Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration: A Primer for Military Practitioners

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FORWARD

As this primer illustrates, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs are intensive, especially in terms of resources, funding, and personnel requirements. In terms of desired effects, past DDR programs have had fair success with disarmament and demobilization, but fall short with reintegration. DDR practitioners often cite a loss of funding and time as reasons for this shortfall, but the actual cause involves an ad hoc approach to planning, management, and organization.

This primer is intended to address the complex issues inherent in DDR and provide a framework for planning, management, and organization. Post-conflict scenarios which prompt a US policy decision to initiate DDR vary in character, so implementation is by no means clear cut. While this primer provides a logical framework, DDR practitioners must adapt their plan to the circumstances. In other words, while the DDR primer provides a roadmap, the practitioners are the drivers.

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INTRODUCTION

Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs represent a major challenge for practitioners because they require meticulous planning, extensive resources, and an extended period of time. While the US military theoretically possesses the organization, planning capacity, resources, and funding to implement DDR, assuming this responsibility unassisted would be an inferior strategy.

A host of DDR stakeholders possess experience and expertise on DDR programs: UN departments (e.g., United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations), Non-Government Organizations (NGOs), International Organizations (IOs), US agencies (e.g., Department of State, US Agency for International Development [USAID], Department of Justice, etc.), regional actors (i.e., African Union), and select countries (e.g., Britain, France, Nigeria, Liberia, and Kosovo, among others). Further, the country pursuing DDR has an interest in its success and can render valuable assistance: government agencies, civil society (e.g., media, academia, business communities, civic groups, and think tanks), local communities, and former combatants.

Implementing DDR is both a security and a confidence-building challenge. Government and rebel forces wish to stop fighting but fear for their safety before disarming and demobilizing. The DDR program creates an environment for former combatants (both insurgent and government forces) to participate freely. Several procedures and control measures are necessary to allay perceived threats to security.
A US policy decision to initiate a DDR program reflects its commitment to a country’s long-term stability. The amount of effort also evinces the degree of US interest in the concerned country. An effective DDR program serves as the gateway to security sector reform (SSR), which is a long-term program to enhance a country’s stability. If DDR falters, SSR is much more difficult to implement.

As this primer reveals, DDR programs are difficult, resource demanding, and time intensive. The most important phase—reintegration—is rarely completed due to funding limitations, untapped resources, and time constraints. In terms of expectations and trust, a DDR program has a short window of opportunity for implementation. If the program is disorganized or plagued by delays, DDR participants will likely leave in frustration without the benefit of reintegration. One of the goals of this primer is to suggest ways to optimize available funds, resources, and time.

Generally, DDR programs fall under several scenarios. The first, and most prevalent, entails a traditional approach to ending a persistent insurgency or civil war, which has spanned several years or decades, devastating state functions and society (e.g., Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Nepal). The second results from a US or coalition intervention in support of insurgent forces against an enemy government (e.g., Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Libya). The third involves a major war resulting in the defeat and occupation of an enemy country (e.g., Afghanistan, and Iraq). The fourth involves humanitarian assistance/disaster response (HA/DR) missions where the host country lacks the capacity to deal with existing factions and criminal elements, which threaten stability (e.g., Somalia and Haiti). This primer focuses on the traditional approach
since this is the most difficult to implement. DDR military planners can adapt this primer’s framework for the other scenarios.

This DDR primer addresses shaping activities prior to implementing a DDR program, to include the prerequisite of a peace agreement in the traditional approach and the all-important public information campaign. The main body of the primer focuses on the planning and implementation of DDR. The primer concludes with the option of a DDR support center for the purpose of increasing coordination, cooperation, and collaboration among stakeholders and the US military.

**Shaping Activities for DDR**

**Traditional Peace Agreement in the Aftermath of a Civil War/Insurgency**

For several decades, the UN has used DDR programs to help countries transition from conflict to peace. Most insurgencies are not successful, so a military stalemate or intermittent conflict results, often lasting years or decades. Incessant fighting devastates state functions, the economy, and society. At some point, the major warring factions (government and insurgent forces) request help from the UN to end the conflict without endangering themselves in the process. Accordingly, the UN uses a DDR program to establish trust and demilitarization.

