\footnote{Quotations, in order, are from Drumond to Prévost, March 5 1814; W. Claus, “Report from the Indian Department;” and Elliott to Col. Stewart, March 4 1814—all in Historical Collections, vol. 15, 503-04, 553-54, and 497-98. Also see Antal, A Wampum Denied, 380. London is near the headwaters of the Thames River, about halfway between Toronto and Detroit.}

“I wish to remain at peace; I wish to remain neutral”

In the months after the Battle of the Thames, as elements of the Confederacy and British officials sought to combine their strategies and forces in the east, the United States resumed its pre-war policies of treaty-making in the west. With General Harrison once again at the forefront, a council was held at Greenville in July 1814 with a gathering of Wyandot, Lunaaapeew (Lenape, or Delaware), Shawnee, Odawa, Ökkewe’ökwe (Seneca-Cayuga; aka, “Mingo”) from Sandusky, Myaamia (Miami), Bodéwadmi (Potawotami), and Kiikaapoi (Kickapoo). All were represented by leaders who had either worked with
the United States, disavowed the Confederacy, or struggled to remain neutral during the previous three years of conflict. Given these various dispositions, and the absence of any particular alliance among these groups, there was some confusion about the purpose of the council. Harrison emulated his former commanding officer, General Wayne, and sought to cultivate good relations with gifts and an unhurried schedule of meetings that allowed each group to counsel among themselves. While accommodating the diplomatic norms of Native councils was helpful, and affirmed the peaceful intentions of the council, it did little to clarify the purpose of this gathering. Harrison was joined in these efforts by Lewis Cass, who had served as Colonel of the 3rd Ohio Volunteers at the outset of the war on the Detroit River and later served as Brigadier General in Harrison’s reconstituted Northwest Army. In recognition of these services, and just a few weeks after Harrison praised his leadership during the Battle of the Thames, Cass was appointed Governor of the Michigan Territory by President Madison.23

Over the course of several days Harrison and Governor Cass made several speeches about the justice of past treaties, the generosity of the president, the duplicity of the British, and the reasons why the United States had gone to war with Great Britain and the Confederacy. When asked to make comments on these matters, Native leaders declined to respond since they could not identify any particular issue to negotiate or concede. Finally, after more than a week of meetings, P’Koum-Kwa (aka Pacanne) expressed general exasperation: “you ask the reason why your children will not speak, and we know not what you wish us to say; but let us know what you have to propose, and then we will answer.” P’Koum-Kwa then offered a brief explanation of his own difficult position at the council, since the war had forced his people to “live between two fires” after their villages were attacked by Harrison’s troops on the Mississinewa. Over the course of the war he variously sought accommodation with the United States and the British, while maintaining some distance from the Confederacy, but neither strategy proved satisfactory or useful. He then reminded Harrison that “you have frequently told us you loved us, we also have loved you, but you have deceived us, as also the [British] people on the other side.” “Since we have come together here,” he continued, “you have not come to the point with us; you too, seem not to speak plain to us; … and [know] father I have told you the minds of our warriors; the Kickapoos and Pattawatamy warriors are of the same mind as the Miamies.”24

This speech broke a log jam in the council proceedings and caused other representatives to challenge Harrison directly over the course of the next two days. Citing previous incidents where the U.S. wanted their communities to remain neutral in the war


with Great Britain, Wyandot, Bodéwadmi, Kiikaapoi, and Myaamia leaders openly questioned the implied purpose of the treaty council—which increasingly seemed less about establishing peace than forcing the assembled nations to form a military alliance with the United States. Ktunga (aka Charley), a Myaamia leader from Eel River, told Harrison that he meant to “take fast hold of your whole hand … to now tell you, I wish to remain at peace; I wish to remain neutral alongside you.”

As he had done in earlier treaty councils, Harrison singled out Ktunga and the Myaamia as bent on undermining the council and demanded they be rejected by all the other assembled delegations. Governor Cass also spoke sharply to Ktunga, but sought to ease tensions and allow all to save face. Toward these ends he alluded to the earlier requests that U.S. officials made regarding Native neutrality in 1811. At that time the United States “needed no assistance from them” to fight the British, and the same was still true. However, Cass stated that he was well aware of their “restless dispositions, that they could not remain neutral, that their young men and warriors could not be restrained, and if not for us, would be against us.” In other words, an alliance was merely an insurance against future conflict between the gathered groups and the United States as well as an invitation to channel “restless dispositions” against the Confederacy or the British as they saw fit. The council finally came to a close after three weeks, and resulted in a fairly straightforward agreement for the assembled Native nations to aid the United States through the remainder of the war and to not treat for peace with Great Britain.

“twilight’s last gleaming”

Aside from a few raids on isolated farmsteads, and the summer engagements at Prairie du Chien and Mackinac noted above, conflict in the upper Ohio Valley, Michigan Territory, and the western district of Upper Canada (present-day Ontario) had effectively ended by the spring of 1814. And with the conclusion of the second Greenville Treaty in late July, the chance of reconstituting some version of the fractured Confederacy was effectively over. Even the once dim hope of the alliance that Tecumseh pursued with the Mvskoke (Muscogee or Creek) became an impossibility in March 1814. At a place called Tohopeka, where the Talapoosa River makes a sweeping horseshoe bend, an army of Tennessee militia led by General Andrew Jackson destroyed a force of more than 1,000 Mvskoke warriors—and subsequently forced the Mvskoke to cede twenty-three million acres in what is now Alabama and Georgia. With the exception of Jackson’s campaign in the South, which was less about the war with Great Britain than it was a campaign against Spanish Florida, the Mvskoke, the remainder of the War of 1812 had become concentrated in the eastern theater and along the Atlantic seaboard.
Some of the largest and deadliest campaigns of the entire war occurred in the summer of 1814. These included the Battle of Chippawa, the Siege of Fort Erie, the Battle of Lundy’s Lane, and the Battle of Lake Champlain. Though each engagement proved a tactical victory for one side or the other, the combined result of these conflicts amounted to a deadly and costly strategic draw. On land, and particularly along the Niagara Peninsula and the St. Lawrence River, the British and the United States were evenly matched. However, the British possessed a distinct naval advantage along the eastern seaboard—where they blockaded U.S. ports and moved almost unopposed through Chesapeake Bay. In late August troops from the British Army and Royal Marines overwhelmed U.S. militia forces and took Washington, D.C., where they burned the White House, Capitol, Navy Yard, and other federal buildings. These actions were more symbolic than strategic, and partly served to avenge the destruction of York (the provincial capital of Upper Canada) the previous year. In mid-September, the British bombarded Fort McHenry in an effort to take Baltimore Harbor, but were thwarted by U.S. defenses. Coming so soon after the burning of Washington, this successful defense was celebrated as an important victory that found its most lasting expression in Francis Scott Key’s “Star Spangled Banner.”

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29 Ibid., 196-204.
Even as these actions were underway, the United States and the United Kingdom had begun peace negotiations in the Belgian city of Ghent in August. The appeal of a negotiated end to the war was rooted in concerns about Europe and the vicissitudes of war in North America. The dramatic increase in the number of resources, troops, and ships that Great Britain was able to bring to the North American conflict promised to extend a war that might well tear the United States apart. On the other hand, a prolonged war could only add to the staggering debt that Great Britain had taken on during the Napoleonic Wars. Moreover, the reduction of British forces in Europe might leave the continent vulnerable to more conflict—which ultimately proved true when Napoleon escaped imprisonment and returned to France in March 1815. Yet both sides still wanted to gain a distinct territorial advantage in order to negotiate a treaty that was more favorable to their position.\footnote{Taylor, \textit{Civil War of 1812}, 417-19; Hickey, \textit{The War of 1812}, 293-96.}

Toward these more limited ends, the British developed plans for a two-pronged campaign in the South: a large force would land at Savannah then push westward toward the lower Mississippi, and another would take New Orleans. The goal was not to permanently occupy the Gulf region, but to hold territory and strangle western commerce via the Mississippi River in order to gain concessions at Ghent. The planned invasion of Savannah was delayed, but the British arrived at the Mississippi River Delta in mid-December. Opposing this offensive was a mixed array of U.S. regulars and southern state
militias under the command of General Andrew Jackson. After a few smaller engagements to the south of the city, the British attempt to take New Orleans commenced on January 8, 1815. Though greatly outnumbered, U.S. forces were both resourceful and bold in their defense of New Orleans. By anticipating and exploiting British lapses, Jackson and his officers turned the battle to their advantage and won a smashing victory on January 18. It was a stunning defeat of battle tested British soldiers, whose losses were more than thirty times greater than the U.S. forces.\(^{31}\)

Though spectacular, the U.S. victory at the Battle of New Orleans ultimately had no bearing on the war or the treaty negotiations that formally brought it to an end. The Treaty of Ghent had already been signed on December 24, 1814, and was subsequently ratified by unanimous consent in the U.S. Senate. Its terms reflected the exhausting irresolution of the war, which—as the treaty’s preamble stated—had made “His Britannic Majesty and the United States of America desirous of terminating the war which has unhappily subsisted between the two Countries, and of restoring upon principles of perfect reciprocity, Peace, Friendship, and good Understanding between them.” With neither party admitting fault, nor addressing the primary issues of impressment and free maritime trade in the U.S. declaration of war, the Treaty of Ghent amounted to a return to status quo ante bellum (the state existing before war)—with all territories, prisoners, and properties taken during the war to be returned in due course. In short, the signatories were ready to accept stalemate as the better part of valor. For the British negotiators and their government, a treaty of peace provided an escape from a costly and increasingly unpopular war that drew their attentions away from Continental Europe, while U.S. officials saw the treaty as a face-saving exit from a war that, in the words of Maryland Republican Joseph Hopper Nicholson, was no longer “for ‘free trade and sailors’ rights,’ not for the conquest of the Canadas, but for our national existence.”\(^{32}\)

In a remarkable coincidence of delayed communications, news of the concluded treaty negotiations in Ghent did not reach the Gulf Coast until mid-February—at about the same time that the treaty was being ratified by the Senate and not long after news of the battle’s outcome reached Washington, DC. As the final notice from an already concluded war, however, the Battle of New Orleans became a victorious touchstone for subsequent memories of the war. As the historian Matthew Dennis notes, the War of 1812 amounted to a costly and painful “split decision” that “Americans were generally happy to accept” in January 1815. However, the news from New Orleans helped redefine the war “as a glorious victory, a heroic defense of the United States.”\(^{33}\) Jackson and his army embodied the ingenuity and pluck of the underdog, as well as the character and resolve that would shape the nation’s future greatness. These would prove the most lasting sentiments of the war, and instantly gave rise to boasts of beating “at every


opportunity, Wellington’s Veterans!” and having “unqueen’d the self-styled [sic] Queen of the Ocean.” Similar sentiments would take hold in British North America as well, where successful defenses against repeated U.S. actions along the Niagara Peninsula and St. Lawrence River would foster a nascent sense of Canadian national identity.34

A Separate War, and a Separate Peace

Alan Taylor has quipped that the “War of 1812 looms small in American memory,” but selective national amnesia did not set in for some time. Jackson used his exploits at New Orleans to ascend to the presidency in 1828, and contrasted his war triumphs against President John Quincy Adams’ former role as a supposedly weak negotiator in Ghent. Other presidents and vice presidents successfully campaigned on their service in the War of 1812, including Vice President Richard Mentor Johnson, President William Henry Harrison, his Vice President and successor John Tyler, and President Zachary Taylor—who first made a name for himself during the siege of Fort Harrison. Except for Johnson, who was born in Kentucky, all of these men were from the Virginia Piedmont region, and all lived and served in the Northwest theater of the War of 1812. The same was true for several veterans of the Kentucky Militia, who had successful political careers as governors, U.S. senators, U.S. representatives, and members of the state legislature. Even the dead were written into the political landscape, with nine Kentucky counties named after men who died at Frenchtown. Although memories of the War of 1812 soon faded in the rest of the United States, the western war still loomed large in the state’s collective memory.35

Though not as frequently, nor as long as in Kentucky, the battles of Frenchtown and their aftermath were remembered throughout the United States for several years—not least because the defeat was so destructive, fatal, and complete. Yet the larger historical context of the battles and their aftermath gave them particular meaning in the states that were formed out of the Northwest Territory. U.S. citizens and political leaders in Kentucky, Ohio, and the Indiana Territory were the loudest advocates of a war between 1809 and 1812—and they clearly understood their motives in a broader historical context. Since the onset of the Seven Years’ War (aka French and Indian War), conflict in the region invariably conflated imperial and Indigenous opposition to the goals of Euro-American land seekers. These goals were pursued, fought for, and often thwarted during the American Revolution and through all but the final conflict in what became known as the Northwest Indian Wars (1785-1795). The Confederacy that grew up around Tenskwatawa and Tecumseh was a new manifestation of this old dynamic, which U.S. citizens west of the Alleghenies characterized in the same terms of “absolute Tyranny”


35 Taylor, Civil War of 1812, 10; The literature on former presidents is voluminous, but see the entries for Harrison, Tyler, and Taylor in John A. Garraty and Eric Foner, eds., The Reader's Companion to American History (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1991), 491, 1091-92, and 1060-61. On post-war Kentuckians, see Clift, Remember the Raisin!, 107-67, passim. Andrew Jackson was born in southern North Carolina, but the other presidents all hailed from Albemarle County, Virginia—where Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and James Monroe had their primary estates and plantations.
and “merciless savages” that Thomas Jefferson had used in the Declaration of Independence. In that regard, especially, this region best fit subsequent characterizations of the War of 1812 as a “second war of American independence.”

While the events along the River Raisin correspond to this idea of a “second war,” the same is true of the surrender of Detroit, the Battle of the Thames, the smaller conflicts of 1811-1813 in the western Ohio River and upper Mississippi River valleys, and—at least tangentially—Perry’s victory on Lake Erie. It is especially worth noting that the Battle of the Thames was the only consequential U.S. victory in British North America through the entire war, and Perry’s victory (which decisively turned the tide of the war in the Detroit River—western Lake Erie region) was the only naval engagement during the war that was of immediate and lasting significance. In contrast, the battles on the River Raisin and their aftermath mark the zenith of the Native Confederacy and its alliance with the British. And if not for the vicissitudes of weather (a sudden change in the wind that favored Perry, the heavy rains that soaked Fort Meigs, or the warm winter of 1813-1814), the events on the River Raisin may well have shaped a different outcome and altered the final terms of the Treaty of Ghent. As it was, however, “Remember the Raisin!” became the most potent call for vengeance during the war—and thus had a lasting echo in how the war was remembered. Because the memory of the Raisin conflated tragedy with triumph—it ennobled a prevailing sense of victory in the years after the war, and allowed Americans to forget “how tenuous their ‘victory’ in the West had been.”

A few years after the Treaty of Ghent took effect, the once uncertain outcome of the war almost seemed predestined; if not by divine plan, then through a manifestation of a virtuous national character. In 1818 Andrew Griswold Whitney gave the Fourth of July Oration in Detroit, and proclaimed to an assembled audience of civic leaders, veterans, and other worthies that the “events of the late war have … not enervated the American Character: have not enfeebled the arms nor corrupted the hearts of our soldiers.” Then, in a direct nod to the "Gentlemen of the Army" in the audience, Whitney gave solemn praise: “the events of the late war in which you were engaged has shown that you have not studied the deeds of your fathers in vain…. You have repeatedly vanquished the veterans of Europe… You have raised the National Character, for valor, to the high ground on which it stood at the close of the Revolution. You could not hope to do

36 Though common in 20th century texts, one of the earliest uses of the phrase “second war of independence” dates to the February 15, 1815 issue of the New York National Advocate: “This second war of independence has been illustrated by more splendid achievements than the war of the revolution;” quoted in Carol Sue Humphrey, The Press of the Young Republic, 1783-1833 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1996), 91. A similar phrase was used some years later in James Fenimore Cooper, Notions of the Americans: Picked Up by a Travelling Bachelor, vol. 1 (Philadelphia: Carey, Lea & Carey, 1828), 315. One of the clearest echoes of Jefferson’s passage on American Indians in the Declaration of Independence came from the Lexington (Kentucky) Reporter on December 10, 1811: “the blood of our fellow citizens murdered on the Wabash … calls aloud for vengeance … [as] “the SCALPING KNIFE and TOMAHAWK of British Indians, is now, again devastating our frontiers;” quoted in Humphrey, The Press of the Young Republic, 1783-1833, 87-88.

37 Clift, Remember the Raisin!, 141-143; Dennis, “Reflections on a Bicentennial,” 278-280—quotation on p. 278.
While few if any of the veterans would have described their service as a matter of repeated vanquishing, most saw their efforts as continuing the work of the Revolutionary generation. More specifically, they saw themselves as the men who finally destroyed the twin menace of British imperialism and Native independence. For them, to remember the Raisin was to know the reason for the war and the meaning of victory.

In this last regard, the crowd that gathered to hear Whitney’s oration was fairly unusual. With the exception of similar gatherings that may have occurred in Lexington, Vincennes, or Cincinnati, the people in Detroit knew how, why, and what they had won in the late war. Indeed, the Northwestern theater was the only area where any of the stated objectives of the war had been achieved. Of “the series of acts, hostile to the United States as an independent and neutral nation,” that President Madison described in his war message to Congress, the only issue the war resolved was “the warfare just renewed by the [American Indians] on one of our extensive frontiers; a warfare which [has] … for some time been developing … among tribes in constant intercourse with British traders and garrisons.” Moreover, this complaint was the only one that directly shaped the negotiations and final drafting of the Treaty of Ghent.

Accepting the Unacceptable

During preliminary negotiations through the spring of 1814, British and American commissioners expressed their concerns about a host of matters, including fishing rights off of Nova Scotia, adjustments to the border between British North America and the United States (with President Madison going so far as to suggest the surrender of Upper and Lower Canada to the U.S.). All of these issues were non-starters, and served more as preliminary tests rather than clear objectives during this informal phase of negotiation. Yet the U.S. delegation continued to broach the issue of impressment, even though the practice had ceased when Napoleon’s alliance began collapsing on the Continent. It still remained a matter of principle for President Madison, however, who wanted to guard against further uses of the policy. In response, the British commission made it clear that changes to British law, particularly in relation to wartime actions like impressment, were out of the question. As growing numbers of British troops began arriving in North America from Europe, and peace became more urgent than principle for the U.S. commissioners, they privately conceded this point amongst themselves—as did President Madison and his cabinet.

With impressment off the table, and the Orders in Council that barred neutrals from trading with France and its allies having been rescinded in June 1812, there was only one outstanding issue remaining from Madison’s war message: the “warfare just renewed by the … tribes in constant intercourse with British traders and garrisons.” When formal treaty negotiations began in Ghent on August 8, the British commissioners addressed this matter directly. A “sine qua non of a treaty of peace,” they told the U.S.

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39 President Madison to Congress, June 1, 1812, in U.S. House Journal, 1790. 12th Cong., 1st sess., 454, 457.
40 Taylor, Civil War of 1812, 411-412; Hickey, War of 1812, 282-83;
commissioners, required that “peace be extended [by the United States] to the Indian allies of Great Britain, and that the boundary of their territory be definitively marked out, as a permanent boundary between the dominions of Great Britain and the United States.” This last element recalled the “Indian-barrier state” that officials in British North America had championed in the early 1790s, and restated to their Native allies in the build-up to the outbreak of the War of 1812.41

The creation of such a “barrier state” that bordered the United States along the Greenville Treaty line, was expected to foster continuing ties between the British and their Native allies as well as prevent the likelihood of another invasion from the south. Such an arrangement would also guarantee that British fur trade companies would be able to operate in the western Great Lakes. Besides these strategic and commercial concerns, this matter was a point of honor for past and current governors of the Canadas as well as officers in the British Indian Department. The latter had frequently fought with and lived among their Native allies, friends, and kin over the previous two decades. Since the end of the American Revolution, the British had twice promised—and failed—to support the territorial concerns of their Native allies. By addressing these matters, the British were seeking to right past failings while advancing their version of what a victory in a “second war of independence” would mean in the western Ohio Valley, the Detroit River region, and the western Great Lakes.42

The young “War Hawk” Henry Clay, who was one of the U.S. commissioners, quickly denounced “the absurdity, to say the least of it, of Great Britain attempting without powers, to treat for … tribes, scattered over our acknowledged territory.” His views were seconded by others, including John Adams who wrote that to “condemn vast regions of territory … [so] that a few hundred [American Indians] might find wild beasts to hunt upon it, was … incompatible with the moral as with the physical nature of things.” Such an action, he continued, would “preclude forever the people of the United States from settling and cultivating those territories.” With a complete impasse on the sine qua non of the British position, treaty talks came to a near standstill. President Madison’s public release of diplomatic messages, which represented a profound breach of diplomatic protocol, exposed the main reason for the breakdown of negotiations in Ghent. In the United States, the British push for a separate Indigenous territory created more congressional support for continuing the war—but in Parliament the opposition denounced the push for a separate Indigenous territory as an insufficient cause for prolonging a costly war—particularly after British offensives had faltered on Lake Champlain and Baltimore Harbor.43


As the British negotiating position weakened, and President Madison learned the United States would incur crippling debt if conflict persisted much longer, both sides became more interested in ending the war than in winning the terms of peace. On November 27 the British offered to end the war on the terms of *uti possidetis*—by which the signatories would retain the territory they currently held as a result of the war. While this proposal was not formally accepted, it accelerated negotiations. By mid-December both parties agreed to settle on a treaty that essentially amounted to a return to pre-war conditions. The final treaty, which was signed the day before Christmas, also contained an additional article that obligated the United States to cease “hostilities with all the Tribes or Nations of Indians with whom they may be at war at the time of such Ratification, and forthwith to restore to such Tribes or Nations respectively all the possessions, rights, and privileges which they may have enjoyed or been entitled to in one thousand eight hundred and eleven previous to such hostilities.” While the explicit reference to Britain’s Native allies distinguished this treaty from earlier agreements with the United States, it made no reference to Indigenous territories and did not touch on any land cession treaties prior to 1811.44

**Springwells and Victory**

In the summer of 1815, U.S. and British officials held councils to both convey and fulfill the terms of the Treaty of Ghent with Native peoples. At councils on the Mississippi River, Louisiana Territorial Governor William Clark hosted representatives from the westernmost groups that had fought with the British. Along with formal statements of peace and friendship, Clark also explained that the British would no longer be able to trade in the western Great Lakes or along the Upper Mississippi. Instead, the United States would build forts around Lake Michigan and the Upper Mississippi to keep the peace and support the operations of U.S. traders.45 The British also met with Anishinaabeg (Ojibwe, Odawa, and Bodéwadmi) delegations in the northern Great Lakes as well as representatives from more westerly groups, to convey the terms of the Treaty of Ghent and to state that they would maintain trade relations from new posts in Upper Canada.46

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45 The groups represented at the councils with Clark included Lakȟóta Oyáte (Lakota, aka Western Sioux) and Dakhóta Oyáte (Dakota, aka eastern Sioux) from both sides of the Mississippi, as well as Mshkodésik Bodéwadmi (Prairie Potawatomi), Piankeshaw, Kiikaapoi (Kickapoo), Thákiwa (Sauk, or Sac), and Meskwaki (Fox). Other groups were not represented, including western Ojibwe, Hoocąągra (Ho-Chunk or Winnebago), and Mamaceqtaw (Menominee), as well as specific leaders from the previously noted groups. See “Treaty with the Potawatomi,” 110-11; “Treaty with the Piankeshaw,” 111-12; “Treaty with the Teton,” 112-13; “Treaty with the Sioux of the Lakes,” 113-14; “Treaty with the St. Peter’s Sioux,” 114-15; “Treaty with the Yankton Sioux,” 115. “Treaty with the Kickapoo,” 116-17; “Treaty with the Sauk,” 120-21; and “Treaty with the Foxes,” 121-22: all in Kappler, ed., *Indian Affairs*.

The two largest councils were held along the Detroit River in late August, with the British at Malden and the United States at Springwells—an ancient burial mound site near the mouth of the River Rouge and a strategic locale during the events that led to General Hull’s surrender of Detroit in 1812. Unlike the British, who were treating with their allies, U.S. Commissioners William Henry Harrison and John Graham “deemed it proper to include … those tribes who had been friendly to us as [well as] those who had been hostile.” They hoped the latter could be “restored to their former position before the war” and thus aligned with Native communities that were more favorably disposed towards the United States. The U.S. approach thus proved more complicated, not least because the council at Malden had commenced before the one at Springwells. This caused initial attendance to be low and resulted in a series of postponements as Harrison and Graham had to await the end of the British council before theirs could begin. The situation was further compounded by an informal U.S. policy that sought to prevent Native peoples from crossing the Detroit River to Upper Canada, but welcomed any who wished to return to Michigan Territory or beyond. Consequently, attendance at the Springwells council could make it difficult for anyone who expected to cross back to the south side of the Detroit River. Once the Commissioners understood the difficulties associated with these restrictions, and rescinded the policy, more Native leaders announced they would come to Springwells once the council at Malden had concluded.47

Even though it marked the end of an era in formal British-Native relations and alliances, the council at Malden covered weighty subjects that required fulsome discussions. The primary purpose of the council was to present the full terms of the Treaty of Ghent, identify the borders between the United States and British Canada, clarify the nature of British-Native relations within Canada, and offer British support for their former allies who remained within U.S. territory. In addition, Native leaders used the council proceedings to assess how and where (in terms of international boundaries) to best pursue a course that guaranteed the most autonomy for their people. The gathering at Malden was also characterized by angry denunciations of Britain’s acceptance of the treaty, as well as expressions of sorrow on all sides over the loss of the alliance. On this last score it is important to remember that relations between the British and Native leaders had always been complicated, and often fraught with tension, but they were never merely transactional. Consequently, the council included a good deal of social visiting that inflected the formal proceedings and delayed their conclusion. Lastly, the British were generous with feasting and presents, which brought a welcome relief from the hunger and want that followed the end of the war.48

47 Quotations from William Henry Harrison and James Graham to Secretary of War William H. Crawford, September 9, 1815, in ASP, vol. 2, Indian Affairs, 16-17. Also see “Treaty with the Wyandot, etc., 1815,” in Laws and Treaties, 117-119; Floyd R. Dain, “The Treaty of Springwells,” Detroit Historical Society Bulletin 26 (November 1969): 4-8; and Taylor, Civil War of 1812, 428-29. General Duncan McArthur, who then commanded the U.S. Army of the Northwest, served as the third treaty commissioner with Harrison and Graham. Michigan territorial governor Lewis Cass was also present at the treaty council, as one of several formal observers and witnesses. These matters and other details are covered in the correspondence and reports that are collected in ASP, vol. 2, Indian Affairs, 13-25.

For those who did come to the Springwells council grounds, either from Malden or directly from their villages, the stores of supplies and gifts the U.S. Commissioners had brought were important enticements—both as a sign of good will on the part of the United States as well the promise of respite after seasons of hardship and want. While these provisions were intermittently stopped during extended periods of waiting for the council at Malden to end or the delayed arrivals of communities from the north and southwest, on the whole the council proved a fairly straightforward affair. All who attended espoused a desire for peace, and were relieved that the U.S. Commissioner did not raise the issue of new land cessions. Even Tenskwatawa—who made a brief visit with a small delegation from Malden—“addressed the council in a speech” that Harrison described “in tenor and subject [to be] pacific.”

The Treaty of Springwells succeeded as a council of peace, and even rapprochement, but it ignored the requirements of the Treaty of Ghent in one respect. The stipulation that relations between the United States and Native peoples were to return to conditions as they were in 1811 seemed clear enough. Yet the U.S. Commissioners qualified this particular condition with a requirement that all “agree to renew and confirm the [1795] treaty of Greenville …, and all subsequent treaties to which they were, respectively, parties, and the same are hereby again ratified and confirmed in as full a manner as if they were inserted in this treaty.” This condition included the 1807 Treaty of Detroit, which ceded more than six million acres of southeastern Michigan Territory to the United States. While the treaty predated 1811, it had been contested by a number of Wyandot, Bodéwadmi, and Odawa leaders who insisted they never agreed to the vast cessions that were described in the final written document. Moreover, their refusal to accept what they deemed a fraudulent treaty contributed to the conditions of war that existed prior to and after 1811—and inspired many of the affected groups to seek alliance with the British. In short, the year 1807 fit the conditions of the Treaty of Ghent, but the irresolution of the Treaty of Detroit and its consequences did not. While some misgivings were expressed during the councils at Springwells about the stipulation to accept all the terms of past treaties, those who would have most forcefully contested this point were in Malden or far to the west.

From Harrison’s perspective, the Springwells council extended the basic terms of peace and “fidelity to the United States” that he and Governor Cass had stipulated in the the 1814 Treaty of Greenville—albeit to a larger and more diverse gathering of Native leaders. While this was not insignificant, and was a requirement of the Treaty of Ghent, confirmation of the 1807 Treaty of Detroit came with a degree of urgency. The area covered by that treaty had been designated as possible Military Bounty Lands by

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49 Harrison and Graham to Secretary of War, 16-25; quotation on 23. Also see Dain, “The Treaty of Springwells,” 9-10; Owens, Mr. Jefferson’s Hammer, 243-44; and “The Treaty with the Wyandot, etc., 1815,” 117-119.
Congress in May 1812, to be surveyed and granted as incentives and payments to volunteers who enlisted in the soon to be declared war. Because Hull’s invasion of Upper Canada failed, and conflict in the region persisted through most of the war, no surveys were undertaken until 1815. By then, the vision of a growing U.S. population in the Detroit River area had strategic appeal—especially when a large number of the new residents would be veterans who could readily serve in new militias in the case of a resumption of hostilities. In short, Harrison’s political and military experience made him well-attuned to the importance of confirming the 1807 Treaty of Detroit—and heightened his instincts for integrating land cessions with other components of a large treaty council. Such an approach would serve him and his successors well in the coming years.  

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Chapter Nine

Removing and Remaining

This chapter covers the immediate and lasting consequences of the War of 1812 for Native peoples in what became known as the Old Northwest, with particular emphasis on the policy of American Indian Removal and its application to the Native groups and communities that were most directly affected by the conflicts and dislocations of the war era.

On July 4, 1818, Michigan Territorial Governor Lewis Cass split his time catching up on correspondence as well as participating in the Fourth of July celebrations that he hosted on his property in Detroit. In a brief letter he wrote to a friend that afternoon or evening, Cass shared some of the sentiments in Andrew Griswold Whitney’s oration and noted how “this day … incite[s] within my bosom emotions sacred and powerful.” His most poignant feelings were triggered by the recollection that just a few years ago, at the River Raisin, “many of our countrymen lay bleeding beneath the tomahawk and scalping knife of [their Native adversaries].” Yet Cass readily exclaimed, “How different the scene now!” With “peace … the fruits of prosperity now enrich our land; learning and the arts flourish …; and the Government [is] strengthened by … the blessings of free and equal laws.”¹ Another of Cass’s letters that day touched on more mundane matters, including a plan to counteract North West Company efforts to increase trade with northern Anishinaabeg (Ojibwe and Odawa) from British Canada. Though he was generally “opposed to the introduction of spirituous liquors into the Indian Country,” Cass nevertheless directed his agent to allow “spirits to be introduced” by U.S. traders “to promote the trade of our Citizens.”²

Though very different in tone and content, these two pieces of correspondence fairly capture the scope of issues that defined the governor’s interests and responsibilities: from commerce, American Indian affairs, and British activities along territorial borders, to the implementation of federal policies and national interests. The holiday provided some relief from his many duties, but he no doubt gave some thought to his most pressing concern that summer. In less than two months he was slated to host and administer five separate treaty councils that would be held on the St. Mary’s River near the Ohio-Indiana border. All of these councils were intended to correct and revise the single treaty that Cass, his fellow treaty commissioner and old comrade in arms General Duncan McArthur

¹ Lewis Cass to Unknown [likely Andrew Jackson], July 4, 1818, in Andrew Jackson Papers: Series 1, General Correspondence and Related Items, 1775 to 1885; Library Congress, Manuscript Division <https://www.loc.gov/item/maj005822/> (accessed December 16, 2016). While the addressee is unnamed, Cass references the recipient’s military heroism in the war—which suggests the letter was to Jackson. On the hosting of the Fourth of July celebration on Cass’s property, see George B. Catlin, The Story of Detroit (Detroit: The Detroit News, 1923), 261.
(who had taken charge of the Army of the Northwest following Harrison’s resignation in 1814), and U.S. Indian Agent John Johnston had conducted with multiple groups the previous summer at Fort Meigs. In an effort to craft the first treaty that would have involved removal to areas west of the Mississippi River, Cass, McArthur, and Johnston took a novel approach to the basic expectations of treaty-making. The three men had rightly guessed that they could gain larger cessions of land if they included clauses for the retention of unceded parcels that would be retained as individual land grants by each village or town leader. As such, these grants would function as individual estates with all the benefits of fee-simple title (i.e., they could be bought, sold, inherited, borrowed against, or any other such processes).³

While this innovation helped gain begrudging consent to the cession of nearly all Native lands remaining in Ohio, it also appealed to the men who put their marks on the treaty—since it meant “their” lands, which they would hold for their communities, would not be subject to future treaty negotiations. The latter condition did not matter to Cass, McArthur or Johnston, since they presumed that impoverished American Indian communities would readily sell their lands to all-comers at the earliest opportunity. They might also have guessed that legal ownership by one person of an entire community’s land could enrich a few at the expense of others and cause many to simply move west on their own accord. While this tactic led to a collective agreement to cede vast stretches of land, it did not result in an agreement on removal nor did it gain formal ratification by the U.S. Senate—which viewed the granting of fee-simple land grants as side-stepping the federal government’s exclusive authority to acquire Native lands.⁴

As Cass prepared for the five treaty councils that would replace the single Treaty of Fort Meigs, his task was compounded by three key factors: he would need to explain the reasons for revisiting the terms of the previous treaty; he would extend the terms of the former treaty to include more cessions of land in the recently admitted state of Indiana (1816), and—as he noted in a letter to Johnston in January—the treaty would have to involve removal to “the West Side of the Mississippi.” President James Monroe concurred with these objectives, and acknowledged Cass’s depiction of removal as a humanitarian policy that would “secure [American Indians] from the exterminating pressure of our progressive settlements.” Yet Monroe was most impressed with the administrative simplicity that would result from removal. “The great object is to remove altogether these tribes beyond the Mississippi. If that is accomplished, every difficulty is


removed; there then ceases to be any question about the tenure by which the Indians shall hold their lands.”

Two of the five treaty councils that took place in 1818 involved the same groups that were at the 1817 council. These included Wyandot from Upper Sandusky and Big Rock (Brownstown), Odawa who lived on the lower Maumee River, the Shawnee from Wapakoneta, and Ökwe'owé (Seneca-Cayuga; aka, “Mingo”) at Lower Sandusky. With the exception of a few additional small reservations for specific Wyandot groups in the vicinity of Upper Sandusky, these treaties otherwise converted the lands “granted [in 1817] by the United States to the chiefs of the respective tribes” into “Indian reservations.” A third treaty involved Bodéwadmi from northern Indiana and southeastern Michigan Territory, who together ceded lands in north-central Indiana. The last two treaties involved delegations of Myaamia and Lunaapeew representatives, and called for a vast cession of land in central Indiana. While the Myaamia would retain a block of land extending southward from the Wabash toward the upper basin of Wildcat Creek, the Lunaapeews consented to forfeit “all their claim to land in the state of Indiana” for land acquired by the United States “upon the west side of the Mississippi.” The decades-long effort of the Lunaapeew to establish and maintain a home in the western Ohio Valley had come to an end, and these diasporic people would soon join their western relatives who had been migrating away from the region for the past generation.

“can never be incorporated into our system”

American Indian removal, as a policy and a program, is closely associated with the presidency of Andrew Jackson, the Indian Removal Act of 1830, and the Cherokee Trail of Tears from Georgia to present-day Oklahoma (1838-39). Yet its origins date back to the Early Republic and the policy was applied to Indigenous groups both north and south of the Ohio River. The idea of removal was first implied in the “civilization program” put forward by Secretary of War Henry Knox in the 1790s. Knox believed the United States had a moral duty to help American Indians assimilate to U.S. values and norms. Toward these ends, he proposed a combination of government agents and Christian missionaries that would teach literacy, market agriculture, and U.S. systems of community governance. If successful, this assimilation program was expected to prevent war, facilitate land acquisition, and absorb Native peoples into American society. Such “benevolent ethnocide” was not readily or widely accepted, by American Indians or the people with whom they were to assimilate, but it demonstrated a central conceit that was tied to a policy of land acquisition. For the “gift of civilization,” as the historian Brian

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5 Tiro, “The View from Piqua Agency,” 49-51; quotations from Cass to Johnston, January 30, 1818, as well as Cristopher Van Deventer to Cass, June 29, 1818 on p. 50 and 51. Van Deventer, who was chief clerk in the War Department, served as President Monroe’s emissary in this matter. To ensure that any “question about tenure” was resolved, Van Deventer also relayed Monroe’s order to General William Clark to acquire lands from Native groups in Missouri that could then be transferred to the new arrivals.

6 Quotation comes from “Treaty with the Wyandot, etc., 1818,” in Kappler, ed., Indian Affairs, 162.

7 While some Lunaapeew were not averse to moving west, many resented the treaty. Johnston would later boast that the commissioners had bribed at least two of the leading delegates with separate personal annuities. See Tiro, “The View from Piqua Agency,” 50-52; Amy C. Schutt, Peoples of the River Valleys: The Odyssey of the Delaware Indians (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), 182-83; John P. Bowes, Land Too Good for Indians: Northern Indian Removal (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2016), 104-08.
Dippie notes, “Indians would gladly exchange land.” Whenever this formula failed to materialize, however, Euro-American negotiators rationalized that it was because some racial defect prevented Native peoples from realizing the value of the gift.8

If Secretary Knox represented the moral code that would inform removal, then Thomas Jefferson wrote the first draft of the future policy. Throughout his life, Jefferson always maintained an overriding desire to foster and sustain an expanding agrarian empire. This was clearly manifested in his views on Native peoples, which ranged from a desire “to ameliorate the condition of the Indian natives, by introducing among them a knowledge of agriculture and some of the mechanic arts,” to feeling “oblige[d] … to pursue them to extermination, or drive them to new seats beyond our reach.”9 In the first guise, teaching them “Habits of industry, easy subsistence, [and] attachment to property” was the desired goal of American Indian policy when it accompanied land cessions and Native peoples appeared open to assimilation.10 When Native leaders refused to cede lands, and allied themselves with a European power to defend their lands and values, the fundamental threat they posed to U.S. expansion led Jefferson to advocate the destruction of whole communities.