This traditional approach begins with a UN resolution to initiate peace negotiations among the warring factions under the aegis of a UN (or lead-nation) mediator, and with the immediate goal of reaching a peace agreement. In those cases involving the United States as the lead country for a DDR program, a Department
of Defense designated DDR task force offers inherent advantages for successful implementation. While not directly involved in the peace negotiations, DDR task force liaison officers observe and apprise higher command of progress and issues which will impact DDR planning.

A designated American DDR task force provides the necessary command and control, mission focus, and resources for effective implementation of DDR. The DDR task force may fall under a larger named task force or operate alone according to US strategic objectives. Accordingly, the DDR task force staff conducts the planning, establishes the task organization, identifies needed resources, reaches out to stakeholders, and produces the implementation plan. The features of this primer serve as a guide for such planning.

It would be a grave mistake for the US military to view DDR as a purely military effort. Instead, the military must take a whole of government approach to DDR, involving a host of experienced stakeholders. The participation of stakeholders will determine the number of DDR sites that the DDR task force can field at any one time. However, incorporating these organizations is no easy task. An enduring challenge is creating the requisite unity of effort among all stakeholders for the implementation of DDR. The greatest challenge is achieving cooperation, participation, and the sharing of information from stakeholders, which may have different agendas, organizational cultures, capacities, capabilities, and resources. Some stakeholders may view the DDR task force as an interloper; therefore, achieving their active participation is a major objective. The payoff for greater inclusiveness is the capability to increase the number of DDR sites at any one time.
The Department of State’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG) should be involved in the DDR program from the start. OIG audits and assessments identify potential mismanagement, waste, and fraud in the DDR program, which help practitioners increase efficiencies and minimize costs. As such, OIG participation in planning and execution provides an invaluable service to the DDR program.

One way to achieve unity of effort is through the establishment of numerous Civil Military Operation Centers (CMOC) and perhaps DDR support centers. The primary purpose of the CMOC is to provide DDR information for stakeholders, outreach for stakeholder cooperation, and the establishment of rapport. Since Civil Affairs personnel operate CMOCs, they possess the proper skillsets for interacting with stakeholders. The DDR task force may also consider establishing DDR support centers to support DDR sites (discussed at the end of this primer).

The peace agreement outlines political power-sharing arrangements in the new government, as well as equitable representation in the new armed forces and police forces. For the DDR program, implementation begins as soon as the peace agreement is concluded, so DDR task force planners include the DDR implementation plan or a planning matrix as an annex to the peace agreement (annex A). Additionally, a memorandum of agreement between the US and host nation (HN) government is proper to establish the parameters of the DDR and SSR programs.

Since successful DDR rests on the political will of host government and insurgent leaders, as well as mutual confidence in the security arrangements, DDR task force liaison officers at the peace talks display a map
with the following confidence-building annotations:

- Lines or zones of separation (LOS/ZOS).
- Security forces to monitor the LOS/ZOS with checkpoints, observation posts, and patrols.
- Camps for the consolidation of former combatants.
- Weapons turn-in points with date/time groups.
- Demobilization points with date/time groups.
- Reintegration cantonments with date/time groups.

The first task is to disengage former combatants by utilizing lines or zones of separation. This method increases the sense of security in former combatants, reduces incidental or intentional clashes, and thereby establishes the necessary trust for the initiation of the DDR program.

Security forces control the LOS/ZOS with checkpoints, observation posts, and patrols. To provide constant monitoring, platoon and company command posts permit the rotation of troops to the LOS/ZOS, rest and recovery, and communications. For commerce and normal activities, civilian traffic along established routes through the LOS/ZOS continues. Security force leaders might consider a pass system as a control measure.
The consolidation of former combatants into camps provides positive control and enhances their sense of safety. Each camp has at least one DDR task force liaison officer assigned to explain the DDR program, provide updates on the implementation schedule (i.e., the planning matrix), address rumors (which always abound), and coordinate the logistics for assigned DDR sites. The camps are temporary with minimum amenities so as to forestall a personal attachment to the camps among former combatants. Government forces consolidate in existing garrisons, but police continue their normal duties if all stakeholders agree. In this case, police keep a distance from the LOS/ZOS (e.g., 10 kilometers).

The DDR task force dispatches engineer survey teams to each of the DDR sites to determine suitability, such as the location, size of the reception area, facilities, access, and other desired features. If feasible, the weapons turn-in and demobilization sites should be near each other, but with sufficient distance to prevent congestion. The site for the reintegration cantonment requires sufficient space, drainage, and access for a provisional period. Accompanying DDR task force liaison officers visit nearby communities to identify available local resources for the potential support of DDR sites (e.g., labor, teachers, vocation experts, restaurant owners, office and school equipment, etc.). The liaison officers report their findings and needed funding to the DDR task force.

Public Information Campaign

The public information campaign is essential to the DDR program, requiring substantial resources, organization, and coordination among stakeholders. The DDR task force public affairs office, Civil Affairs
operation centers, and ministerial advisors serve as the catalysts. In coordination with central and local government officials, civil society organizations, NGOs, and IOs, the public information campaign informs the populace of the peace agreement and the DDR program.

The public information campaign includes the criteria for participation in the DDR program, to include combatants, service support personnel, labor slaves, sex slaves, forced marriage spouses and their children, child soldiers, and disabled veterans. Potential candidates are advised to have supporting information regarding their service for DDR in-processing.

All means of media (e.g., radio, TV, newspapers, social media, and short message service), as well as posters, leaflets, and vehicle/aerial loudspeakers, serve to propagate DDR information throughout the country. Government and local officials hold press conferences, special broadcasts, and town hall meetings to explain the DDR program and encourage participation. They also encourage relatives and friends to persuade insurgents they know to participate in the DDR program.

The public information campaign also includes the dates and locations for weapons turn-in and demobilization sites to forestall possible confusion. Civilians are encouraged to bring in weapons and munitions they have found to the turn-in sites, and are warned not to handle unexploded ordinance (UXO). Instead, they mark it with engineer tape, made available at designated locales or dropped in with leaflets, and notify the local authorities. The public information campaign continues throughout the DDR program to ensure maximum participation.
Disarmament

While this section focuses on disarmament, DDR planners should co-locate each weapons turn-in site and demobilization site without impinging on their exclusive activities. For planning purposes, the number of disarmament and demobilization sites is dependent on the geographic size of the country as well as the available logistics, resources, and personnel. Accordingly, these factors may require time sequencing in accordance with the planning matrix, which is included in the public information campaign and available to camp liaison officers. Since insurgent groups and interested civilians will likely walk to the designated disarmament/demobilization sites, time-space factors require sufficient notification.

The DDR task force CMOC coordinates with UN, NGOs, host nation government officials, journalists, photographers, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel, administrative support personnel, security personnel, and other relevant people to garner support of each disarmament/demobilization site and arranges for transportation as needed. The DDR task force provides logistical support for office supplies, generators, shelters, audio-visual systems, trucks, crates for turned in weapons and munitions, and heavy equipment transports (for tanks, armored personnel carriers, and other heavy equipment).

DDR planners must understand that disarmament is a voluntary act as well as a confidence-building measure to encourage the turn-in of weapons without fear of attack. While disarmament/demobilization sites require protection, security personnel should remain non-threatening and friendly. Ceremonial symbols (banners, music, etc.) promote an atmosphere of safety
and celebration for incoming insurgent forces. DDR planners should establish multiple water stations at the site.

Some caveats for consideration are necessary in regard to disarmament. Regarding incentives to offer money for weapons, DDR practitioners must consider the unintended consequences. First, it undermines the spirit of disarmament from a voluntary to a mercenary activity. Accordingly, people may turn-in antiquated and unserviceable weapons for cash. The initiative creates a market for arms dealers. Further, people may use the money to purchase modern weapons.