In Jefferson’s mind, the ultimate resolution to this dichotomy came with the Louisiana Purchase. The acquisition of this vast territory not only settled the problem of navigation and U.S. commerce along the Mississippi River, it powerfully affirmed the Jeffersonian plan for national development and agrarian expansion. Within a few years Jefferson expected the new territory would allow for a policy of removing eastern Native nations to lands beyond the Mississippi, and thereby foster a more orderly conversion of their former lands into American farms and towns across the continent. “[T]he best use we can make of [Louisiana Territory] for some time,” he told John Breckenridge,

will be to give establishments in it to the Indians on the East side of the Missipi, in exchange for their present country, and open land offices in the last, & thus make this acquisition the means of filling up the Eastern side, instead of drawing off it's population. When we shall be full on this side, we may lay off a range of States on the Western bank from the head to the mouth, & so, range after range, advancing compactly as we multiply.11

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While the Louisiana Purchase made removal possible, it also changed the connection between civilization and assimilation. As President James Monroe would later state, “the extension of our settlements” prevented Native communities from becoming like Euro-Americans, and “unless the tribes be civilized they can never be incorporated into our system in any form.” Consequently, the “rights of humanity” and “the honor of the nation” required the U.S. to “remove them” beyond the Mississippi. In other words, assimilation could only occur if Native peoples moved far away from the society they were to emulate. Leaving a homeland in order to become one with the people who insist that you leave is a strange and disheartening fate. In many cases the people who were to be removed had embraced elements of the “civilization” program, and had no desire to leave their crops, homes, and livelihoods for a mostly unknown place. Others who resisted or very selectively adopted the cultural and commercial models of U.S. society were inclined to resist further land cessions and removals, but not averse to creating separation between themselves and a growing tide of U.S. citizens in their midst. In either case, any confusion or resistance that the rhetoric of removal caused among Native leaders was often viewed by U.S. officials as further proof of racial deficiency and intransigence. While speaking with Chahta (Choctaw) leaders about the merits of removal, Andrew Jackson became exasperated. “Hear and listen well,” he commanded. “Decide for the happiness of all your people …. We have labored hard to convince you of your real interests. We hope you will see them as we do …
Chapter Nine

Should you [not], it will be a source of great regret, as it may be a measure fatal to your nation."\(^{12}\)

**Lewis Cass and the Push for American Indian Removal**

Coming a year after Andrew Jackson conducted the Treaty of the Cherokee Agency (1817), Cass’s council with the Lunarapeew (aka Treaty of St. Mary’s) produced the second removal treaty—and the first to involve an exchange for lands on the west side of the Mississippi River. This precedent would be followed in 1820 at the Treaty of Doak’s Stand, which removed the Chahta from their remaining lands in Mississippi to the Arkansas Territory.\(^{13}\) That would prove the last removal treaty until 1830, the same year the Indian Removal Act was passed during Jackson’s first presidential term. In the interim, however, land cession treaties continued apace—especially north of the Ohio River. In 1819 Governor Cass conducted the Treaty of Saginaw with various communities of Ojibwe, Odawa, and Bodéwadmi that resulted in the cession of six million acres through the mid-section of Michigan’s lower peninsula.\(^{14}\) Over the next decade Cass and other treaty commissioners would complete twenty-two more treaties within the old *Pays d’en Haut*. About half of these addressed unresolved claims from past treaties with groups of Waayahtana (Ouatenon, or Wea), Piankeshaw, Kiikaapooi (Kickapoo), Shawnee, Lunarapeew (Lenape, or Delaware), and others who had moved west over the previous two decades. The rest involved substantial land cessions in the Lower Peninsula of Michigan Territory, northeastern Indiana, northern Illinois Territory, and southwestern Wisconsin Territory. Other treaties were also completed by William Clark in present-day Nebraska, Kansas, and Oklahoma to reserve areas for eastern Indigenous nations that were expected to swap their lands for parcels in what was then formally referred to as Unorganized Territory of the United States.\(^{15}\)

The scale and pace of these various land cession treaties stemmed from two related dynamics. The first reflected a desire among U.S. officials to resume the treaty making process that had stopped in 1809 and thus prevent a new alliance against the United States by isolating Native communities on reduced parcels of land. The second purpose, of course, was to bring land seekers, town builders, and economic development to a region plagued by decades of conflict and distrust. These latter goals were greatly fostered by the construction and completion of the Erie Canal in the 1820s. As


\(^{13}\) “Treaty with the Choctaw, 1820” in Kappler, ed., *Indian Affairs*, 191-95.


waterborne commerce began to flow between New York City and Lake Erie—and from there to the Upper Great Lakes—population growth far exceeded the expectations of early boosters. Between 1820 and 1830 the population of Ohio increased from approximately 581,000 to 937,000, with most of that growth occurring in the northwest corner of the state. Over the same period Indiana’s non-Indigenous population went from 148,000 to 476,000, while Michigan Territory more than tripled from just 7,800 to 28,000. As these newcomers crowded into recently ceded areas, they pressed closer to the small reservations of various Native groups. At times a latent hostility toward Native peoples contributed to abuses in the form of trespass, the killing of livestock, or physical violence against individuals and communities. In a sense, these migrants enacted a kind of private removal policy to pressure Native groups away to leave the lands that these newcomers deemed “too good for Indians.\textsuperscript{16}

Such developments did not go unnoticed by Governor Cass, but he was less concerned about violence against Native communities than possible conflicts between different Native groups that were forced to compete for the same diminishing resources. As he noted in a letter to Secretary of War John C. Calhoun in April 1821, Cass did not understand the “causes or circumstances of [such] contest[s]” between Native groups, but he encouraged Secretary Calhoun to instruct “Indian Agents generally to exert their influence & authority to prevent and to terminate this kind of petty war fare.” If such authority could be converted into a general policy, Cass believed the “Agents could not only [pacify] hostilities after they may have commenced, but they also ought to act as Mediators … to wean the Indians altogether from these pursuits, & to prevail upon them to abandon the … Tomahawk and the scapling knife … to which [these] uncivilized nations are so prone.” Cass also believed that preventing conflict between the “wretched remnant of our once powerful aboriginal tribes” was also a matter of public safety and national concern since allowing their “predatory and barbarous” natures to remain “in a continued state of excitement” could result in their seizing “any favourable occasion, which may be presented, of entering into [new] combinations against us.”\textsuperscript{17}

Given these fears, Cass argued that the “time has arrived when we should be known to the Indians by every humane and benevolent exertion; and certainly on a fair retrospect of their former situation and on a correct view of their present and social & moral degredation [sic], they have a right to expect much.” In a remarkable conceit that would serve as his moral compass through the rest of his career, Cass then offered a blunt assessment of the federal government’s obligations. “In fact we must think for them. We must frequently promote their interest against their inclination, and no plan for the improvement of their condition will ever be practicable or efficacious [if] … the promotion of which their consent must in the first instance be obtained.”\textsuperscript{18}


\textsuperscript{18} Ibid. Also see Bowes, \textit{Land Too Good for Indians}, 41-42
While Cass’s policy suggestions had no measurable effect at the time, they certainly informed his approach to American Indian policy as both a treaty commissioner and the Governor of the Michigan Territory. To address the problems described in his letter to Secretary Calhoun, as well as foster levels of population growth and economic development that would make a territory like Michigan qualify for statehood, Cass became a leading advocate for linking a formal policy of removal with the established framework of treaty making. The acquisition of most (or all) of a Native nation’s land base, in conjunction with wholesale removal of its members to new lands beyond the Mississippi River, would accomplish two key goals. First, it would bring more land into the public domain and thus accelerate the process of surveying and selling large tracts to town builders and individual families. Secondly, it would create distance between various Native communities and newcomers, and thus reduce the potential for conflict. To Cass this was a win-win scenario for all involved, and it became the underlying rationale for an important treaty council that he conducted with Myaamia and Bodéwadmi leaders on the Mississiniwa River in the fall of 1826.

These objectives and their expected outcomes were explicitly referenced in Cass’s opening address of the council. “Your Great Father whose eyes survey the whole country,” he opined, “sees that you have a large tract of land here, which is of no use to you. You do not cultivate it, and there is but little game upon it.” Fortunately, as Cass viewed the matter, “there are a great many of the white children of your father who would be glad to live upon this land. They would build houses, and raise corn and cattle and hogs.” The Myaamia, Bodéwadmi, and many other nations also stood to benefit from these circumstances since the “Great Father is not only anxious to purchase the country of you, but he is desirous that you should remove far from his white children … [to] a large country west of the Mississippi … [where] they can hunt and provide for their women and children and once more become a happy people.” While this opportunity came with an open-ended promise that the land “will be yours, as long as the sun shines, and the rain falls,” the offer was presented as a one-time deal. “You must go before long,” Cass told them. “You cannot remain here. You must remove or perish.”

Cass expected this council would serve as an early roll-out for a future policy of American Indian Removal, but in this case he badly misjudged the situation. After meeting for several days with their respective communities, the Myaamia and Bodéwadmi leaders returned to the Council House to give their replies to Cass’s proposal. The Bodéwadmi leader Aabanaabi (Looks Back) rejected the entire treaty, as did the Myaamia leader Meehcikilita (aka “Le Gros”). Subsequent pressure from the commissioners managed to exploit divisions within and between the Myaamia and Bodéwadmi, and ultimately resulted in an agreement to cede a right of way along the Wabash River as well as some large blocks of land in northeastern Indiana and southwestern Michigan Territory. The Myaamia and Bodéwadmi also retained substantial

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tracts for their various communities, and adamantly refused to entertain the notion of relocating beyond the Mississippi River.  

Removing the “Indian Problem”

Though Governor Cass’s first efforts at combining wholesale land acquisition with removal did not meet expectations, he soon became a leading advocate for making this sort of two-step program a centerpiece of American Indian policy. In doing so, he gave speeches and wrote essays on American Indians and federal policy that often referenced his military service during the War of 1812, the many treaty councils he participated in, and his years as territorial governor of Michigan. These activities raised his national profile and made him a respected champion of “Indian Removal” as the best and only solution to what many called the “Indian Problem.” A sense of this public persona, and the degree to which it made a lasting impression, can be garnered from an early twentieth-century admirer who noted that Cass possessed the “courage that conquers, … an accurate knowledge of Indian traits and of Indian character,” was “scrupulously honest in all his … many important treaties with the Indians,” and always desired “to advise and encourage them in all matters relating to their own highest welfare.”

All of these perceived virtues and experiences were on full display in the summer of 1829, at an influential conference in New York City regarding the “Emigration, Preservation, and Improvement of the Aborigines of America.” In his keynote address and a subsequent essay, Cass presented a long exegesis on the moral and legal basis for American Indian Removal as a humane, civilized, and politically necessary policy. Though rooted in his reading of legal texts and informed by the many treaty councils he had conducted, Cass’s arguments were ultimately grounded in his sense that Native peoples represented an existential and moral conundrum with only one solution. “It is difficult,” he argued,

to conceive that any branch of the human family can be less provident in arrangement, less frugal in enjoyment, less industrious in acquiring, more implacable in their resentments, more ungovernable in their passions, with fewer principles to guide them, with fewer obligations to restrain them, and with less knowledge to improve and instruct them.

21 Quotations and treaty terms are from the Mississinewa Council proceedings are from “Treaty Negotiations September 1826” and “Treaty Negotiations October 1826,” in The John Tipton Papers, vol. 1, eds. Armstrong Robertson and Dorothy Riker (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Bureau, 1942), 577-592. Also see Bowles, Land Too Good for Indians, 66-72; and Juanita Hunter, “The Indians and the Michigan Road,” Indiana Magazine of History, 83 (September 1987), 577-592. Eight years after the Missisinewa council, state officials pushed for the complete removal of all Native peoples from Indiana. Apparently confident that their arguments in 1826 were still convincing, Myaamia leaders directly petitioned then Secretary of War Lewis Cass to intervene on their behalf. Cass declined, and instead authorized state officials to begin negotiating removal agreements. However, as noted in the following section of this chapter, the Myaamia managed to resist removal until 1842 and—along with some of the Bodéwadmi who were represented at the 1826 council—managed to remain in their homelands for many years after.

Consequently, they were incapable of recognizing “the benefit of [U.S.] institutions, and [thus could not be taught] … to appreciate their value …. The fulcrum is wanting, upon which the lever must be placed. They are contented as they are; not contented merely, but clinging with a death-grasp to their own institutions.” The only rational solution, as Cass viewed the matter, was for “the civilized power … [to] exercise a wholesome restraint over the conduct, and a general supervision over the concerns, of their barbarous neighbors. A jurisdiction of this nature is essential to the safety of both, and its extent must be determined by those who are called to exercise it.” In short, the United States was obligated to “govern and they obey.”

To bolster his arguments, Cass returned to the subject of his 1821 letter to John C. Calhoun. Namely, what he regarded as the latent violence and duplicity of Native peoples that derived from their presumed lack of “self-governance and self-management.” No one “can look back upon the history of the Indians, … without being sensible, that they are … ‘of a restless and mischievous disposition,’ and that ‘all [civilized people] have a right to join in order to repress, chastise, and put it ever out of [the Indians’] power to injure [us].’” Moreover, Cass insisted that “some of the most unprovoked aggressions and atrocious barbarities have been committed within a few years; and nothing but the absence of foreign aid, and the impression of our strength, prevents the renewal of the scenes at Fort Mimms, at the Maumee, and at the River Raisin.”

All of these sentiments, including memories of the River Raisin in 1813, informed Cass’s successful advocacy for a federal removal policy—which Congress soon institutionalized in 1830 with the passage of the Indian Removal Act. The following year President Jackson appointed Cass as the Secretary of War, with primary authority for the development and implementation of the new removal policy. Over the next five years he endeavored to, in his words, “satisfy [Native peoples] of our sincerity and the value of the aid we offer; to hold out to them motives for exertion; to call into action some powerful feeling” to change their “traits of character” and “condition.” Because “almost all of them have disappeared, crushed by the onward course of events, or driven before them,” any thoughts of remaining in their homelands and “preserving their peculiar institutions” was a “vain hope.” As Cass saw matters, Native peoples needed to be removed for their own good to a place where “the Government … [can] determine what arrangements can be made for the permanent establishment for the Indians.” To shirk this responsibility and allow Native peoples to “remain” among a rapidly growing population of U.S. citizens was tantamount to accepting “their fate [as] written in the annals of their race.” Removal

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offered the only “hope to see them renovated in character and condition by our example and instruction, and by their exertions.”

Figure 9.2: Nineteenth Century Land Cessions. Most of the land cessions encompassed by the period of 1811-1830 correspond to treaties conducted after the end of the War of 1812. Removal Era treaties generally correspond to areas identified with the period 1831-1850. The roughly square shape in the center of Indiana encompasses lands retained by the Myaamia after the St. Mary’s Treaty of 1818 and until the Treaty of 1840.

Removing and Remaining

The policy of Indian Removal clearly fits the definition of hegemony; namely, “having a position of political, economic, or military predominance over others.” Yet this very unequal power dynamic does not mean removal was a uniformly imposed policy that left little room for Native peoples to respond or shape its enactment. Indeed, Americans were greatly divided by the policy. The House of Representatives only passed the Removal Act by four votes, and congressmen received numerous petitions from women’s groups, abolitionists, and missionaries to vote against the policy. Even Henry Clay spoke against removal. Citing language from the Treaty of Ghent, he noted that native treaty rights were bound up in “the lands where they inhabit or hunt.” To take these lands, and exchange them for others acquired by the United States, was to disconnect this sovereignty from the place in which it was situated—and thus removal amounted to an abrogation of previous treaties. Moreover, the decision not to “uplift” or

“civilize” American Indians on their own lands was both a failure of moral will and a specious cover for taking lands.\textsuperscript{26}

While opposition to removal was often grounded in patronizing rhetoric, it nevertheless marked a divide that would create flexibility in how the policy was enacted. The commissioners and agents who conducted removal treaties held varying opinions that fit along a spectrum between Clay and Jackson, and more often than not they already knew the Native leaders with whom they met in council. When treaties became entwined with personal relations, removal could sometimes be avoided. This proved the case with the Pokégnek Bodéwadmi (Pokagon Potawatomi) from the St. Joseph River in northeastern Indiana and southwestern Michigan, who worked with Catholic missionaries and welcomed “civilizing” programs that helped them adjust to new conditions in their homelands. In 1833, at a large treaty council in Chicago, U.S. Commissioners brought together Bodéwadmi leaders from central Michigan Territory to northeastern Illinois Territory to conduct a series of removal treaties for all of their communities. As commissioners prepared to finalize the terms of each treaty, however, the Bodéwadmi ogima (chief) Pokégnek (aka Leopold Pokagon) made a specific case for his people to stay: his community was mostly Catholic, frequently interacted with their Euro-American neighbors, and had already adopted all of the “civilized” qualities they were supposed to need. The commissioners were swayed by this reasoning and agreed to put aside the removal treaty that had been drawn up for the Pokégnek Bodéwadmi.\textsuperscript{27}

A few other Bodéwadmi communities also managed to stay in southern Michigan, including the present-day Nottawaseppi Huron Band of Potawatomi and the Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Potawatomi Indians of Michigan. Either by hiding from federal authorities sent out to conduct a removal or returning to their homeland after a brief stay in present-day Kansas, they re-consolidated along familial lines and old geographic associations. The people who would later constitute the Nottawaseppi Huron Band were related to Bodéwadmi that lived in the Detroit area during the late 18th century (including some of the people who sold land on the lower River Raisin). By the advent of the removal period, some were living on reservations along the upper Huron River and at the confluence of the River Raisin and the Macon River. However, in the post-removal period they re-established themselves to the west on a tributary of the St. Joseph River. A slightly different scenario occurred with the Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band, who lived on the headwaters of the Kalamazoo River during and after post removal period. Composed of Ojibwe, Odawa, and Bodéwadmi, the forebears of the Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band avoided removal through the assistance of an Episcopalian Mission and the Ojibwe and Odawa communities that were affiliated with the mission. Both the Nottawaseppi Huron Ban and the Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band persisted in their


\textsuperscript{27} Bowes, Land Too Good for Indians, 156-59, 177-81.
homeland for many generations, and eventually reestablished a treaty relationship with the United States and control over defined reservation lands in the 1990s.\textsuperscript{28}

Other variations on removal occurred, with very mixed consequences. In the 1830s about half of the Odawa on the Maumee River left for Upper Canada. These included a good number of stalwarts from the Confederacy who left with Naiwash to live among other Anishinaabeg in the ancient homeland of the Giishkaakhang Odawa on Georgian Bay. The rest were removed between 1837 and 1839 in three stages to present-day Kansas, but the journeys proved deadly for half of these forced migrants. The Odawa in northern Michigan were able to avoid removal by negotiating land cession treaties that established small reservations on the upper and lower peninsulas and guaranteed usufruct rights on public (i.e., unclaimed or unsold) lands. While the U.S. Senate abrogated the portions of the treaties that established small reservations, the northern Odawa remained in their homelands, continued to exercise and defend their usufruct rights, and gained federal recognition along with restoration of some of their treaty lands in the 1980s and 1990s.\textsuperscript{29}

A very different scenario played out for the Shawnee and Lunaapeew (Lenape, or Delaware), regardless of whether they had been part of the Confederacy or had cooperated with the United States prior to and during the War of 1812. While some Shawnee and Lunaapeew signed removal treaties in the 1830s and were subsequently removed to western lands in the 1830s, most had already left Ohio and Indiana in a series of migrations that dated back to the 1780s. The greatest number of departures coincided with the dramatic growth in the region’s non-Indigenous population during the 1820s. One of largest of these less than voluntary removals occurred in 1826, when Tenskwatawa left Wapakoneta with a group of 500 Shawnee (approximately a third of


the entire Shawnee population in Ohio) and moved to present-day Kansas City where he remained until his death 10 years later.30

Wyandot Removal and the Struggle Between “weal or woe”

Through the 1820s the Wyandot lived in four different locales: the Wyandot Reserve on the Huron River about seven miles west of Big Rock (Brownstown), the Upper Sandusky Reservation in present-day Wyandot County, Ohio, the Big Spring Reserve about 15 miles north of Upper Sandusky, and the Anderdon Reserve just to the north of Amherstburg. The boundaries of the reserves/reservations in Michigan Territory and Ohio were established in two treaties with the Wyandot that were conducted by Lewis Cass and Duncan McArthur in 1818. The 5,000-acre Wyandot Reserve coincided with the cession of Maguaga and Big Rock, and served as a single reservation for the members of those two communities. The Upper Sandusky Reservation had been recognized in earlier treaties, but was enlarged in 1818 by more than 55,000 acres. The 16,000-acre reservation at Big Spring was established for any Wyandot in Canada who wanted to return to the United States. The small community that developed at Big Spring was mostly comprised of Wyandot who came from Lower Sandusky (which was ceded in 1817 at the Treaty of Fort Meigs), Big Rock, and Maguaga, and thus tended to have closer ties to the Wyandot on the Huron Reserve than they did with the community at Upper Sandusky.31

While the Wyandot identified as one people, the location and composition of these four reserves/reservations corresponded to persistent differences that predated the War of 1812. As had occurred in the decade before the war, U.S. officials sought to exacerbate potential divisions within the larger Wyandot nation in order to expedite the removal process. The first effort along these lines occurred in the winter of 1831-1832 and involved a treaty negotiation with the Big Spring Band for the cession of their reservation in exchange for lands beyond the Mississippi River. As U.S. Special Agent James Gardiner noted to Secretary Cass, he expected “that, notwithstanding the apparent determination of the Upper Sandusky Indians to maintain their present position, this treaty [would initiate] … the means of producing a final cession of all the Wyandott [sic] lands in Ohio in a year or two more.”32 The majority of the small population at Big Spring was willing to sell the reserve, and generally concurred with Gardiner’s assessment that “their present situation in the State of Ohio, in the vicinity of a white population, which is continually increasing and crowding around them, they cannot prosper and be happy, and the morals of many of their people will be daily becoming more and more vitiated.” However, the Big Spring Band adamantly refused any suggestion that they move to the West; insisting, instead, that the treaty must affirm their

intention to “remove to Canada, or to the river Huron in Michigan, where they own a reservation of land, or to any place they may obtain a right or privilege from other Indians to go.”

The treaty with the Big Spring Band was roundly criticized by the leaders of the Upper Sandusky Wyandot, who complained that most of the signatories were more connected to the Detroit River area than to the Big Spring Reserve—and were thus not qualified to represent the Wyandot communities in Ohio. Given this response, and wary

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33 Quotation is from “Treaty with the Wyandot, 1832,” in Kappler, ed., Indian Affairs, 338. Also see Bowes, Land Too Good for Indians, 132-134.
of causing more resistance among Wyandot leaders at Upper Sandusky, U.S. officials likely shelved any notions they may have had about a treaty with the Wyandot on the Huron River reserve in Michigan. In the meantime, disputes among the Wyandot over the sale of Big Spring reached an amicable resolution in December 1832 when some Wyandot from Big Spring—“being also anxious … to keep the whole nation together”—determined to share “an equal distribution of the proceeds of [the Big Spring] reservation [with] … our kinsfolks of Upper Sandusky.” In return, they received a “seat upon the grand reservation at Upper Sandusky, and to an equal participation in all privileges and immunities arising from the same.”

These developments were welcomed by U.S. officials, who recognized the newly enlarged Council at Upper Sandusky as the preeminent authority among the Wyandot on matters regarding land cessions and removal. Their reasoning was based on four basic conditions: the people living at Upper Sandusky composed the majority of the Wyandot living in the United States, possessed the largest reservation, were situated in the midst of a rapidly growing population of U.S. citizens, and were in the State of Ohio (rather than the federal Territory of Michigan). This last point would become more significant in 1834 when Governor Robert Lucas of Ohio threatened to exercise state sovereignty over the reservation if the federal government did not remove the Wyandot to the west. In an effort to stave off pressure from Governor Lucas and would-be squatters, the Wyandot agreed to a new land cession treaty in 1836. The terms were unique, but they reflected a keen desire on the part of the Wyandot to squelch the demands of the State of Ohio and affirm their intentions to stay on their lands. The treaty encompassed the sale of 36,400 acres that had been added to the eastern side of the Upper Sandusky Reservation in 1818 (ostensibly for a presumed influx of Wyandot from around Amherstburg), along with a 640 acre parcel to the northeast of the main reservation known as Cranberry Reserve. According to the terms of the treaty, the survey and sale of the lands were to be conducted by the State of Ohio—with the proceeds turned over to the Wyandot. These funds were then designated for “the rebuilding of mills, repair and improvement of roads, establishing schools, and other laudable public objects for the improvement of their condition,” with the remainder distributed among Wyandot households as annuities.

The 1836 treaty brought a sense of respite to the Wyandot at Upper Sandusky, while public projects and annuities seemed to promise a degree of permanence. The demographic and political dynamics of Ohio did not abate, however, and the push for removal continued apace. Throughout the 1830s, the Lunaapeew (Lenape, or Delaware) near Lower Sandusky, the Odawa who lived on the lower Maumee River, the Shawnee and Onödowá‘ga: (Seneca) from Wapakoneta, and the Ökwe‘öwé (Seneca-Cayuga; aka, “Mingo”) at Lower Sandusky were all pressured into ceding their lands in Ohio and

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34 Quotation from a documented agreement between 10 signatories to the Big Spring treaty and the “Wyandot Chiefs of Upper Sandusky” on December 3, 1832; in Correspondence on the subject of the emigration of Indians: between the 30th November, 1831, and 27th December, 1833, vol. 3 (Washington: Duff Green, 1835), 543-544. Also see Bowes, Land Too Good for Indians, 133-134.
removing to present-day Kansas. By 1839 the Wyandot were the only tribal nation in Ohio, and they became the entire focus of the political and private interests that had long championed the removal of all American Indian from the state. As the Wyandot faced this growing threat to their communities and lands, the encroachments of an increasingly aggressive population of U.S. citizens made it difficult to maintain a united front against the rising clamor for their removal. These external pressures also enlivened internal divisions among the Wyandot that predated the War of 1812 and corresponded to the different experiences of the Detroit River and Upper Sandusky communities in the decades after the war.\footnote{Mary Stockwell, \textit{The Other Trail of Tears: The Removal of the Ohio Indians} (Yardley, PA: Westholme Publishing, 2016), 205-211, 241-249, 2270-281; Charles Garrad, \textit{Petun to Wyandot: The Ontario Petun from the Sixteenth Century} (Ottawa: Canadian Museum of History and the University of Ottawa Press, 2014), 509-514, 517.}

A year after the Treaty of Springwells (1815) formally ended conflict in the Detroit River border region, the Upper Sandusky Wyandot accepted the entreaties of Methodist missionaries to preach and live among them. In the ensuing years a substantial number of Wyandot adopted many of the religious and economic precepts of the Second Great Awakening—a Protestant religious revival movement that emphasized individual salvation and individual effort in a market economy. Such individualism may have run counter to the traditional precepts of Wyandot society and leadership, but the families who took these ethics to heart would eventually prove to the most adamant opponents of removal. Situated at an important crossroads, their reservation already had important commercial advantages and, as a Methodist missionary warned, they would be in a less prosperous circumstance and soon surrounded by unscrupulous Euro-Americans if they agreed to remove to present-day Kansas.

These “Christian” Wyandot were opposed by “Pagan” Wyandot who were so named because they did not associate with the Methodist missionaries, had some earlier experience with Catholicism, continued to embrace older cultural practices, and preferred to remain at some distance from Euro-American communities. Though removal was hardly a “Pagan” preference, migration to Canada or some area to the west might allow for a level of cultural and political autonomy that could not be sustained in Ohio. These different views were largely entrenched by the mid 1830s, when U.S. officials began encouraging the Wyandot to send parties to assess the lands they would move to in present-day Kansas. The Wyandot obliged, in part to see if some accord might be worked out between “Christian” and “Pagan” leaders, but they were disappointed by the conditions they found on the western prairies and declined to participate in a treaty. Even as U.S. officials began to lose their patience through the late 1830s and Ohio officials blustered, the so-called “Christian” and “Pagan” Wyandot failed to reach an accord amongst themselves.\footnote{Cox, “The Ohio Wyandots,” 40-43, 72-73, 110-126, 217-221; Bowes, \textit{Land Too Good for Indians}, 137-144. Also see Charles Dickens, \textit{American Notes for General Circulation}, ed. Patricia Ingham (New York: Penguin Books, 2000), 216-217.}

The impasse was finally broken by tragedy in December 1840, when three U.S. citizens killed Summundewat (the principal leader of the Upper Sandusky Wyandot) his sister, and brother in-law at a winter hunting camp. Though all three assailants were arrested, none were ever charged. Following this event and its dispiriting outcome, the
“Christian” leaders of the Upper Sandusky Wyandot took full measure of their vulnerabilities and began to consider leaving Ohio. By this time, the entire Wyandot nation had been worn down by more than a half-century of wrestling with federal officials over the shifting terms and conditions of treaties, the violence of the War of 1812, a decade of engaging and countering Ohio politicians, and the ongoing agitations that stemmed from the federal policy of Indian Removal and the expectations of land speculators. William Walker, an Upper Sandusky Wyandot leader whose family lived near Malden during the War of 1812, summed matters up in a letter to his brother: “even those who have, heretofore, been opposed to the treaty are truly desirous now that the matter might be closed and they relieved from this state of suspense. Let the result be for ‘weal or woe.’”

A removal treaty was finally concluded in March 1842, which called for the cession of all lands in Ohio and Michigan Territory for a permanent annuity of $17,500 and 148,000 acres in present-day eastern Kansas. All of the signatories were from the Upper Sandusky Reserve, but they apparently acted with the consent of “the Wyandotts of the River Huron, in Michigan,” who probably numbered less than sixty men, women, and children at the time. The following July, as the date of removal approached, the Wyandot who had gathered in Ohio had become—in the words of Joel Walker—“very dull and desolate;” woe had become a collective reality, “everybody … appeared to have a long face on,” and the “once peaceful barbarian village [wore] rather a gloomy appearance.” Now refugees, forced to leave their homes, the Wyandot remained committed to managing the process of their removal with the assistance of a few missionaries. Numbering 644 people, they first took themselves and their belongings by wagon, horse, and foot to Cincinnati, all the while encountering frequent reminders of the pressures that had forced them to cede their lands. Travelling south along the same road that William Hull had enlarged in 1812, the Wyandot were preyed upon by thieves and liquor peddlers—and repeatedly met cold indifference from the communities they passed. Once in Cincinnati they traveled by steamboat to St. Louis, and from there up the Missouri River to the vicinity of present-day Kansas City.

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40 The population of the Huron Reserve had diminished over the years through intermittent migrations to Anderdon, Upper Sandusky, the islands and shore of the Detroit River, and other Native and non-Native communities with whom they were close. At least a dozen or more Wyandot moved to Anderdon in the period between the treaty council and the removal date. Consequently, the people still living on the Huron Reserve were in no position to alter the consensus within the larger and more powerful leadership council at Upper Sandusky. Given the subsequent decision of all 45 men, women, and children who lived on the Huron Reserve to assemble at Upper Sandusky before removal, it is likely that they deferred to the authority of the leaders of the Wyandott Nation at Upper Sandusky. See “Treaty with the Wyandot” (1842), in Kappler, ed., *Indian Affairs*, 537; Bowes, *Land Too Good for Indians*, 145; and Sallie Cotter Andrews (Tewatronyahkwa, Deer Clan), “Nicholas Cotter: ‘Ron-nyan-es’ or ‘Striking the Sky,’ Big Turtle Clan, 1822–1887” <https://www.wyandotte-nation.org/culture/history/biographies/nicholas-cotter/> (accessed 12 June 2018).
The entire 1,000-mile journey took three weeks, and the days on the river boats proved less stressful than the overland portions. After crossing the Missouri River to the Kansas shore, however, their travails recommenced. Because the federal government had not been able to acquire the lands that were identified in the 1842 treaty, the Wyandot were forced to live as squatters in makeshift quarters near the confluence of the Kansas and Missouri rivers. Through the fall and winter they suffered from exposure, hunger, and disease, with approximately 100 of the 664 people who left Ohio dying in a matter of months. In the midst of this woeful period, Wyandot leaders arranged to purchase 25,000 acres from nearby Lunaapeew (Lenape, or Delaware), and finally began to rebuild their community the following spring.42

Figure 9.5: Wyandot Removal, 1843. Map illustrates the route of the Wyandot from Upper Sandusky to present-day northeastern Kansas.

Potawatomi Trail of Death

A different but equally tragic scenario unfolded in what came to be known as the Potawatomi Trail of Death. One of the groups most opposed to removal, missionaries, and U.S. officials was the Mshkodésik Bodéwadmi (Prairie Potawatomi) that lived along the Yellow River about thirty miles southeast of Lake Michigan. Closely associated with Main Poc, who had died in 1816, this community’s principal leader was a prophet known as Menominee who blended Tenskwatawa’s teachings with elements of Catholicism. Menominee was not present at the 1833 Treaty of Chicago, where various Bodéwadmi groups assembled for a series of treaties, and the following year declared that he would not meet with U.S. Commissioners. In the summer of 1836 the United States conducted

removal treaties with most of the signatories who were at Chicago in 1833, including one group residing on the Yellow River. However, a large faction associated with Menominee remained aloof. The following year the first Bodéwadmi removals in northern Indiana occurred, and included Bodéwadmi along the Tippecanoe River—about a day’s travel to the south of the communities on the Yellow River.43

The 1837 removals soon brought a flood of squatters into northern Indiana through the spring of 1838, including areas within the Yellow River basin. These interlopers were not welcomed by resident Bodéwadmi communities, but matters became potentially volatile by mid-summer. The removal treaties of 1836 had set August 5, 1838 as the final date for all signatory groups to abandon their homes in Indiana. Menominee was not a signatory to the treaty, and had no intention of abiding its terms. Alarm by the continued presence of Bodéwadmi in the Yellow River area, a group of newcomers wrote to Indiana Governor David Wallace and expressed their fears of an imminent uprising. After visiting the area in late August, Wallace was determined to enforce the terms of the 1836 treaties on the Yellow River Bodéwadmi before summer’s end. The Governor soon met with General John Tipton in Logansport, and directed him to effect a forced removal of Menominee and his community. A veteran of the Battle of Tippecanoe and a Major in the Indiana Territorial Militia during the War of 1812, and having just completed a term as a US Senator, Tipton possessed the connections and experience to carry out the order. Within two days he brought together a mounted militia force of 100, and set out for the Yellow River some 40 miles to the north. Before leaving, Tipton also sent a messenger to arrange for a meeting with Menominee. Tipton arrived at the Yellow River on August 30 and met with Menominee in a log chapel near his village. The meeting quickly became an incarceration, however, when Tipton informed Menominee and his cohort that they were all prisoners. The Bodéwadmi who attended the meeting were all locked within the chapel, and Tipton then sent out several militia units to bring in as many Yellow River Bodéwadmi as they could find within two days. A few days later, more than 800 people had been hastily assembled in the vicinity of the chapel, and cursory preparations were underway for an early morning departure on September 4.44

With their leaders caged in a prison wagon, and the smoke of their burning homes and fields pouring into the sky, the Yellow River Bodéwadmi began a forced march under military escort on the morning of September 4. Over the two months of their nearly 700-mile ordeal, a prolonged heat wave, followed by periods of cold rain and snow, weakened the Bodéwadmi and exacerbated widespread illnesses. At one point, more than a third were plagued with fever, diarrhea, tuberculosis, depression, or general fatigue—and had to crowd on to baggage wagons because they could not walk. Death was a near daily experience, particularly for young children, and the pace of the westward march forced “their bereft and exhausted families to leave the bodies behind in hastily dug graves.” By the time they arrived at their destination on November 4, at least forty-three

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Chapter Nine

had died and as many as sixty-eight escaped. The trauma of the journey would deeply
scar the Yellow River Bodéwadmi, and the route they and other Bodéwadmi took to the
West came to be known as the Potawatomi Trail of Death. Arrival in Kansas, for the
Bodéwadmi and other Native nations, also brought a new existential challenge. As Kelli
Jean Mosteller (Citizen Potawatomi Nation) writes, “removal from the places oral
tradition dictated they were meant to live, dispossession of the lands where their
ancestors were buried, and the loss of sites where seasonal ceremonies took place,”
shattered essential conceptions of the relationship between place and people. Those who
escaped the Potawatomi Trail of Death were generally able to maintain these ancient
relations, while their tales of the removal experience served as a stark warning to the
Bodéwadmi with whom they settled in Michigan and Upper Canada.45

Figure 9.6: “Potawatomi leaving Logansport, Indiana, September 10, 1838.”
Detail of a sketch by George Winter. The Wabash River is in the background. Source:
Tippecanoe County Historical Association, Lafayette, Indiana.

Myaamia Removal and Hiding in Plain Sight

Removal was conceived as a blanket policy, predicated on racialized conceptual
ions of civilization and commerce, and applied through blunt applications of military,
political, economic, and legal force. Yet every Native community experienced the
process differently, and the applications of force were never uniform. A case in point
involves the last substantial removal from the western Ohio Valley, which occurred in

1846 and involved the Myaamia who were then centered around the confluence of the Mississinewa and Wabash rivers. The first treaty with the Myaamia during the Removal Era occurred in 1834, but the matter of removal was not formally raised until a subsequent treaty council in late November 1840. The delay partly stemmed from the personal diplomacy of Pinšiwa (Jean Baptiste Richardville) who, like his uncle P'Koum-Kwa (aka Pacanne), was a venerated akima (civil leader). His fluency in English and French, as well as his connections with traders, missionaries, and state officials, allowed him to assuage concerns about the Myaamia. Even when Myaamia removal seemed unavoidable, his personal status allowed him to gain exemptions for several families—including his own—before his death in 1841. Maconaquah, a leading Myaamia woman, also managed to gain exemptions for a number of her relatives after the 1840 treaty was confirmed. Born Francis Slocum, who as a young child lived in northern Pennsylvania when she was captured by Lunaapeew (Lenape, or Delaware), Maconaquah’s efforts on behalf of her children and other members of her village succeeded in part because of her Euro-American origins—and the willingness of U.S. citizens and officials to attribute the presumed virtues of the “white race” to Maconaquah, her Myaamia relatives, and other members of her village.46

Pinšiwa and Maconaquah were exceptional figures, and well known to Euro-Americans within and beyond Indiana. Yet their experiences were shared by other Myaamia. After the 1840 treaty, a series of administrative delays on the part of U.S. officials and petitions from Myaamia leaders put the date of removal off until 1846. In the interim, several Myaamia families managed to gain relief from removal with non-Myaamia testimonials about their Christian faith and their success as farmers and entrepreneurs. Such characteristics were hardly rare, and during the six-year delay a substantial number of Myaamia families that farmed their own parcels came to believe that they could remain on these various holdings indefinitely. As a final date for removal drew near, however, last ditch efforts to persuade U.S. officials proved too little and too late. Instead, Governor James Whitcomb—like Governor Wallace before him—sent troops to ensure compliance.47

Because the extended relations of Pinšiwa and Maconaquah encompassed so many households, the number of people exempted from removal amounted to nearly half of the entire Myaamia population. Along with others who gained their own exemptions, or fled when the militia troops arrived, the number of Myaamia who remained in Indiana amounted to more than half of the Myaamia nation. The nearly 400 who could not claim or prove an exemption were ultimately forced to board canal boats at Peru, Indiana, for the journey to Kansas Territory. Though not as trying as the Potawatomi removals of


1837-38, the one-month journey on a series of canal and river boats still took a toll—with several elderly and very young Myaamia dying en route. The arrival in eastern Kansas was traumatic as well, leaving the Myaamia “grief-stricken and disheartened” over the loss of their homes and the prospect of life in an unfamiliar land so far from their relatives in the Wabash River valley. These feelings would be magnified in the coming months, since winter was coming and the people would have to live in canvas tents and eat government-supplied rations until they had built houses and harvested crops the following year. Those who remained in Indiana were also confounded and depressed in the aftermath of Removal, and all were left to contend with a deep and lasting wound running through the Myaamia nation.48

Like the Myaamia still in Indiana, a fair number of Shawnee and Lunaapew, as well as Wyandot, Odawa, and Ökwe'öwé (Seneca-Cayuga; aka, “Mingo”), managed to remain in the region long after the removal period. This anomaly stemmed from the 1818 treaties conducted by Cass and McArthur in which some leaders retained their village sites as discrete “reservations” that had the legal qualities of an estate that could be passed on to their descendants. Most of these retained lands were not included in subsequent removal treaties, and thus hundreds of Indigenous and Métis peoples remained in Indiana and Ohio. Over the course of a few generations, the ties within these Native groups weakened as families and individuals moved to reservations in Oklahoma or “married out” of their communities. While some of these groups still persist as loose associations of self-identified American Indian communities in Ohio and Indiana, only the Miami Nation of Indians of the State of Indiana is formally recognized by a state, and none have a nation-to-nation relationship with the federal government.49 In every case, however, the histories of the people who hid in plain sight during and after the Removal Era present a further manifestation of Native adaptation and persistence—and the deep connections between their communities and the places the Creator made for them.50

Coda to 1812: Black Hawk War

Along with the Cherokee Trail of Tears, one of the most famous historical episodes associated with the Removal Era is the Black Hawk War in 1832. The origin of the conflict did not begin with Removal, but with William Henry Harrison’s 1804 Treaty of St. Louis, which ceded a vast expanse of land between the Illinois and Mississippi Rivers as well as a large area in what is now eastern Missouri. The treaty involved a party of five Thâkîwa (Sauk, or Sac) and Meskwaki (Fox) who were returning north after a council with William Clark in St. Louis. While the extent of the cession would not be known for several years, Harrison’s treaty was immediately denounced by the Thâkîwa and Meskwaki as invalid since it was conducted with men who were not authorized to treat for land. It is also likely that the men were badly intoxicated when the treaty was

49 The Indiana Miami formed and maintained a treaty relationship with the United States between 1854 and 1897, but subsequent efforts to restore nation-to-nation relations with the United States have not been successful. See Rafert, The Miami Indians of Indiana, 128-30, 276-78, 283-92.
The Thâkîwa who were associated with Mahkate:wi-meši-ke:hke:hkwa (also Ma-ka-tai-me-she-kia-kia, or Black Hawk) never accepted the 1804 treaty, and readily allied with the British and the larger Native Confederacy during the War of 1812. By the 1820s, as U.S. citizens pushed into the heart of the Thâkîwa homeland in present-day northwestern Illinois, most Thâkîwa and Meskwaki moved across the Mississippi. However, the community associated with Mahkate:wi-meši-ke:hke:hkwa still seasonally inhabited their village of Saukenuk at the mouth of the Rock River (present-day Rock Island) on the east side of the Mississippi and, much to the chagrin of U.S. officials, maintained active trade relations with the British to the north.51

The survey and sale of lands in Illinois incensed Mahkate:wi-meši-ke:hke:hkwa and his community, and they refused to acknowledge U.S. sovereignty over the area. In the spring of 1831, 1,500 Thâkîwa and Meskwaki returned to Saukenuk to plant crops and demonstrate their independence within their homeland. By late June a force of Illinois volunteers responded to this action with an attack on Saukenuk, but found that the village had been abandoned. The departed Thâkîwa and Meskwaki had already moved about forty miles up the Rock River where they received assistance from a prophet known as Waapakiishik, who led a village of about 200 disaffected Hoocâągra (Ho-Chunk or Winnebago), Thâkîwa, Meskwaki, Bodéwadmi, and Kiikaapoi (Kickapoo). In a relationship that was reminiscent of Tecumseh and Tenskwatawa, Mahkate:wi-meši-ke:hke:hkwa and Waapakiishik had become the center of Native opposition to the region’s growing population of Euro-American newcomers as well as U.S. policies that sought to remove and “civilize” American Indians. By autumn, however, Mahkate:wi-meši-ke:hke:hkwa moved across the Mississippi to reside near the winter hunting grounds of the Thâkîwa.52

Mahkate:wi-meši-ke:hke:hkwa once again returned to Saukenuk in the spring of 1832, perhaps in response to possible assistance from Native groups to the north as well as the British. Neither materialized and, after a mixed force of U.S. Regulars and militia were sent to Saukenuk in late April, the Thâkîwa and Meskwaki again fled up the Rock River. This time the U.S. force pursued, and a long running conflict took place along the Rock River through northwestern Illinois—where Waapakiishik and some of the warriors in his village came to the support of the Thâkîwa and Meskwaki. These joined forces were then pursued further up the river into southwestern Wisconsin Territory. At this point, the events that became known as Black Hawk’s War shifted into a long retreat toward the Mississippi and costly rear-guard engagements with much larger militia forces. After weeks of moving northwestward across various river drainages, the flight and pursuit came to an end in early August amongst the maze of islands and sloughs where the Bad Axe River joins the Mississippi. After a few scattered groups attempted to surrender, most of the remaining Thâkîwa and Meskwaki were chased across the Mississippi and fired upon from a steamboat.53

While the tragic denouement on the Mississippi hardly amounted to a war, it marked the end of any sustained armed resistance to the United States in what had once

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52 Ibid., 34-46.
53 Ibid. 63-86.
been part of the much larger Northwest Territory. In this respect, the events of 1832 are directly connected to the treaties of William Henry Harrison and—in the person of Mahkate:wi-meši-ke:hke:hkwa—the Native Confederacy that formed around Tenskwatawa and Tecumseh prior to and during the War of 1812. Yet in the minds of most people in the United States, the Black Hawk War became associated with Indian Removal in two ways. First, it made western governors more forceful in their advocacy and implementation of removal; and second, it turned Mahkate:wi-meši-ke:hke:hkwa into a tragic symbol for Eastern critics of President Jackson and the Removal policy. In a remarkable accident of political theater, both Jackson and Mahkate:wi-meši-ke:hke:hkwa toured several eastern cities at the same time—with the latter drawing great crowds that came to see and celebrate a noble champion of Native rights. These sentiments did not hold in western cities, especially in Detroit where “the throng resembled more a lynch mob than an admiring multitude” and effigies of Mahkate:wi-meši-ke:hke:hkwa and his companions were burned.54

The violence associated with the events known as Black Hawk’s War marks a distinct episode in the 1830s, but as the event in Detroit suggests, it follows directly from the motives and causes that gave rise to the War of 1812. The same is true of the Removal Era, which was grounded in the host of treaties that preceded and soon followed the War of 1812. Harrison’s treaties before the war clarified the central cause of the Native Confederacy, while removal effectively defined the consequences of defeat. The examples given in the preceding paragraphs, along with the discussion of Mahkate:wi-meši-ke:hke:hkwa and the events of 1832, do not cover the full breadth of experiences during the Removal Era. Yet they all offer clear insights into the direct and lasting consequences of the War of 1812 for Native peoples as well as the foundational conditions that underlay U.S. national growth through the middle of the 19th century and beyond. These consequences and conditions would find new expressions in subsequent removals of Native communities from Kansas to Indian Territory (Oklahoma) in the 1860s—a fate that most Thâkîwa and Meskwaki would also endure. Each removal, for every community, renewed old traumas, deepened the process of dispossession, and created a further separation between homelands and communities. After more than five decades, the future that Native peoples who fought along the Detroit River and at Frenchtown was both clearer and darker—and still unfolding.

Chapter Ten

Remaining, Remaking, and Remembering

The final chapter returns to the subject of the Wyandot during between the end of the War of 1812 and the Wyandot Removal from Ohio to present-day Kansas. The topical emphasis is on the people variously referred to as the “Canadian Wyandot,” the Wyandot Indian Band of Anderdon, and the Wyandot of Anderdon Nation. Their history in the first half of the 19th century parallels that of other Native peoples discussed in Chapter Nine, but their persistence in the Detroit River region reflects a remarkable continuity that is finding new expression in growing concerns about identity, homeland, environmental stewardship, and history. The chapter then shifts to a history of the River Raisin Battlefield site, the City of Monroe, and various ways the battles have been commemorated since the 19th century. The narrative concludes with an overview of the movement to create what is now the River Raisin National Battlefield Park.

The Wyandot of Anderdon

Between the aftermath of the War of 1812 and the series of treaties held on the St. Mary’s River in 1818, a small number of Wyandot left Lower and Upper Sandusky to live with the “Canadian Wyandot” on the Anderdon Reserve near Amherstburg. Centered on the lower Canard River, the reserve was established in 1816 for the Wyandot who were allied with Teotrontore (more commonly Sou-neh-hoo-way, or Splitlog). Though more closely tied to the Wyandot in Michigan Territory, the people who lived on the Anderdon Reserve also had close connections to the Wyandot community at Big Spring in Ohio. Consequently, the 1832 dissolution of the Big Spring reserve caused some residents to move (or move back) to Anderdon rather than south to the Grand Reserve at Upper Sandusky. Similar ties also extended to families who had previously moved to the Grand Reserve from Michigan Territory and Big Spring. As the spectre of removal became more imminent, some of these Wyandot from Upper Sandusky and most of those still on the Huron Reserve joined their fellow Wyandot on the Anderdon Reserve.¹

The number of people who moved to the Anderdon Reserve in the early 1840s is unrecorded, but it is very likely that more would have come if not for a significant reduction of the reserve from roughly 23,000 acres to 7,700 acres in 1836. Though not a direct parallel to U.S. policies in the 1830s, this reduction was partly a response to developments across the border. The push for shrinking the Wyandot land base mostly came from Sir Francis Bond Head, the newly appointed Lieutenant Governor for Upper Canada, who took a multi-part approach toward regularizing land policies and government administration in what is now southwestern Ontario. One of Bond Head’s primary concerns related to a growing political reform movement against Crown rule in

¹ Charles Garrad, Petun to Wyandot: The Ontario Petun from the Sixteenth Century (Ottawa: Canadian Museum of History and the University of Ottawa Press, 2014), 515-516; also see pp. 296-299 above. Note: in referencing a specific “reserve” or “Reserve,” this paragraph follows the capitalization that is used in government documents.
Upper Canada. To both address and defuse the conditions that inspired reformists and would-be rebels, Bond Head wanted to encourage more commercial and agricultural development in the Detroit River border region and thus address a potential cause for dissent.²

Along with quelling dissent by liberalizing economic policies and promoting more private property ownership, Bond Head also sought to exercise more control over First Nations affairs. While this third concern certainly fit with his desire to attract more people to migrate from Lower Canada and take up lands in what is now southwestern Ontario, Bond Head also wanted to avoid the incessant treaties, relocations, and removals that characterized U.S. policies toward American Indians. In this latter role, Bond Head also viewed himself as a benevolent arbiter of potential conflicts between Native peoples. One of his first forays into this assumed role involved the Huron Reserve at Anderdon and the concerns of Odawa, Bodéwadmi, and Ojibwe groups that had recently moved to the area to avoid U.S. removal policies. Bond Head soon learned that these members of the Nswe’ mishkote’ win (Council of Three Fires) were parties to agreements from the 1790s and early 1800s that established a collective reserve near Amherstburg for them, the Wyandot, and other Native allies of the British. Wyandot leaders were suspicious of their erstwhile Anishinaabeg allies, and refused to recognize their interests to any portion of the Huron Reserve.³

In an effort to unravel the consequences of multiple agreements for the same lands, and attract more British subjects to take up land in the area, Bond Head crafted a treaty with the Wyandot that called for ceding the northern and southern thirds of the Huron Reserve. Together these amounted to approximately 15,300 acres—which left about 7,700 acres for the Wyandot. The full proceeds from the sale of the lands in the northern third of the reservation were designated for the Wyandot, but the revenue generated from selling the southern third of the reserve was intended for the more recently arrived Anishinaabeg. Bond’s initial proposal was poorly received by the Wyandot, and vigorously denounced by the Splitlog and Warrow families. Broad Head responded with threats to immediately cut off all funding for the “annual presents” the Wyandot received from the Crown. Splitlog scoffed at the threat and refused to entertain any talk of land cessions.⁴

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Figure 10.1: Plan of the Huron Reserve (1836-1837). Map shows areas within the Huron Reserve as distributed by Wyandot leaders to specific family lines. Laid out in the manner of the French long lot system, the reserve had designated lands in the rear that were set aside for future generations. As was the case in French habitant communities, the Huron Reserve also included another five tiers of undesignated and unsurveyed areas (not shown in this image) reserved for hunting, harvesting plant foods, woodland resources, and future long lots. The darkened portions of the map encompass the northern and southern thirds of the Huron Reserve that were ceded in the 1836 treaty. A series of land cessions between 1848 and 1886 further reduced the Reserve and the loss of nearby islands. Sources: footnoted below.5

5 Map sources include an updated version of Peter Carroll’s, “Plan of the Huron Reserve, Western District, Crown Lands, April 6, 1836” (produced by the Wyandotte Nation of Oklahoma); and “Anderdon Township, 1837,” in Detroit River Canadian Heritage Background Report (Ottawa: Canadian Heritage Rivers Association, 1998), 27.
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The meetings between Bond Head and Wyandot leaders occurred in the midst of several councils the Lt. Governor held with other Native groups that had come to Amherstburg to receive annuities and meet with the King’s new representative. The Odawa, Bodéwadmi, and Ojibwe who had returned to the area were among these groups, and Joseph Warrow grew increasingly concerned that Bond Head would simply treat with these Anishinaabeg for the land cessions. They Wyandot would thus lose large tracts of land and receive nothing in return. Warrow and his party were joined by several leaders within the Wyandot community, including Thomas Clarke and others associated with Splitlog. Clarke was also able to have the stone quarry in the southern third of the Huron Reserve to be withdrawn from any land sales—and instead retained by the Wyandot. While the Anishinaabeg were allotted funds from land sales in the southern portion of the reserve, they did not stay in the Detroit River area. Instead, they moved to Manitoulin Island where Bond Head established a new center for the distribution of annuity goods that was closer to more First Nations communities as well as to Ottawa and Toronto. More than a center for “presents” and councils, Manitoulin also became something of an exclusive First Nations territory mostly inhabited by Anishinaabeg who were generally welcomed the migration of other Anishinaabeg to the area.6

This reduction of the Anderdon Reserve effectively precluded a substantial movement of Wyandot to Canada in the wake of the 1842 removal treaty. Consequently, the Wyandot population at Anderdon never grew much beyond the 200 people who were estimated to be living there in 1838. Of these, about two dozen chose to join their close kin at Upper Sandusky who had opted to move to present-day Kansas. In subsequent years, some Wyandot from Kansas occasionally returned to the Detroit River area. Because they were deemed “American” Wyandots, however, they did not receive formal recognition from Canadian officials nor, in some instances, the leaders of the Wyandot at Anderdon. In 1878, nearly all of the people who constituted what was then referred to as the “Wyandot Tribe” applied for citizenship under the auspices of the Indian Act of 1876, and most of the reserve was surveyed and patented as the private property of Wyandot residents with the remainder sold off to Anglo-Canadians.7

Twelve years later a small group formally known as the “Wyandots of Anderdon,” under the leadership of Chief Joseph White, also terminated their Native status and had their lands surveyed and patented. While these actions resulted in the loss of a collective political status within the Dominion of Canada, they also provided an important degree of independence from Crown oversight and—through private property laws—secured their long-standing attachments to homes and lands along the eastern side of the Detroit River. The rationale behind these latter concerns was still evident in the early 20th century, when the number of people who identified as Wyandot and continued to live within the former boundaries of the Anderdon Reserve or on Bois Blanc (aka “Bob-Lo”) Island numbered about 70—with most still maintaining a notable fluency in their own language.8

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“There my lineage would form a group, surrounding me”9

Descendants of the “Wyandot Tribe” and the “Wyandot of Anderdon” remained in the Detroit River region through the 20th century, with some moving north to Windsor and Detroit or across the river to the communities of Brownstown, Gibraltar, Trenton, and Flat Rock where some Wyandot had remained after the Treaty of Upper Sandusky (1842). From these various bases, they sustained family ties and enduring associations with relatives on both sides of the river. Along with kinship and shared history, many also maintained an especially close attachment to the Wyandotte Indian Cemetery and the “Indian School Burying Ground”—which are situated within the boundaries of the former Anderdon Reserve and still remain unceded Native lands within the Dominion of Canada. Our Lady of the Assumption Church in Windsor, Ontario, also continued as another important touchstone for generations of Detroit River Wyandot. Originally established in 1760 as the Mission des Hurons de la Pointe de Montréal du Détroit, the Church sits on land donated by the Wyandot to the Jesuits and houses birth, marriage, and burial records for many generations of Wyandot.10

In the second half of the 20th century the records at Our Lady of the Assumption Church, along with materials in archives and special collections held by public libraries and research universities in the region, attracted scholars interested in Wyandot history and language. These materials also established a basis for recognizing and reinvigorating the historical importance of the Detroit River Wyandot, and became a key resource for identifying and reconnecting Wyandot descendants in the Detroit River region. One of the main proponents of this latter effort was Charles Oscar Warrow, a direct descendant of three Wyandot chiefs who led the Wyandot community at Amherstburg from the end of the War of 1812 until 1835. Born in 1906, Warrow (who was generally known as “Oscar”) spent all but the last years of his life in communities of central importance to the history of the Detroit River Wyandot; namely, Trenton (Maguaga), Grosse Ile, Grosse Pointe, Wyandot Township, and Flat Rock—where he was buried in 1980 near the Huron River and within the former boundaries of the Huron Reserve. Along with Grace Warrow Manning, Yvonne Gibbs, Lil Splitlog, Judith Pidgeon-Kukowski (Kwendae’to’), and others, he also conducted research in local historical records, consulted with scholars on Wyandot history in the Detroit River area, worked on genealogies, poured over local

to forego their “Indian” (aka First Nations) status and become Canadian citizens did so in 1914. In a 1997 interview, Ted Warrow noted that the last official reference by Canadian officials to “the Wyandot Indian Band of Anderdon” occurred in 1925; see Jaqueline Smrke, “Natives bid to restore band status,” Windsor Star, July 15, 1997, 3.

9 John L. Steckley, De Religione: Telling the Seventeenth-century Jesuit Story in Huron to the Iroquois (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2004), 179. Quotation comes from a translation of a seventeenth-century Jesuit text on Baptism that was originally rendered in the We'dat (i.e., Wyandot) language.

historical records, and used extensive personal contacts to identify other Wyandot descendants in the Detroit River area. The larger goals of these efforts were to re-establish and revitalize the region’s Wyandot community with an eye toward ensuring its future viability on both sides of the Detroit River.\footnote{11}

Oscar Warrow’s son, Ted Warrow, joined with other Wyandot descendants to further this cause in the 1990s. One of the earliest fruits of these labors was the establishment of an annual Green Corn Feast on Grosse Ile. The Feast was rooted in the Green Corn ceremony that was once widespread among agrarian peoples throughout eastern North America. While some groups in Canada and the United States have maintained the ceremony almost continuously—or resurrected it in the 20th century, some version of this annual event was very likely held in the Detroit River area through most of the 19th century. While these sacred events varied in their particulars among different cultural groups, all functioned as a multi-day combination of harvest festival, New Year’s celebration, peace council with public rituals of pardon and absolution, and various ablutions of personal and community renewal. The Green Corn Feast is a less extensive, one-day affair, but the now annual event helps maintains a deep connection to the past as well as strengthen connections among Wyandot descendants in the region.\footnote{12}

In an effort to further galvanize this community and strengthen their ancestral identity, Ted Warrow and other Wyandot descendants looked into the requirements of a 1985 amendment to the Canadian Indian Act of 1876. Among other things, the amendment established a process for an “Indian band” to restore its treaty-based relationship with the federal government of Canada. The two main criteria for reconstituting a band required a clearly defined group composed of direct lineal descendants of the original or former band, and retention of a historical land base since the time of the band’s dissolution. By the mid 1990s the Wyandot Indian Band of Anderdon had formed with 60 members, all of whom could directly trace their descent from Wyandot who had lived on the Anderdon Reserve prior to its dissolution. In the matter of demonstrating a retained land base, the Wyandot Indian Band of Anderdon noted the two unceded parcels of the former Anderdon Reserve that still harbored the remains of their forebears.\footnote{13} In May of 1997, however, the Ministry of Indian and Northern Affairs rejected the petition on the grounds that the cemetery lands had been

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{11}{Scholars who worked with these materials and consulted with Wyandot/Wyandotte in the Detroit River region, Kansas, and Oklahoma include Charles Aubrey Buser, Patricia Anderson Buser, John L. Steckley, and Charles Garrad. Correspondence between the Buser’s and the people named in this paragraph can be found in the Charles and Patricia Buser Collection in the Ohio State University Rare Books and Manuscripts Library.}
\footnote{13}{Although the term “Indian band” (or “\textit{bande de la Première Nation}”) remains a legal term in Canadian law, “First Nations” (or “\textit{bande de la Première Nation}”) is more commonly used by the federal government, First Nations peoples, and the broader Canadian public. I have chosen to use the words “Band” and “Indian” in this paragraph since they correspond to the 19th-century terminology that is embedded in Canadian law, the 1985 amendments, and the petition for restoration of the Wyandot Indian Band of Anderdon.}
\end{footnotes}
surrendered to the Crown in 1833. Since the Ministry failed to elaborate on the terms and timing of the “surrender,” this pathway toward reconstituting an Indian band reached a seemingly permanent impasse.14

Restoring “Indian band” status in Canada would have certainly advanced efforts to strengthen the Wyandot community in the Detroit River area. However, recognition from Canadian officials was not the only way to build community and establish a land base. In regard to the former, the renamed Wyandot Nation of Anderdon received a profound affirmation in the summer of 1999 when they joined with the Wyandot Nation of Kansas, the Wyandotte Nation of Oklahoma, and the Huron-Wendat Nation (located in Wendake, Quebec) to hold a Feast of Souls ceremony at the site of Ossossané in present-day Midland, Ontario. Ossossané was the site of a well-documented, ten-days-long Feast of Souls ceremony in 1636, and was located in the heart of Wendake (the Wyandot, Wyandotte, or Wendat homeland) prior to the dispersal of the mid-17th century. The focal point of the ceremony was a large ossuary pit where the remains of people from Ossossané as well as affiliated towns and villages were interred together—and thus the living and the dead, and the peoples with whom they were related, were united in a common space and through a collective ceremony.15

The reinternment followed the recent adoption of a new policy by the Royal Ontario Museum (ROM) to acknowledge that Aboriginal human remains must be treated with great care and respect. The ROM is committed to the repatriation of human remains in its care, at the request of Canadian Aboriginal groups. In this process, the spiritual requirements of the Aboriginal peoples and federal and provincial legal requirements must be respected.16

Over the previous decade the Museum had addressed First Nations concerns about human remains and cultural materials on an ad hoc basis, and occasionally partnered with U.S. museums in matters relating to the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990 (NAGPRA). However, the new policy marked a significant shift because it

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14 See Smrke, “Natives bid to restore band status;” and Bruce G. Trigger, “The Original Iroquoians: Huron, Petun, and Neutral,” in Edward S. Rogers and Donald B. Smith, eds., Aboriginal Ontario: Historical Perspectives on the First Nations (Toronto: Dundurn Press Limited, 1994), 61. The argument that the Huron Reserve was surrendered to the Crown in 1833 is almost certainly specious. Moreover, existing documents suggest that the nine efforts to obtain a legal “surrender” of the Reserve between 1831 and 1836 were duplicitous and founded on efforts to divide Wyandot leaders and misrepresent their stated concerns. Even the Bagot Commission (1842-1844), which strongly advocated for de-culturation and assimilation of First Nations peoples, concluded that the circumstances surrounding the “surrender” of the Huron Reserve were “peculiar,” and “not clearly established.” See Ronda Telford, “How the West Was Won,” 337-353; quotations from the Bagot Commission on p. 345. Also see R. J. Surtees, Indian Land Surrenders in Ontario, 1763-1867 (Ottawa: Ministry of Indian and Northern Affairs, 1984), 58, 98, 126-127.


Chapter Ten

dealt with a large and well-known collection, it was associated with a national historic
site (i.e., the Ossassané National Historic Site of Canada), and the continued storage of
human remains in the museum’s basement was increasingly viewed as an egregious
affront to the Wendat.17

For the Huron-Wendat Nation, the reinternment was a long-desired restoration
that required the consecration of a Feast of Souls ceremony. Like the ceremony that
occurred in 1636, this event would also bring together related communities: the Huron-
Wendat Nation, the Wyandotte Nation of Oklahoma, the Wyandot Nation of Kansas, and
the Wyandot Nation of Anderdon. As Kathryn Magee notes, the ceremony was also
intended “to renew the Wendat Confederacy on twenty-first century terms.” More than
350 years after their dispersal, and three centuries after the Wyandot came to live in the
Detroit River region, these “disparate groups across North America continued to …
identify themselves as” a common people. The 1999 Feast of Souls joined these diasporic
peoples “together through the same avenues as their seventeenth-century ancestors,
drawing upon the power, traditions, and culture of [their] Confederacy before its
dispersal.”18

The Feast of Souls ceremony and reunion was a profound event for all who joined
together in the multi-day event. The power of the occasion also resulted in a joint
statement from the leaders of all four nations, in which they pledged to collectively work
for the welfare of the people of the Confederacy. With endless patience, may we fulfill our duty, and may our firmness be tempered with tenderness
and compassion …. [I]f any nation of the Confederacy should ever need help, let it call out the others to come to its aid. We vow to attempt to work
together in a way that the embers of long ago council fires may be fanned
into a flame of kinship, culture and love that will warm countless
generations of Wendat people.19

The statement, and the spirit of the occasion in which it was made, has been
reaffirmed at subsequent events where representatives from some of the four nations were
present. Perhaps the most significant reunion occurred in September 2015 when leaders
from all four nations gathered in Gibraltar, MI to hold a dedication ceremony for the
acquisition of a 15-acre parcel that had been part of Big Rock or Brownstown, where the
Wyandot lit their Council Fire in the village led by Tohunehowetu (aka Adam Brown).
The renamed Wyandot of Anderdon Nation have since developed a plan to turn the land
into a site for the public presentation of Wyandot history, culture, and environmental
stewardship. Known as the Six Points Property, the site is also intended to be “the future
home of the Wyandot of Anderdon Nation,” and will include a separate area for
ceremonial use, gatherings, and tribal offices. For logistical and financial reasons, the

17 Mima Kapches, “Ossossané Ossuary: The Circle Closes,” 7-10; and Sioui, Huron-Wendat, 47-49. For
popular coverage of the site’s excavation in 1947, see J. Herbert Cranston, “The Lost Souls of Ossossane,”
Maclean’s, October 15, 1947, 24-32.
18 For an excellent overview of the 1999 Feast of Souls ceremony, see Magee, “Dispersed, But Not
Destroyed,” 358-366; quotations from pp. 358-359. Also see Seeman, The Huron-Wendat Feast of the
Dead, 140-144.
19 A copy of the signed document can be found at Wyandot of Anderdon Nation: Wendat Confederacy
land was purchased by the federally recognized Wyandotte of Oklahoma Nation and then leased to the Wyandot of Anderdon Nation—which is recognized by the State of Michigan as a State Historic Tribe, but within the context of federal law is simply considered a 501(c)(3) non-profit organization. While the Wyandotte of Oklahoma Nation’s ready access to funds, and a more certain purchase agreement helped seal the deal, the arrangement also affirmed the pledge that members of the Huron-Wendat/Wyandot/Wyandotte Confederacy would aid each other.20

In the years since the Feast of Souls ceremony at Ossossané, the Wyandot of Anderdon Nation became the successor to the Wyandot Nation of Anderdon (née Wyandot Indian Band of Anderdon). Like the group that formed in the 1980s, the Wyandot of Anderdon Nation continues to work towards gaining formal recognition as a distinct nation that directly engages with the federal government. While the government in question is now the United States of America rather than the Dominion of Canada, the goal is essentially the same for a community with deep connections on both sides of the riverine border. For almost three decades, the long effort to gain federal recognition (from Canada or the United States) has been an ongoing process of community rebuilding, cultural revitalization, and demonstrating the sovereignty of people with a long history of treaty making with the United States, France, Great Britain, Canada, and a host of Native nations. Federal recognition would further advance and solidify these efforts, and ensure a fuller exercise of sovereignty within a homeland that long predates

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the establishment of the United States. In announcing the acquisition of the Six Points property and the Master Plan for its transformation, the Wyandot of Anderdon Nation presented a very clear vision of the past, present and the future. “This land was lost to us [in the St. Mary’s Treaty of 1818], but our ties to it have never been broken. Our Nation has proudly regained this land and is reclaiming our heritage in hopes of educating our children and grandchildren, and making our presence known to the world.”

Along with efforts to revitalize their political and cultural institutions, the Wyandot of Anderdon Nation has also taken an active interest in projects related to environmental restoration and historical interpretation in the Detroit River region. While this includes partnerships with state, county, and municipal agencies, some of the most consequential projects have involved collaborations with National Park Service at various sites in the River Raisin National Battlefield Park and with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service in the Detroit River International Wildlife Refuge. One of the most significant and ongoing partnerships between the Wyandot of Anderdon Nation and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service dates back to the early 2000s and involves the protection and restoration of Humbug Marsh. Located near the former site of Big Rock and the Six Points property, the Humbug Marsh Unit harbors the “last [mile] of natural shoreline on the U.S. side” of the Detroit River and is a designated “Wetland of International Importance.” Because of its proximity to Big Rock and Six Points, the wealth of ecological diversity within Humbug Marsh, and the fact that the visual, biological, and cultural qualities of the marsh made it the last stretch of the Detroit River that ancestors of the Wyandot might still recognize, the Wyandot of Anderdon became actively involved in the push to acquire the site from a developer and make it a centerpiece of the new wildlife refuge. In subsequent years this relationship with the Refuge and Fish and Wildlife staff has become a partnership and a friendship that continues to grow.

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Figure 10.3: Six Points Master Plan: A Vision for the Future Home of the Wyandot of Anderdon Nation. The Six Points project will involve land conservation, habitat restoration, protection of archaeological resources and historically significant spaces, sharing of Wyandot values with visitors, and provide a key location for ceremonies, gatherings, and council meetings. Though open to the public, the structures and locales identified by the numbers 9-14 in the right-hand margin will be reserved for members of the Wyandot of Anderdon Nation and their guests. The lower portions of the site are mostly wetlands that include a turtle pond and views toward the Detroit River.

Source: University of Michigan, School of Natural Resources and Environment Master’s Practicum, Six Points Property Master Plan: A vision for the future home of the Wyandot of Anderdon Nation (2016).

Relations with the National Park Service and staff at the River Raisin National Battlefield Park have been even more extensive. Ted Roll, the Grand Chief of the Wyandot of Anderdon Nation is an Executive Board Member of the River Raisin National Battlefield Park Foundation—which cooperates with and assists the National Park Service in management and public outreach programs. Members of the Wyandot of Anderdon Nation have also participated in public presentations, educational programs, and ceremonies at various park sites. In the summer of 2015, some three months before the ceremony at the Six Points property, leaders from each nation of the Wyandot Confederacy came together at the River Raisin National Battlefield Park headquarters to complete work on a program for educators entitled the “Wyandotte Journey Towards Understanding.” The program, which included site visits to multiple units of River Raisin National Battlefield Park, as well as to Fallen Timbers Battlefield and Fort Miamis National Historic Site in Maumee, Ohio, received glowing reviews from participants—nearly all of whom noted how their historical understanding of the region had been
enlarged and transformed by Native perspectives. The “Wyandotte Journey Towards Understanding” also served as the basis of a program and tour in mid-September 2016 for attendees of the annual meeting of the American Association of State and Local History that was held in Detroit. Entitled “War and Peace: Following in the Footsteps of the Huron-Wyandot.” The program was also well received by this group of academics and professional historians.

In September 2018, representatives from the Wyandot of Anderdon Nation and the Wyandotte Nation of Oklahoma came together for the bicentennial of the treaty that resulted in the cession of Big Rock and Maguaga, and the relocation of the “Michigan Wyandot” to the Huron Reserve. To mark the significance of the treaty and celebrate the return to Six Points and Big Rock, the two nations jointly hosted a gathering at the Six Points property and conducted a ceremony at a nearby park in Gibraltar. Staff from River Raisin National Battlefield Park assisted with the second event, which was also attended by Susan White, the Refuge Manager for the Detroit River International Wildlife Refuge. The ceremony was centered on the presentation and blessing of three wampum belts. The first commemorated the 1818 treaty, the resilience of the Wyandot of Anderdon, and their 2018 return to Big Rock. The second belt focused on the 1843 removal of the Wyandot from the Upper Sandusky and the Huron reserves to Kansas, and the subsequent persistence and growth of their descendants across 175 years. The third belt honored the Wyandot/Wyandotte/Wendat Confederacy, from the time its members lived in their ancient homelands, through the many travails and separations that followed their first encounters with Europeans, to the enduring bonds that recently brought them together at Ossossané and the commitments they made to work for the benefit of future generations.

The powerful symbolism of these three belts is well captured in the descriptive explanation that was given during the presentation of the first belt.

The 200th commemorative wampum belt was woven by over 400 Southeast Michigan youth in a purple field emphasizing the horror and tragedies of losing the villages of Brownstown and Monguagon after an intense 33-year struggle to retain them. On each end of the belt, fragmented pieces of the Treaty of Greenville wampum belt are [depicted] to illustrate the broken treaties and worthless words that were inscribed in it. The two squares represent the two villages and the nearly 1,200 Wyandotte that lived in the villages when they were taken from the Wyandot in 1818 by the United States under the leadership of Territorial Governor Lewis Cass. The six-sided star [near the center of the belt] symbolizes the Six Points development and the return of the Wyandot to this site of the Confederated Council Fire at Big Rock (or Brownstown) 200 years after the Treaty of St. Mary’s. The six points [of the star] represent the traditional Wyandot prayer to the North, South, East, West, Heaven, and Mother Earth as a thank you to the Great Creator for

protecting the Wyandot people and keeping them strong during the 200-year journey since leaving their villages.

In the middle of the [white] six points design is one purple bead representing the heart and soul of the Wyandot as one people…, protected by the Great Creator. [Two broad rows of white beads running across the center portion of the belt show] the open lines of understanding and healing [that are required] as together we journey to understand and share for the benefit of future generations. Between each symbol on the belt there are seven beads representing the seven generations who came before us making our journey possible and the seven generations to come, reminding us to be good stewards of Mother Earth and to remember the lasting impacts of decisions we make today on the future generations.\(^24\)

The place, timing, and tone of this commemorative event powerfully illustrates the enduring significance of the Battles of Frenchtown and the broader contexts in which they occurred. For the Wyandot, those contexts include their status as the Keeper of the Council Fire before and during the Sixty Years’ War for the Great Lakes (1754-1814). The Wyandot were also deeply involved with the battles along the River Raisin, their villages of Big Rock and Maguaga were sites of conflict, and Big Rock was central to the strategic concerns of the British, the U.S., and the Native Confederacy through most of 1812 and 1813. In short, the Wyandot were one of the most engaged and most affected groups in the Northwest Theater of the War of 1812. The seventh-generation references that were made during the wampum belt ceremony at Gibraltar also serve as reminders that such concerns long preceded the War of 1812 and continued long after. Native peoples in the early 19\(^{th}\) century, regardless of how they chose to engage or avoid war, invariably considered their deep obligations to past and future generations—as did their forebears and descendants. Such concerns also guided their approach to the profound challenges that came with subsequent land cession and removal treaties.\(^25\)

For the Wyandot and other Native peoples, the War of 1812 was the culmination of a sixty-year struggle to ensure the ancient past would carry through to future generations. As the events and memories embedded in the 1818—2018 bicentennial wampum belt attest, this struggle resulted in horror, profound loss, displacement, and dispossession. While these post-war traumas resulted from U.S. policies toward American Indians and—to a somewhat lesser degree—British and Canadian policies toward First Nations peoples, they were greatly exacerbated by widespread prejudices against Native peoples, the duplicity of government officials, and the constant push to convert reservation lands into private property. Like other Native groups in North America.


\(^{25}\) Weighing decisions in light of how well they comport with the concerns of seven generations into the past and their effects on the next seven generations is common to many Native peoples in North America.
America, the Wyandot in the Detroit River sometimes became invisible to their non-Indigenous neighbors in order to survive these multiple threats. Yet even as they “hid in plain sight,” they sustained a persistent and tenacious attachment to their home territory and to their former role as Keepers of the Council Fire.  

The 2018 wampum belt and the recent acquisition of the Six Points property are the fruits of this tenacity, and powerful testimony to the multi-generation effort to shape a viable future within the Wyandot homeland. This process remains ongoing, and is also evident in the Wyandot of Anderdon Nation’s collaborations with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Park Service: two agencies that are committed to restoring and managing the environmental, cultural, and historical legacies that define the Detroit River region. Because the Wyandot are so embedded in the landscapes and histories of the area, and so connected to past and future generations, they “remember the Raisin” like no other people. Through two centuries of horror and healing, they have come to embody the significance of the battles and their historical legacies. This is not to suggest that the Wyandot represent the past in a way that echoes William Faulkner’s oft-quoted observation that the “past is never dead. It’s not even past.” Rather, it is to suggest something more significant and more lasting. While Faulkner alluded to the ways the past continually haunts the present, a concern for the next seven generations implies that the present is a promise to an ever-living future. In other words, the degree to which the Wyandot embody the historical significance of the Battles of Frenchtown is roughly the same as the effects their decisions will have on their homeland and their descendants over the next seven generations.

27 It is important to note that the Wyandot of Anderdon Nation’s ongoing process of community revitalization also parallels recent historical trends in the Great Lakes region and across the country. Most of these developments followed a period of Native activism from the late 1960s through the 1980s, which laid the groundwork for several key developments in the 1990s. Among these were a series of efforts by American Indian communities to exercise greater self-determination and more directly address long-standing concerns over self-governance, the exercise of traditional practices within their homelands, and fuller recognition of their inherent sovereignty as recognized in treaties with the United States. Some of this coincided with federal policy developments that included the Native American Graves and Repatriation Act (1990), President Clinton’s “Memorandum on Government-to-Government Relations with Native American Tribal Governments” (1994) and subsequent Executive Order 13175 on Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments (2000). The 1990s also witnessed the restoration and recognition of nation-to-nation relations with a number of American Indian communities through the process of federal recognition. Among these were five of the twelve federally recognized tribal nations in Michigan. For broader examinations of these matters, see Stephen Cornell, The Return of the Native: American Indian Political Resurgence (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); Joane Nagel, American Indian Ethnic Renewal: Red Power and the Resurgence of Identity and Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); Joanne Barker, Native Acts: Law, Recognition, and Cultural Authenticity (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011); Dennis F. Kelley, Tradition, Performance, and Religion in Native America: Ancestral Ways, Modern Selves (New York: Routledge, 2014). The five tribal nations in Michigan that gained federal recognition in the 1990s are the Little River Band of Ottawa Indians, the Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians, the Match-e-be-nash-she-wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians of Michigan, the Nottawaseppi Huron Band of the Pottawatomi, and the Pokagon Band of Potawatomi Indians (Michigan and Indiana). The seven groups with a longer established federal recognition are the Bay Mills Indian Community, the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians, the Hannahville Indian Community, the Keweenaw Bay Indian Community, the Lac Vieux Desert Band of Lake Superior Indians, and the Ottawa-Chippewa Tribe of Michigan.
Remaking: Frenchtown becomes Monroe

Much like the Removal Era and the saga of the Detroit River Wyandot, the development of Monroe, Michigan, also illustrates the consequences of the War of 1812 and the U.S. victory in the Northwest theater. By 1816, after concerns about the possibility of renewed conflict in Michigan Territory had died down, the habitants of the community they referred to as sur la Rivière Aux Raisins were committed to rebuilding their homes and livelihoods to pre-war conditions. Former Yankee residents like John Anderson also returned, and were soon followed by a number of families and single men from Ohio and the eastern states. These newcomers viewed southeastern Michigan as a place to seek new opportunities, but they moved to the Frenchtown area for a particular reason. It was one of the few areas in Michigan Territory where land had been surveyed and deeded in the years before the war—and where much of it was available for purchase. While the General Land Office also conducted surveys in adjoining areas beginning in 1817, these lands would not be ready for patents or deeds for a few more years. Consequently, most of the newcomers focused their attention on parcels immediately south of the River Raisin and to the west of the old core of the habitant community.\[28\]

The new arrivals, who the habitants often referred to as Bostonnois (“Bostoners”), soon outnumbered their French-speaking neighbors. In just a few years the growing community increasingly reflected the Protestant “Yankee” quality of individualism and its association with market-based relationships and pursuits. The mostly informal designation of “Frenchtown” also gave way to a new name that seemed to confirm the changing social order along the River Raisin. In July 1817, Governor Cass divided Wayne County to create Monroe County, which he named in honor of former Secretary of War and recently inaugurated President James Monroe—who was scheduled to visit Michigan the following month.\[29\] Territorial Secretary William Woodbridge subsequently designated the general environs of Frenchtown as the county seat, and declared a 12.5 square mile area centered on the home of François Lassalle to be the “Town of Monroe.” Official references to the name “Frenchtown” continued for a few more years with the designation of the Frenchtown post office (the second oldest in the Territory), which was formally changed to the Monroe of Michigan Territory post office in 1824.\[30\]

By this time the Catholic habitants had become a minority in an otherwise Protestant town with New England values. This is not to suggest that habitants and


\[29\] President Monroe was then on a “Goodwill Tour” of the Northeast and the lower Great Lakes, and came to Detroit for a few days in mid-August. John McClelland Bulkley, *History of Monroe County, Michigan: A Narrative Account of its Historical Progress, its People, and its Principal Interests*, vol. 1 (Chicago: The Lewis Publishing Company, 1913), 416-17.

Yankees did not pursue the same commercial goals, or that Bostonnois somehow exploited their more established neighbors. The latter had the advantage of relatives and close connections on both sides of the Detroit River, and some habitants carried on a mostly exclusive trade with Wyandot, Bodéwadmi, and Odawa communities. These connections were envied by some Yankee merchants, and likely contributed to the suspicions of new arrivals who questioned the national and even racial loyalties of their French-speaking neighbors. Nevertheless, the habitants persisted in their home community much as their ribbon farms remained embedded in Monroe’s property lines and transportation routes.  

Through the early 1820s, most population growth in southeastern Michigan occurred in areas to the west and northwest of Monroe where soils were better drained and larger parcels could be acquired in areas that followed the cadastral survey. As Monroe became a regional entrepot for these interior agricultural areas, flour mills went in to operation on the lower Raisin and a toll bridge was constructed across the river to facilitate transportation to the north and south. In the mid 1820s John Anderson formed a company with several others in Monroe to construct a small harbor at the mostly French-speaking community on La Plaisance Bay. Their success was announced in the *Michigan Sentinel*, Monroe’s first newspaper and the second oldest in Michigan, on June 23, 1827.

> Our enterprising fellow citizens Miller and Germain, have recently shipped from La Plaisance Bay, for the city of New York, two hundred barrels of flour, manufactured at their mills …. This is claimed to be the first flour shipped from Michigan and speaks loudly of our manufacturing and commercial prospects, and is an evidence of the great change that has taken place in this section of the country within a few years past.

With the only Michigan port on Lake Erie, Monroe became a regional processing and shipping center with direct connections to New York by way of the Erie Canal.  