Regardless of the host nation’s gun control laws, the DDR program should not embark on sweeping disarmament of the citizenry. Because weapons turn-in is a voluntary act, any measures at compulsion will undermine the spirit and effectiveness of the DDR program. The Public Information Campaign should encourage the voluntary surrender of weapons but not demand it. Gun ownership is a domestic issue, so the DDR program should not become an enforcement arm of the host government’s gun control policies.

DDR personnel are not authorized to offer amnesty to UN-identified war criminals. War criminals may attempt to exchange participation of their forces in DDR with amnesty. DDR officials will not negotiate but can advise war criminals to surrender to the authorities for host nation legal process or the UN International Court of Justice. People involved in suspected atrocities are permitted to participate in the DDR program with their cases handled during reconciliation.

The receipt, collection, and recording of weapons and munitions require administrative and logistical
support. Former combatants and non-combatants will bring in various types of weapons, boxed and loose ammunition, munitions, and equipment, which DDR administrative personnel must catalogue. Despite Public Information Campaign warnings, non-combatants may bring in UXO, including mines. Hence, ordnance or engineer teams are needed for safe disposal of UXO.

While government military units in garrisons will not need to turn in weapons, DDR personnel will need to conduct accountability of weapons and munitions in arms rooms, armories, and storage facilities. The vast majority of these weapons, weapon systems, and munitions is earmarked for the new armed forces and police.

The weapons collection process requires facilities, administrators, office supplies, storage containers or crates, trucks, and/or aircraft for transportation to a central weapons/munitions collection facility. Facility personnel are needed to determine the serviceability of the weapons, ammunition, and munitions for use in the new army and police forces. What is not needed is destroyed. This disposition includes excess weapons and munitions from government military units.

**Demobilization**

Immediately following weapons turn-in, the combatants move to the demobilization site as a unit for the demobilization ceremony. A formal demobilization ceremony is imperative and open to the public, signifying the end of fighting and a new era of peace. Accordingly, stadiums are ideal locales; otherwise large open fields or parade grounds will suffice. Ceremonies often include a symbolic destruction of a few weapons to underscore the importance of the occasion.
Government military personnel earmarked for demobilization also participate in demobilization ceremonies in their garrisons. It is important for the government to recognize and honor all those who served their country. Because of likely passions as a result of the conflict, UN or DDR task force officials should host the demobilization ceremony for insurgent forces.

The demobilization ceremony is celebratory in nature with food, water, guest speakers, bands, and parade formations to underscore the formality of the ceremony. DDR administrators should solicit local communities for food catering. Each demobilized former combatant (insurgent and government military) should receive a discharge certificate recognizing his/her service. Discharging former combatants with honor and ceremony is an effective way to reintegrate them into society peacefully. Honoring one’s service creates a sense of pride and contentment.

The DDR task force must assist with organization, security, transportation, resources, equipment, and so forth for the ceremonies. Foremost is the printing of official discharge certificates. Immediately following the ceremony, combatants report to the certificate station where administrators record the names and dates on the certificates. Discharge certificates are important to “veterans” since they form part of their resumé for employment and potential benefits (particularly for disabled veterans).

Veterans earmarked for the new army and police forces report to the reception station for placement in their roles, and DDR task force transportation moves them to the training centers. All those veterans earmarked for discharge move to the reintegration cantonment.
Reintegration Cantonments

Reintegration (sometimes called “reinsertion and reintegration”) rarely succeeds due to funding, resources, and time constraints. A large measure of incomplete reintegration stems from improper preparation, organization, and management. This recurrent failure not only creates hostility among veterans but also relegates them to a position of societal outcasts and poverty. Predictably, many turn to crime or militancy.

Because a well-managed reintegration program requires substantial space, positive control of participants, and essential services, the DDR task force should not rely on existing local resources (e.g., buildings, electricity, water, sewage). The DDR task force must avoid competing with the local community for resources and essential services. Existing facilities are not configured for positive control of the participants. Moreover, renting such resources can become expensive, which can deplete DDR funds quickly.