These advantages of location were further augmented by a key federal infrastructure project that put Monroe at the center of a regional economic boom in the 1830s. In the years immediately after the War of 1812, Hull’s Trace (the first federal road in the United States) was improved between Fort Meigs and Monroe, but the stretch between Detroit and the River Raisin was in poor shape—with several stretches nearly impassable during wet seasons. In response to complaints from Monroe and Detroit, the federal government rebuilt the “trace” between 1824-1829. Some of the worst stretches were moved inland from the marshes along Lake Erie and the mouth of the Detroit River, and the entire route was transformed into a thirty-three-foot wide, well-graded roadway from the toll bridge on the River Raisin to the north end of Detroit. This greatly eased travel and more closely linked Monroe with Detroit’s growing connections to the new agricultural communities that were forming in the Grand, Kalamazoo, and Joseph river basins to the west and northwest.  

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Michigan Fever

Completion of the road also helped fuel “Michigan Fever,” a frenzied period of plat surveys, land sales, and property speculation that followed the period of removal treaties in southern Michigan. Vast tracts of public lands attracted swarms of new comers looking to acquire property, causing Michigan’s population to grow from approximately 30,000 in 1830 to more than 170,000 in 1837. This rapid increase was accompanied by an exponential growth in annual land sales from 147,062 acres in 1830 to a peak of 4,189,823 acres in 1836. With the bulk of these transactions handled by the federal land offices in Detroit and Monroe, the acreage encompassed a broad swath of land from the southern end of Lake Huron to the southeastern shore of Lake Michigan. Fueled by unsustainable speculation, these markets imploded in early 1837—soon after Michigan gained Statehood on January 26 and just as financial crises in Europe and the Americas tightened credit around the world. In the United States the collapse of the Michigan land market helped trigger the “Panic of 1837,” a period financial crisis that resulted in widespread bank collapses and closures. The “Panic” soon gave way to a deep recession, marked by nearly seven years of chronic deflation and high unemployment.34

At the height of the land speculation frenzy and subsequent financial panic, Monroe and the Detroit River area were caught up in the so-called “Toledo War” (1835-1836) and the “Patriot War” (1838). The first related to an unresolved dispute over the boundary between Michigan Territory and Ohio that resulted from cartographic errors in the late 18th century. While the dispute was real, and even delayed Michigan statehood by a year and a half, the “war” had only one (non-fatal) casualty. This occurred in July 1835 when Monroe County Deputy Sheriff Joseph Wood was stabbed with a pen knife.

while trying to make an arrest in Toledo, Ohio. The “Patriot War” was a more serious affair that was tangentially related to a broader rebellion against Crown rule in Upper Canada. The namesakes of this “war” were the “Hunter Patriots,” self-styled militias from the United States who viewed that Canadian rebellion as an opportunity to “liberate” Canada from the British. In the Detroit River region, the “war” involved three conflicts: the Battle of Windsor, where “Hunter Patriots” were defeated by British forces near Windsor and by U.S. forces in Michigan, and the Battles of Fighting Island and Pelee Island where the “Patriots” were routed and forced to retreat to the United States.\(^{35}\)

The conflicts of the 1830s partly reflected the legacies of the Northwest Ordinance (1787) in the rendering of poorly understood geographic features, and the War of 1812 in the Hunter Patriots’ echoing of General William Hull’s triumphant expectations of an easy conquest. Unlike those earlier events, however, they were mere tempests in a teapot—and any turmoil associated with the recent “wars” was soon forgotten as land markets began to stabilize and credit became more available. By the late 1830s, the residents of Monroe could already sense a new era of stable economic growth. To bolster these hopeful expectations, the City of Monroe invested in a key infrastructure project that would more tightly bind the area to national markets—and thus expand and diversify the local economy. The initial phase occurred in 1838, when the City issued bonds to finance the straightening and dredging of the River Raisin to create a 1,300-foot navigable channel from near the site of the 1813 battles downstream to the edge of the marshes. From there, the “City Canal,” as it was known, would connect with the 4,000-foot long United States Canal, a federally financed project then under construction. After some delays, both projects were completed in 1843—the year that the national economy finally shifted out of its chronic recession. With a direct waterborne connection to the commerce of Lake Erie and—via the Erie Canal—the eastern seaboard, Monroe was primed to take advantage of a resurgent national economy.\(^{36}\)

The “Floral City”

Throughout the 1840s, Monroe increased in population and developed an increasingly diversified economy. Less an adjunct of Detroit and Toledo, the Monroe was able to develop local industries that included fisheries, brick factories, pulp and paper mills, as well as furniture and other manufactories for the regional market. The city also remained an important transshipment area for agricultural produce, including processed grains as well as fresh and dried fruits. In all regards, these various enterprises benefited from access to steamboats on Lake Erie and newly developing networks of railroad connections across the Midwest. In the 1850s Monroe became renowned as the “Floral City”—both for the abundance of lotus in the lakeshore marshes as well as the number of


nurseries in the town that shipped ornamental trees and plants across much of the nation and into Canada. One of the more famous nurseries in Monroe belonged to Israel Ilgenfritz, who owned one of the largest nursery businesses in the United States and grew much of his stock on the easternmost part of the Frenchtown battlefield—where the prairie met the wooded border of the lake marshes.\footnote{Dunbar and May, \textit{Michigan}, 164-68; Bulkley, \textit{History of Monroe County}, 536-597; and Graydon M. Meints, \textit{Michigan Railroads and Railroad Companies} (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1993), 2-27.}

![Figure 10.5: Birds-eye View of Monroe, ca. 1860s. Oval shape corresponds to the core area of the Battles of Frenchtown and shows the Ilgenfritz Nursery on the right (eastern side) of the battleground. Factores are on the south side of the river and downriver from the city center—which is not shown in this image. Detail of \textit{Monroe: Monroe Co Michigan, 1866} (Drawn and Published by A. Ruger: Chicago Lithographing Co., 1866). Source: Library of Congress.]

Through the mid 19th century, the population of Monroe more than doubled from 1,700 in 1840 to about 3,900 in 1860. This increase, coupled with economic diversification, was reflected in the demographic profile of the city. Besides Anglo-American “Yankees” and the descendants of French \textit{Canadiens}, Monroe also had growing numbers of German immigrants and Irish from the Northeast. While most of the newcomers were laborers, some were entrepreneurs or professionals who primarily worked within their communities. African Americans and Native peoples who usually do not make it into the historical record were also in Monroe. American Indians were likely seasonal residents and, as occurred in other parts of the United States in the mid 19th century, may well have worked individually or in small family groups at orchards and nurseries. As was the case in Detroit, the African American community in Monroe had ties and shared history with families on the Canadian side of the Detroit River. Monroe was also one of the penultimate stops on the Underground Railroad for escaped slaves on their way to Canada by way of Detroit. The labor of Monroe’s African American residents would have followed patterns typical in the region, with men often working in construction or performing manual labor, and women taking on the household and family chores of white families while maintaining their own gardens and household. For every distinct group in Monroe during the mid 19th century, status, ethnicity, and race roughly
corresponded to the types of work and wage scales that depressed or augmented the economic opportunities of different groups and individuals.\textsuperscript{38}

![Image](image.png)

**Figure 10.6: “Monroe from the Battle-Ground,” ca. 1860s.** View presents the River Raisin and the battleground area, which was fronted by the two homes along the fenceline. The road sweeping through the lower center of the image dates to the early 19\textsuperscript{th} century. Source: Benson J. Lossing, *Pictorial Field-Book of the War of 1812* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1869), 169.

Like most all of Michigan, Monroe sent young soldiers, nurses, and supplies in support of the Union cause during the Civil War. The two most famous residents to head off to the battlefields were the newlyweds George Armstrong Custer and Elizabeth “Libbie” Custer (née Bacon). Unlike most officers’ wives, Elizabeth Custer lived with her husband during the war and through the rest of his military career—and contributed informally to the running of large encampments behind the battle lines. In all, Monroe County sent approximately 2,000 men to the war, and lost approximately 436—in battle and as prisoners of war, but most frequently from disease, illness, or accidents.\textsuperscript{39} In the decade following the war, and through the rest of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, the demographic and economic profiles of Monroe remained fairly stable. This contrasts markedly with Detroit, which grew six-fold between 1860 and 1900 (45,619-285,704), and Toledo,


which increased ten-fold (13,768-131,822). While the city and county of Monroe continued to prosper, they increasingly fell within the orbit of the growing metropolitan centers to the north and south.\textsuperscript{40}

**An Industrial City:**

Much as habitation remade the former village sites along the Nmézibe (Sturgeon River) into the settlement sur la Riviére aux Raisins, and Yankees would layout the town of Monroe to the southwest of the battle site, the small city on the River Raisin underwent another profound transformation in the early 20\textsuperscript{th} century. With its population still hovering around 5,000, Monroe nevertheless became an industrial city—with a primary focus on the manufacturing of paper and fiber board products. As the national market for paper goods grew exponentially in the late 19\textsuperscript{th} and early 20\textsuperscript{th} centuries, existing mills expanded as new ones were constructed to supply paper and cardboard for magazines, business products, government records, packaging and a host of other mundane uses in a rapidly expanding national economy. While most of these were located downwind of the city center, toward the canal docks on the south side of the river, the largest new paper mill was constructed on the north side of the river on the site of the former core area of Frenchtown. The first buildings went up in 1911, but the plant would continue to expand until it covered most of the battle site by the mid 20\textsuperscript{th} century. The mill remained in use under different ownerships until 1995, when it was largely abandoned.\textsuperscript{41}

With excellent transportation networks and almost unlimited access to water for cooling and manufacturing, Monroe’s industrial base quickly grew and diversified beyond paper. In the 1910s Brisk Blast began producing tire pumps for the burgeoning number of automobile owners and repair shops, and subsequently changed its focus and name to produce Monroe shock absorbers for automobiles, trucks and trains. Other suppliers of parts for Detroit-based auto manufacturers also took root in Monroe, as did a steel mill that produced raw material for other industrial manufacturers. As part of a larger wave of labor organization during the Great Depression, a strike at the Newton Steel Mill in Monroe briefly caught the nation’s attention. The strike ultimately collapsed in a melee with the Monroe Police Department, but the corporation—along with the rest of the steel industry—was eventually unionized by 1942. Industry and labor remained a mainstay of Monroe through much of the second half of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, but one Monroe-based corporation best captured the ideal of suburban leisure and comfort in


By the end of the 20th century, Monroe’s situation as a manufacturing center was coming to an end. Like the rest of the so-called “Rust Belt” in the Northeast and the Lower Great Lakes, Monroe experienced population decline, unemployment, a diminished tax base, and an aging infrastructure in need of repair. The source of these changes are manifold, but their origins date back to the mid-20th century when massive federal projects like dams, highways, and military bases, and defense plants triggered the move of industries and people to western metropolitan centers. Later, the rise of global trade in the post-Cold War era, along with increased automation, silenced factories and undermined the industrial workforce. Monroe resembled other “Rust Belt” communities in another important respect: it inherited a century of industrial by-products that had spoiled the River Raisin, polluted soils, and left vacant buildings steeped in toxic materials. In response to these conditions, the City of Monroe (which adopted the slogan “Resilient Monroe!”) determined to make a virtue of necessity. The long process of environmental mitigation and brownfield restoration, along with the removal of abandoned factory buildings, could become the basis for an urban renewal program that combined outdoor recreation, heritage tourism, urban open spaces, and downtown re-development. The portions of the River Raisin Battlefield that lay beneath the old facilities of the River Raisin Paper Company, along with associated parklands, was
identified as a cornerstone of this revitalization. In these efforts, Monroe came to epitomize a new movement in the early 21st century that has seen communities across much of the United States actively reshape themselves in accordance with their unique histories and physical settings.\textsuperscript{43}

**Remembering**

In 1961, to commemorate its 50th Anniversary, the River Raisin Paper Company published a brochure titled “50 Years of Continuous Progress.” Along with calling attention to a 1904 monument that had been placed near the battle site, and was very near the entrance to the company’s main plant, the brochure debuted an artist’s rendering of core area of Frenchtown in 1813 as seen from the south side of the river. Along with a brief description of the battles and their aftermath, the brochure also noted how “Remember the Raisin!” was a rallying cry at the Battle of the Thames. The author then brought history to the present, as manifested in the state-of-the-art paper mill.

The changes from the frontier days of Monroe to the present are symbolic of the Nation’s growth. Today, the battlefield of the River Raisin is the site of the River Raisin Paper Company. The manufacturing plants of the company stand exactly on the spot where the picket fence enclosed the American prisoners.

The brochure is not unlike other brief celebratory pieces that are commissioned for a corporate milestone. Yet the brochure also illustrates a broader truth about commemoration; it very often construes the past to speak directly to the immediate needs of the present.\textsuperscript{44}

Aside from the day on which the events occurred, the first commemorations of the battles of the River Raisin and their aftermath would have involved celebration and boasting, as well as the showing, giving, and trading of prizes taken. In the coming weeks and months as warriors returned home, they would present a trophy, either a scalp or a possession from the vanquished, or perhaps a prisoner. Feasting, stories, and dances would celebrate valiance and victory. For the habitants on the River Raisin, the battles and their aftermath were an unmitigated disaster. For nearly a week their lives had been a recurring cycle of fear, hopeful expectation, violence, death, and destruction. The memories persisted as a collective trauma that was further deepened over the next year with each new alarm about British or Native foraging parties and the expected abuses that would ensue. The Kentuckians taken prisoner on January 22 may have been inclined to forget the defeat and focus more on thoughts of home. Those who survived the rout and slaughter on the south side of the river were likely in shock during their first nights at Fort Amherstburg, but some took to their journals to recall lost comrades and friends. Lastly, the men who witnessed and survived the killings on January 23 probably had no

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\textsuperscript{44} *50 Years of Progress* (River Raisin Paper Company, Monroe, Michigan), n.p.
desire to “remember the Raisin” for some time. These were part of the mix of feelings, then, that would inform the earliest formal commemorations.

Re-covering the Dead

Over the next fifty years, the most poignant commemorations of the battles and their aftermath involved the interment of human remains. The habitants who surreptitiously buried the dead likely performed some ceremony, which solemnified the act as well as the memories of January 1813. To give some kind of final rites brought peace to the living and retrieved the latter from the horrors of their demise. Similar sentiments were at play when Colonel Johnson brought a detachment to rebury exposed remains in June 1813, but the process of gathering disturbed bones and placing them in a mass grave was perhaps more galling than depressing. The act of remembering the Raisin on that day involved digging into the ground and holding the bones of fellow Kentuckians. This experience was both personal and collective, and made any desire for vengeance more visceral. When Governor Shelby’s forces came to the River Raisin in early October, the same rituals and sentiments from June were repeated. This time, however, the event involved hundreds who were enroute to a battle that would avenge the fallen. In a matter of days they would shout “Remember the Raisin!” and rush British troops trying to make a stand on the road near Moraviantown.45

While all of the various U.S. regulars and militia who were present for the Battle of the Thames rallied to the cry, it had more meaning for those fighting with Shelby, Johnson, and other units from Kentucky. The defeat on the River Raisin and the subsequent killing of prisoners involved their fellows, and it was Kentucky militiamen who suffered so many casualties at Fort Meigs. The Battle on the Thames would have great strategic importance, but it was also a personal battle for many of the young men from Kentucky. Many of their families had been fighting the Shawnee and other Native groups for generations, and so these young men were now living the tales they had learned as children about honor, violence, and Native warfare. Killing Tecumseh would avenge the River Raisin, but it would also balance the ledger of past conflicts in the Kentuckians favor.46

In coming years, memories of the battles and their aftermath would find their way into publication—but commemorations as such continued to focus on finding remains and giving them a proper burial. On July 4, 1818, a group of men went with John Anderson from the Fourth of July celebration at Governor Cass’s to Monroe where they joined a group of residents to unearth the bones that Johnson’s troops had buried and

removed them to the cemetery. A month later they were disinterred and taken to the Protestant cemetery in Detroit; and then again in 1834 they were exhumed and sent to the Kentucky State Cemetery in Frankfort. In 1848, the bodies of eighteen Kentucky soldiers who died during the battle on January 18, 1813, were found in a common grave during roadwork. They were identified by one of the veterans who was on the burial detail, and sent to Frankfort. As Monroe continued to develop, similar reminders of the battles were periodically uncovered, including a common grave in February 1871 and the remains of two bodies found in 1910 during the construction of the River Raisin Paper Mill.47

A Spirit of Celebration

While every recovery of human remains awakened memories of a war that most Americans rarely considered anymore, the 1871 discovery of the multiple remains marked a shift to more public ceremonies that took on the characteristics of a community celebration. The first such event was championed by Joseph Guyor, who was present during the battles of Frenchtown and was one of the young men who fled to Ohio on January 22, 1813. Following the 1871 discovery of remains from the Battles of Frenchtown, Guyor determined to arrange a reunion of veterans. Guyor posted a notice in the *Monroe Monitor* newspaper, inviting veterans of the battles to come stay on Guyor’s Island—where he kept a restaurant and lodge used by sportsmen on the canal near Lake Erie. As one attendee later recalled, the site was well-chosen for its facilities, for the beauty of the scenery, and for its historical relevance as “the scene of large gatherings of the Pottawattomie and Shawnee …, [as well as] the ancient site of a village” that had been uncovered during the construction of a railroad. The multi-day affair attracted twenty mostly French *Canadien* veterans, and another 50 or so residents of Monroe. Lt. Colonel George Armstrong Custer, who was then on home-leave from his service as Commander of the Seventh Cavalry, was a guest of honor. A hero of Gettysburg and celebrated in the national press for the Battle of Washita on the southern Great Plains, Custer was received by “the men of past generations … with warmest demonstrations of respect and admiration.”48

The success of the 1871 reunion was followed by a much grander affair on July 4, 1872 in the center of Monroe, which brought in 150 veterans of the War of 1812, with most having been “in the ranks of that gallant column of Kentuckians, who responded to the cries of distress and alarm that went up from the little French settlements scattered along the River Raisin.” The event also attracted another 15,000 to 20,000 attendees who witnessed fireworks, viewed relics from the war, watched a brief sham battle, and, with Colonel Custer serving as Master of Ceremonies, listened to speakers like Michigan Supreme Court Justice James Campbell celebrate the “Soldiers of the war of 1812, worthy followers of the men of ’76, … whose valor and sacrifices secured this pleasant land under the protecting care of the Union [and] … remind our children how Freedom is gained, and how she is guarded.” Campbell then shifted to a solemn recognition of the specific locale and unique circumstances of the event.

[You have] again brought Kentucky to Michigan … [and] this spot, which will ever be sacred to you and us. It’s [sic] memories recall to you friends

and kinsmen, whose loss made sorrow through all your households. To us they are the glorified memories of martyrs, who died in our behalf …. May their spirit still live where their bodies perished.\textsuperscript{49}

This remarkable event, which was three times larger than the population of Monroe, helped shape memories of January 1813 in two significant ways. The broad historical themes that explained the events of 1776 and the War of 1812 certainly fit the oratorical themes of 54 years before: a tragic massacre of heroic martyrs who sought to defend the American Revolution. Yet the 1872 reunion localized these sentiments, and made the events of 1813 a foundational memory of the community that all shared—whether of \textit{Canadien}, Yankee, or some other descent. To remember the Raisin was to embody the “spirit” in the place where the [martyrs] “bodies perished.” The presence of Custer added another dimension to the commemoration and its particular relevance to the community of Monroe. Custer was a glamorous hero of the Union cause during the Civil War and represented the national virtues that Justice Campbell praised. Moreover, he was widely celebrated for his actions in the “western Indian wars” that had been making headline news for the past few years. As Commander of the Seventh Cavalry in the Dakotas, Custer embodied the purpose of former U.S. wars in the Old Northwest and served as a reminder that the ancient war continued. His death in 1876 also made him a martyr, and provided a haunting echo of 1813 for the residents of Monroe.\textsuperscript{50}

\textbf{Image 10.8: Gathering at Guyor’s Island, 1871.} George A. Custer is pictured in the middle of the top row with his right hand on John Clapper and his left hand on Francis Navarre. Joseph Guyor is seated in the middle row near the right edge of the photograph. Source: Monroe County Historical Museum, Monroe, Michigan.

\textsuperscript{49} Campbell quoted in \textit{ibid.} 129; event described on pp. 128-34.

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The next significant spate of memorializing the battles of Frenchtown occurred in the early 20th century, when the placement of stately memorials was a key feature of the City Beautiful Movement—which sought to clean up urban public areas, create well-landscaped parks, and build inspiring public architecture. In 1904, a promise made in 1872 was finally fulfilled with the unveiling of the Kentucky Memorial in downtown Monroe at Memorial Place park. Later that same year a stone cairn was placed along the River Raisin near what had been the southwest corner of Frenchtown’s core. While the monuments, and the dedication ceremonies, sustained memories of 1813, no significant commemorations would occur for more than a half-century.\(^{51}\)

Making a Park

Though barely noticed nationally, the sesquicentennial of the War of 1812 inspired renewed interest among the residents of Monroe. In 1962, the Monroe County Historical Society began exploring the possibility of a battlefield park, and established the River Raisin Memorial Park Committee. The most likely site was an undeveloped ten-acre parcel immediately east of the River Raisin Paper Company facilities (which, by this time had become part of the Union Camp Corporation). With low funds and relying on volunteer hours, the Committee—which joined forces with the Society’s Historical Trails Committee—necessarily made slow progress. By 1973, however, they were ready to pursue two possibilities. The first involved placement of an observation deck on a knoll in Rauch Park on the south side of the River Raisin between Dixie Highway and the CSX Railroad bridge, and purchase of the 10-acre parcel.\(^{52}\)

In order to confirm the historical relevance of the parcel, which was near the presumed site of the 17th Infantry encampment on the night of January 21, 1813, the Monroe County Historical Commission agreed to sponsor archeological surveys in 1976 and 1977. These studies, along with historical research, resulted in the identification and partial excavation of three house sites—two of which were dated to the time of the battles of Frenchtown, and uncovered material evidence associated with U.S. troop locations and movements.\(^{53}\) Further excavations in 1980 and 1981 of two areas within the former core area of Frenchtown generally turned up materials that post-dated the 1812-1813 period, though subterranean evidence of some structural elements may have corresponded to the period of the battles of Frenchtown.\(^{54}\) Also in 1981, the Monroe County Historical Commission and the Michigan Department of State History Division presented a compelling vision of a future park in a lengthy feasibility study that presented various acquisition plans, cost analyses, and interpretive approaches for sites related to the events of January 1813. Though it did not lead to immediate results, the study clarified possible

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\(^{51}\) Naveaux, *Invaded on All Sides*, 290; “Monument, Shaft to Mark River Raisin Battlefield Presented to City of Monroe;” supplement to the *Monroe Democrat*, October 21, 1904, 37; Custer was memorialized in an even grander fashion in 1910 when President William Howard Taft and Elizabeth Bacon Custer unveiled a monumental equestrian statue in downtown Monroe.

\(^{52}\) Naveaux, *Invaded on All Sides*, 292-93.


approaches and served as a basis for the pursuit of future opportunities. The trigger for the study was the closing of the corrugated plant, which covered a large expanse of the mill complex and was slated for demolition. The following year a nine-year effort to gain federal recognition of the battle’s significance finally resulted in the listing of an eighty-acre River Raisin Battlefield Site on the National Register of Historic Places.55

As initial plans for interpretation and preservation of the battlefield area were underway, Richard Allen Sieb—a local businessman and longtime resident of Monroe—purchased an early 20th-century bungalow and an adjoining 20-foot easement near the southeast corner of the mill complex in 1985. This action provided an additional year for the park movement to put together a funding package to acquire and refurbish the property for use as an interpretive center. These efforts soon garnered $122,000 from the County of Monroe, the State of Michigan, and La-Z-Boy Corporation to transform the bungalow into the River Raisin Battlefield Visitor Center in 1990—which presently serves as the Visitor Center for the River Raisin National Battlefield Park. During the Center’s initial year, the first annual commemoration of the 1813 battles was organized by the newly established Friends of the River Raisin Battlefield and held on January 20, 1991. A year later, the Monroe County Historical Society initiated a plan called “Project 2013” that would integrate existing municipal parks along the river with an expanded battlefield park facility. The goal was to have the complex ready for “a bicentennial observance [of] the Siege of Frenchtown” in 2013. This growing interest in the battlefield coincided with the changing fortunes of Jefferson Smurfit—who purchased the plant from Union Camp a few years earlier. A declining market for paper products and fiberboard, compounded by the aging facilities in Monroe, made the plant a costly asset for a struggling corporation. A proposal to convert part of the facility into a massive waste-to-energy incineration energy plant met strong public opposition, and the facility was shut down altogether in 1995.56

Even before 1995, the mill complex was already shrinking. Two abandoned mill structures on the west side of North Dixie Highway were undergoing demolition in the area that is now the Monroe Multi-Sports Complex and the Riviere Aux Raisins Park. Archeological monitoring and shovel testing that occurred during the demolition revealed structural evidence of prehistoric occupation and the remains of a limestone rubble foundation likely associated with Frenchtown.57 As more potential acreage for an expanded River Raisin Battlefield Park became available, a movement developed for a regional master plan that would link a larger battlefield park with a Downriver Linked

55 “River Raisin Battlefield and Massacre Site, Monroe County, Michigan: A Feasibility Study of Alternatives for Acquisition, Development, Management, and Interpretation,” prepared for the Monroe County Historical Commission by David A. Clary (Architecture Preservation Consultants, June 1981), copy on file in MSHDA; Invaded on All Sides, 293; River Raisin Battlefield Site (20MR227); National Register ID: 82000542 (December 10, 1982).
Greenways Initiative that called for recreational trails connecting Sterling State Park with the River Raisin. This coincided with a successful effort to obtain a Clean Michigan Initiative Grant from the State of Michigan and use the funds to convert the brownfields of the old paper mill site into park lands rather than new industrial development.\footnote{58}

As more buildings on the Monroe Paper Company property were demolished, archeological surveys were commissioned by the City of Monroe and jointly funded by the National Park Service between 1999 and 2003. The primary goal was to determine the condition of subsurface materials and corroborate the findings of recent historical studies on the possible location of key archeological features. The 1999 survey uncovered a historic fenceline associated with Frenchtown. The following year, further investigation of two areas associated with the battlefield site revealed 1,450 artifacts. Most were prehistoric ceramics, lithics, and faunal remains associated with an American Indian village site ca. 1450-1650. Nearly all of the historical artifacts post-dated the War of 1812, but backhoe trenching did reveal evidence of the puncheon fence used by Kentucky militia set in a wide, shallow wall trench. In 2003 further excavation revealed more fence lines associated with Frenchtown, while metal surveys in the open field where the U.S. 17\textsuperscript{th} Infantry was encamped and initially attacked revealed numerous items related to the Second Battle of Frenchtown.\footnote{59}

With archeologists confirming the integrity of subsurface materials and artifacts, the ongoing efforts to develop a battlefield park began to accelerate. In August of 2003, a land swap involving multiple government agencies brought thirty acres to the battlefield park and 215 acres of adjacent marshlands to Sterling State Park. A year later the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality provided a combined loan and grant that totaled $1.8 million for land acquisition. As pieces of a larger park came into place, plans for interpretation, management, further demolition, and environmental mitigation continued as well. How or when they might be implemented was still unclear, until U.S. Representative John Dingell brought his legislative skills to the cause. Having already worked on passage of the Detroit River International Wildlife Refuge Act (Public Law 107-91) in 2001, he was well versed in the complexities of environmental restoration, recreation, and community development in the post-industrial landscapes of Downriver communities.\footnote{60}

Representative Dingell had also closely followed the developments in Monroe and took a keen interest in plans for a battlefield park. Given the complexities of local and state land acquisition, demolition, and environmental mitigation, he determined to elevate the issue to the federal level. In early 2006 Dingell introduced two bills before

\footnote{58} The result of this project is the River Raisin Heritage Trail. See Naveaux, Invaded on All Sides, 294; the recreation trails plan was part of a larger project supported by the Community Foundation for Southeast Michigan <http://www.michigan.org/property/downriver-linked-greenways> (Accessed January 6, 2017).
\footnote{59} G. Michael Pratt, “A Phase II Archaeological Investigation of the River Raisin Battlefield and Massacre Site, City of Monroe, Monroe County” (1999); Pratt and William E. Rutter, “Phase II Archaeological Reconnaissance of the River Raisin Battlefield, Monroe, Michigan” (2002); Pratt and Rutter, “Draft Report: Archeological Assessment of the Selected Areas of the River Raisin Battlefield, Monroe, Michigan” (2004). These studies were partially funded with matching grants from the American Battlefield Protection Program of the National Park Service. All reports on file at MSHDA.
\footnote{60} Phase I Environmental Site Assessment: Pumphouse and Box Factory Parcels, E. Elm Street at N. Dixie Highway, Monroe Michigan (Legacy Environmental, Inc); on file at Monroe County Historical Museum.
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Congress: the River Raisin National Battlefield Study Act (H.R. 5132) and the River Raisin Battlefield Acquisition Act (H.R. 5133). Working the halls of Congress through the spring, Dingell managed to obtain a hearing for H.R. 5132 in the middle of July. After gauging support in Michigan over the summer, Dingell’s bill came to the floor on September 26 and passed. With support from both Michigan senators, and Kentucky Senator James “Jim” Bunning, the bill passed the Senate in December and was signed into law by President George W. Bush on December 20, 2006.61

The River Raisin National Battlefield Study Act did not authorize the creation of a federal park site, but it established a process through which the feasibility of a park (federal or otherwise) could be studied. The Act also formalized a process by which lands could be donated and held, with assistance from the National Park Service (NPS), for a future park, in accordance with the American Battlefield Protection Act of 1996 (PL 104-333, 16 U.S.C. 469k). In 2007, the process for gaining formal National Park Service recognition of a park and any lands that might be donated to it began with the commissioning of a National Historic Landmark nomination that was contracted out by the Monroe County Historical Society. While the study was ongoing, subsequent steps involved a Special Resource Study that involved four components; confirmation that the area possesses nationally significant resources; a suitability assessment to determine the distinctiveness of the resource and the history it conveys; a feasibility assessment to ensure the park would be large enough to protect its key resources and support visitor use; and consideration of different ways to protect and interpret the resource (by the NPS or some other entity). Determinations on these four factors would come through study and consultations by the Special Resource Study Team and from public input through correspondence and public meetings.62

On July 10, 2008, Representative Dingell and Michigan Senator Carl Levin submitted legislation to establish a River Raisin National Battlefield Park. Since the Special Resource Study process was still underway, and a draft National Historic Landmark study had yet to be submitted, NPS Deputy Director Daniel Wenk recommended that legislation be tabled until the process was complete. At the time he made his statement, July 30, 2008, he expected “the study process [and the NHL] should be … completed in 2-3 years from now.” Through the following year, a nearly complete draft NHL nomination was produced and the Special Resource Study Team had completed much of its work. However, Dingell and Levin would choose to submit their legislation before the process had run its course. Confident in the support of their constituents, they joined their bills with an Omnibus Public Lands Management Act. Senator Jeff Bingaman of New Mexico had first proposed a bill to this effect on June 26, 2008, just two weeks before the River Raisin National Battlefield Park legislation had

been drawn up. Bingaman’s bill was delayed, however, which allowed more pieces of legislation to become part of the omnibus package in its second iteration.\(^{63}\)

Though best known as the Omnibus Public Lands Management Act of 2009, Bingaman’s second piece of legislation was formally titled “An act to designate certain land as components of the National Wilderness Preservation System, to authorize certain programs and activities in the Department of the Interior and the Department of Agriculture, and for other purposes.” The bill was introduced during the first week of the new 111th Congress on January 9, 2009, was voted out of the Senate on March 25, and signed into law by President Barack Obama on March 30. The suddenness with which a brand-new national park proposal resulted in a unit of the National Park Service was breathtaking, especially since the main feature of the park was mostly comprised of vacant industrial buildings in various stages of demolition. The results far exceeded what anyone expected just a few years before—and what the new national battlefield park augured for the upcoming bicentennial would have been unthinkable to the original authors of the “Project 2013.”\(^{64}\)

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To Remember the Raisin

The establishment of the River Raisin National Battlefield Park was not so much the product of legislative skill as it was the affirmation of local talents. The idea of the national battlefield park, and its ongoing development, is rooted in decades of planning and volunteering to recover a place of national significance. By the same token, the national park unit is part of a small, post-industrial city’s vision of its present and future. Like the battles of Frenchtown, the River Raisin National Battlefield Park is situated within a community. This is still a fairly unusual circumstance within the National Park System, as is the stipulation that the park can only acquire acreage through donation. Among other things, this ensures that the National Park Service manages what others desire or are willing to give. Yet park management is situated within a context that extends beyond the local area and involves collaboration with other federal public land units and agencies, collaboration and consultation with federally recognized American Indian nations, interpretive programs that convey the national and longstanding significance of the site and the events that occurred in 1813, and an obligation to protect, manage and restore environmental features and conditions that correspond to the historical setting. It is a slightly different approach to remembering the Raisin than might occur without the National Park Service, but it complements—and is complemented by—the efforts of a community that has a long and active interest in the park site.

The purpose of this study fits somewhere between the obligations and interests noted above, and seeks to extend them to a broad array of peoples and historical processes that both shaped and became embedded in the actions, memories, and consequences of the battles and their aftermath. Put another way, this study endeavors to remember the Raisin from multiple perspectives. This is not an easy task, nor is it always pleasant. At the core of any effort to remember the Raisin, there is violence, death and destruction. The fact of the brutality begs difficult questions, which in turn remind us that to remember often requires an effort to fully understand rather than dismiss or overlook the unpleasant parts we would rather avoid. The violence that occurred at the River Raisin, as well as the conflicts that preceded and followed, was intimate and purposeful. In a world where alliances, friendships and kinship were grounded in rituals of generosity and reciprocal kindnesses, threatening enemies were treated with equally intimate and brutal measures. This rubric was generally true for Long Knives and Indigenous peoples, especially in a world made deadlier by gunpowder and metal weapons. Kindness and violence were also key to social cohesion in a world where incarceration or confinement were not viable options for punishing important transgressions. In short, the violence that occurred along the River Raisin more than 200 years ago was of another world—and to remember requires an effort to understand that world on its terms.

The location of Frenchtown and the battles also beg deceptively simple questions of the sort one learns in journalism class: who, what, why, when, and where. All of these terms can force new ways of understanding. The question “why here?” for instance, requires attention to geology, water tables, the migrations of animals, fish, and birds, the persistence of human communities, climate, the endurance of past associations with place, the consequences of violence and imperialism, and a host of other issues that predate human habitation and still define our lives today. Questions of who and why are often at the center of how we ascribe blame or virtue. The answers to questions about
“who belongs?” and “why are they here?” were immediate and simple for Indigenous peoples and Kentuckians in the early 19th century. They are more complicated for us today, in part because we inherit a wider set of possible answers. This in turn means the question of “who?” can be very difficult with just the slightest shift in perspective. Who, for instance, had a right to be on the lower River Raisin in the late 18th and early 19th centuries? Wyandot, whose ongoing connection to the Big Rock (Brownstown) area is as long as the historical arc of this study; Kentuckians enroute to the Battle of the Thames; Canadien militia from Upper Canada; Generals from Tennessee; Irish immigrants in the Detroit area? When the question is extended to subsequent generations and later commemorations, the list becomes endless and every succinct response offers a different declaration about legitimacy or merit.
Chapter Ten
Cultural Resource Base Maps

The following Cultural Resource Base Maps provide a geographical overview of the ten Administrative Units that constitute the River Raisin National Battlefield Park. Since very little acreage is held in fee simple title by the National Park Service, the administration of these various units involves cooperative agreements with other public agencies that operate at the federal, state, county, township, and municipal level.

A. River Raisin National Battlefield Park Administrative Units 333
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D. Wyandot Reserve (historical) Unit 339
E. Big Rock/Brownstown Unit 341
F. Hull’s Trace Unit 343
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River Raisin National Battlefield Park

LEGEND
- Location of associated site within administrative boundaries of River Raisin NBP
- Roadways and highways
- Streams and drainages
- Site of historic conflict, with intensive conflict occurring in the dark core area

River Raisin NBP Administrative Units

1. Fort Detroit
2. Springwells
3. Maguaga
4. Wyandot Reserve (historical)
5. Big Rock/Brownstown
6. Hull's Trace
7. Macon Reserve (historical)
8. Frenchtown
9. Plum Creek
10. Ottawa Reserve (historical)

River Raisin NBP Administrative Units and Management

River Raisin National Battlefield Park includes several units in Wayne and Monroe Counties, Michigan. Only two of the units, Frenchtown (8) and Hull’s Trace (6), are directly administered by the National Park Service (NPS). Of these two, Frenchtown is the only unit where all the land administered by the NPS is owned in fee simple by the United States of America. All of the units, including those administered by the NPS, are managed through partnerships with federal, state, county, and municipal agencies as well as local organizations.
River Raisin National Battlefield Park

Site of the village of Maguaga

Battle Core

Battle Area

Outlined areas denote parcels identified for interpretation and possible co-management

MAGUA UNIT
CULTURAL RESOURCE BASE MAP
Cultural Resource Base maps
**Wyandot Reserve** established with the cession of the reservations at Maguaga and Big Rock/Brownstown.
Cultural Resource Base maps

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Legend

- NPS and other public land parcels within Plum Creek Unit
- Core area of conflict and U.S. retreat on January 22, 1813

River Raisin National Battlefield Park
Historic Resource Study

PLUM CREEK UNIT
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Appendices and Addendum

Appendices

A. River Raisin National Battlefield Park and its significance relative to other NPS sites that correspond to the War of 1812
   a. Horseshoe Bend National Military Park
   b. Chalmette Battlefield, Jean Lafitte NHP & Preserve
   c. Boston National Historical Park: USS Constitution
   d. Fort McHenry National Monument and Historic Shrine
   e. Fort Mackinac National Historic Landmark
   f. Perry’s Victory and International Peace Memorial
   g. President’s Park (White House)
   h. Castle Clinton National Monument (New York City)
   i. National Mall and Memorial Parks: U.S. Capitol
   j. Cumberland Island National Seashore

B. Consultations

C. Recommendations for Additional Studies

D. Acknowledgements

E. Bibliography of Battlefield-related Source Material Literature

Addendum

A. River Raisin Battlefield Site: National Register of Historic Places Documentation
A. River Raisin National Battlefield Park and its significance relative to other NPS sites that correspond to the War of 1812

Compared to the number of Revolutionary and Civil War sites within in the National Park System, War of 1812 sites are quite rare. Along with the River Raisin National Battlefield Park, there are six sites that are primarily associated with the War of 1812: Fort McHenry National Monument and Historic Shrine; Horseshoe Bend National Military Park; Perry’s Victory and International Peace Memorial; the Chalmette Battlefield unit within Jean Lafitte National Historical Park & Preserve; Fort Mackinac National Historic Landmark, and the USS Constitution—which is part of the Boston National Historical Park. Other sites within the National Park System with associations to the War of 1812 include President’s Park (The White House), Castle Clinton National Monument (New York City), the U.S. Capitol (as part of the National Mall and Memorial Parks), and Cumberland Island National Seashore. As a collective, these park units do not form a comprehensive representation of the war’s breadth or significance, yet each site conveys the importance of a distinct locale within the larger conflict.

Cumberland Island National Seashore, Georgia:

Though Cumberland Island National Seashore did not become associated with the War of 1812 until after the Treaty of Ghent was signed, it represents two key elements of the broader war. Namely, the increased strength of the Royal Navy along the U.S. coastline following Napoleon’s surrender in the spring of 1814, and the opportunities the war could present to enslaved African Americans. While enroute to support the invasion of New Orleans, Admiral George Cockburn sailed his small fleet to Cumberland Island to await further information about the coordination of ships and troops. He also commandeered property on the island, attacked the small fortifications that guarded St. Mary’s, and occupied the port—all of which placed the coastal island and the nearby sea lanes under the control of Great Britain. Cockburn also recruited enslaved residents for service in the Royal Marines with guarantees of pay and emancipation, but this effort was cut short when word of the Treaty of Ghent arrived. Cockburn’s presence on Cumberland Island also connects the National Seashore to other War of 1812-related NPS sites. These include the bombardment of Fort McHenry, the burning of Washington, DC (President’s Park and the U.S. Capitol), and—through Cockburn’s mission to support of the invasion of New Orleans—Chalmette Battlefield.

Castle Clinton National Monument, New York

Though located in one of the most densely populated areas on earth, Castle Clinton is one of the least known NPS sites with a connection to the War of 1812. In the wake of the Chesapeake-Leopard Affair (1807), New York and other major coastal cities began to fortify their harbors. Located on the southern tip of Manhattan Island, Castle Clinton (then known as Southwest Battery) was one of four installations around New York Harbor. The original namesake for Battery Park, Castle Clinton would become better known in the mid 19th century as the Castle Garden restaurant, theater, and opera. Between 1855 and 1890 it served as an immigration processing center for the State of New York, then later housed the New York City Aquarium. As a deterrent, the Southwest Battery and the other fortifications served their purpose, since the Royal Navy never attempted to sail into New York.
U.S. Capitol and President’s Park, Washington, D.C.

During the Chesapeake Campaign in the summer of 1814, Royal Marines wrought destruction through much of the Chesapeake Bay region, and ultimately invaded Washington, DC. In retaliation for the burning of the Canadian capital of York by U.S. troops in April 1813, the British set fire to the White House, the U.S. Capitol building, several warships, and the navy yard where they were anchored. The damage to the Capitol was considerable—but not irreparable. The British then moved on to the now abandoned White House, and set it afire. While the effects of the attack on Washington would not be fully repaired for several years, the burning of Washington was more a national embarrassment—and a boastful trophy for the British—than a strategic defeat. It also serves as a measure of the lopsided nature of the war at that time, as well as a victory that an indebted and weary Britain was too exhausted to exploit.

Fort McHenry National Monument and Historic Shrine, Maryland

Built in the late 18th century, Fort McHenry anchored the defenses of Baltimore Harbor against a maritime attack. In mid-September 1814, Admiral Cockburn’s forces arrived at the mouth of the harbor with the intention of taking the port and thus controlling a large swath of the Mid-Atlantic coast. The fort withstood a 25-hour bombardment and maintained control of the channel into Baltimore Harbor—thus forcing the British to withdraw. Though nothing was gained in the engagement, and little damage occurred to either side, the resilience of Fort McHenry prevented losses that would likely have exceeded those suffered by Washington, DC. The bombardment of Fort McHenry also inspired Francis Scott Key’s “The Star Spangled Banner”—which conflated survival with victory and neatly captured how the war would be remembered in subsequent years.

USS Constitution, Massachusetts

Like the survival of Fort McHenry and the burning of Washington, the USS Constitution is one of the best-known symbols of the War of 1812—and of the three it is the only one that was involved in an outright victory. Over the course of the war, the Constitution defeated four British warships in three-separate engagements and captured several British merchant ships. While the victories did not alter the calculus of the war, they had great symbolic importance by demonstrating that U.S. sailors and ships could defeat the ruler “of the waves.” These defeats also caused great consternation among the British public who—even though the Royal Navy retained its dominance in the western Atlantic—fretted about the course of the war and its purpose.

* * * * * * * * *

Taken together, the six NPS sites noted above do not present a coherent or comprehensive representation of the war. The President’s Park, the U.S. Capitol, Fort McHenry, and the USS Constitution possess symbolic importance, but only Fort McHenry and the USS Constitution are primarily associated with the War of 1812. Few visitors to Cumberland Island take the time to see the small War of 1812 display in the NPS Visitor Center, and Castle Clinton rarely—if ever—factors into historical studies of the war.¹ However, the same is not true of two NPS sites associated with the campaigns

of Andrew Jackson: the Chalmette Battlefield unit within Jean Lafitte National Historical Park & Preserve, and Horseshoe Bend National Military Park.

**Chalmette Battlefield, Louisiana**

Like Fort McHenry, Chalmette Battlefield is as much a shrine as it is a site for historical interpretation of the events associated with the Battle of New Orleans. And like Admiral Cockburn’s activities around Cumberland Island, the Battle of New Orleans and General Jackson’s smashing victory over the British at Chalmette Plantation occurred after the ratification of the Treaty of Ghent. Nevertheless, it served to chasten the British, made Jackson a national hero, and gave the United States a celebrated victory at the close of a brutal truce. The date of the victory, January 8, 1815, became a national holiday and Jackson’s heroics ultimately propelled him to the White House.

**Horseshoe Bend National Military Park, Alabama**

One of the most decisive and consequential battles during the War of 1812 occurred in March 1814 at a place known as Tohopeka, or Horseshoe Bend. It was there that General Jackson led an army of 2,000 Tennessean militia and U.S. Infantry, along with several hundred Chahta (Choctaw) and Tsalagihi (Cherokee) warriors, against approximately 1,000 Mvskoke (Muscogee or Creek) warriors. More than 800 Mvskoke were killed, and almost all the rest were wounded. Five months later, at the Treaty of Fort Jackson, the Mvskoke were compelled to cede twenty-three million acres in what is now Alabama and Georgia. While the context of the battle shares some similarities with the Battles of the River Raisin, it had almost nothing to do with the British or the War of 1812. Rather, it stemmed from many of the same impulses that led to the wars of the 1790s in the Ohio Valley—but in a decidedly Southern context. Jackson’s imperial foe in the Southeast was Spanish Florida, with whom the United States was not at war but Southern filibusters sought to annex to the United States, and his wrath was directed toward the Mvskoke and the enslaved African Americans who found refuge in West Florida.

**Perry’s Victory and International Peace Memorial, Ohio**

In terms of strategic significance, one of the most consequential battles during the War of 1812 occurred on Lake Erie in September 1813. Though it hinged on a sudden change in wind direction and the unconventional tactics of Commandant Oliver Hazard Perry, the U.S. victory over the British fleet was total—and it completely changed the balance of power around western Lake Erie. Since before the outbreak of the war, the Royal Navy (operating out of the Amherstburg Royal Naval Dockyard) controlled shipping and communication on Lake Erie. This gave the British and the Native Confederacy a distinct advantage over U.S. forces, which were entirely dependent upon burdensome overland routes for supplies, communications, and reinforcements. Perry’s victory completely reversed that equation, and the British were ultimately forced to flee overland while U.S. troops ferried across western Lake Erie. The magnitude of Perry’s victory can also be measured with a brief exercise in counterfactual history. If Perry had lost the engagement with Commander Robert Heriot Barclay, the British and the Native Confederacy alliance would have retained control of Michigan Territory and—armed
with U.S. vessels and cannons—possibly driven the U.S. Army of the Northwest away from Lake Erie and back toward Fort Wayne. Moreover, British negotiators at Ghent may well have been able to gain some of the territorial cessions they proposed for the creation of an American Indian buffer state. Put another way, the fates of the British-Native alliance and the U.S. Army of the Northwest greatly depended on the outcome of the Battle of Lake Erie.

**River Raisin National Battlefield Park, Michigan**

Within this grouping of NPS sites, the River Raisin National Battlefield Park (RRNBP) stands out for several reasons. First, it is directly associated with Perry’s Victory and International Peace Memorial, as well as Fallen Timbers Battlefield and Fort Miamis National Historic Site (which was utilized by British and Native Confederacy forces during the siege of Fort Meigs). This constellation of historically significant sites, along with the proximity of Fort Meigs National Historic Landmark (Ohio) and Parks Canada’s Fort Malden National Historic Site in Amherstburg, Ontario, provides a fair sense of the area’s significance during the War of 1812.²

RRNBP also shares a number of key characteristics with two of the more significant War of 1812-related park units, especially in regards to interpretation. At Horseshoe Bend, for instance, the park presents information on the landscape as well as the people involved in the battle, and interprets the cultural relationships and conflicts that led to the Creek War. Along with materials and information on the broader course of the War of 1812, the park also describes the war's impact on the Mvskoke people, its relation to the growth of slavery as well as the western expansion of the United States, and the role war played in the career of Andrew Jackson. The still relatively new interpretive center at Perry’s Victory and International Peace Memorial focuses on the naval battle for Lake Erie, as well as the details and structures of specific vessels. However, a good deal of attention is also given to the Northwest theater of the War of 1812, and some of the key Indigenous, British, and U.S. personalities.

Such commonalities are not redundancies, but connections that provide opportunities within the NPS for a more comprehensive approach to the commemoration and interpretation of the War of 1812. On this last score, however, RRNBP is unique. Unlike other NPS units related to the War of 1812, RRNBP directly connects the war of 1812 with earlier conflicts and historical developments (namely, the “Sixty Years’ War”). General Hull’s invasion of Canada, which passed through and launched from units within RRNBP, was a continuation of conflicts and military agendas that stemmed back to the Seven Years’ War and ran through the American Revolution and the Northwest Indian Wars. The invasion plan also reflected the fundamental goal of the so-called War Hawks—the most passionate advocates for war—who dreamed of destroying the Native Confederacy and removing the British from North America.

Hull’s dramatic failures, along with the Battles of Frenchtown and their aftermath, illustrated the deadly folly of the War Hawks. Subsequent events, and the defeat of the British-Native Confederacy alliance at the Battle of the Thames, also broke the dreams of Tecumseh and his British allies. Unlike the broader course of the war, and the terms of

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² The Fallen Timbers Battlefield and Fort Miamis National Historic Site are affiliated units of the National Park System that are managed by Metroparks of the Toledo Area
the Treaty of Ghent that stipulated a return to *status quo ante bellum*, the Northwestern theater of the War of 1812 did not end in a “tie.” Although the British remained in Canada, the conflicts that centered on the Detroit River and western Lake Erie broke the Native Confederacy and allowed U.S. political, economic, and demographic expansion into the region. In short, the Northwest theater is the one area where the United States clearly won what many described as the “Second War for Independence.” In the case of the Northwest theater, victory in this second revolution finally achieved an essential goal of the first: dispossession of American Indians and the incorporation of their lands.

The changes wrought by the War of 1812 would long reverberate in the western Ohio Valley and the Great Lakes region—in terms of economic and environmental transformations, demographic shifts, and in the implementation of the policy of Indian Removal. The events along the River Raisin and the Detroit River are as intimately connected to this subsequent history as they are to historical developments of the preceding century. Consequently, the units within RRNBP provide a unique opportunity to illustrate how the region and the War of 1812 can articulate deep-seated and ongoing historical trends in North America.
Appendix A   Significance relative to other NPS sites associated with the War of 1812
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William B. “Ben” Secunda
NAGPRA Project Manager
University of Michigan

George Strack
Former Tribal Historic Preservation Officer
Miami Tribe of Oklahoma

Erin Thompson
Tribal Historic Preservation Officer
Absentee Shawnee

Richard White
Margaret Byrne Professor of American History
Stanford University

Marcus Winchester
Director, Language and Culture Programs
Pokagon Band of Potawatomi: Pokégnek
Bodéwadmi
C. Recommendations for Additional Studies

For all its significance, the small scale of River Raisin National Battlefield Park and the geographic distribution of discrete park units, does not by itself convey a sense of historical gravitas. However, the array of units and their various historical associations do invite deeper inquiry—which is rewarded with fuller understandings of the past and the present, and of the connections between peoples and landscapes. While the present study seeks to deepen these connections and understandings in the context of a lengthy monograph, historical synthesis does not readily lend itself to full explorations of distinct places, personalities, or historical episodes. The following recommendations are intended to facilitate such explorations in the service of public presentations and park interpretation.

A. Cultural Landscape Report

A significant amount of research work has been done on the ancient and historical landscapes of the lower River Raisin and the Detroit River area, and some of it has been utilized in the crafting of this Historic Resource Study (HRS). However, further studies on the various units that compose the River Raisin National Battlefield Park (RRNBP) would deepen understandings of cultural and historical contexts as well as inform recreational activities throughout the park. Because land and culture were at the heart of the conflicts that occurred in the region, neither the battles, the peoples, nor the landscapes can be understood independent from the other. Consequently, a Cultural Landscape Report would be a valuable tool for interpretive activities as well as future management programs.

B. Special History Studies

The number of people associated with the Battles of Frenchtown and their immediate aftermath is uncountable. However, there are certain individuals whose biographies provide a through-line that connects and expands on many of the subjects covered in the Historic Resource Study (HRS). The following biographical subjects are noted below: Mahkate:wi-meši-ke:hke:hwka (aka Black Hawk), Lewis Cass, Richard Mentor Johnson, William Henry Harrison, Duncan McArthur, and George Armstrong Custer

- Mahkate:wi-meši-ke:hke:hwka (also Ma-ka-tai-me-she-kia-kiak, or Black Hawk): Mahkate:wi-meši-ke:hke:hwka who fought at Frenchtown and in several other consequential battles during the War of 1812. As a Thâkîwa (Sauk, or Sac), he is also the descendant of people who were around western Lake Erie immediately prior to the disease epidemics and wars of the early 17th century. The Thâkîwa (Sauk, or Sac) subsequently developed an uneasy but important relationship with the French around Detroit, and later became strong allies of the British—through and beyond the War of 1812. Their experiences with the treaty-making of William Henry Harrison also fostered a deep resentment toward the United States, particularly among Mahkate:wi-meši-ke:hke:hwka, his allies, and his community, that would erupt in the events that became known as the Black Hawk War (1832).
After that event, Mahkate:wi-meši-ke:hke:hkwa came to represent a new version of Tecumseh to the U.S. public: a noble warrior whose defeat served as a poignant measure of the stern efforts that were required to build a continental nation.

- **Lewis Cass:** While much has been written about Lewis Cass, there are no studies that directly relate his life and career to the lasting impacts of the Battles of the River Raisin and their Aftermath. Lewis Cass played an integral role in the public debate over removal policy leading up to the passage of the Indian Removal Act. During this debate, he frequently alluded to the events on the River Raisin and other conflicts in Michigan Territory as examples of what could occur if Native peoples were not forced to move beyond the Mississippi River. From his military service at the outbreak of the War of 1812 to his long tenure as Governor of Michigan, Cass had a hand in a series of significant historical developments. These include his service and conduct under General Hull and the fall of Michigan Territory, his various military promotions, his central role in Hull’s Court Marshal, his administration of Michigan Territory, treaty making in the Aftermath of the Battles, vigorous advocacy for the forceful removal American Indians to what is now present-day Nebraska and Kansas. During his service as the Secretary of War under President Andrew Jackson, Cass vigorously applied the policies associated with the Indian Removal Act (1832) and became directly involved in the military response to the uprising led by Mahkate:wi-meši-ke:hke:hkwa. In sum, Cass’s life deserves a detailed examination that directly relates to the experiences of Indigenous peoples.

- **Richard Mentor Johnson, William Henry Harrison, Duncan McArthur:** The political careers of specific individuals associated with the River Raisin should be further explored concerning their influence into and roles associated with U.S. Indian Policy. Foremost among these are Richard Mentor Johnson, William Henry Harrison, Duncan McArthur. Collectively and individually, their careers demonstrate the significance that the River Raisin played in the development and implementation of American Indian Removal.

- **George Armstrong Custer:** Because of his personal fame and ongoing cultural resonance, George Armstrong Custer’s youthful years in Monroe, Michigan, and his familiarity with survivors of the Battles of the River Raisin deserve further examination in light of his later career on the Great Plains.

**C. Ethnographic Studies**

- **Ancient, Pre-Contact, and Historical Associations:** Since at least the middle of the 19th century, activities related to construction, road-building, demolition, and development have unearthed material and human remains associated with Indigenous communities that date back to the Pre-Contact era. A host of research that is cited in the HRS suggests that at least some of these ancient communities are antecedent to groups that were in the area during the historical era. Moreover, this research indicates that many of the material and social developments that occurred among earlier populations continued among their descendants as well as later
arrivals to the region that adopted the established lifeways of the region. Consultations with associated tribal nations, along with input from scholars working on pre-contact societies in the western Lake Erie basin, can provide the basis for a study that conveys the antiquity of Native residence in the region—and the relevance of those older communities to historical and present-day identifications to the area.

- **Odawa, Bodéwadmi, and Wyandot**: River Raisin National Battlefield Park includes sites that were historically associated with the Odawa (Ottawa), Bodéwadmi (Potawatomi), and Wyandot that moved to the Detroit River area at the turn of the 17th and 18th centuries. All of these sites (former Reserves or villages) were taken through treaties and the policy of Indian Removal, and all remain touchstones for Odawa, Bodéwadmi, and Wyandot peoples who live in the area and beyond. The research for this HRS suggests that the former Wyandot and Odawa Reserves/villages likely correspond to communities that have been closely associated since the pre-contact era (i.e., Tionontaté and Giishkaakhang Odawa). It is also likely that the Bodéwadmi who moved to the Detroit River area around 1700 were descended from people who previously lived further to the west of Lake Erie, had previously lived near the Tionontaté and Giishkaakhang Odawa when many groups sought refuge on the west side of Lake Michigan. While these suppositions are well grounded, they require further proof. In either case, the historic sites directly associated with these communities can provide further depth to interpretations of the Native Confederacy during the War of 1812. Namely, by establishing the antiquity of ongoing associations and past alliances, the long-standing deference to the Grand Council Fire of the Wyandot, and the central location of the Battles of Frenchtown within this larger cultural and historical landscape. And finally, these sites can more fully be presented as parts of a shared Native homeland rather than isolated detention areas.

**D. Additional Special History Studies (non-biographical)**

- **African American (slave and free) Perspectives and Experiences**: The history of the Detroit River region in the late 18th and early 19th centuries deserves a fuller assessment of the African American (slave and free) experience on both sides of the international border. Beginning in the early 18th century, when Indigenous captives from the Central Plains were sold as slaves in Detroit, to the participation of enslaved and free African Americans in both Canadian and U.S. militias during the War of 1812, the colonial and early national histories of the region were tied to broader ideas about race, labor, freedom, and slavery. At the outbreak of the War of 1812, these ideas were construed differently by francophone Canadiens, white Americans from the Great Lakes region and the South, Native peoples, African Americans, Black Canadians, and Indigenous peoples.

After the American Revolution, the Detroit River became an easily crossed international boundary where—depending on the side of the river-- different legal systems complicated notions of property in people and variously held out the threat of enslavement or emancipation. Knowing when and where to cross the river, and
having kin on one side or the other, were thus matters of great import for enslaved peoples as well as free people who might become vulnerable to enslavement on the other side.

In the decades following the war, the Detroit River area became a critical destination on the Underground Railroad. Nearly every escaped slave headed for the Canadian side of the river passed through or stopped in the vicinity of Monroe, Michigan. From there, they either crossed the river directly or moved on to Detroit and then crossed directly to Windsor, Canada. Recent studies on how race and status have been shaped by the borderland context of the Detroit River, along with a growing number of studies on African American and Black Canadian communities in Detroit, Windsor—and how they have shaped the shared histories of these studies, would serve as an excellent basis for this Special History Study.

• Motivations for War and Military Service: While there is substantial information about the actions and experiences of U.S. regulars and militiamen during the War of 1812, very little has been written on the ideas and understandings that motivated communities to support the war and inspired individuals to fight. Because of the large number of memoirs, reports, and civic statements about the Battles of the River Raisin, the subject is ripe for a focused study. Consequently, a brief analysis of the cultural, social, and economic factors that shaped westward migrations and aspirations (as well as the fears and hatred that colored relations with Native peoples) should be considered for a topical study in coming years. With sufficient secondary literature, such a study could further deepen understandings of the antagonists who met and killed each other along the River Raisin.
D. Acknowledgements

In the Introduction to *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815*, Richard White alludes to the 18th-century novel *Tristram Shandy* by Laurence Sterne. Like the narrative structure of Sterne’s fiction, White viewed the research and writing for the *Middle Ground* as a never-ending task of digging backwards through a multiplying list of sources to make sense of later events. I have often reflected on White’s metaphor while working on the present study, and we shared a pained but humorous conversation about the subject at a mutual friend’s engagement party. Yet the experience of working on this project is different from White’s in two respects. First, his narrative ended in 1815, while this work continues to the present-day. Second, I was able to benefit from White’s masterful study as well as a new generation of scholars who have revisited White’s thesis and—in many cases—carried it into the 20th and early 21st centuries. The point here is not to establish an equivalency between this work and the scholarship of others, but to acknowledge how deeply I have relied on the cumulative efforts of Indigenous and non-Indigenous scholars, as well as archivists, antiquarians, compilers, and historical societies. In many respects, then, the bibliography and consultations noted in this appendix serve as the principle acknowledgements for this work.

The complexity of this study, and the patience it required of others as each deadline was extended, have also given me a host of reasons to offer more personal expressions of gratitude. First and foremost, I am especially grateful for the support, enthusiasm, and knowledge that Scott Bentley (Superintendent of the River Raisin National Battlefield Park) has brought to this project. I told him once in a conference call that he was my favorite Superintendent in the entire National Park System—and I’d like to take this opportunity to reiterate that earnest statement. The same sentiments apply to Daniel Downing, Chief of Interpretation, Education & Operations—a true “Jack” and “Master” of all trades at River Raisin. The thoughtful patience of Ron Cockrell, who has managed this project from the NPS Midwest Regional Office in Omaha, is also much appreciated—and at moments has served as a life-line. In the same vein, I am indebted to the insightful and deeply informed commentary that I have received from anonymous readers during the drafting of this work. My hope is that all will recognize their contributions in the final narrative.

The efforts of archivists and librarians at facilities noted in the Bibliography have also been invaluable to this project. However, I would like to single out Chris Kull from the Archives and Library at the Monroe County Historical Museum—who directed me to a wealth of information about the history of Monroe, the effort to establish a commemorative park on the former site of the River Raisin Paper Company, and offered good-natured observations on a host of town matters. Others in Monroe who were helpful with their time include volunteers at the NPS Visitor Center and, especially, Ralph Naveaux, whose book *Invaded on All Sides* provided valuable insights on the Battles of Frenchtown as well as the movement that led to the establishment of the national battlefield park. Chief Ted Roll, of the Wyandot of Anderdon, also proved especially helpful. Besides providing a font of information and insight, and in the process becoming
a friend while I was on the road, he organized a meeting and exchange of information with a number of tribal members in Brownstown, MI. Another Archivists and librarians at the Detroit Public Library, the Bentley Library at the University of Michigan, and the Library of Michigan were all especially kind and helpful, as was Dean Anderson, State Archeologist for Michigan. Lastly, I would like to especially acknowledge the patience of my friends and family as I frequently disappeared into places and times that were far from our home.

Chi-Miigwech,
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- Wayne State University: Rare Books and Special Collections
- Detroit Public Library: Burton Historical Collection
- University of Michigan: Bentley Historical Library
- Library of Michigan: Rare Materials Collection
- Purdue University: Special Collections
- Notre Dame University: Rare Books and Special Collections

Digital Collections
- American Memory from the Library of Congress:
  - Manuscript Division <http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/mcchtml/corhome.html>
  - U.S. Congress <http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/anlaw/lawhome.html>
- Library of Congress: Geography and Map Division
  - <https://www.loc.gov/collections/?fa=partof%3Ageography+and+map+division>
- Internet Archive: American Libraries Collection
  - <https://archive.org/details/americana>
- Internet Archive: Canadian Libraries Collection
  - <https://archive.org/details/toronto>
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  - <https://www.hathitrust.org/>
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Appendix E  Bibliography of Battlefield-related Source Material Literature


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Books


Appendix E Bibliography of Battlefield-related Source Material Literature


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Appendix E  Bibliography of Battlefield-related Source Material Literature


Wood, Cameron C. “‘We Wish to Remain among the Whites’: The Creation of a Shared Nottawaseppi Huron Potawatomi and Settler Community in the Mid-19th Century.” 2011.


Dissertations


Appendix E  Bibliography of Battlefield-related Source Material Literature


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Leighton, Arthur J. “‘Eyes on the Wabash’: A History of Indiana’s Indian People from Pre-Contact through Removal.” PhD diss., Purdue University, 2007.


**Theses**


Reports


*Phase I Environmental Site Assessment: Pumphouse and Box Factory Parcels, E. Elm Street at N. Dixie Highway, Monroe Michigan.* Legacy Environmental, Inc.


1. Name of Property

Historic name: River Raisin Battlefield Site (Additional Documentation and Boundary Increase)

Other names/site number: State of Michigan Archeological Site 20MR227; River Raisin National Battlefield Park

Name of related multiple property listing: N/A

(Enter "N/A" if property is not part of a multiple property listing)

2. Location

Street & number: 1403 East Elm Avenue
City or town: Monroe State: MI County: Monroe

3. State/Federal Agency Certification

As the designated authority under the National Historic Preservation Act, as amended,
I hereby certify that this nomination request for determination of eligibility meets the documentation standards for registering properties in the National Register of Historic Places and meets the procedural and professional requirements set forth in 36 CFR Part 60.

In my opinion, the property meets does not meet the National Register Criteria. I recommend that this property be considered significant at the following level(s) of significance:

_X_ national ___ statewide ___ local

Applicable National Register Criteria:

_X_ A ___ B ___ C ___ D

Signature of certifying official/Title: Date

State or Federal agency/bureau or Tribal Government

Section 7 page 1

Addendum National Register Documentation 413
In my opinion, the property _X_ meets ___ does not meet the National Register criteria.

Signature of commenting official:  
Brian D. Gallagher  
Date 12/10/18

Title: SHPO  
State or Federal agency/bureau or Tribal Government

4. National Park Service Certification

I hereby certify that this property is:

✓ entered in the National Register

__ determined eligible for the National Register

__ determined not eligible for the National Register

__ removed from the National Register

✓ other (explain)

4/17/2019

Signature of the Keeper  
Date of Action

5. Classification

Ownership of Property

(Check as many boxes as apply.)

Private:   
X

Public - Local   
X

Public - State   
X

Public - Federal

X

Category of Property

(Check only one box.)

Building(s)   

District   
X

Site

Section 7 page 2
River Raisin Battlefield Site

Name of Property

Building(s)

District

Site

Structure

Object

**Number of Resources within Property**
(Do not include previously listed resources in the count)

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<th>Noncontributing</th>
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</tbody>
</table>

Number of contributing resources previously listed in the National Register 0

6. **Function or Use**

**Historic Functions**
(Enter categories from instructions.)

- **DEFENSE**: battle site
- **DOMESTIC**: multiple dwellings
- **TRANSPORTATION**: road related
- **AGRICULTURE/SUBSISTENCE**: agricultural fields
Current Functions
(Enter categories from instructions.)
- LANDSCAPE: park
- TRANSPORTATION: rail related and road related
- DOMESTIC: multiple dwellings
- COMMERCE/TRADE: warehouse, financial institution, restaurant, specialty store
- VACANT
- UNKNOWN
- WORK IN PROGRESS: park, conservation area
River Raisin Battlefield Site  
Name of Property 

Monroe MI  
County and State 

7. Description

Architectural Classification
(Enter categories from instructions.)

N/A

Materials: (enter categories from instructions.)
Principal exterior materials of the property: N/A

Narrative Description
(Describe the historic and current physical appearance and condition of the property. Describe contributing and noncontributing resources if applicable. Begin with a summary paragraph that briefly describes the general characteristics of the property, such as its location, type, style, method of construction, setting, size, and significant features. Indicate whether the property has historic integrity.)

Summary Paragraph

The expanded River Raisin Battlefield Site includes lands on the south and north shores of the River Raisin and encompasses sites directly associated with the Battles of Frenchtown that occurred between January 18-23, 1813. Covering approximately 230 acres, the site includes the core area of the historic Frenchtown settlement (which became the primary area of conflict and destruction) as well as lines of attack, retreat and surrender. Restoration of industrial brownfields and park development has returned much of the core conflict area to the landscape of open fields and cleared riparian zones that existed in January 1813. Historic landscape features also include the River Raisin shoreline, Mason Run, and a grid of streets, park boundaries, and property lines that still trace the roture system of ribbon farms (or long lots) that existed in early 19th-century Frenchtown. Another key feature of the Battles of Frenchtown was Hull’s Trace, a roadway first laid out in the summer of 1812 that served as the primary route to
and from the conflicts of January 1813. The original trace (i.e., path, or rudimentary road) bisects the battlefield area and is now overlain by a railroad right-of-way consisting of two sets of tracks owned—from west to east—by Norfolk Southern Railway and Canadian National Railway. Aside from these landscape features, physical evidence of Frenchtown, the battles, and their aftermath are archeological. No contributing structures exist on the site. North of the River Raisin, current conditions include two lightly developed municipal parks, National Park Service land and facilities within River Raisin National Battlefield Park (RRNBP), reclaimed brownfields, vacant lots, a small marina with a restaurant, and twenty-four private residences on both sides of East Elm Avenue. South of the River Raisin the expanded National Register of Historic Places (NRHP) site includes a stretch of land along the River Raisin that includes two lightly developed municipal parks, vacant lots, thirteen private residences, and a credit union.

**Narrative Description**

This document expands and amends the existing National Register designation for the River Raisin Battlefield (site # 82000542). Since the National Register of Historic Places listing was made in 1982, the physical conditions of the battlefield area have changed considerably. The abandonment and removal of large facilities associated with the paper industry, and the conversion of these sites to open park areas, has created an entirely new landscape. As a result of these changes, the historic qualities of setting, association, and feeling have been greatly enhanced and enlarged. This is true of the landscape within the boundaries of the original National Register site as well as adjoining parcels that compose significant parts of the Battles of Frenchtown but were not included in the 1982 NRHP nomination. The process of demolition, environmental mitigation, and landscape restoration within the core battle areas also created opportunities for archeological investigations which have shed new light on American Indian use and residence in the area, the establishment and development of Frenchtown in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, the War of 1812 conflicts that occurred there, and the subsequent history of the site. The establishment of River Raisin National Battlefield Park in 2009, which has administrative and statutory authority within and beyond the original boundaries of the NRHP site, represents another significant development. The sum of these many changes provides a new and larger context that better reveals historic landscape features and more fully conveys the significance and scale of the Battles of Frenchtown.

**GENERAL SETTING**

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1 Daniel F. Harrison, National Register of Historic Places, Hull's Trace North Huron River Corduroy Segment, Brownstown Township, Wayne County, Michigan, National Register #10001022 (2010). This site is managed as a unit of River Raisin National Battlefield Park (RRNBP).
River Raisin Battlefield Site  
Name of Property:  
Monroe MI  
County and State:  
The expanded River Raisin Battlefield Site is situated within the City of Monroe in southeastern Michigan. Set on a level plain and extending across the lower reach of the eastward flowing River Raisin, the expanded NRHP site is approximately three miles upstream from Lake Erie. The area has supported human use and residence for thousands of years, and served as an important crossroads between areas to the south and north as well as between Lake Erie and inland areas to the west. Though altered by more than two centuries of agricultural, residential, commercial and industrial development, this dynamic continues to define the area. The City of Monroe serves as a hub for the mostly rural and inland areas of Monroe County while the Port of Monroe, which is the only Michigan port on Lake Erie, connects area industries with the entire Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Seaway System. Monroe is also roughly equidistant from the Detroit Metropolitan Area to the north and the Toledo Metropolitan Area to the south. The routes to and from the Battles of Frenchtown essentially followed all of these pathways – along the shore of Lake Erie, inland from the west, up from the Maumee River rapids (present-day Toledo), and down from Detroit. These geographic connections and intersections made the settlement of Frenchtown a site of dramatic conflict in large part because it occupied a contested crossroads of great strategic importance.

Monroe is a relatively small city with a land area of just over ten square miles and a population of approximately 23,000. Served by railroads, state highways, Interstate 75, and the Port of Monroe, it is well connected within the region and beyond. For most of the 19th century, Monroe was a regional hub for a mostly agricultural economy, but in the early 20th century the city became economically linked to rising new industrial centers in Toledo and Detroit. While most of the county remained rural, the city became devoted to the production of steel, the manufacture of automobile parts and large machinery, furniture manufacturing, and large-scale paper and cardboard container production. Toward the end of the 20th century Monroe followed the broad economic decline of the so-called Rust Belt, and has since lost much of its manufacturing base. In response to these changes, the city has come to epitomize a new movement that is seeing communities across much of the United States actively reshape themselves in accordance with their unique histories and physical settings. The restoration of the battlefield site and the establishment of the national battlefield park are two key examples of this movement.

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2 In the context of this document, the “core area” of the expanded River Raisin Battlefield Site refers to the main scenes of action on January 18, 22, and 23. This corresponds to the central environs of Frenchtown on the north side of the River Raisin as well as near shore areas on the south bank of the river. The expanded boundaries of the NRHP site encompass the areas where battle approaches transitioned into attacks, and where retreats continued as running battles or devolved into complete routs. For purposes of interpretation and administration, the NPS situates the Battles of Frenchtown within a larger area that extends beyond the City of Monroe to the site of the British and American Indian encampment at Swan Creek on January 21, 1813 (about four miles north of the battlefield in Berlin Township), and about five miles to the south of the River Raisin where the last U.S. surrenders occurred at Otter Creek (in LaSalle Township). These more extensive boundaries also include British, American Indian, and U.S. lines of approach and retreat as well as a few skirmish areas.

3 During the War of 1812, southeastern Michigan had a few mostly French-speaking communities. The largest was known as Frenchtown and included the battlefield site. Most of the properties connected with Frenchtown were located within the present city limits of Monroe, which was established in 1817 and named after then president James Monroe. The communities to the north of the River Raisin and beyond the boundaries of Monroe were later reorganized as the Frenchtown Charter Township, which includes most of the area within Monroe County that lies north of the Monroe city limits.
River Raisin Battlefield Site  Monroe  MI

In the 1982 National Register listing, the River Raisin Battlefield Site took in an area bounded by Mason Run on the north, Detroit Avenue on the east, and the north bank of the River Raisin on the south. The western boundary followed a line that ran southwesterly from the point where Noble Street intersects with Mason Run and through part of an existing paper mill facility to the River Raisin. The expansion of these boundaries is significant, incorporating more of the key locales associated with the Battles of Frenchtown and utilizing the boundaries of adjacent parklands that retain—or have recently been restored to—their historic landscape characteristics. The new boundaries encompass those of the original listing, with the following additions. On the north side of the River Raisin, the west boundary extends all the way to the CSX rail line to take in key areas utilized by various combatants during the Second Battle of Frenchtown (January 22, 1813). This new boundary includes the entire footprint of a former paper mill facility that was partly included in the original listing, and has since become municipal parkland, along with two vacant structures and two commercial sites that are slated for reclamation and incorporation into the national park unit.

The north boundary of the expanded battlefield site extends beyond the Mason Run drainage to encompass an additional fifty-four acres of vacated commercial and industrial property that is being reclaimed for inclusion into the national park unit. This expanse incorporates areas where Kentucky militia pursued Canadian militia and warriors from a confederated alliance of American Indian communities (hereafter referred to as the Native Confederacy or Confederacy) in a running battle at the close of the First Battle of Frenchtown (January 18, 1813). Areas to the north of Mason Run also include the approach route and relative positions of British artillery and Confederacy warriors during the Second Battle of Frenchtown. This portion of the expanded NRHP site includes part of a reclaimed industrial site as well as former commercial properties that have been vacated, demolished, and slated for reclamation. The eastern boundary extends

4 This seemingly arbitrary boundary cut across the property of what was then the Union Camp Corporation, but it did follow the survey lines of a historic ribbon farm.

5 The Confederacy comprised individuals, families and communities from several distinct cultural groups that included Wyandotte (aka Wyandot or Huron), Shawnee, Bodéwadmi (Potawatomi), Odawa (Ottawa), Ojibwe (Chippewa), Lunaapeew (Lenape, or Delaware), Myaamia (Miami), Waayahtanwa (Wea), Hoocąągra (Ho-Chunk, aka Winnebago), Kiikaapoi (Kickapoo), Muscogee (Creek), Ōkwe'ōwé (Seneca-Cayuga; aka, “Mingo”), Thâkîwa (Sauk, or Sac), and Meskwaki (Fox) fighters. Members of these various communities also resided in or moved to areas within present-day Canada before, during, and after the War of 1812. Those who remained in Canada, and whose descendants continue to reside there, are more appropriately referred to as First Nations. The majority remained within the boundaries of the United States during and after the War of 1812 and signed treaties with the United States. For consistency, in this nomination all are referred to collectively as American Indians—in accordance with the standard terminology used by federal and state agencies, American Indian tribes and organizations, and academic institutions in the United States. For more on the terms and orthographies used for referencing specific groups, see note 38 below. The term Canadian will be used in this narrative to identify the local militia forces (both anglophone and francophone) from present-day southwestern Ontario that fought with British Regulars and Native Confederacy fighters.
River Raisin Battlefield Site

Name of Property: River Raisin Battlefield Site
County and State: Monroe MI

Beyond Detroit Avenue (which served as the eastern boundary of the original NRHP listing) to include approximately 35 acres of open field and marshland where Confederacy warriors outflanked and attacked U.S. forces during the Second Battle of Frenchtown (January 22, 1813). Along the north bank of the River Raisin, between East Elm Avenue and the river’s edge, the boundary extends a short distance eastward and westward from the original NRHP listing: beginning at a point approximately 700 feet east of the East Elm and Detroit Avenue intersection, and extending westward to include a cluster of private residences and a stretch of publicly owned riverfront on the west side of North Dixie Highway.

Expansion of the River Raisin Battlefield Site’s boundaries also includes areas on the south side of the River Raisin. Along the river this includes two municipal parks—Rauch Park (2.1 acres), which is to the west of the Norfolk Southern tracks, and Hellenberg Park (13 acres), which is to the east of the Canadian National tracks—and a small stretch of vacant land that extends westward from Rauch Park to the CSX rail line. This area is where U.S. forces and Kentucky militia crossed the frozen river to attack Canadian militia and Confederacy forces in Frenchtown on January 18, as well as where some re-crossed the river as they retreated from pursuing Confederacy fighters on January 22. The Hellenberg Park parcel, which includes Sterling Island, was also a key line of attack on January 18 as well as the site of a brief defensive stand by U.S. forces on January 22.

Though relevant to the events of January 1813, areas to the south of this mostly open riverfront area are not included in the expanded boundaries for two reasons: first, they encompass nearly 200 acres of residential and commercial areas that do not possess historic qualities of setting, association, and feeling that exist within the former core of Frenchtown and the near shore areas along the south riverfront; and second, preliminary archeological surveys have concluded “they can't be determined significant under [National Register] Criterion D, potential to provide information important in history.” A southern extension of the boundaries of the NRHP site may be prudent at a future date, particularly if long-range plans to convert the area into open parklands and interpretive recreational corridors come to fruition. Toward these possible ends, two specific sites are worth noting. Extending south from the current riverfront parks, known lines of retreat along the route of Hull’s Trace (i.e., between Kentucky Avenue on the west and the Norfolk Southern and Canadian National lines on the east) run approximately one mile to Plum Creek Park. This small park is the site is where U.S. troops surrendered to Native Confederacy fighters on January 22—and it was in this vicinity that significant numbers were

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6 This land is part of a larger parcel slated for future acquisition and incorporation into RRNBP.
7 Hellenberg Park was improved in 1985 with a Land and Water Conservation Fund (LWCF) stateside assistance grant from the National Park Service. It, therefore, is perpetually encumbered with the LWCF Act for public use and enjoyment as park land.” Bob Anderson, Chief, Recreation Grants Division, NPS Midwest Region, to Senior Historian Ron Cockrell, NPS Midwest Region, email, March 9, 2015.
8 Pratt, Rutter, and Richard Green, “The River Raisin Battlefield, Outside the Core: Archeological Survey of Peripheral Battlefield Areas, American Battlefield Protection Program Grant GA 2255-08-008” (2010), 33-34.
9 On the south side of the river, residential areas within the River Raisin 100-year floodplain, along with a mix of vacant commercial land in the vicinity of Hull’s Trace, have been identified in a long-range plan for possible acquisition and conversion to park uses and recreational corridors. These plans are detailed in River Raisin History Corridor East – Master Plan (2013), which was jointly produced by the City of Monroe, the Monroe County Historical Society, the River Raisin National Battlefield Park Foundation, and the National Park Service.
River Raisin Battlefield Site

The areas that are included within the expanded boundaries present significant features of the Battles of Frenchtown and their aftermath. Though heavily engineered near its confluence with Lake Erie, the section of the River Raisin that runs through the expanded NRHP site follows its historic course and is undergoing significant habitat restoration. The same is true of Mason Run, a small creek that runs across the northern portion of the core battlefield area before flowing to Sterling State Park and the Ford Marsh Unit of the Detroit River International Wildlife Refuge (DRIWR). Historically, the area between Mason Run and Frenchtown was a lightly wooded area composed of a few small orchards as well as cultivated and fallow fields that were laid out in long narrow lots. In accordance with French colonial practices, these “ribbon farms” had a narrow frontage along the River Raisin that extended back for more than a mile. While ribbon farms were scattered along both sides of the river for several miles, the area referred to as Frenchtown was a cluster of homes and structures adjacent to the point where Hull’s Trace reached the north bank of the Raisin. Frenchtown, as such, was contained within a series of garden fences that had recently been fortified with a puncheon fence. Resembling an informal stockade, this fencing surrounded six extended family homes, outbuildings, and community paths. All of these structures were destroyed in the Battles of Frenchtown, as were many of the small orchards. Even after two centuries of change, however, streets bordering and crossing the battlefield still follow the original ribbon farm layout, and the route of Hull’s Trace (which underlies North Dixie Highway) is still used as a major transportation corridor. Along with the persistence of features like Mason Run and the River Raisin, these conditions present an accurate spatial reference to major events and positions within the historic landscape.