A more efficient way is to construct temporary reintegration cantonments. As such, DDR task force engineer units can build cantonments quickly at sites based on the area surveys near the demobilization sites. Such sites require proper drainage and space for cantonments, nearby roads for access, and ideally a nearby airfield.
Construction Considerations

Engineers can develop a standardized cantonment blueprint for rapid set-up (annex B). Cantonments are designed for expansion in case the number of participants is larger than estimated. Quick erection, modularized shelters serve to accommodate all requirements for the DDR program. Water containers, generators, and waste disposal tankers ensure that the cantonments are self-sustaining. For the erection of shelters, cantonment engineers and administrators should consider using local labor to expedite the preparation.

Since the number of cantonments is predicated on available resources, logistics, and personnel, the DDR program strategy must factor in the priority and sequencing of DDR sites. Reports from DDR task force liaison officers determine the needed number and size of cantonments. In some cases, the number of former warring factions in one locale may be so large, that more than one cantonment is needed. If that option is not feasible, DDR planners may need to sequence reintegration participation in one cantonment. Here, DDR planners cycle participants through the reintegration program. Since reintegration depends on former warring factions’ expectations and confidence in the program, DDR planners should avoid sequencing through one cantonment whenever possible.

Engineers can establish cantonments in a matter of days, using quick erection, modular shelters. In this manner, cantonments become highly mobile, durable, and adaptive. As historical experience attests, reintegration rarely achieves the desired effects due to time and financial factors. Hence, cantonments allow for expeditious assembly and disassembly at minimum expense.
The construction of barriers to protect the cantonment requires political sensitivity. The biggest challenge is allaying criticism that they make cantonments resemble concentration camps. On the other hand, barriers are needed to control access into the cantonments and protect supplies and equipment from pilferage. The public information campaign and cantonment administrators should openly explain the reasons for the barriers. Additionally, cantonment administrators should minimize or lower the profile of security forces in order to give the cantonment a non-militarized appearance.

Cantonment Administration, Education, and Training

DDR task force administrators are responsible for overall management of the cantonments. For reintegration administration, basic education, and vocational training, they employ the services of non-military stakeholders—UN, NGO, US agencies (e.g., USAID), host nation organizations, local communities, contractors, and former DDR graduate personnel—to the fullest extent practical. Given their background, Civil Affairs personnel are suitable as the cantonment administrators, overseeing program planning, providing assistance where needed (e.g., doctors, dentists, veterinarians, and logistics), and reporting progress to the DDR task force.

With the collaboration of stakeholders, cantonment administrators design the reintegration program for the in-processing, education, training, graduation, out-processing, and transportation of participants home. A timetable is required to determine the estimated duration for reintegration. For planning purposes, a timetable of six weeks for the reintegration program
will suffice. It is important to inform the participants of the timetable and initiate activities quickly in order to meet expectations. Nothing is worse than participants departing the cantonment in frustration due to inactivity and delays. A set curriculum for basic education informs teachers of the minimum requirements to give students a foundation for further education. Vocational training instruction is geared for skills that support the local economy.

Before using stakeholder resources, cantonment administrators should exhaust local community volunteers first (e.g., teachers, business people, farmers, repairmen) since they are closer and more attuned to the needs of their communities. Other stakeholders can supplement or fill in the gaps. This approach minimizes associated costs for education and vocational training.

In-processing

In-processing includes: service verification of combatant and support personnel; medical and dental screening; segregated assignment of barracks and latrines for leaders, males, females, child soldiers, and families; accommodations for disabled veterans; issuance of clothing and shoes; provision of food and water; and initiation of stipends. Some participants may have personal weapons, so a weapons turn-in and storage point is prudent.

Verifying the service of former fighters and support personnel requires cross checking dates and locations of service as well as knowledge of unit leaders and colleagues. Trusted former insurgent colleagues may assist in verifying veteran status. Verifying can be an arduous process due to the presence of female soldiers, support personnel, slaves (e.g., sex, labor, and forced
marriages), child soldiers, accompanying family members, and disabled veterans. Insurgent leaders may attempt to deny participation of some of these people in reintegration; administrators must remain vigilant of such interference.