The current physical appearance of the River Raisin Battlefield Site’s core area also provides a strong sense of the historic landscape. On the north side of the River Raisin, where most of the conflict and destruction occurred, the battlefield site is composed of two larger parcels divided by the railroad right-of-way and North Dixie Highway, and two narrow strips between the River Raisin and East Elm Avenue. East of the Canadian National line is a forty-two-acre parcel that is currently the main area for interpretation within RRNBP. Bounded on the south by East Elm Avenue, on the east by Detroit Avenue, and encompassing the Mason Run drainage on the north, most of this parkland is a converted industrial site that had long been used for manufacturing paper products and packaging. It now consists of a grassy field, scattered trees and shrubs, and a recently replanted stretch of Mason Run. A good deal of the acreage that is closer to the Detroit Avenue side of this National Park Service (NPS) land was formerly used for a plant nursery, and retains the approximate conditions that were present during the War of 1812. The visitor center and administrative offices for RRNBP are located at the southeastern end of this former nursery

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10 It should be noted that preliminary archeological fieldwork occurred at two locations along Plum Creek in 2009. Extensive fill materials from the mid-20th century were encountered, and researchers were unable to determine if “1813 soil horizons even survive … beneath the modern fill horizons.” Pratt et al, “The River Raisin Battlefield, Outside the Core,” 33.

River Raisin Battlefield Site

area, in a house built during the early 20th century and accessed from East Elm Avenue. A densely-wooded area is immediately east of this facility while a short distance to the north is a pavilion that provides interpretation of battlefield archeology through exhibits, guides, and literature. This area is set within a pedestrian loop that runs through the location of the U.S. 17th Infantry encampment on the night of January 21, 1813 and through the early minutes of the Second Battle of Frenchtown the following morning. Across Detroit Avenue is a stretch of mowed grass that was once used as an ash dump that subsequently became overgrown and heavily wooded. The landowner has since removed the ash and trees and transformed the area to open field and forested wetlands.

The portion of the expanded NRHP site that lies to the west of North Dixie Highway and north of East Elm Avenue is another former industrial site that was demolished and reclaimed in the 1990s and is now the City of Monroe’s Multi-Sports Park. At the north end of this 15.3-acre parcel is the city’s 70,000 square foot Multi-Sports Complex, which has been proposed as a future visitor center and administrative facility for RRNBP. Aside from the parking lot at the Complex, and a nearby skatepark, the rest of the site is mowed grass with a scattering of trees and some shrubs. Immediately south of the Multi-Sports Park is Riviere Aux Raisins Park, (1.9 acres), which extends along the north side of East Elm Avenue from the corner of North Dixie to the edge of the original NRHP site boundary. A mostly grassy area with a few trees and a flagpole, the primary feature of the park is a concrete and stone obelisk commemorating the “River Raisin Massacre.” Erected in 1904 and placed near the riverbank, it was moved across East Elm Avenue to its current position in 2002. The area along the river, immediately across from Riviere Aux Raisins Park, is a narrow strip of city-managed greenway with a concrete sidewalk.

The only area within the northern part of the expanded River Raisin Battlefield Site that still has a number of developed properties is east of the railroad right-of-way, along East Elm Avenue. A short distance to the east of the Canadian National Railway Bridge is a row of early and mid-20th-century homes fronting the river (some with detached garages and small boat launches), with another set of early-20th-century homes on the north side of East Elm Avenue. The proximity of these homes to the River Raisin places them in the same vicinity as most of the homes and structures that were extant, and destroyed, during the Second Battle of Frenchtown and the following day.

Immediately south of these home sites, on the opposite side of the River Raisin, is Hellenberg Park. Situated on Strong Island, which was once separated from the mainland by a shallow branch of the River Raisin that was blocked and filled in the early 20th century, the park is accessed from East Front Street and includes an open grassy area, a baseball diamond, parking lot, boat launch area, basketball court, and a few structures. This park area encompasses the lines of attack and retreat of U.S. troops, as well as the site of the defensive stand on January 22, 1813. Hellenberg Park also has a footbridge to Sterling Island, which is composed of fill taken from a small chain of islands that were once situated near the south bank of the River Raisin. The vegetation on Sterling Island approximates the riparian conditions that existed along this

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River Raisin Battlefield Site

Monroe MI

stretch of the river in the early 19th century. Just west of the Norfolk Southern rail line, and across the river from the Riviere Aux Raisins Park and the narrow greenway, is Rauch Park and another vacant parcel. Together they provide an open green space of mowed grass and trees that is bisected by the approach to the North Dixie Highway Bridge. Most of the remaining area within the expanded River Raisin Battlefield Site that lies south of the River Raisin is composed of private residences, streets, and vacant lots.

During and after the battles along the River Raisin, Frenchtown proper was destroyed. The buildings were burned, fences were burned or broken apart, and some orchard trees were damaged or cut down. Consequently, the absence of historic structures at the current battlefield site is consistent with the actions and consequences of the Battles of Frenchtown. For the next few years the immediate environs remained unused and uninhabited, but the site subsequently began a long process of transformation. In 1817 the town of Monroe was platted as an American settlement to the south and west of the ruined core of Frenchtown, along the opposite shore of the River Raisin. Over the next few decades, American settlers and land speculators poured into southeastern Michigan in a movement that was largely fostered by two developments: the dislocation and removal of nearby Bodéwadmi (Potawatomi), Wyandotte and Odawa (Ottawa) communities, and the opening of the Great Lakes to East Coast markets with the completion of the Erie Canal in 1825. In the process, francophone families became a distinct minority population and their lands were subdivided or sold off to become American farms that were cleared and drained for more intensive commercial agriculture. The former site of Frenchtown was annexed into the growing City of Monroe, but continued as a productive agricultural area that served local and regional markets.

As the region and city industrialized, most of the battlefield area on the north side of the River Raisin was developed by the River Raisin Paper Company beginning in 1911, and the company’s facilities eventually encompassed 200 acres. Over time the company and its properties were acquired by other corporations, and the structures within the expanded NRHP site were variously used, replaced, left vacant, or repurposed through most of the twentieth century. A combination of aging facilities, economic competition, concerns about toxic pollution, and a growing interest in commemorating the Battles of Frenchtown led to the first demolitions of industrial structures in the 1970s. That process ultimately came to a close in early 2015 with the removal of a brick pump house and office structure (ca. 1918) that stood just east of the Canadian National Railway Bridge. After more than 200 years, the battlefield site on the north side of the river—with the exception of East Elm Avenue, portions of the railroad right-of-way, and Dixie Highway—has steadily returned to conditions that reflect conditions that existed at the close of the conflicts and destruction that occurred between January 18 and 23, 1813.

CONTRIBUTING RESOURCES

River Raisin Battlefield Site

Monroe, MI

Name of Property

County and State

The River Raisin Battlefield Site is the sole contributing resource in this nomination. Much has changed in the past several years, and large portions of the battle site have been restored to conditions approximating those of the early 19th century. Subsurface resources also remain largely intact. Archeological investigations have revealed that materials related to Frenchtown and the events of January 1813 remained in situ and mostly undisturbed through decades of agricultural use and a century of industrial development, expansion, and demolition.

The expanded NRHP site also reflects the process of land acquisition and restoration that remains ongoing through partnerships between the City of Monroe, the Port of Monroe, the National Park Service, the River Raisin National Battlefield Park Foundation, the Michigan Department of Natural Resources, and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Even as that process moves forward, however, some noncontributing structures and roadways will remain within the approximately 230 acres of the expanded NRHP site. None of the noncontributing features or planned restoration projects will undermine the significance of this expansion of the NRHP site.

There are three other sites on the National Register that are historically connected to Frenchtown and the battles that occurred there, but they are all individual listings and are not included here as components of a multiple-property site or district. The most recently listed site is Hull's Trace North Huron River Corduroy Segment (NRHP ref. #10001022), which is a partly exposed corduroy road that was laid down in the early-19th-century. This site is an administrative unit of the River Raisin National Battlefield Park, and is an intact remnant of the same road—or trace—that bisected Frenchtown and connected Fort Detroit with the military encampment that became Fort Meigs. While this exposed stretch of road has direct relevance to the events of January 1813, it lies 14 miles north of the battlefield and has important associations with other National Register sites—and is thus not part of a multiple-property listing. Within the city limits of Monroe is another National Register site, the Sawyer House (NRHP ref. #77000721), which has a connection to the Battles of Frenchtown. The Sawyer House occupies the site of a dwelling that belonged to Francois Navarre, who initiated the development of Frenchtown in the late 18th century and served with American forces during the War of 1812. Because of its location, on the south side of the river and nearly a mile from the battle site, the Navarre home was peripheral to the events of January 1813. U.S. General James Winchester used the house as his headquarters, but its distance from Frenchtown caused him to miss, and misread, events as they unfolded during the Second Battle of Frenchtown. The site of Navarre’s house was entirely covered over

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14 On partnerships, see River Raisin Heritage Corridor-East Master Plan.

15 Harrison, Hull's Trace North Huron River Corduroy Segment. The stretch of Hull’s Trace that is preserved near the mouth of the Huron River was part of the route used by the British and American Indians during their approach to Frenchtown on January 21, 1813, as well as in the removal of British wounded and American Prisoners of War on January 22, 1813. It is also the site where U.S. forces encamped after reentering Michigan Territory from Upper Canada (present-day province of Ontario) in September of 1813 to bury the remains of soldiers killed at the Battles of Frenchtown. Primary documents describing the burying of soldier remains were written from this site. The distance from the battlefield is measured in road miles along North Dixie Highway, U.S. Turnpike Road, and Jefferson Avenue, which together cover Hull’s Trace from present-day Monroe to the mouth of the Huron River. Other NRHP sites that have associations with the Hull’s Trace North Huron River Corduroy Segment site include Fort Meigs (#69000151), Jefferson Avenue—Huron River and Harbin Drive—Silver Creek Canal Bridges (#0000080), and Fort Wayne (#71000425).
by Dr. Alfred Sawyer’s Italianate home in 1873, and no visible trace remains of the original structure. Lastly, the Navarre-Anderson Trading Post (NRHP ref. # 7200645) is a National Register site about five miles west-northwest of the battlefield site. A cluster of three buildings, one being a reconstruction and the other two dating back to the late 18th and early 19th centuries, they were part of a small family compound that was located on the north side of the river and just west of the expanded River Raisin Battlefield Site boundaries. The structures were moved a short distance in 1894, and then to their current location in 1971. Bullet holes on the historic facade of the main building likely date back to the Battles of Frenchtown, but distance from its original location preclude the Trading Post’s inclusion with the expanded River Raisin Battlefield NRHP listing.

NONCONTRIBUTING RESOURCES

At present there are 62 noncontributing resources within the proposed boundaries of the River Raisin Battlefield site (NRHP site # 82000542), as enumerated in Section 5 above. Under the category of buildings, 28 are single-family residences that are located on East Elm Avenue along the north side of the River Raisin and, along the south side of the river, on East Front Street. There are also 25 commercial buildings located on both sides of the river, four of which have been vacant for several years. Most of these properties are located around the northern extension of the NRHP boundaries in an area that is zoned by the City of Monroe as a Light Industrial District. The commercial buildings located near the north and south banks of the river are related to dining, entertainment, banking, and boating. Another two buildings within the proposed boundaries are for public use. These include an early twentieth-century bungalow that serves as the combined Headquarters and Visitor Center for River Raisin National Battlefield Park, and the Monroe Multi-Sports Complex building just north of Riviere Aux Raisins Park. There are also three municipal parks that are counted as noncontributing sites within the proposed boundary expansion: Hellenberg Park (which includes Sterling Island) on the south shore of the River Raisin, Riviere Aux Raisins Park on the north side of the river, and the expanse of open space around the Monroe Multi-Sports Complex. There are also three noncontributing structures within the proposed boundaries that include one bridge (the Dixie Highway bridge) and two railroad trestles (Canadian National and Norfolk Southern railways). Lastly, there is one noncontributing object within the boundary expansion area: a fifteen feet tall stone obelisk that was dedicated in 1904 to memorialize the Americans who died during the Second Battle of Frenchtown. Originally placed near the river bank, it is currently located on the southeast corner of Riviere Aux Raisins Park.

STATEMENT OF INTEGRITY

River Raisin Battlefield Site

Monroe, MI

In regards to setting, feeling and association, it is important to note that none of the Frenchtown village elements that existed at the outset of the Battles of Frenchtown are present above ground. Their absence within the core area of conflict and residence, however, is the product of the battles on January 18 and 22 as well as the destruction wrought by American Indians on January 23, 1813. While a few properties near the south bank of the River Raisin survived the conflicts, as well as some further west on both sides the river, the general destruction of the core of Frenchtown is a particularly significant event. Consequently, the absence of the former structures is a persistent and historically accurate result of the conflicts. If the current site included representative structures of early 19th century Frenchtown, their presence might serve commemorative and interpretive purposes. However, these would be noncontributing resources within the battlefield area since the historical significance of the Battles of Frenchtown derives in part from the complete destruction of the core village area.

The expanded NRHP site maintains historic integrity of setting, feeling, and association in the series of fields, river shores, and wooded areas displaying historic landscape features that were present during the Battles of Frenchtown. The same is generally true of near-shore areas on both sides of the River Raisin, with the exceptions of noncontributing residential structures that front along both sides of East Elm Avenue along the north shore of the river and the sparsely developed mix of residential, municipal park, and commercial structures near the southern shore of the river. On both sides of the River Raisin, streets and property lines that border or run through the expanded NRHP site on a north-south axis follow the roture system of ribbon farms (or long lots) that radiated back from their narrow frontages and were first laid out by the habitants of Frenchtown in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. Moreover, East Elm Avenue follows the route of the riverfront road that was first laid out in the late 18th century while the original course of Hull’s Trace is overlain by North Dixie Highway. These roadways, and the old property lines they trace, make it possible to identify specific sites where allied British, Canadian militia, American Indian forces were arrayed against, U.S., Kentucky militia, and local Michigan militia forces prior to and during the battles. The persistence of the historical grid is also being used to identify stretches of land for further acquisition, restoration, and incorporation into RRNBP.

The entire area within the proposed expansion of the River Raisin Battlefield Site possesses integrity of location. Specific events and their locations are well documented in contemporary reports from British and U.S. military sources, recorded comments from Confederacy fighters, and the published recollections of soldiers, Kentucky militia, and Frenchtown habitants. This information is further corroborated in a series of prolonged cases that were brought to the U.S. Court of Claims by property owners who sought reparations for the damages they sustained in the two battles and their aftermath. Residents of Monroe, which was founded in 1817, remained keenly aware of the battlefield site for many years. Even newcomers in the 1820s acquired some passing familiarity with the town’s wartime experience, since the Battles of Frenchtown and subsequent killing of surrendered U.S. soldiers received a great deal of press in the United States and inspired the War of 1812 battle cry of “Remember the Raisin!” Finding

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human remains within the battlefield area was not uncommon, even as late as the 1840s, and each discovery sharpened memories of the battles. Guided by contemporary accounts, property records, the Court of Claims cases, and historical recollections, recent archeological investigations have recovered materials related to the battles and the destruction of Frenchtown. These investigations have corroborated the historical record and demonstrated that subsurface conditions remained largely undisturbed by the construction and expansion of large industrial sites through the 20th century. In sum, an expansion of the River Raisin Battlefield Site accords with evidence from contemporary records, published accounts, a long-standing community awareness, and archeological evidence.
8. Statement of Significance

Applicable National Register Criteria
(Mark "x" in one or more boxes for the criteria qualifying the property for National Register listing.)

☐ A. Property is associated with events that have made a significant contribution to the broad patterns of our history.

☐ B. Property is associated with the lives of persons significant in our past.

☐ C. Property embodies the distinctive characteristics of a type, period, or method of construction or represents the work of a master, or possesses high artistic values, or represents a significant and distinguishable entity whose components lack individual distinction.

☐ D. Property has yielded, or is likely to yield, information important in prehistory or history.

Criteria Considerations
(Mark “x” in all the boxes that apply.)

☐ A. Owned by a religious institution or used for religious purposes

☐ B. Removed from its original location

☐ C. A birthplace or grave

☐ D. A cemetery

☐ E. A reconstructed building, object, or structure

☐ F. A commemorative property

☐ G. Less than 50 years old or achieving significance within the past 50 years
River Raisin Battlefield Site
Name of Property

Monroe MI
County and State

Areas of Significance
(Enter categories from instructions.)
MILITARY

Period of Significance
1811-1814

Significant Dates
January 18-23, 1813

Significant Person
(Complete only if Criterion B is marked above.)
N/A

Cultural Affiliation
N/A

Architect/Builder
N/A

Statement of Significance Summary Paragraph (Provide a summary paragraph that includes level of significance, applicable criteria, justification for the period of significance, and any applicable criteria considerations.)
The expanded River Raisin Battlefield Site possesses significance under National Register of Historic Places Criterion A. The battles that occurred on January 18 and 20, 1813, and the subsequent killing of wounded American prisoners and destruction of Frenchtown that occurred on January 23, 1813, were significant historic events that derived from broad patterns of North American history and directly contributed to national and regional developments during and after the War of 1812. The battle events mark a significant victory for the Native Confederacy that came together in 1811 to prevent U.S. expansion into the Great Lakes region and areas to the south and west. The battles also represent a key point in the War of 1812, as British forces—in alliance with Confederacy warriors—sought to block a U.S. invasion of Upper Canada (present-day Ontario) and help foster the creation of a distinct American Indian territory to the west and southwest of Lake Erie and the western Great Lakes. This effort came to a formal end when a large gathering of American Indian leaders affirmed a “A Treaty of Peace and Friendship” with the United States (aka Treaty of Greenville, 1814), and British negotiators dropped their support for such a territory prior to signing of the Treaty of Ghent in December 1814. The Battles of Frenchtown collectively remain the largest conflict to ever occur within the present boundaries of Michigan and proved the deadliest engagement for the United States during the War of 1812. This loss inspired the spirited cry of “Remember Raisin!” for U.S. forces in subsequent battles during the War of 1812, including the decisive American victory at the Battle of the Thames in Upper Canada (present-day Ontario) where British forces surrendered and the celebrated Shawnee leader Tecumseh was killed. The events along the River Raisin also mark the last hours of Frenchtown, one of the very few French ribbon farm settlements to be established within the United States after the Revolutionary War.

Narrative Statement of Significance (Provide at least one paragraph for each area of significance.)

Criterion A—Military

The historical significance of the River Raisin Battlefield Site is both expansive and singular. The larger, or expansive, significance derives from the position of Frenchtown within broader geographical and historical contexts that extend back to the 17th century, and involve communities and developments throughout the Great Lakes region. As a military event, it reflects generations of crisis, conflict, and accommodation for a host of confederated American Indian groups, an equally long period of invasion and dispossession of their lands and communities by Europeans and Euro-Americans from the Mid-Atlantic and Northeast, the creation and persistence of French and Métis communities during and after French imperial activity in North America, and competition between French, British, and U.S. interests in the region that each knew as Pays d’en Haut (Upper Country), the Western Territory, or the Ohio Country. In the first decade of the 19th century, Frenchtown was situated along a key travel corridor within a historically and culturally complex borderland of competing interests. First established in the mid-1780s, the settlement was primarily inhabited by French-speaking
Catholic habitants whose French and Métis lineages reached back to the French colonial era in the Great Lakes region. Other nearby communities included multi-ethnic American Indian villages of mostly Wyandotte to the north, mostly Bodéwadmi (Potowatomi) to the west and northwest, and mostly Odawa (Ottawa) to the south. While relations between habitants and American Indian communities were generally peaceful and mutually beneficial, they operated within a narrow space that was impinged upon by powerful regional, national and global forces.¹⁸

With the Detroit River and western Lake Erie as an easily crossed boundary between British Canada and the United States, unsettled tensions over the disposition of the Great Lakes area after the American Revolution remained a live concern for various groups and communities in the border area and beyond. To the south, in Ohio and Kentucky, American settlers, land speculators and political leaders were committed to finishing a decades-long process of destroying and removing American Indian communities from present-day Ohio and areas to the west. From the upper Great Lakes to the lower Ohio River, a growing confederacy of American Indian communities associated with the Shawnee brothers Tecumseh and Tenskwatawa was organizing to defend and strengthen their communities against further territorial loss. All of these developments, from the settlement of Frenchtown and the location of the nearby Wyandotte villages of Brownstown and Maguaga to the competing agendas of Kentuckians, British officials, U.S. policy makers and the Native Confederacy, were rooted in historical processes that had been actively shaping the region for more than half a century.¹⁹

All of these interests and dynamics were part of what historian David Skaggs has termed the “Sixty Years War for the Great Lakes,” a period of prolonged crisis and conflict in the region that spanned from the French and Indian War (1754-1763) through Pontiac’s Rebellion (1763-1765), Lord Dunmore’s War (1774), the Revolutionary War (1775-1783), and the Northwest Indian War (1785-1795) to the War of 1812 (1812-1815).²⁰ As the various dates indicate, the region was not wracked by six decades of continuous warfare, but repeated conflict touched every community and generation. In the decade after 1795, for instance, years of conflict gave way to a series of American Indian land cessions and the wholesale displacement of many communities from present-day Ohio. As Native resistance to further loss of villages and land intensified in the early 1800s, however, U.S. officials, Trans-Appalachian settlers, British officials, and American Indian communities prepared for a renewal of old conflicts. War came in 1811 with the Battle of Tippecanoe in present-day Indiana, and the older dynamics of the

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¹⁹ For an overview of these conditions, see the essays in David Curtis Skaggs and Larry Lee Nelson, eds. The Sixty Years' War for the Great Lakes, 1754-1814 (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2010), and Tanner, ed., Atlas of Great Lakes Indian History, 48-121.

²⁰ Skaggs, “The Sixty Years’ War for the Great Lakes, 1754-1814: An Overview,” in Skaggs and Nelson, eds. The Sixty Years' War for the Great Lakes, 1-20. The terms used here reflect commonly used designations in the United States, which can differ from American Indian, Canadian, French, and British conceptions of these conflicts.
“Sixty Years War” both determined and defined the course of the War of 1812 in the western Great Lakes region.\(^\text{21}\)

Though maritime issues like British impressment of American sailors and restrictions on U.S. trade with Europe and European colonies topped the list of grievances in President James Madison’s “War Message” to Congress on June 1, 1812, the push for war with Britain was strongest in the Trans-Appalachian West.\(^\text{22}\) Led by the so-called War Hawks, a group of influential western congressmen, they sought an expansive war and pressed for an invasion of Canada. More than “Free Trade and Sailors’ Rights,” westerners worried about what they called an “ANGLO-SAVAGE WAR” and, like Representative Felix Grundy of Kentucky, wanted to “drive the British from our Continent” to stop their “intriguing with our Indian neighbors” and to bring more territory—as well as the proceeds of the Canadian fur trade—into the United States.\(^\text{23}\) The British, for their part, hoped to foster an independent territory for American Indians in the Great Lakes region that would restore pre-Revolutionary War conditions and serve as a buffer against further U.S. expansion. For the confederacy of American Indians that allied with the British, conflict with the United States related to more existential questions of territory, culture, and autonomy.\(^\text{24}\) In every case, the War of 1812 in the Great Lakes region was about ending (and winning) the Sixty Years War. Because Frenchtown was a key location in the strategy of all parties, it was variously claimed and occupied by every faction in the months that followed the U.S. Declaration of War on June 18, 1812. By January of the following year, the settlement became the epicenter of violence and destruction in the Great Lakes region.

The singular importance of the River Raisin Battlefield Site derives from its strategic position during the War of 1812 as well as the scale and significance of the Battles of Frenchtown and their aftermath. It is no coincidence that Michigan Territorial Governor William Hull, who also served as commanding general of the newly formed U.S. Army of the North West, first learned of the official declaration of war against Great Britain while approaching Frenchtown on the 2\(^\text{nd}\) of July. General Hull received the news while implementing an already planned invasion of Canada that involved the construction of a road from southern Ohio to Detroit. Though it followed well-known paths that had been used for countless generations, the road had to support the passage of an army and its supplies. Construction proved arduous, and involved numerous river crossings, the construction of blockhouses and supply depots, and pushing through the wet


and muddy tangle of the vast Black Swamp that encompassed much of the lower Maumee River basin. The crude road, which became known as Hull’s Trace, was mostly completed between early May and early July—when Hull and his 1,500-strong force of U.S. Regulars and Ohio militia arrived in Detroit.25

From a military standpoint, the stretch of road from the Maumee River to Detroit was the most critical section of the entire route. The decision to invade Canada by land, and thus develop a road along the western shore of Lake Erie, was largely determined by the strong positions of Fort Amherstburg and the King’s Navy Yard at the mouth of the Detroit River—which blocked all upstream access to Detroit and would allow British vessels to easily sweep any U.S. maritime force from Lake Erie. Consequently, the settlement at Frenchtown was one of the most important locales in Hull’s invasion plan. As one of the few populated areas along the entire route, Frenchtown and the farms that fronted the lower River Raisin helped provision Hull’s forces—and they were expected to keep supplying Detroit in the coming invasion of Canada. The local militia force also helped with the routing and construction of the road, offered some additional protection along the sections to the north and south of Frenchtown, and provided information about nearby American Indian communities as well as on developments at Fort Amherstburg just eighteen miles to the northeast. All of these qualities were integral to Hull’s plan, but the strategic importance of the small settlement could also be exploited by allied British and Native Confederacy forces—which soon made it the Achilles heel of Hull’s Army of the North West.26

Frenchtown and the First Months of the War of 1812

The invasion of Canada began on July 12, and U.S. forces were initially unopposed when they crossed the Detroit River. After meeting resistance from Canadian Militia, American Indians, and British Regulars—and then failing to lay siege to Fort Amherstburg—the invasion began to falter by early August. To bolster his position at Detroit and support the stalled invasion on the opposite side of the river, Hull sent three separate detachments to protect and retrieve desperately needed supplies at the Wayne Stockade and other buildings in Frenchtown. The first detachment of 200 Ohio Militia and some U.S. Regulars was routed on August 5 near the Wyandotte village of Brownstown, and the second detachment of 610 regulars and militia was turned back near the Wyandotte village of Maguagua on August 9. On both occasions they were surprised by large numbers of American Indian warriors led by Tecumseh (Shawnee), Stayeghtha (a.k.a. Roundhead; Wyandotte), Main Poc (Bodéwadmi), and others that had crossed over from their encampments near Amherstburg—as well as a contingent of British troops that participated in the engagement of August 9. All told, American casualties numbered upwards of 180 killed, wounded, or captured. A third detachment tried to reach Frenchtown by a more circuitous route via Godfroy’s Trading Post on the Huron River (present-day Ypsilanti, Michigan) and down the Saline River.

During the long journey, the detachment ran out of supplies and had to turn back. These failures, along with news that Fort Mackinac had fallen to allied British and Native Confederacy a few weeks earlier, convinced Hull to withdraw his invading forces back to Detroit. Cut off from any possible support from Mackinac, and fearing that a vast number of American Indian fighters would soon pour down from the Upper Great Lakes, Hull intended to entrench his command at Detroit. Within days, however, Detroit was under siege by a force greatly augmented by newly arrived British reinforcements and a growing number of warriors who had come to join the Native Confederacy.27

After a brief period of shelling and a number of expert feints by British and Confederacy forces, Hull determined that his position in Detroit was untenable. On August 16, less than five weeks after his invasion of Canada had begun, Hull surrendered Detroit and Michigan Territory without a fight. This dramatic turn of events was so sudden that word did not reach the small detachment of Ohio militiamen at Frenchtown until almost two days after the event. They had been stationed at the Wayne Stockade, constructed in 1806 about one mile west of Frenchtown, when Captain William Elliott from the British Indian Department presented the written terms of the surrender.28 The militia officer in charge of the site rejected the documents as forgeries, locked Elliott’s party in an adjacent blockhouse for a night, and threatened to hang the captain in the morning. New information from Detroit allowed cooler heads to prevail, but instead of honoring the terms of surrender the small group of Ohio Militia fled south. In the wake of the Ohioans’ departure, groups of Confederacy warriors ransacked some dwellings while the British sought to establish preliminary authority in Frenchtown and the surrounding area. Within a few days order was restored, most of the Confederacy warriors departed to surrounding villages or Fort Amherstburg, and the British burned the stockade and its outbuildings before leaving the town under a light guard.29

The defeat of the U.S. Army of the North West and the advent of British administration in Michigan altered but did not diminish the strategic importance of Frenchtown. On the contrary, the settlement’s significance in the War of 1812 was magnified. For the rest of the summer and

27 On the Battles of Brownstown and Maguagua (a.k.a. Monguagon), and Hull’s surrender, see Antal, A Wampum Denied, 78-84, 97-100; and Anthony J. Yanik, The Fall and Recapture of Detroit in the War of 1812: In Defense of William Hull (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2011), 68-105.

28 The British Indian Department, which operated alongside and association with the British Army, deserves some explanation. The Department dates back to the mid-eighteenth century and the Seven Years’ War in North America (French and Indian War). Established to manage diplomatic relations with American Indian groups as well as foster military and commercial alliances, the Indian Department was initially a branch of the British Army. By 1800 authority had transferred to the Lieutenant Governor of Upper Canada (present-day Southern Ontario and parts of Northern Ontario within the Great Lakes Basin) and the Governor General of Canada—who was responsible for the affairs of the Indian Department in Lower Canada (present-day southern and eastern Quebec). At the time of the War of 1812, Sir George Prévost served as the Governor General of Lower Canada and the Commander and Chief of British Forces in Canada while civilian leadership in Upper Canada devolved to a series of commanding officers who also served as provisional Lieutenant Governors. Consequently, the entire British Indian Department operated under military authority throughout the war. At this time the Department had a distinct officer corps totaling around 100 individuals who served as agents, advisers, and interpreters for British officials and Confederacy groups and generally fought alongside their American Indian allies. See Robert Allen, His Majesty's Indian Allies: British Indian Policy in the Defence of Canada 1774-1815 (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1996), 11-21, 149-166.

29 Antal, A Wampum Denied, 111-112.
fall of 1812, Frenchtown served as an important procurement center for the British commissariat—as well as an informal and less than voluntary supplier to American Indian fighters en route to present-day Ohio and Indiana. The River Raisin area also served as a base of operations for Tecumseh and his closest associates, who moved to and from battle sites to the south while maintaining regular contact with the British at Fort Amherstburg and allied American Indian villages to the west and north.  

The situation in Frenchtown changed in late fall and early winter, however, when reports came in to Fort Amherstburg that part of the reconstituted Army of the North West was slowly making its way along the lower Maumee River. While the news was hardly unexpected, it triggered an immediate concern about the material and strategic importance of Frenchtown. If U.S. forces became entrenched at the River Raisin, it could result in the loss of Michigan and jeopardize the security of Upper Canada. With this new threat, the British and Confederacy alliance quickly determined to make the settlement a forward line of defense or—if circumstances warranted—to remove or destroy its resources before they fell into American hands. By the second week of January, when word came that a large American force was settling in at the Maumee Rapids, the two small companies of the Essex militia (who together numbered about 50 men) that were already situated in Frenchtown were bolstered by a contingent of as many as 200 mostly Bodéwadmi and Wyandotte fighters. Along with an additional artilleryman and a light cannon, the augmented force prepared for an expected U.S. attack.

The Battles of Frenchtown

Thirty-five miles to the south, the left wing of the reconstituted Army of the North West established a defensive winter camp near the Maumee Rapids (present-day Perrysburg, Ohio) on January 10, 1813. Formed the previous summer and serving under the command of Brigadier General James Winchester, the combined force of Kentucky Militia and U.S. Infantry that once numbered close to 2,000 men was down to fewer than 1,300. A good deal of that decline was attributable to desertion or dismissal, but many of those who did not reach the Rapids had either become incapacitated along the way and left behind at a rear post or died from exposure and disease. After four-and-a-half months of hard travel, repeated setbacks, and a few minor engagements with allied American Indian and British forces, the remaining men under Winchester’s command were malnourished, poorly clothed and profoundly dispirited. While it was obvious that his force needed to recuperate, Winchester also knew his men required some “progressive operations” or his command would falter altogether. After months of wearisome duty, the militiamen had nearly finished the terms of their service and showed no inclination to extend their enlistments. Indeed, many had already come close to deserting on more than one occasion—and most despised Winchester. For men who four months earlier had boasted of conquering the “ancient enemy … of Americans and Kentuckians” (i.e., the alliance of British

and American Indian interests that dated back before the Revolutionary War), the prospect of
more hunger, fatigue, and biding time was unacceptable.\textsuperscript{33} In short, incessant hardship and
prolonged inaction had brought the left wing of the Army of the North West to the verge of
collapse.

Such a fate was soon averted, however, when a messenger from Frenchtown arrived in
Winchester’s camp on January 13. He reported that the British had begun rounding up suspected
U.S. sympathizers and confiscating stored foodstuffs, livestock and portable property for use at
Fort Amherstburg. Moreover, the messenger stated that all French-speaking habitants were to be
taken across the Detroit River to Canada and Frenchtown burned to the ground. The following
day another habitant of Frenchtown arrived with much the same story, and Winchester decided
to send scouts to assess the situation. He received a promising report on January 16: the military
force at Frenchtown was hardly formidable, none of the reported confiscation and rounding up
had occurred, and the settlement on the River Raisin still held an abundance of resources and
supplies that could help support his forces through the winter. That same evening the decision
was made to take Frenchtown, and the following morning approximately 550 men from the 1\textsuperscript{st},
2\textsuperscript{nd} and 5\textsuperscript{th} Kentucky Volunteer Militia Regiments, along with a company of the U.S. 17\textsuperscript{th}
Infantry Regiment, were assembled and sent north under the command of Lt. Colonel William
Lewis. Soon afterwards, Winchester dispatched another 110 militiamen from the 1\textsuperscript{st} Kentucky
Volunteer Rifle Regiment, and the two forces joined up that evening at the north end of Maumee
Bay (near present-day downtown Toledo, Ohio).\textsuperscript{34}

The combined force set off in the early morning hours of January 18, using the frozen and snow-
dusted shoreline of Lake Erie as a road to the north. South of Frenchtown the Kentuckians were
joined by as many as 100 habitants—some of whom served in the Michigan Militia the previous
summer—and the entire force came together a short distance to the south of the frozen River
Raisin around three o’clock in the afternoon. Facing them, on the north side of the river, the
Essex Militia was positioned behind the cover of houses, structures, and fences within the village
of Frenchtown. On the west and east ends of the village, Confederacy warriors took up similar
but less protected positions. The Essex Militia soon opened fire with its lone artillery piece,
which was answered with shouts and a three-pronged rush of Kentuckians and habitants across
the frozen river. They soon took control of the north bank and forced the Essex militiamen and

\textsuperscript{33} Quote is from the speech made by Captain William Lewis just before the battle of January 18, 1813; in
“Recollections of the Late War, the River Raisin Battle,” \textit{Kentucky Yeoman} (Frankfort), May 7, 1833; reprinted in
Federal Writers' Project. \textit{Military History of Kentucky, Chronologically Arranged} (Frankfort, KY: State Journal,
1939), 82. Also see G. Glenn Clift, \textit{Remember the Raisin! Kentucky and Kentuckians in the Battles and Massacre
at Frenchtown, Michigan Territory, in the War of 1812} (Frankfort: Kentucky Historical Society, 1961), 46-49.

\textsuperscript{34} Winchester, “General Orders,” Camp Miami Rapids, January 16 and 17, 1813, James Winchester Papers, Burton
Historical Collection, Detroit Public Library; Elias Darnell, \textit{A Journal Containing an Accurate and Interesting
Account of the Hardships, Suffering, Battles, Defeat and Captivity of Those Heroic Kentucky Volunteers and
Regulars Commanded by General Winchester, in the Years 1812-13}. Also, Two Narratives by Men That Were
Wounded in the Battles on the River Raisin and Taken Captive by the Indians, 2 ed. (Philadelphia: Lippincott,
Grambo, and Company, 1854), 45-48; Robert B. McAfee, \textit{History of the Late War in the Western Country} (Bowling
Green, OH: Historical Publications Company, 1919), 223-26; Au, \textit{War on the Raisin: A Narrative Account of the
War of 1812 in the River Raisin Settlement, Michigan Territory} (Monroe, MI: Monroe County Historical
American Indians to retreat from the central core of Frenchtown. The Essex militia briefly held its ground at the north edge of Frenchtown where, as Kentucky rifleman William Atherton recalled, “they made a stand with their howitzer and small arms, covered by a chain of enclosed lots and a group of houses, having in their rear a thick brushy wood filled with fallen timber.”

Efforts to outflank the allied Canadian and Confederacy fighters proved unsuccessful, and the fighting devolved into a series of fierce skirmishes through the denser woods to the north. Fallen timber offered protection to the slowly retreating allied forces, who were now determined to make a successful escape to the Wyandotte village of Brownstown while forcing the Kentuckians to pay as dearly as possible for their ensuing victory. In “the woods the fighting became general and most obstinate,” as one Kentuckian described this part of the battle, “the enemy resisting every inch of ground as they were compelled to fall back.” Over the course of two miles the slow-moving battle continued until darkness fell, with the retreating forces taking cover to fire on the pursuing Kentuckians, then dashing to another protective area before the pursuers could regroup or return accurate fire. It was this part of the battle that brought the most casualties to the U.S. side, which all told lost 13 killed and 54 wounded. Records for the Essex Militia are spotty, and no accounting was made for Native losses, but the Canadians suffered at least one casualty (whether killed or wounded is uncertain). American Indian casualties were greater, but the numbers are not clear. Some were certainly killed since Kentucky militiamen boasted of mutilating and scalping at least a few corpses. Traces of blood were also found along the paths taken by retreating American Indians, either from wounded individuals or the bodies of dead fighters who were dragged away by their comrades.

Word of the victory soon reached General Winchester, who rejoiced at the initial news and agreed to Colonel Lewis’ request for more troops. He quickly assembled the four companies of U.S. Regulars under his command (17th and 19th U.S. Infantry) and a few militiamen, and then led the force of about 300 to Frenchtown—which they reached before dawn on January 22. The decision to attack Frenchtown, as well as assemble the bulk of his command so close to Fort Amherstburg, came with considerable risk. It also “alarmed” (and contravened the standing orders of) Major General William H. Harrison, who commanded the entire Army of the North West and was then encamped with the right wing at Upper Sandusky about fifty-five miles southeast of the Maumee Rapids. The victory at Frenchtown seemed to confirm Winchester’s initial decision to send troops to the River Raisin, while the number of casualties (which numbered roughly 10% of the original force sent to Frenchtown) precluded any chance of a

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35 Quote is from William Atherton, Narrative of the Suffering & Defeat of the Northwestern Army, under General Winchester: Massacre of the Prisoners, Sixteen Months Imprisonment of the Writer and Others with the Indians and British (Frankfort, KY: A.G. Hodges, 1842), 36. For a detailed summary of the early part of the battle, see Naveaux, Invaded on All Sides, 112-120.

36 One member of the Essex Militia, and two American Indians were also taken prisoner by the Kentucky forces. Atherton, Narrative of the Suffering & Defeat of the Northwestern Army, 37; Darnell, Journal, 42-43; Antal, A Wampum Denied, 163-64; Au, War on the Raisin, 28-29. Clift, Remember the Raisin!, 53-55; Benson J. Losing, The Pictorial Field-Book of the War of 1812 (New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1869), 313-315; Naveaux, Invaded on All Sides, 120-21.

37 Au, War on the Raisin, 30-33; Clift, Remember the Raisin!, 56-62; Naveaux, Invaded on All Sides, 131-39.

quick withdrawal back to the Maumee Rapids. As Winchester wrote to Harrison, he both feared and welcomed a counter attack from Fort Amherstburg: admitting that his position “was not very favourable for defence,” yet boasted that if the enemy tried “to retake this place … he will pay dearly for it.” Comforted by the victorious outcome, Harrison averred that it was right of Winchester to bolster Lewis’ forces at Frenchtown. Consequently, he accelerated the plans for a winter invasion of Upper Canada and quickly mobilized 360 of his troops to aid Winchester at Frenchtown.39

Hopeful expectation trumped anxiety as Winchester’s forces settled into Frenchtown, but across the Detroit River at Fort Amherstburg another sentiment prevailed: decisive urgency. Sometime in the early hours of January 19 news about the loss of Frenchtown first reached the commander of Amherstburg, Colonel Henry Procter. Aware of the U.S. build-up at Upper and Lower Sandusky, and Winchester’s movements along the lower Maumee River, Procter regarded the force that attacked Frenchtown as the opening act in a planned invasion of Detroit and Canada. To counter such a strategy, he “deemed it requisite, that, [the Enemy] should be attacked without Delay, and with all, and every Description of Force, within my Reach.”40 The goal was to destroy or at least dislodge Winchester’s forces before they could be joined by the right and center wings of the Army of the North West, and to reestablish a forward position against the U.S.

Procter quickly dispatched a company of regulars, some artillerymen, and the 28 members of the Provincial Marine to Brownstown, where they met up with some of the retreating American Indian fighters from the previous day’s battle. By the 20th, more regulars from the 41st Regiment of Foot and Royal Newfoundland Fencibles, as well as Canadian militiamen and members of the British Indian Department, came in from Detroit and Amherstburg. All told, the British and Canadian force amounted to 595 men and included six pieces of artillery. At Brownstown, it was joined by a confederated force of American Indians that were then wintering on both sides of the Detroit River; and included Wyandotte, Shawnee, Bodéwadmi, Odawa (Ottawa), Ojibwe, (Chippewa), Lunaapeew (Lenape, or Delaware), Myaamia (Miami), Waayahtanwa (Wea), Hoocąągra (Ho-Chunk, aka Winnebago), Muscogee (Creek), Ókwe'oe'we (Seneca-Cayuga; aka, “Mingo”), Kiikaapoi (Kickapoo) Thâkîwa (Sauk, or Sac), and Meskwaki (Fox) warriors. Though each group had formidable war leaders, they formally deferred to the Wyandotte—the longest established group in the Detroit River area—and their most renowned men: Stayeghtha (Roundhead), Sou-ne-hoo-way (Splitlog) and Myeerah (Walk-in-the-Water). Numbering at least 600, and perhaps as many as 800, this was one of the largest and most diverse assemblages of American Indians in the entire war. On January 21 the British, Canadians and American Indians


moved en masse to Swan Creek, and then on to Stony Creek where they spent part of a restless
night before heading toward Frenchtown a few miles to the southwest.\textsuperscript{41}

Arriving before dawn on January 22 and unnoticed by the American sentries, the allied forces
gathered into their battle positions between 250-350 yards to the north of Frenchtown. Arrayed
in an arc along the wooded stretch of Mason Run, they were organized into three large
groupings: British regulars and the six artillery pieces were positioned across the center; about
200 yards to their right was a somewhat dispersed clustering of mostly Odawa, Ojibwe,
Bodéwadmi and some Canadian militia; and another 250 yards to the left of the center position a
large number of mostly Wyandotte and Shawnee fighters held the forward position, with
Canadian militia and artillery in the rear. The American forces, which numbered 934 able-
bodied men, were primarily situated in two locales. Approximately 700 men (mostly from
Kentucky militia regiments) were encamped within the center of Frenchtown, with defensive
positions staked out behind the puncheon fence along the north side of the village as well as the
garden fence lines to the east and west. In the open field to the east, about 160 regulars from the
U.S. 17\textsuperscript{th} Regiment slept behind a hastily constructed series of breastworks. The remainder were
scattered throughout the Frenchtown community, in barns or homes, while General Winchester
slept at his temporary headquarters in the home of Francois Navarre on the south side of the
River Raisin—about a mile to the west of Frenchtown proper. A small number of \textit{habitants} from
Frenchtown and nearby settlements had also come to help defend the village, and added to the
total.\textsuperscript{42}

Just as the British forces in the center readied their attack, reveille sounded on the American side
and soon after a sentry spotted the Red Coats in the dim pre-dawn light. He fired a shot into the
forward line that killed the lead grenadier, and the report of his musket sent the just awakened
Infantry and militia scrambling for their battle positions. Almost immediately, the British
opened with their artillery and the regulars pushed forward from their center position. As they
drew within range of Frenchtown, they fired a powerful volley at what, in the still dark distance,
had seemed to be a line of soldiers on the opposite end of the field of battle. Assuming they had
the advantage, the British then made a fierce charge toward Frenchtown, but the target of their
fusillade proved to be the puncheon fence behind which the protected Kentuckians could fire at

\textsuperscript{41} Herbert C. W. Goltz, ”The Indian Revival Religion and the Western District, 1805-1813,” in \textit{The Western
District: Papers from the Western District Conference}, eds. K. G. Pryke and L. L. Kulisek (Windsor, Ont: Essex
County Historical Society and the Western District Councils, 1983), 29-32; Antal, \textit{A Wampum Denied}, 166-67;
Naveaux, \textit{Invaded on All Sides}, 139-145. References to specific American Indian groups follow the orthographies
or common spellings from official communications or language materials used by federally recognized tribes in the
United States and by Canadian First Nations that are historically associated with the conflicts in the Detroit River
region. These include the Wyandotte Tribe of Oklahoma, the Absentee Shawnee Tribe of Indians of Oklahoma, the
Nottawaseppi Huron Band of the Potawatomi, the Ottawa Tribe of Oklahoma, the Wikwemikong Unceded Indian
Reserve, the Saginaw Chippewa Tribe, the Walpole Island First Nation/Bkejwanong Territory, the Chippewas of
Kettle and Stony Point First Nation, the Munsee-Delaware Nation, the Delaware Nation at Moraviantown, the
Miami Tribe of Oklahoma, the Peoria Tribe of Indians of Oklahoma, the Ho-Chunk Nation, the Muscogee Nation,
the Seneca-Cayuga Nation, the Kickapoo Tribe in Kansas, the Kickapoo Tribe of Oklahoma, the Sac and Fox
Nation, and the Sac & Fox Tribe of the Mississippi in Iowa.

\textsuperscript{42} Shadrach Byfield, ”A Common Soldier’s Account,” in \textit{Recollections of the War of 1812: Three Eyewitnesses’
on All Sides}, 145-55; Au, \textit{War on the Raisin}, 30-35.
will. With the British artillery still overshooting the mark, and the puncheon fence providing ample protection, the Kentuckians were unscathed and unrelenting. After 20 minutes the British were forced to retreat, leaving their fallen comrades behind—who tried to crawl away while taking fire from Kentucky marksmen. 43

Matters went quite differently on the right flank of the U.S. position. There the Canadian militia quickly adjusted the aim of their artillery, and soon wreaked havoc on the more exposed position of the U.S. 17th Infantry. As cannon fire tore through the encampment and shattered breastworks, Canadian militiamen and Wyandotte warriors took possession of some nearby buildings and fired into the exposed encampment. The U.S. soldiers struggled to hold their ground, but eventually faltered when mounted warriors came around their right flank. An attempt was made to send a few companies of Kentucky militiamen to the aid of the 17th Infantry, but the effort ultimately proved disastrous. General Winchester, who had just arrived from his headquarters, ordered the infantrymen to fall back to the north bank of the river where they could rendezvous with the Kentuckians. Together they made a brief stand, but were soon overwhelmed by the pursuing Wyandotte, Shawnee, and Canadian militia. After a frantic retreat to the south side of the river where some made a weak stand, the American position disintegrated entirely. All were swept up in the ensuing chaos, including Winchester and several officers. Fleeing pell-mell toward the south, many were run down and killed. Others managed to continue for a mile or two along Hull’s Trace, but few managed to escape their pursuers—who now included the array of American Indian forces that had swept around the west and south side of Frenchtown. Of the approximately 400 Men who were caught up in the rout, about 220 were killed and another 147 captured. Only 33 escaped. 44

The actions to the east and south of Frenchtown were barely perceived by the British regulars at the edge of the woods and the Kentuckians still entrenched behind the fence lines. They instead remained locked in what, for them, seemed to be the main battle area. Over the course of two hours, the British regrouped and made two more frontal attacks, but the Kentuckians’ position was too strong. The third and last attack proved the most costly, with over 100 British casualties, a number that was more than double the total losses suffered by the entrenched Kentuckians in all three attacks. As the British pulled back and evaluated their weakening situation, Colonel Procter suddenly found himself face-to-face with General Winchester in the custody of Stayeghtha. Procter pressed his opposite for outright capitulation, but the Kentuckians still within the pickets of Frenchtown balked when they first received word of Winchester’s captivity. Feeling themselves on the verge of victory, they still believed the battle could be won. As Private Elias Darnell later recalled, “some [men] plead[ed] with the officers not to surrender, saying they would rather die on the field!” With their ammunition almost gone, and now surrounded on the south, east, and west by American Indian warriors, it became apparent to the officer’s still within Frenchtown that victory—let alone escape—was not possible. After some

River Raisin Battlefield Site

Monroe MI

Name of Property | County and State

more back-and-forth with the British over the disposition of prisoners and wounded, the Kentucky militia and remaining U.S. forces surrendered.45

The battle was costly for the British regulars and Canadian militia, whose combined losses of 24 killed and 161 wounded amounted to nearly one third of the forces under Procter’s command at Frenchtown. For the left wing of the Army of the North West, however, the loss was an unmitigated disaster. Of the 934 Americans who heard the morning’s reveille, all but the 33 who managed to escape to the Maumee Rapids were either dead, wounded, or prisoners of war. A preliminary count on the evening of the 22nd put the number of U.S. dead at 218, while the number of ambulatory prisoners who were marched off to Amherstburg was tallied at 495. Approximately 60 wounded prisoners were unable to make the journey, and they were attended by 30 of their fellows who stayed behind. Aside from the 33 who evaded capture during the desperate retreat from the River Raisin, approximately 66 were missing. Some number was likely dead but their bodies remained undiscovered, while the rest had become captives within various American Indian encampments. Based on later counts of prisoners that passed through Amherstburg, it seems that most of these captives were eventually turned over to the British.46

The undisputed victor at the River Raisin was the Native Confederacy. While their casualty numbers remain unknown, American Indians fared much better than their British and Canadian allies in every respect. The Wyandotte and Shawnee war leaders who directed the attack on U.S. regulars on the east side of Frenchtown quickly turned the fight into the sort of running battle they preferred. Moving “in scattered order,” groups of fighters took advantage of small areas of cover and harassed the edges of the U.S. position. As the soldiers gave ground they were driven toward the Kentucky reinforcements, then all were nearly surrounded. Brief efforts by some U.S. regulars and Kentucky militiamen to make a joint stand were short-lived, and their retreats were channeled southward along Hull’s Trace to a series of awaiting ambushes. All of this went in accordance with a basic strategy that eschewed the massing of forces, emphasized the actions of small groups working in concert with others, and sought to disorient the enemy with quick random strikes from several directions. Once the attack was joined by many of the Bodéwadmi, Myaamia, Odawa, and Ojibwe fighters that had swept around the west side of Frenchtown, the fate of the “Long Knives” (as the Kentuckians were known) was more than sealed.47


The small clusters of regulars and Kentucky militia that managed to get as far as the prairie and woods on the south side of the River Raisin were exhausted, low on ammunition, or had abandoned their cumbersome muskets to improve their chances of flight. Efforts to make a final stand, flee, or bargain for their lives often resulted in the same fatal result. Native warriors were not in a position to safely hold many prisoners, nor were they disposed to spare the lives of men who would kill them at the first chance. Moreover, they were expected to atone for the deaths and destruction their communities had suffered over the past few years at the hands of people with whom they had been in conflict for generations. This sentiment was particularly acute among the Bodéwadmi and Myaamia whose villages had been recently attacked, and their homes and crops destroyed, by some of the very same militiamen and soldiers that were now running, fighting, and begging for their lives. In short, the Kentuckians and the U.S. regulars (who hailed mostly from Kentucky and southern Ohio) were in the hands of the “ancient enemy” they sought to destroy—and wished to destroy them. Most were killed outright, which accounts for the high death toll and relatively low number of wounded and captured from this part of the battle.\textsuperscript{48}

The Native Confederacy was also responsible for ending the battle and bringing about the wholesale surrender of the Kentuckians still entrenched within Frenchtown. While the presentation of General Winchester to Colonel Procter shifted the British focus from assessing their losses to demanding a U.S. surrender, the decisive victory on the south side of the River Raisin allowed for a new concentration of American Indians around Frenchtown. As Winchester later recalled, this development convinced the Kentuckians to give up their arms and take “the opportunity of surrendering themselves as prisoners of war” to the British—or lose the battle to “the [warriors], who were then assembled in great numbers.” At this point the Kentuckians were already receiving sniper fire from the rear and soon realized that if they tried to hold out too long “the buildings adjacent would be immediately set on fire” and they would be cut down while trying to escape the flames.\textsuperscript{49}

For Procter, the U.S. surrender to his command was an important triumph—but returning to Amherstburg became a matter of great urgency. U.S. forces under General Harrison were already heading from the Maumee to the River Raisin, and the British feared that they might arrive within a few hours. With his able-bodied forces outnumbered by the large contingent of U.S. prisoners, Procter could hardly defend his position and guard hundreds of men who would turn on their captors if given the opportunity. Moreover, the large number of grievously wounded British regulars and Canadian militiamen needed care. In short, Procter’s victory over Winchester necessarily became a hurried retreat. Once the Kentuckians within Frenchtown had


\textsuperscript{49} Quotes are from Winchester to Harrison, January 23, 1813, in John Brannan, ed., \textit{Official Letters of Military and Naval Officers of the United States During the War with Great Britain in the Years 1812, 13, 14, & 15, with Some Additional Letters and Documents Elucidating the History of That Period} (Washington: Way & Gideon, 1823), 133.
grounded their arms and surrendered, the decision to return to Amherstburg was immediately set in motion. British wounded were placed on sleighs and sent back to the fort while the U.S. prisoners who could walk were assembled and counted—then ordered to march north and east across the frozen Detroit River. Because there were not enough available sleighs, some of the British wounded stayed in Frenchtown until the evening when transport was arranged for their removal to a field hospital a few miles north of Frenchtown (at either Stony Creek or Swan Creek). The 60 or so U.S. prisoners who were too badly wounded to make the long march to Fort Amherstburg, along with the 30 who stayed behind to care for them, remained in Frenchtown. They were guarded by two militia officers and three interpreters from the British Indian Department, who were nominally charged with preventing escapes as well intervening with any American Indians that might come into the settlement. Procter had agreed to send back any available sleighs the next day to transport the wounded prisoners over to Amherstburg, but all expected that U.S. troops would arrive from the south before that became necessary.

Colonel Procter’s information on the location and movement of Harrison’s forces was questionable, but it proved remarkably accurate. While the Second Battle of Frenchtown was still underway, Procter received word that a large U.S. force was marching along frozen Lake Erie—just eight miles south of Frenchtown. This report was later deemed erroneous, but a battalion of U.S. regulars that Harrison had sent north from the Maumee was on the ice at that time, though perhaps not so close. By the time the Kentuckians were about to surrender, however, the relief battalion was within two hours of the River Raisin. Harrison was several hours behind with two more battalions of Ohio and Kentucky militia, and it is possible that a substantial force of 900 could have arrived at Frenchtown by nightfall. However, after encountering several escapees from the rout of the U.S. 17th Infantry and Kentucky militia, Harrison and his officers halted their marches. After convening together, they “unanimously determined that as there could be no doubt of the total defeat of Genl. Winchester there was no motive that could authorize an immediate advance but that of attacking the enemy who were reported to be greatly superior in numbers and were certainly well provided with artillery.”

Though Harrison’s reasoning is understandable in light of the circumstances and incomplete information, the decision to hold back proved fateful.

Aftermath

Like the prisoners and their five-man guard, the *habitants* who remained in Frenchtown as well as the group of American Indians encamped a few miles north at Stony Creek also expected that some part of Harrison’s force would arrive by nightfall. Accordingly, the members of the Indian


51 Procter’s information came from a Canadien militia scout who reported seeing a large military force on the ice. This sighting was later deemed a Fata Morgana—a kind of mirage across an expanse of ice or water that enlarges and alters the shape of a distant object—of a few Wyandotte drovers moving livestock north from the Sandusky area. Given the nature of a Fata Morgana, which presents enlarged reflections of objects beyond the horizon, this may well have been a sitting of the more distant American forces. The report to Procter is described in John Norton, *The Journal of Major John Norton, 1816* (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1970), 316-17. On the movements and decisions of Harrison’s troops on January 21-22, see Harrison to Secretary of War, January 24, 1813, in *Messages and Letters of William Henry Harrison*, 331-34; quote is from p. 332. Also see Lossing, *The Pictorial Field-Book of the War of 1812*, 363-64; and Au, *War on the Raisin*, 46-48.
Department would slip away to Amherstburg, the wounded prisoners would become the responsibility of their countrymen rather than the overtaxed British, and the *habitants* could start the process of cleaning up and sorting through their losses. The group of Confederacy warriors gathered a few miles to the north at Stony Creek would have kept an eye on the arriving army, but prudence and a desire to fight another day would have likely prevented them from engaging Harrison’s forces.  

By first light there was no sign or news of a U.S. relief force, and so the able-bodied prisoners began readying their wounded comrades for the trip to Amherstburg. By this time, however, the Canadian and Indian Department guards already knew that no such journey would take place. In the absence of U.S. troops from the south, a pre-dawn council at Stony Creek had determined to complete the victory that had been cut short by the U.S. surrender to the British. Soon after the guards learned of this decision, most departed. Since they had no authority over the actions of their American Indian allies, there was nothing they could do without endangering themselves. The last remaining interpreter from the Indian Department conveyed the news to Captain Nathaniel Hart, one of the U.S. wounded. In answer to Hart’s concerned question about what “the Indians intend[ed] to do,” the interpreter replied, "They intend to kill you." When Hart then asked the man to intervene in some way, the interpreter replied that doing so would effectively make him an ally of the U.S. and thus "they will as soon kill [me] as you."  

The promised sleighs had not arrived and any that may have been en route would certainly have been warned off—either by the departed guards who were themselves heading back to Amherstburg or the American Indians still at Stony Creek.  

The event that became known as the “River Raisin Massacre” was not a sudden burst of collective violence. Rather, it started as a fairly deliberate taking of valuables and able-bodied captives that was later punctuated by the killing of the most severely wounded survivors of the previous days’ battles. According to witness accounts from *habitants* and prisoners, in the first hour or so after daybreak the number of American Indians that had come into Frenchtown was fairly small—with the few who spoke English engaging with some of the men who were taking care of the wounded. As Dr. Gustavus Bower later described the morning, “They did not molest any person or thing upon their first approach, but kept sauntering about until there were a large number collected, (say one or two hundred) at which time they commenced plundering the houses of the inhabitants, and the massacre of the wounded prisoners.” Even then, the killings followed a method that—however brutal—might be described as utilitarian. The wounded who could not travel were the primary victims, and they were killed with a suddenness that betrayed little or no emotion. The same could be said of the looting, the taking of able-bodied prisoners,  

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54 While there are no recorded accounts of why the promised sleighs did not arrive from Amherstburg, there are several likely reasons. Two guards, along with an officer, had left Frenchtown around dawn and may well have met the sleighs on the road north of town or on the ice of the Detroit River. It is also possible that the sleighs may have been turned back at Brownstown or Stony Creek, where they would have learned from the American Indians still gathered there of the ensuing events at Frenchtown.
and the burning of buildings and structures—behaviors that Dr. John Todd, a surgeon with the Kentucky 5th Regiment Volunteer Militia later described as a kind of “orderly conduct.” A sense of deliberate order did not diminish, and perhaps intensified, the horrors that many would later describe. Indeed, the most gruesome recollections stemmed from the systematic nature of the killings and resulting treatment of the remains. Men were killed with just one or two blows, their bodies quickly stripped of clothing and often scalped, and the bloody corpse left where it had fallen. In places, recalled Elias Darnell, the ground was “strewed with the mangled bodies, and all of them were left like those slain in battle, on the 22nd, for birds and beasts to tear in pieces and devour.”

By late-morning most of the Bodéwadmi, Wyandotte, Odawa, Ojibwe, Myaamia and others had departed toward Brownstown with their spoils and captives. All of the structures and buildings that had survived the previous days’ battles were destroyed, leaving the core area of Frenchtown in utter ruin. The number of men who were killed in Frenchtown that morning is not known, nor is there any clear accounting of the straggling prisoners who were cut down on the road north. Plausible estimates range between 30 and 80, with most counts putting the number closer to 60. The number of captives is equally unclear. Over the next several days most of the latter were either turned over to the British at Amherstburg or ransomed in the streets of Detroit. Several were taken to their captor’s villages, with some destinations as near as the River Rouge and others as far as the Straits of Mackinac. In accordance with the precepts of a “mourning war,” these men could expect two fates: kind treatment and adoption by the kin of an individual who had been killed by the Long Knives (and thus fill the place of the deceased); or killed as atonement. In either case the decision about their fate was generally left to the nearest female kin of the deceased.

Remember the Raisin!

The events of January 23, 1813, became known as the “River Raisin Massacre” in the United States, and quickly grew into the most famous and longest lasting echo of the Battles of Frenchtown. In March, President James Madison devoted a good portion of his Second Inaugural Address to a vivid condemnation of “[American Indians] armed with … the hatchet

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56 The most detailed estimates are from Au, War on the Raisin, 45-46; and Clift, Remember the Raisin!, 87. Both authors put the number of killed on January 23 near 60. For descriptions of captivity within American Indian communities after the Battles of Frenchtown, see Antal, A Wampum Denied, 198-99. On mourning wars see Timothy J. Shannon, "The Native American Way of War in the Age of Revolutions, 1754-1814," in War in an Age of Revolution, 1775-1815, eds. Roger Chickering and Stig Förster (Washington, D.C.; [New York]: German Historical Institute; Cambridge University Press, 2013), 140-42. Also see Thomas Abler, "Scalping, Torture, Cannibalism and Rape: An Ethnohistorical Analysis of Conflicting Cultural Values in War" Anthropologica 34:1 (1992): 3-20.
and the knife …, devoted to indiscriminate massacre …, eager to glut their … thirst with the blood of the vanquished and to finish the work of torture and death on maimed and defenseless captives.” In this and other such accountings, the “massacre” took on a transformative significance. In Ohio and especially Kentucky, “Remember the Raisin!” became a recruiting slogan for more militia volunteers to join an Army that was only recently on the verge of collapse due to a lack of reenlistments. In subsequent battles, including the Battle of the Thames where Tecumseh and Stayeghtha fell, it became a fiery battle cry that would later be celebrated in print alongside other famous slogans of the war like “Free Trade and Sailors’ Rights” and “Don’t Give Up the Ship.”

Unlike General Hull’s embarrassing defeat and surrender the previous summer, the death and capture of so many soldiers and militiamen at Frenchtown did not lead to widespread criticism of U.S. military leadership. Instead, as Madison’s Second Inaugural made clear, “British commanders”—and particularly Procter—were entirely at fault for having “extorted victory over the unconquerable valor of our troops” by the threat and example of “massacre from their [Native] associates.” In other words, Frenchtown was not a fair fight because, as Harrison made clear in a letter to Secretary of War James Monroe, “the British have no intention to conduct the war (at least in this quarter) upon those principles which have been held sacred by all civilized nations.”

These were not new sentiments, and they had as much to do with oft repeated tropes about “Indian atrocities” as they did the recent events at Frenchtown. Since before the Revolution, the specter of “Savages … exercising their wanton barbarities”—to quote George Washington—inspired numerous military campaigns into the Great Lakes region, excused most every defeat suffered by U.S. forces, and explained the cause and purpose of informal conflicts west of the Appalachian Mountains between Euro-Americans and American Indian communities. In this context the magnitude of U.S. losses on the River Raisin was not a strike against the war effort, but an affirmation for prosecuting “a war of extermination” in the Great Lakes region. In the build-up to what became the War of 1812, while “preparations for war [were] openly going on,” President Jefferson directed Governors Hull and Harrison in 1807 to convey to the “tribes … already expressing intentions hostile to the United States … this solemn declaration of our un-

58 Madison, “Second Inaugural;” Harrison to Secretary of War, February 11, 1813, in Messages and Letters, 2:359. Also see Owens, Mr. Jefferson's Hammer, 128-87.
59 This term comes from Hugh Henry Brackenridge, Indian Atrocities: Narratives of the Perils and Sufferings of Dr. Knight and John Slover among the Indians During the Revolutionary War (Nashville: W.F. Bang, 1843); first published in 1783. In a prefatory note to his readers, Brackenridge noted “that the nature of an Indian is fierce and cruel, and that an extermination of them would be useful to the world, and honorable to those who can effect it.”
alterable determination…; if ever we are constrained to lift the hatchet against any tribe, we will never lay it down till that tribe is exterminated, or driven beyond the Mississippi…. In war, they will kill some of us; we shall destroy all of them.” Hull repeated these sentiments during his short-lived invasion of Canada, when he issued a proclamation addressed to the “INHABITANTS OF CANADA!” threatening that if you should take part in the approaching contest, you will be considered & treated as enemies, & the horrors & calamities of war will stalk before you. If the barbarous & savage policy of Great Britain be pursued …, the war, will be a war of extermination. The first stroke of the Tomahawk, the first attempt with the scalping knife, will be the signal for one indiscriminate scene of desolation. No white man found fighting by the side of an Indian, will be taken prisoner. Instant destruction will be his lot.61

Such expressions were almost verbatim repetitions of century-old views on American Indians and warfare, but they were colored by two generations of conflict dating back to before the French and Indian War (1754-1763). In the Declaration of Independence, Thomas Jefferson made an explicit connection between “absolute [British] Tyranny” and American Indians. While the latter were reviled as “merciless Indian savages whose known rule of warfare, is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes and conditions,” their abilities to wage war were presumed to require the sponsorship of an imperial power.62 Through a kind of double-jeopardy, American Indians were also viewed as subjects and agents of British tyranny. When American Indians did not abide the norms of European standards of warfare, the British were at fault for not exercising sufficient control; conversely, the British were deemed weak and dishonorable whenever they relied on the support of American Indian fighters. The killings of wounded soldiers at the River Raisin, which U.S. government officials and the public widely—but erroneously—believed to have occurred while “British officers and soldiers silently and exultingly contemplated the scene,” was presented as one of the most dramatic examples of British tyranny. The “River Raisin Massacre” was a bloody confirmation that the U.S. was fighting what many called a “Second War of Independence,” and to remember the Raisin was to redouble the effort to finally destroy the twin menace of British tyranny and American Indian “perfidy.”63

To the Victors

Despite frequent U.S. pronouncements to the contrary, the alliance between the British and the Native Confederacy did not have a senior partner. They shared a common set of goals (to halt

and reverse the northwestward expansion of U.S. settlements, to sustain the British fur trade, and affirm a collective American Indian sovereignty in the Great Lakes region), but the alliance was also marked by a latent distrust on both sides. As the Shawnee war leader Tecumseh reminded Colonel Procter, the British had twice abandoned an alliance with American Indians—first at the Peace of Paris that ended the American Revolution in 1783, and later at the decisive Battle of Fallen Timbers in 1794 that eventually led to a vast cession of lands in Ohio. Understandably, Tecumseh was “afraid that [the British] will do so again.” Procter acknowledged as much in his correspondence with his superiors, noting that any “aid we may expect from the Indians will always be in proportion to their confidence in our strength and which they are too sensible is but small.” Yet British officers also complained that their allies were “fickle,” did not appreciate the larger strategic goals that guided British military actions, and often abandoned the field of battle when their own designs were accomplished.64

For the Native Confederacy warriors at Frenchtown, the hasty departure of British forces for Amherstburg was not “fickle,” but completely understandable. However, Procter’s desire to take care of his wounded and remove a large number of prisoners before Harrison’s troops arrived was a British concern that did not readily align with the personal or collective objectives of the American Indians who remained. For them the battles on January 18 and 22 were not distinct from the subsequent taking of captives, destruction of Frenchtown, and killing of wounded prisoners. When the expected U.S. troops failed to arrive, the status of the able-bodied prisoners from the previous day’s battle remained unchanged—with one exception. Unlike their fellows in Amherstburg, who were subject to British authority, these men belonged entirely to those members of the Native Confederacy who claimed them as their own. The same was true of the wounded, as well as the property of the habitants.

As noted above, the able-bodied prisoners had particular value in the form of ransom, adoption, or a retribution killing. While the second and third alternatives followed age-old practices that sought to rebalance a household, family or community that was still mourning a loss, the first alternative was more akin to plunder.65 Unlike U.S. soldiers and Kentucky militiamen, Confederacy fighters did not draw from a ready set of stipends, bonuses, or payments for the risks they took. Their communities might receive gifts from the British, and any family members who travelled with them to Amherstburg obtained some material support, but otherwise a warrior received little more than ammunition and some rations. Consequently, victory in battle came with an implicit right to plunder. This not only compensated for past dangers or losses, but the rewards of plunder served as a point of honor for warriors who were expected to return to their communities with gifts and resources. Strategically, plundering also weakened the enemy’s position and, certainly through the entire Sixty Years War, often served as direct retribution for the destruction of American Indian towns by U.S. troops, militias and vigilantes. While taking


65 White, *The Middle Ground*, 343-351; Starkey, *European and Native American Warfare*, 27, 34.
prisoners to a captor’s home village could also achieve these various ends, obtaining ransom for a healthy and valued captive was more akin to the compensatory purposes of plunder.\(^{66}\)

The burning and looting of Frenchtown that occurred on January 23 was also directly related to the previous day’s fighting. Just when the British called for a truce to initiate the process of surrender, the core of the village was nearly surrounded by Confederacy fighters and the Kentuckians were on the verge of being burned out. In short, what would have been the final stage of the Second Battle of Frenchtown was thwarted. The surrender denied the Confederacy a potent victory they were about to claim, and left intact a community and an array of structures that would be of great tactical significance to Harrison’s army. Burning and looting the village center thus made good on the purposes and prospects of the previous day’s battle, and forced the habitants to flee toward communities around Sandusky Bay.\(^{67}\) Destruction of the town also served as punishment to the habitants for making a definitive alliance with the U.S. In doing so they rejected an earlier plea for assistance from Stayeghtha (Roundhead) and Myeerah (Walk-in-the-Water), who hoped to draw on the history of good relations between nearby American Indian communities and the habitants of Frenchtown. The appeal for aid was also couched in a threat, however, and once Frenchtown effectively declared itself for the United States, the Wyandotte and their allies readily determined that “we will not consider you in future as friends, and the consequences [will] be very unpleasant.”\(^{68}\)

The killing of the wounded at Frenchtown was horrific for those who died as well as the survivors who witnessed the killings, and certainly traumatized many of the latter. Yet in both respects it was not unlike the many killings of disarmed combatants that had occurred at the hands of Long Knives and American Indians since well before the American Revolution. Just a few months earlier General Hull had threatened “instant destruction”—with no chance of imprisonment—to any “white man found fighting by the side of an Indian;” the fate of the latter was too obvious to state. The Kentuckians who were surrounded by the combined forces of American Indians on January 22 expected a similar fate at the hands of American Indians—and thus preferred to die fighting. Instead of the frenzied mass killing that the Long Knives might have feared, the event known as the “River Raisin Massacre” only struck the badly wounded. The methodical nature of the killings, coupled with the unexpected suddenness of the deadly blows, appalled the survivors—but was nevertheless understood as atonement for recent events. More than random acts in a multi-generational “blood feud,” the killings were meant to correspond to specific American Indian losses in the previous days’ battles as well the death and destruction that accompanied attacks on several Bodéwadmi and Myaamia towns a few months earlier. A number of the Bodéwadmi and Myaamia who were in Frenchtown on January 23

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\(^{68}\) *Barbarities of the Enemy*, 132.
came from these same villages, and certainly knew that the attacks had come from Winchester’s forces.69

The most gruesome aspects of the killing and destruction that occurred on January 23 involved the mutilation of corpses. The taking of scalps was widely noted by survivors and later commentators, who accused Procter of paying bounties for each Euro-American scalp. No bounties were offered by Procter, and even his harshest U.S. critic—Michigan Territorial Judge Augustus Woodward—attributed the violence on January 23 to “an ignoble revenge on [the] prisoners” that needed no cash incentive. However, scalping had a much broader significance than revenge or retaliation for specific wrongs. In many respects a scalp taken from an enemy was something like a service medal—a demonstration of prowess and a mark of honor to be displayed in a ceremony upon the warrior’s return home. While scalps could be kept as a sort of personal trophy, in which the slain foe’s power became a possession of the victor, they were also incorporated into a community’s ceremonial life. After a series of Victory Dances (or “Scalp Dances”) following a successful conflict, scalps were often left as offerings at grave sites. Among the Hoocąągra (Ho-Chunk, aka Winnebago) and other groups, they were also incorporated into war bundles, objects that were “the focus of important ceremonies … that involved a series of supernatural beings associated with war.”70

By far the most galling and intentionally offensive action was the mutilation and dismemberment of the dead. Though interpreted as a frightful warning to the inhabitants of Frenchtown and U.S. troops that would soon be coming into the area, this was primarily about affecting the afterlives of the vanquished and the community where they died. Habitants were threatened against burying the bodies so that the violated corpses remained in the open to be picked over and scattered by animals, without the rights of burial and the ceremonies that would bring peace to the dead or their communities. More than any other action, this violation of the dead was directly related to the actions of Kentucky militiamen the previous autumn. The Bodéwadmi leader Segnak (Blackbird, the Younger) explained such actions to the British a few months later, noting that when the “Big Knives” destroyed villages the previous fall, “they did not allow our dead to rest. They dug up their graves, and the bones of our ancestors were thrown away and we could never find them to return them to the ground …. The way they treat our killed, and the remains of those that are in their graves in the west, makes our people mad when they meet the Big Knives.” Segnak made it clear that “We do not disturb their dead,” but their transgressions require us “to follow their example.”71 While such actions and reasoning could only inflame a desire within the U.S. to “Remember the Raisin!,” for Segnak and other Confederacy fighters they represented an extreme form of victory: one that vanquished the enemy and mitigated the effects of recent violations of their own dead.


River Raisin Battlefield Site
Monroe MI

Denouement

The Battles of Frenchtown, along with the subsequent killings and destruction on January 23, capped a six-month stretch of military success for the Native Confederacy that included the routs at Brownstown and Maguaga, participation in the siege and capture of Detroit, engagements with small detachments of U.S. troops on the lower Maumee, and the gathering of important intelligence for the British at Amherstburg as well as for Tecumseh and other Confederacy leaders in the Detroit River area. In concert with these earlier actions, Frenchtown proved a smashing victory that marked the highpoint of the Confederacy’s strength during the War of 1812. The first U.S. Army of the North West had been completely defeated just eight weeks after the official declaration of war, and the left wing of the reconstituted Army of the North West was annihilated at Frenchtown barely five months later. In the ensuing months, groups of Confederacy fighters moved at will through present-day Michigan and northwestern Ohio, where they kept a close eye on Harrison’s stalled army on the lower Maumee as well as on nearby settlements.72 As spring approached and Procter received new reinforcements at Amherstburg, hopes ran high within the Confederacy that a joint offensive with the British might drive the U.S. forces into southern Ohio. Such a victory would restore much of the territory that had been lost since the mid-1790s, and thus achieve the vision that Tecumseh conveyed to Harrison in 1810; namely, “to tear up” past treaties, “stop this evil” of coerced land cessions since the 1780s, and restore “for the red men … a common and equal right in the land, as it was at first, and should be now—for it was never divided, but belongs to us all.”73

While the Confederacy’s prospects seemed to broaden, General Harrison concentrated his command at the Maumee Rapids where the construction of Fort Meigs commenced just ten days after the Battles of Frenchtown. Harrison needed to protect supplies and artillery for a still planned invasion of Upper Canada, shelter his diminishing command (which shrank to just 700 by winter’s end as enlistment periods for Virginia and Pennsylvania militia service expired and the volunteers returned home), and provide a northern assembly point for expected new recruits. Given its significance to the U.S. position in the western Great Lakes, Fort Meigs became the focus of the next allied British-Confederacy offensive. After delays caused by a spate of bad weather, a combined force of approximately 530 British regulars, 460 Canadian militia, and 1,250 Confederacy warriors led by Tecumseh and Stayeghtha (Roundhead) assembled in the Detroit River area in mid-April then established a siege of Fort Meigs on April 28. The weather-caused delays thwarted their efforts in several ways, however. Harrison had time to move 300 additional troops to the nearly finished fort in mid-April, and 1,200 Kentucky militia arrived soon after the siege began—which brought the combined U.S. forces to approximately 2,300. Weeks of cold rain had also softened the earthen ramparts and makeshift embankments that had been thrown up within the fort’s perimeter. These absorbed most of the British ordinance and left the rest of the fort complex relatively undamaged. The siege lasted a week and involved one significant battle on May 5 that resulted in heavy casualties among the newly arrived

72 Au, War on the Raisin, 60-61; Cecil King, Balancing Two Worlds: Jean-Baptiste Assiginack and the Odawa Nation, 1768-1866 (Saskatoon: Dr. Cecil King, 2013), 133-34.
River Raisin Battlefield Site

Name of Property
Monroe MI

Kentuckians. Nevertheless, the lifting of the siege amounted to an important victory for Harrison and signaled a change of fortune for the British-Confederacy alliance. 74

The siege demonstrated that Procter’s limited artillery was not capable of dislodging an entrenched U.S. position, and confirmed that the American Indian preference for making swift strikes from cover was not conducive to siege warfare. After some debate and disagreement between Procter and Tecumseh about the value of another siege, the alliance returned to Fort Miegs in late July and then moved on to Fort Stephenson (near Sandusky) in early August. The second siege of Fort Miegs was even less successful than the first, while the attack on Fort Stephenson resulted in significant British casualties. These failures weakened the alliance, which was already suffering from a lack of supplies for British troops, Canadian militia, and the large number of Confederacy warriors and their families based near Amherstburg. Moreover, siege warfare exasperated the Native Confederacy since, as Stayeghtha (Roundhead) stated, it was like trying to fight a “ground hog under the ground” that refused to come out. There was no honor and no gain in such an encounter. Through the rest of August, a number of Confederacy fighters and their families departed the Detroit River area and returned to their villages and crops. 75

After the failed siege of Fort Stephenson, Procter’s only option was to consolidate his forces around Amherstburg. After months of chronic shortfalls in supplies and troops, which were increasingly channeled toward the defense of Lower Canada (present-day southern Québec), there was little to do but sustain British, Canadian, and Confederacy forces as best as possible and assist in the preparation and arming of vessels in the Royal Naval Dockyard. By then the war in the western theater had shifted to a maritime contest for control of Lake Erie, and both the U.S. and the British had to await its outcome before making any strategic decisions. The single and decisive engagement came on September 10, when Commodore Oliver Hazard Perry defeated and captured the entire British squadron in the vicinity of the Lake Erie Islands—about 30 miles east by southeast of Frenchtown. With this victory the U.S. could move supplies and troops at will on western Lake Erie and—with the exception of a long and difficult land route up the Thames River Valley—effectively severed Amherstburg from present-day eastern Ontario and Québec. 76

General Harrison immediately pressed his new advantage by marshaling the 5,000-strong Army of the North West for another invasion of Canada, with about half ferrying up from Sandusky to Amherstburg and the rest travelling on land from Fort Meigs by way of Frenchtown and Detroit.

Procter, for his part, hastily prepared for a mass overland retreat from Detroit and Amherstburg to Burlington Heights (present-day Hamilton, Ontario) at the western end of Lake Ontario. Seeing these preparations, Confederacy leaders chastised Procter for abandoning the alliance and accused him of cowardice. Speaking for many, Tecumseh demanded that Fort Amherstburg and its artillery be left to the Confederacy to defend against the U.S. invasion. Upon learning that all of the fort’s artillery had been used by the British squadron that fell to Commodore Perry, and that U.S. control of Lake Erie made any position in the Detroit River area indefensible, many in the Confederacy decided to leave for their home villages or prepare to fight another way in another place. Of the approximately 3,000 warriors of the Native Confederacy then in the vicinity of Amherstburg, only a third chose to join the British retreat and make a stand against Harrison’s army somewhere along the Thames River.\footnote{Antal, A Wampum Denied, 297-309; John Sugden, Tecumseh's Last Stand (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1985), 62-71.}  

As Harrison’s forces pushed northward along the western edge of Lake Erie, Colonel Richard M. Johnson's Kentucky Mounted Riflemen—along with men from the Frenchtown settlement—were the first to arrive at the River Raisin on September 27. They were followed a few days later by militia under the command of Kentucky Governor Isaac Shelby, and the remains of as many as 65 dead from the Battles of Frenchtown were interred in a mass grave.\footnote{Naveaux, Invaded on All Sides, 288-89; Clift, Remember the Raisin!, 101-104.} By this time U.S. forces were already garrisoned at Detroit, Sandwich (present-day Windsor, ON), and Amherstburg, and Harrison’s lead forces were in pursuit of Procter and the Confederacy. On October 4, Harrison came within striking distance near Moraviantown (present-day Chatham, ON). The following afternoon Harrison arrayed his combined forces, which numbered more than 3,000, against an allied force of some 450 infantrymen and militia who were well enough to bear arms, and another 500-800 Confederacy warriors who were with the main body of the retreating army. Rallying to the cry of “Remember the Raisin!,” Johnson’s cavalrymen rushed the overwhelmed British forces and the Battle of the Thames had become a rout almost before it began. Confederacy warriors, using the cover of wooded marshlands, held off the onslaught for about 30 minutes before breaking into a running retreat. While casualty numbers were not particularly high, and about equal on all sides, the U.S. victory was total. More than half of the British fighting force was taken prisoner, as were nearly all of those who were unable to bear arms. Though Procter and most of his command escaped, and Confederacy warriors made a successful retreat, both Tecumseh and Stayeghta (Roundhead) were dead.\footnote{Antal, A Wampum Denied, 331-349; Sugden, Tecumseh's Last Stand, 105-135.} 

The Battle of the Thames was not the death knell of the Native Confederacy, but it did lead to a dramatic fracturing of the alliance. Once the magnitude of the U.S. victory was known, most of the groups of Bodéwadmi, Wyandotte, Myaamia (Miami), Waayaahnwa (Wea), Odawa, and Ojibwe that had abandoned their alliances with the British during the retreat from Amherstburg chose to refrain from further conflict. This decision, and the new circumstances in which it occurred, was formalized just days after the Battle of the Thames through a provisional armistice...
agreement with General Harrison. The armistice generally applied to American Indian communities from the Detroit River area to south of Lake Michigan, and groups of Ojibwe (Chippewa), Hoocąągra (Ho-Chunk, aka Winnebago), Kiikaapoi (Kickapoo), Thâkîwa (Sauk, or Sac), and Meskwaki (Fox) from areas further north and west held to their alliance with the British stationed at Mackinac and continued to push back against remote U.S. settlements and military outposts. Still others moved eastward to fight with the main force of the British military against U.S. forces along the Niagara Peninsula. Ohio and Kentucky militiamen carried on in a similar manner, but in a different theater of the war, with a number joining the forces led by General Andrew Jackson in the South.

Over the next several months, the British contemplated several plans for retaking the western reaches of Upper Canada and Michigan, and the Bodéwadmi (Potawatomi) war leader Main Poc assembled as many as 1,200 Confederacy warriors near Detroit in March 1814. The uncertain course of the war around Lake Ontario, an early spring thaw, and gnawing doubts about troop numbers and equipment all stymied any British movements toward western Lake Erie—and ultimately put off a potential rendezvous with Main Poc and his forces. Small incursions by British and U.S. forces occasionally occurred in the Thames River Valley, and U.S. settlements in Michigan still suffered from intermittent raids by small groups of American Indians. Toward the end of spring, however, two years of war and near-constant military requisitioning of crops, cattle, and supplies had created a blighted landscape that extended well to the east and southwest of the Detroit River area. With the population thinned, crops destroyed, fields unplanted, commerce shut down, and nagging fears that war might return, the region was almost as hard for the U.S. to manage as it would have been for the British to invade and reestablish themselves. For these two antagonists, the result was stalemate and stagnation. However, life for American Indian communities around the western Lake Erie Basin became desperate. Some had lost all of their crops to U.S. raids the previous summer, and all were now effectively cut off from British supplies. The hunger and disease that plagued their communities through the winter of 1813-1814 continued to haunt them through spring, and former concerns about war, neutrality or alliances gave way to elemental concerns about subsistence and survival.

If nothing else, such desperate straits confirmed that the war in the western Great Lakes region was already over and the Native Confederacy had lost. This general defeat found its first official expression in a treaty council at Greenville, Ohio, in July 1814. Held at the same location as the first Treaty of Greenville of 1795, which ended the series of conflicts known as the Northwest Indian War (1785-1795) and included the cession of most of present-day Ohio to the United States, the second Treaty of Greenville did not involve any new land or boundary issues. Rather it served to “give peace” to groups that assisted U.S. forces or maintained neutrality in the recent conflicts, and to “extend this indulgence” of peace to groups that had been allied with the

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80 “Harrison to Secretary of War, October 10, 1813,” “Armistice between Harrison and the Indians, October 14, 1813,” “Harrison Proclamation to Indians Armistice, October 16, 1813” all in Messages and Letters of William Henry Harrison, vol. 2, 573-75, 576-79.
With conflict effectively over in the western Great Lakes, the only active theaters of war in the summer and fall of 1814 were on the Niagara Peninsula, along the Eastern Seaboard, and in the South. The general momentum of the war shifted toward the British in the summer of 1815 when the decisive victory over Napoleon at Waterloo allowed the British to direct more forces to North America. In the Chesapeake region the Royal Navy terrorized coastal communities and in late August a combined force of British Regulars and Royal Marines burned the public buildings in Washington, D.C.—including the White House. Though dramatic, these events were not significant enough to change the course of the war. Nevertheless, they did help end the basic stalemate that had plagued diplomatic negotiations for months. After two years of war, both sides concluded that outright victory was mutually impossible and thus, even as the White House lay in ruins, the United States and the United Kingdom made a concerted push to negotiate a lasting peace. During the initial talks to end the war, the British promoted the possibility of creating an independent American Indian territory in the western Great Lakes region. As negotiations increasingly focused on ending the war rather than solving any of its original causes, however, the idea was pushed aside and eventually dropped. This was true of most every concern that preceded the war and inspired its initial prosecution, and by the time the two nations completed the Treaty of Ghent on December 24, 1814, they could only agree on two key elements: the war between the British and the U.S. was effectively a draw; and both sides saw little benefit in furthering the conflict. Consequently, the official ending of the war simply amounted to status quo ante bellum (the state existing before war).84

The second Treaty of Greenville, which preceded the Treaty of Ghent by some five months, was also predicated on the same concept of status quo ante bellum—as it existed in 1811—but recognized a possible continuation of hostilities with groups not covered by the treaty. This distinction was addressed in September 1815 at the Treaty of Springwells, which marks the official end of the War of 1812 in the area that people in the U.S. generally referred to as the Northwest. Taking place within the future boundaries of Fort Wayne in Detroit, Michigan, the treaty council included the same principles who signed the Treaty of Greenville in 1814 as well as communities and groups that were directly aligned with the Confederacy and had fought against the U.S. at Frenchtown and elsewhere. All told the treaty involved Wyandotte, Lunaapeew, Shawnee, Bodéwadmi, and Onöndowága from the Detroit River area as well as

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84 Taylor, The Civil War of 1812, 411-419.
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Myaamia, Bodéwadmi, Hoocąągra (Ho-Chunk, aka Winnebago), Odawa (Ottawa), and Ojibwe (Chippewa) from further north and west.  

Though it repeated much of the same language used in the second Treaty of Greenville, the Treaty of Springwells was not a simple peace treaty. For the groups associated with the Confederacy, accepting conditions as they existed in 1811 amounted to a repudiation of all the reasons they had fought against the United States. These included the vast land cession of 1795 as well as subsequent treaties that ceded large portions of present-day Indiana, Michigan, and Ohio. The Confederacy did not consider these treaties valid in 1811, nor did its leaders recognize the right of individual village leaders to sign away large tracts of land that other American Indian communities used or resided in. As the Shawnee leader Tecumseh stated to Harrison at Vincennes in 1810, the members of the Confederacy viewed such dealings as “pretended treat[ies]” that resulted from concerted efforts by government officials to “make differences between” and then “separate the tribes” to acquire land from each group “one by one, and advise them not to come into [the Confederacy].” “No [single] tribe [or individual village leader] has the right to sell,” he continued, “even to each other, much less to strangers who demand all, and will take no less.”

Along with a direct acknowledgement of previous treaties, the Treaty of Springwells also implied an affirmation of the process by which they were conducted. By identifying specific groups and village leaders “associated with Great Britain in the late war between the United States and that power,” but making no reference to their collective association with the Confederacy, the treaty essentially reinstated the framework that Tecumseh described as duplicitous and invalid. Treaty signatories only represented their specific communities, and individually acknowledged the suzerainty of the United States over their external affairs. With the Confederacy defeated, and its former constituents “under the protection of the United States, and of no other power whatsoever,” the Treaty of Springwells effectively reopened the process of land cessions that had ended in 1811.

The War of 1812 may have resulted in a draw between the United States and Great Britain, but in the western Great Lakes the war achieved all that the War Hawks hoped to gain short of acquiring portions of Canada. The British had been driven out of the region, the Confederacy defeated, and the Jeffersonian program of aggressive land acquisition reinstated. The victory was as complete for the U.S. side as the defeat was for American Indian communities—whether they sided with the Confederacy or not. Within six years of the Treaty of Springwells council, the United States had concluded multiple treaties with various American Indian groups in the Great Lakes region and acquired vast tracts of land in Ohio, and the present states of Michigan,

85 “Treaty with the Wyandot, etc., 1815” in Kappler, ed. Indian Affairs, 117-119.
Indiana, and Illinois. The pace of treaty making slowed through the 1820s, but increased again in the late 1820s. With the passage of the Indian Removal Act in 1832, the process of land cessions accelerated further and became fully associated with relocating American Indian communities on lands to the west of the Mississippi River. While some groups managed to remain on small reservations in Michigan and Wisconsin, the majority were forced to move west. These coerced removals were often disorderly and poorly implemented, with many communities suffering exposure, severe hunger and death during the westward treks. In their place, growing populations of Euro-Americans, recent European immigrants, and some former African American slaves created what has since become known as the Heartland of America. Though often referred to in the United States as the “Forgotten War,” the War of 1812—especially in the Upper Midwest—was one of the most transformative in the nation’s history. To many American Indians with current and historical connections to the Great Lakes region, the losses that followed the Battles on the River Raisin are clearly remembered as the beginning of a period that is directly linked to the subsequent removal era.\(^8^8\)

**Battle Setting and Archeology**

The historical significance of the River Raisin Battlefield Site derives from several factors, but the site’s physical setting is especially distinct. Unlike other battles and engagements in the western Great Lakes region during the War of 1812—or over the previous six decades—the events at Frenchtown centered on platted land in an inhabited area along an important travel corridor. Consequently, the events and their effects were recorded and recalled by *habitants* and U.S. civilians in the immediate and near vicinity. The scale of the battles, their strategic importance, and the amount of destruction, death, and captivity that ensued all resulted in a great deal of subsequent attention. Military reports and maps were produced noting physical landmarks and structures as well as the movements and positions of various forces. Official assessments by British and U.S. officers, as well as formal investigations into the events of January 23, 1813, resulted in numerous recorded interviews with witnesses and principal actors who recalled various details of the battles, their aftermath, and their setting. These were followed in 1817 by a map and report that delineated property lines and the locations of damaged or destroyed structures for a case brought to the U.S. Court of Claims by affected property holders.\(^8^9\)

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This wealth of information, corroborated with persistent landscape features like the River Raisin shoreline, Mason Run, the route of Hull’s Trace, and the boundaries of ribbon farms (aka long lots) along present-day north-south trending streets and property lines, provides a remarkably detailed reference for the events and locales associated with the battles and their aftermath. The documentary record has also provided an important guide for several archeological investigations which have confirmed the locations of some destroyed structures and uncovered materials directly related to specific battle engagements. While none of these investigations have resulted in significant reinterpretations of the events that occurred in January 1813, they do confirm the physical integrity of the site in two ways. First, by ground truthing the documentary record and, second, by demonstrating that some archeological resources remain intact and in situ. The latter condition was confirmed through excavations of historically identified sites as well as the discovery that the original paper mill was built atop a two-foot layer of compacted cinder and clay that effectively sealed and protected much of the early nineteenth-century soil strata from a century of construction, expansion, dumping, and demolition.

Though significant for identifying and confirming the location of an important settlement’s destroyed remnants that was destroyed, archeological research has not otherwise “yielded … information important in prehistory or history” — and it is unclear if it “may be likely to yield … [additional] information important to prehistory or history.” Consequently, the expanded site is not being considered in terms of National Register Criterion D. Yet this updated nomination fully concurs with the conclusion of two archeologists who have conducted research at the River Raisin Battlefield Site: namely, that “[archeological] contexts … add an important dimension to the historical data and strongly support the significance of the [expanded] site.”

The first archeological studies of the battlefield area began in the late 1970s, but they were long preceded (and partly informed) by accidental discoveries of human remains and battle debris. Following the destruction of Frenchtown on January 23, 1813, most of the habitants who lived within or close to the battle area departed for Detroit or towards the Maumee Bay and Sandusky. While the remains of a few individuals were surreptitiously buried or hidden under some brush, it was not until eight months later that burial parties gathered the skeletal remains scattered throughout the battle area. These were interred in mass graves, but subsequent finds were buried individually. Items related to the battle were exposed with some frequency into the middle of the nineteenth century, generally as the result of preparing fields or constructing homes as the battlefield area developed into a mixture of residences and plant nurseries. In 1904, the partial remains of four separate bodies were uncovered during the construction of a monument along the north bank of the River Raisin, near the identified sites of two homes that were destroyed in the aftermath of the Second Battle of Frenchtown. In the first decades of the 20th century, industrial development and road building exposed ammunition, cannon balls and other battle-related items as well as skeletal

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fragments in areas that would have been within the fenced area of Frenchtown. As the archeologist Barbara Mead noted in the original River Raisin Battlefield Site NRHP nomination, “the confused conditions of burial and the long history of finds of human bone within the site, [make it] extremely probable that both interred and scattered remains yet exist.”

While many of the materials and artifacts that have been found within the battlefield area are associated with the events of January 1813, some of the human remains uncovered in the early-nineteenth century were from earlier American Indian use and residence. During the 1915 construction of a River Raisin Paper Company mill facility, at least one of the exposed skeletons came from an American Indian cemetery that long predated the establishment of Frenchtown. Accidental finds and amateur surface collections have also revealed materials associated with American Indian populations, but given the circumstances of their discovery they cannot be reliably attributed to any specific period or tradition. In 1976, the first professional archeological investigation of the battlefield area did reveal lithic and artifact fragments associated with Late Archaic (ca. 4,500-3,000 BP) and Late Woodland (ca. 1,400-400 BP) periods. Another archeological survey in 1999 uncovered hundreds of artifacts composed mostly of ceramics, lithics, and faunal remains associated with an American Indian village site (ca. 1450-1650). These finds likely correspond to similar sites throughout the River Raisin watershed and Western Lake Erie Basin, but to date the focus of archeological work has been on the soil layer that corresponds to the core of Frenchtown and the events of January 1813.

The archeological studies of the battlefield area that occurred in 1976-1977 were conducted by Commonwealth Associates with the support of the Monroe County Historical Commission. Based on careful historical research and the reports of a local collector, the first season of work resulted in a controlled surface collection of the field that lies northeast of the current RRNBP Visitor Center. Along with a significant concentration of lead shot, artifacts included a brass button and brass hat ornament associated with U.S. military uniforms during the War of 1812. Together these items confirmed the location of the U.S. 17th Infantry encampment when it was attacked on the morning of January 22. In 1977 the archeological team examined a telephone cable trench that had been cut through the core area of Frenchtown, and were able to identify and partially excavate cellar walls from the Hubert LaCroix, Jean Baptiste Jerome, and George McDougal homesites that had been destroyed in January 1813. Other artifacts included a door latch, a military button, and a British-made pistol flint.

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92 Barbara Mead, National Register of Historic Places, River Raisin Battlefield Site, Monroe County, Michigan, National Register #82000542 (1982), 2. For a general overview of these matters see G. Michael Pratt, William E. Rutter, Theodore J. Ligibel and Jeffrey L. Green, [Draft] River Raisin Battlefield National Historic Landmark Nomination (2009), 5-6. More specific references are in notes 89-93 below.


A Phase II/III excavation in 1980-81 of two areas to the west of Hull’s Trace (present-day North Dixie Highway) attempted to find structural elements that were identified on historical maps of Frenchtown. These included the Godfroy barn, which was destroyed during the Second Battle of Frenchtown, the puncheon fence that protected Kentuckians from British assaults, and the Godfroy home site near the north bank of the River Raisin. While excavations of the site near the river revealed subsurface evidence of some structural elements that may have corresponded to a root cellar or privy from the 1810s, all the recovered artifacts and materials from the various sites post-dated the battles. The excavations did demonstrate that large portions of the battlefield were sealed under a layer of early 20th-century ash and cinder fill that was laid down during the construction of the paper mill—and thus indicated that subsurface materials remained relatively undisturbed throughout most of the paper mill site.95

In 1991 Commonwealth Cultural Resources Group conducted archeological monitoring, shovel testing, and trenching during the demolition of two abandoned mill structures owned by the Monroe Paper Company. Some trenching beneath the fill and structural debris at a site along East Elm Avenue to the east of the Canadian National Railway Bridge did reveal prehistoric debitage, but no artifacts were encountered to provide a sufficient basis for determining an identified culture phase. Brick and mortar was encountered and attributed to a ca. 1810-1840 setting, but could not be identified with any known historical structure. Other portions of the site, where topsoil had been removed or disturbed during the initial construction of the mill, did not yield any intact archeological materials. Another location immediately northwest of the East Elm Avenue and North Dixie Highway intersection (near the present site of the 1904 “River Raisin Massacre” monument) produced evidence of “an intensive and potentially significant prehistoric site,” but a lack of specific artifact types precluded even a tentative association with a particular culture phase. A limestone foundation dating to ca. 1890-1910 was also exposed in the same vicinity, as was an assemblage of ceramic fragments that likely post-dates the Battles of Frenchtown by at least two decades.96

As more buildings on the Monroe Paper Company property were demolished, archeological surveys between 1998 and 2000 revealed several buried features and additional cultural materials. In 1998, a Phase II archeological investigation was conducted by Midwest Archeological Associates in what would have been the southwest portion of Frenchtown—an area that now lies about one city block west of North Dixie Highway and fronts East Elm Avenue. Excavation and metal detection survey resulted in the recovery of artifacts from several eras. These included items related to the use of the mill building and its demolition, artifacts from mid- to late 19th-century occupation and use, and prehistoric lithics and faunal remains. Two sherds of pearlware and some forged nails were found that either predate or are coeval with the events of January 1813, and their presence indicates that artifacts relating to the era of the battles remain in the topsoil that underlies the 20th-century layer of clay and cinder. Only one recovered item could be definitively associated with Frenchtown and/or the battles of 1813: a portion of a silver-plated brass shoe buckle that is possibly associated with a denizen of Frenchtown, a member of the Essex Militia, or a Kentuckian. The most significant find proved to be the buried remains of a historic fence line. Post mold patterns suggested that the fence posts could have supported puncheon planks and the fence might have been one of the puncheon or

picket fences described in accounts of the Second Battle of Frenchtown. The discovery of the shoe buckle immediately within the area enclosed by the fence lent credibility to this possibility. The discovery of the fence line also provided a key datum point for subsequent archeological research of the battlefield area.\footnote{G. Michael Pratt, “A Phase II Archaeological Investigation of the River Raisin Battlefield and Massacre Site, City of Monroe, Monroe County” (1999).}

In 2000, Midwest Archeological Associates extended the 1998 Phase II archeological investigation of the previously discovered fence. Trench excavations and test pits led to the recovery of 1,450 artifacts. Most of these came from a prehistoric midden associated with a late Sandusky Culture (1450-1650 CE) village. The midden contained an abundance of “shell tempered ceramics, lithic tools and debitage, and quantities of well-preserved faunal remains” that may well be associated with the materials recovered nearby in 1991. In either case, the location of this village and the ossuary burials at late Sandusky sites would suggest that many if not all of the human remains found during the construction of the River Raisin Paper Mill may predate the events of January 1813 by a few centuries. The excavations in 2000 also revealed 113 historic artifacts, though most seemed to postdate the events of January 1813. Backhoe trenching did reveal the east-west trending fence line that ran along the north end of Frenchtown, as well as its intersection with the north-south trending fence line (on the western edge of Frenchtown) that had been excavated two years earlier. Charcoal evidence at the top of the postholes also indicates that the fence was destroyed by fire. This evidence, along with the lack of any prehistoric materials in the vicinity of the fence line, the nearby presence of the ca. 1810s shoe-buckle, and the ability to accurately predict the course of the fence line based on historical maps and descriptions, indicates that a key feature of the battles had been found. Lastly, the excavations in 2000 confirmed the findings of previous surveys and excavations; namely, that much of the archeological record associated with historic Frenchtown and older American Indian use and residence remained intact beneath the paper mill complex.\footnote{Pratt and William E. Rutter, “Phase II Archaeological Reconnaissance of the River Raisin Battlefield, Monroe, Michigan” (2002); quotation is from p. 23. The 2000 field season was supposed to include a metal detector survey of the field to the north of the current RRNP Visitor Center, at the site of the U.S. 17th Infantry encampment, but tall grass and weeds thwarted this effort. On ossuary burials at Late Sandusky sites in the region, see Timothy James Abel, The Petersen Site: A Prehistoric to Historic Occupation in Northwestern Ohio (St. John's, Newfoundland: Copetown Press, 2002), 18-20.}

Archeologists returned to the former paper mill site in 2003 to follow up on two previous investigations; namely, the excavations of the puncheon fence and the site of the U.S. 17th Infantry encampment. Seven trenches were excavated in former parking areas, but no artifacts relating to the events of January 1813 were recovered. Two of the trenches did reveal further evidence of the fence and its course along the perimeter of Frenchtown, while another two trenches revealed prehistoric materials that likely correspond to the same late Sandusky village site that had been encountered previously. At the site of the US 17th Infantry encampment the open field was closely mowed, and the area underwent a surface metal detection survey. A total of 715 artifacts were recovered, with most dating to the late-19th and early-20th centuries. However, eighty-one of the artifacts were associated with the battle on January 22, 1813. Nearly half of these were either musket balls or buckshot, but other battle-related artifacts included lead waste, gun flints, and gun parts. Further analysis determined that the calibers of the recovered musket balls and buckshot matched those used by American Indians at the Battle of Fallen Timbers (1794) and the Battle of Mackinac Island (1814).
Four brass buttons were also recovered, and at least two correspond to those used by the US military. No other recovered items from this survey could be unequivocally attributed to the battle. The locations of these artifacts and the relative lack of shot that would have been used by US Regulars “suggests that the survey area lies behind the US position at the start of the attack and, perhaps, that the retreating Regulars offered little return fire as they abandoned their position for the shelter of the north bank of the River Raisin.”

Only two other archeological investigations have occurred within the core area of the battlefield since 2003, one in 2006 that monitored the demolition of a paper mill building and another in 2013 that took soil borings during a gas line project. While neither of these resulted in significant finds, they did add to the understanding of the soil profile beneath the former industrial site. Consequently, they contribute to a substantial catalog of information that augments the historical record and provides a fuller understanding of the battlefield area’s significance. As noted by Pratt and Rutter, archeologists have recovered material data that includes the location “of the puncheon fence that partially enclosed Frenchtown and provided protection to American soldiers during the second battle of the River Raisin as well as the cellars of Frenchtown houses referenced and used by American soldiers during the battle and as locations of atrocities afterwards.” In short, the cumulative findings of archeological research provided “the foundation for accurately defining” the central area of the NRHP site.

Since 2006 much has changed within the core area of the battlefield. The last industrial building from the paper mill was demolished in 2008, the River Raisin National Battlefield Park was established in 2009, clean up and capping of the industrial brownfield was largely completed in 2010, and the transfer of the mill property to the NPS occurred in 2011. At present the national park unit’s boundaries remain unfixed and land transfers are ongoing, but they already encompass the expanded and updated NRHP site on the north side of the River Raisin. Building on the work that had already occurred in the core area of the battlefield, and in response to NPS plans to incorporate areas to the north and south of the former core of Frenchtown, the most recent archeological investigation associated with the battlefield area occurred beyond the former paper mill site. In October 2009, with the support of an American Battlefield Protection Program grant from the NPS, a team of archeologists led by Pratt, Rutter, and Richard Green conducted a preliminary survey of areas to the north and south of the River Raisin.

Based on historical records and recent accidental surface finds, the investigation focused on three areas: (1) north of Mason Run, on lands within the national battlefield park and encompassed by the NRHP expansion; (2) the south side of the River Raisin just above the flood plain on a parcel immediately south of Hellenberg Park (which lies within the floodplain); (3) and at two sites adjacent

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102 *River Raisin National Battlefield Park: Study and Boundary Assessment* (November 2009); *River Raisin Heritage Corridor-East Master Plan*, passim.
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to Plum Creek, about a mile south the River Raisin. The brief four-day survey did not recover any artifacts associated with the events of January 1813, but did provide important information about subsurface contexts. While intact 1813 soil horizons were encountered in the study area, a number of test units revealed considerable disturbance. Other units had deep layers of fill with various mixtures of concrete, metals, and construction debris that thwarted the use of metal detectors and magnetometers. Consequently, backhoe trench excavation provided the only means for assessing the archeological potential of these areas.

Given these conditions, the archeological team determined that a thorough investigation of areas outside the core of the battlefield was not a worthwhile endeavor. While scattered evidence of running battles, brief defensive stands, and assembly areas might be found to the north and south of an expanded River Raisin Battlefield Site, such investigation would require “massive, yet precise, mechanical excavation of large areas.” The expense of such an investigation would be hard to justify given the limited archeological potential of recovering and contextualizing small, random artifacts like munitions, personal items, and pieces of equipment in areas where historical maps and first-person accounts are less precise than those associated with the actions in the core of Frenchtown.”

103 Pratt et al, “The River Raisin Battlefield, Outside the Core,” passim.
104 Ibid. 33-34.
9. Major Bibliographical References

Bibliography (Cite the books, articles, and other sources used in preparing this form.)


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**County and State**

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The text content is already in a plain natural written format. It is a list of references for the River Raisin Battlefield Site. The references include:

- Harrison, Daniel F. National Register of Historic Places, Sawyer House (1977), Monroe, Monroe County, Michigan, National Register #77000721.


McAfee, Robert B. *History of the Late War in the Western Country*. Bowling Green, OH: Historical Publications Company, 1919.


River Raisin Battlefield Site  
Monroe MI

Winchester, James. "General Orders, Camp Miami Rapids, 16 and 17 January 1813." In James Winchester Papers, Burton Historical Collection, Detroit Public Library.


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**Previous documentation on file (NPS):**

- [x] previously listed in the National Register
- [ ] previously determined eligible by the National Register
- [ ] designated a National Historic Landmark
- [ ] recorded by Historic American Buildings Survey #____________
- [ ] recorded by Historic American Engineering Record #__________
- [ ] recorded by Historic American Landscape Survey #__________

**Primary location of additional data:**

- [ ] State Historic Preservation Office
- [ ] Other State agency
- [ ] Federal agency
- [ ] Local government
- [ ] University
- [ ] Other
  - Name of repository: ________________________________

**Historic Resources Survey Number (if assigned):** ____________
River Raisin Battlefield Site

Geographical Data

Acreage of Property  **Approximately 230**

Use either the UTM system or latitude/longitude coordinates

**Latitude/Longitude Coordinates**
Datum if other than WGS84:__________
(enter coordinates to 6 decimal places)
1. Latitude: Longitude:
2. Latitude: Longitude:
3. Latitude: Longitude:
4. Latitude: Longitude:

**Or**
**UTM References**  See continuation sheet
Datum (indicated on USGS map):

☐ NAD 1927  or  ☐ NAD 1983

1. Zone: 17N  Easting: 303234  Northing: 4643747
2. Zone: 17N  Easting: 303026  Northing: 4643427
5. Zone: 17N  Easting: 302891  Northing: 4642131
8. Zone: 17N  Easting: 303349  Northing: 4643281
River Raisin Battlefield Site

Monroe MI

Name of Property

9. Zone: 17N  
   Easting: 303206  
   Northing: 4643357

10. Zone: 17N  
    Easting: 301206  
    Northing: 4643668

Verbal Boundary Description (Describe the boundaries of the property.)

The expanded River Raisin Battlefield Site boundary is defined by streets, railroad lines, property lines, and park boundaries in the present city of Monroe and Monroe Charter Township in the State of Michigan. The northern boundary begins just west of Harbor Avenue at a point approximately 2,400 feet north of Mason Run and extends eastward about 360 feet across a former industrial site to a point adjacent to the Canadian National Railway line. From there the boundary turns south for approximately 1210 feet along the eastern edge of the Canadian National Railway line to a point opposite the intersection of Telb Street and Harbor Avenue. From there the boundary extends west across railroad right-of-ways, Dixie Highway, and continuing until intersecting with the CSX railroad bed, approximately 950 feet. The western boundary follows the railroad bed south across the River Raisin to the intersection with East Front Street, approximately 3,000 feet. The boundary then turns west for approximately 150 feet until the intersection with Blossom Lane. The boundary then turns southwest to follow Blossom Lane, where it crosses East 1st Street and continues along Half Street until its terminus at Woodland Cemetery, approximately 2, 100 feet. From this point the boundary turns northwest for approximately 500 feet to the northwest corner of Woodland Cemetery, then southwest for approximately 800 feet to the southwest corner of Woodland Cemetery, and then southeast for approximately 800 feet to the southeast corner of Woodland Cemetery. The boundary then proceeds southwest to follow Reisig Street before continuing across Plum Creek to its southern bank, approximately 1250 feet. The southern boundary follows the southern border of Plum Creek Park until the intersection with the Canadian National Railway bed, about 1,400 feet. The boundary then turns northwest following the railroad bed until the intersection with East 1st Street, approximately 3,400 feet. At East 1st Street the boundary turns southeast following East 1st Street, which becomes Link Street and then East Front Street, approximately 1,300 feet. At the eastern tip of Sterling Island and East Front Street the eastern boundary turns northeast across the River Raisin for a distance of approximately 900 feet to the southeast corner of parcel # 59-01900-012 and its frontage on East Elm Street. From East Elm Street the boundary runs north along the eastern boundary of parcel # 59-01900-012 for approximately 2,000 feet to Mason Run, then turns northwest along the parcel boundary for approximately 700 feet to Detroit Avenue. The boundary then follows Detroit Avenue north to the intersection with Telb Avenue, approximately 1,300 feet. Turning west on Telb Avenue the boundary crosses Harbor Avenue to the edge of a former industrial site, approximately 580 feet. At this point the boundary runs north for 1,210 feet to the origin point.
**Boundary Justification** (Explain why the boundaries were selected.)

The boundary encompasses significant aspects of battle actions that occurred on January 18 and 22, 1813, as well as the killing, destruction, and captivity that occurred on January 23, 1813. The natural and cultural features within the expanded site are significant to the battle and its location within Frenchtown, a *Canadien* ribbon farm community in Michigan Territory. Archeologically defined features of the battle landscape were used to define the boundary in addition to archival documentation on Frenchtown and the events along both sides of the River Raisin in January 1813.

Specifically, the northern portions of the expanded NRHP site encompasses the British approach to Frenchtown along Hull’s Trace on January 22, 1813, their pre-dawn deployment in the woods to the north of Frenchtown, and the establishment of artillery positions just north of Mason’s Run. The northeastern portions of the NRHP site also encompass an area of intense fighting during a running battle through the woods at the end of the First Battle of Frenchtown. On the north side of the River Raisin, extending the boundaries of the NRHP site incorporates key areas of action for Native Confederacy fighters during the Second Battle of Frenchtown, who swept around the west side of Frenchtown crossed the River Raisin. The western Norfolk Southern Railroad corridor along the western boundary of the expanded site encompasses areas of skirmishing and the positions of Confederacy fighters to the west of the Frenchtown fences. Extending the boundaries to the east of Detroit Avenue takes in the full scope of actions that involved the attack on the U.S. 17th Infantry encampment during the Second Battle of Frenchtown.

The inclusion of areas to the south of the River Raisin incorporates the sites of several key actions during the First and Second Battles of Frenchtown. The south shore of the river acted as a deployment area for American soldiers attacking British positions at Frenchtown on January 18, 1813, as well as the sites of retreat and brief defensive stands on January 22. A broad irregular corridor centered along Kentucky Avenue and extending southward from East Second Street to just beyond Plum Creek encompasses American approach to Frenchtown on January 18, as well as the main American retreat route on January 22. Within the corridor is the General Winchester capture site, Woodland Cemetery, and the route of Hull’s Trace south out of Frenchtown. The Winchester capture site is located at the corner of Kentucky Ave and East Third Street. Woodland Cemetery contains the remains of casualties from the Battles at River Raisin. Where Kentucky Avenue crosses Plum Creek was the site of the last significant between conflict between American soldiers the pursuing Wyandotte, Shawnee, Bodéwadmi, Odawa, and Ojibwe fighters. Wyandotte (Wyandot, a.k.a. Huron), Shawnee, Bodéwadmi (Potawatomi), Odawa (Ottawa), Ojibwe (Chippewa) fighters.
River Raisin Battlefield Site                   Monroe MI
Name of Property                  County and State

11. Form Prepared By

name/title:       Mark David Spence
organization:     N/A
street & number:  707 Broadalbin St. SW
city or town:     Albany       state: OR       zip code: 97321
e-mail:    markdavidspace@gmail.com
telephone:     (541) 223-3536
date:      May 25, 2017
Additional Documentation

Submit the following items with the completed form:

- **Maps:** A USGS map or equivalent (7.5 or 15 minute series) indicating the property's location.
  - See Figure O4 on Continuation Sheet

- **Sketch map** for historic districts and properties having large acreage or numerous resources.
  Key all photographs to this map.
  - See Figure O5 on Continuation Sheet

- **Additional items:** (Check with the SHPO, TPO, or FPO for any additional items.)
Photographs

Submit clear and descriptive photographs. The size of each image must be 1600x1200 pixels (minimum), 3000x2000 preferred, at 300 ppi (pixels per inch) or larger. Key all photographs to the sketch map. Each photograph must be numbered and that number must correspond to the photograph number on the photo log. For simplicity, the name of the photographer, photo date, etc. may be listed once on the photograph log and doesn’t need to be labeled on every photograph.

Photo Log

Name of Property: River Raisin Battlefield

City or Vicinity: Monroe

County: Monroe State: MI

Photographers: Zackary Ray and National Park Service staff

Dates Photographed: August 2, 2011 and March 10, 2014

Description of Photograph(s) and number, include description of view indicating direction of camera:

1 of 8: View to the south from the former site of Frenchtown and the present River Raisin National Battlefield Park across the frozen River Raisin toward Hellenberg Park and Sterling Island (to the left of the bridge). View encompasses one of the routes taken by American forces when they moved into Frenchtown on January 18, 1813, as well as an American route of retreat and the site of a brief defensive stand on January 22, 1813. [NPS Staff: March 10, 2014]

2 of 8: View to the south from the vicinity of a British Artillery position on January 22, 1813. The NPS visitor center and interpretation pavilion can be seen in the distance. The open field is the location of the U.S. 17th Infantry encampment on January 22, 1813, to the east of Frenchtown. [Zackary Ray: August 2, 2011]

3 of 8: View to the north toward a tree line where British, Canadian, and Native Confederacy forces established initial battle positions on January 22, 1813. [NPS Staff: March 10, 2014]

4 of 8: East view of U.S. 17th Infantry encampment toward Detroit Avenue and an open field across the road. The field in the distance is where Confederacy fighters came around the American’s right flank. [Zackary Ray: August 2, 2011]

5 of 8: View to the south of railroad bridges and Dixie Highway crossing the River Raisin. This transportation corridor follows the route north from Frenchtown that was laid out by General William Hull in 1812. [Zackary Ray: August 2, 2011]
River Raisin Battlefield Site
Monroe  MI

Name of Property
County and State

6 of 8: View to the north from near the intersection of East Front Street and the Canadian National Railway route. This site lies on the approach route used by Kentucky militia at the commencement of the First Battle of Frenchtown on January 18, 1813. [Zackary Ray: August 2, 2011]

7 of 8: View to the east from near the intersection of East Elm Avenue and the Canadian National Railway route. View encompasses the area that represented the western half of Frenchtown, toward the opposite side of treeline that is depicted in photos #2 and #3. The low split rail fence is a feature of the River Raisin National Battlefield Park. [NPS Staff: March 10, 2014]

8 of 8: View to the northeast with State of Michigan historical marker and bench on interpretive trail behind River Raisin National Battlefield Park. View encompasses the U.S. 17th Infantry encampment, with Detroit Avenue and the lines of Native Confederacy attack in the distance. [NPS Staff: March 10, 2014]

Paperwork Reduction Act Statement: This information is being collected for applications to the National Register of Historic Places to nominate properties for listing or determine eligibility for listing, to list properties, and to amend existing listings. Response to this request is required to obtain a benefit in accordance with the National Historic Preservation Act, as amended (16 U.S. S.C.460 et seq.).

Estimated Burden Statement: Public reporting burden for this form is estimated to average 100 hours per response including time for reviewing instructions, gathering and maintaining data, and completing and reviewing the form. Direct comments regarding this burden estimate or any aspect of this form to the Office of Planning and Performance Management. U.S. Dept. of the Interior, 1849 C. Street, NW, Washington, DC.
Figure 01 of 13: River Raisin Battle actions on January 18, 1813

First Battle of Frenchtown; Battle Actions on January 18, 1813. Image is closely based on a painting by Tim Kurtz on display outside the Visitor Center at River Raisin National Battlefield Park.
Figure 02 of 13: Position of American forces on the morning of January 22, 1813


**MAP KEY**
1) Navarre house: General Winchester’s quarters, plus 100 soldiers encamped
2) Board fence 5 ft. height
3) Puncheon fence 5 ft. height
4) Area of incomplete fencing
5) Kentucky 2nd Regiment
6) Sheltered wounded and dead
7) Col Lewis’ headquarters
8) 1st Kentucky Rifle Regiment
9) 1st Kentucky Volunteer Regiment
10) 5th Kentucky Volunteer Regiment
11) 17th U.S. Infantry
12) Orchard and Mason Run
Figure 03 of 13: River Raisin battle actions on January 22, 1813

Second Battle of Frenchtown; Battle Actions on January 22, 1813. Image is closely based on a painting by Tim Kurtz on display outside the Visitor Center at River Raisin National Battlefield Park.
Figure 04 of 13: Universal Transverse Mercator Coordinate Points, River Raisin Battlefield Site

Updated Boundary for River Raisin Battlefield Site

Points A – K denote UTM coordinates for River Raisin Battlefield Site NRHP boundary update

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Point</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>UTM Coordinates</th>
<th>Point</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>UTM Coordinates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>CN corridor, 794' NE of point B</td>
<td>17N 303234–4643747</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>Mason Run at a point 700 ft. SE of Detroit Ave.</td>
<td>17N 303345–4642994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>CN corridor &amp; Telb St. extended</td>
<td>17N 303026–4643427</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>Mason Run &amp; Detroit Ave.</td>
<td>17N 303297–4642996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>CSX corridor &amp; Telb St. extended</td>
<td>17N 302756–4643544</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>Corner of Detroit Ave &amp; Telb St.</td>
<td>17N 303349–4643281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>E. Front St. &amp; CSX cor.</td>
<td>17N 302196–4642730</td>
<td>J</td>
<td>200 ft. west of Telb St extended</td>
<td>17N 303206–4643357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>E. Front St at tip of Sterling Island</td>
<td>17N 302891–4642131</td>
<td>K</td>
<td>Mason Run at a point 700 ft. SE of Detroit Ave.</td>
<td>17N 303206–4643668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>E. Elm Ave &amp;</td>
<td>17N 303139–4642262</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Arrows 01-08 show vantage of photos depicting River Raisin Battlefield in 2011 & 2014.
Figure 6 of 13: Photograph 1 of 8

Photo 1: View to the south from the former site of Frenchtown and the present River Raisin National Battlefield Park across the frozen River Raisin toward Hellenberg Park and Sterling Island (to the left of the bridge). View encompasses one of the routes taken by American forces when they moved into Frenchtown on 18 January, as well as an American route of retreat and the site of a brief defensive stand on 22 January.

Figure 07 of 13: Photograph 2 of 8

Photo 2. View to the south from the vicinity of a British Artillery position on 22 January 1813. The NPS visitor center and interpretation pavilion can be seen in the distance. The open field is the location of the U.S. 17th Infantry encampment on 22 January, to the east of Frenchtown.
Photo 3. View to the north toward a tree line where British, Canadien, and Native Confederacy forces established initial battle positions on 22 January 1813. [NPS Staff: March 10, 2014]
Figure 09 of 13: Photograph 4 of 8

Photo 4. East view of U.S. 17th Infantry encampment toward Detroit Avenue and an open field across the road. The field in the distance is where Confederacy fighters came around the American’s right flank.
Photo 5. View to the south of railroad bridges and Dixie Highway crossing the River Raisin. This transportation corridor follows the route north from Frenchtown that was laid out by General William Hull in 1812.
Photo 6. View to the north from near the intersection of East Front Street and the Canadian National Railway route. This site lies on the approach route used by Kentucky militia at the commencement of the First Battle of Frenchtown on 18 January 1813.
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Photo 8. View to the northeast with State of Michigan historical marker and bench on interpretive trail behind River Raisin National Battlefield Park. View encompasses the U.S. 17th Infantry encampment, with Detroit Avenue and the lines of Native Confederacy attack in the distance.