Separating former combatants by gender, age, and family status is necessary to sever command relationships, military bonds, and forced marriages. At least two distinct in-processing facilities are needed to separate adult males from all others physically. Accordingly, cantonment administrators assign these groups to separate billets and latrines in the cantonment. The cantonment layout further segregates accommodations with roads and signs to discourage improper visitations between genders and age groups.

Due to social taboos, sex slaves may not be welcome back into their original communities, so administrators will need to relocate them to other communities in order to give them a fresh start. Similarly, cantonment administrators verify whether people in forced marriages wish to stay or break away from their “spouses.” These people may need to relocate to other communities in order to thwart stalking.

Cantonment administrators take biometrics (e.g., photos, fingerprints, and DNA), issue ID cards and ration cards, and upload them on a select data storage site. Paradoxically, people do not object to biometrics collection because it provides them with a valued identity. The collection of biometrics also protects against people trying to participate in subsequent reintegration programs, as well as identifying potential war criminals attempting to infiltrate the program.
Medical examinations for general health and diseases (e.g., STD/HIV) forestalls epidemics from arising in the cantonment. Disabled veterans will likely need prosthetics, wheelchairs, and walking aids. Dental exams attend to chronic teeth problems, provide basic dental care, and schedule dental work appointments. Mental health counselling for child soldiers, slaves, and obvious trauma cases is necessary for the rehabilitation of former combatants. All child soldiers (including adults impressed as children) need such counselling, since they often lack a moral compass that traditional society instills. Since follow-on medical appointments are necessary, cantonment administrators may need to establish more than one medical/dental station. DDR planners can coordinate with specific NGOs, the HN government, local communities, and the US military for medical specialists.

Since the vast majority of participants will lack adequate clothing and shoes, cantonment administrators stockpile clothing and shoes at the warehouse and establish clothing issue facilities next to the in-processing facility. Participants are instructed to change into their issued clothes at their assigned billets. Identifying this need requires early logistical planning and coordination with stakeholders for the collection, transportation, and storage of clothing and shoes at the cantonment warehouses (or the DDR support centers, if established). Certain NGOs specialize in clothing and shoes donations and serve as a ready source. Additionally, DDR planners can request assistance from the HN government for clothing/shoes donation drives.
Education and Vocational Skills Training

Former combatants need some life skills training, such as learning how to shop and pay for items, money management, hygiene, cooking, laundering, and running a household. Longstanding insurgencies often result in the deterioration of such skills, especially if support personnel or slaves performed these duties.

Basic education aims to fill the gap in general knowledge for former combatants, particularly child soldiers and adults impressed as children. Depending on the number of potential students, cantonment administrators should plan for multiple facilities for basic education. Since time will not permit more than rudimentary instruction, employing local teachers permits them to establish a relationship with students (and sometimes they are former students) for the purpose of continuing education upon reintegration into their communities. Additionally, cantonment administrators should encourage former teachers among the former combatants to assist in the education program. Otherwise, teachers from stakeholders serve as a ready resource to complement indigenous educators. When feasible, cantonment administrators should arrange for local schools to provide temporary school supplies, books, desks, and chairs.

Vocation training is essential for the reintegration process so former combatants can find meaningful employment and support the local economy. Additionally, vocational training reduces the likelihood of former combatants joining criminal or insurgent organizations out of desperation. The use of local entrepreneurs, repairmen, and people in husbandry, etc., as instructors ensures former combatants acquire relevant skills needed for apprenticeship and local
employment. Further, such training can serve as a job fair of sorts for prospective employers. Through this approach, local employers assist in the acceptance of former combatants into local communities.

Cantonment administrators should plan for multiple workshops with electricity for such training. A designated field in the cantonment for teaching agricultural practices as well as a livestock barn for teaching the care of livestock are important to most societies. While local farmers will likely be readily available as teachers, cantonment administrators should seek out veterinarians from stakeholders for livestock training.

The dining facility serves as an opportunity for participants interested in the food service industry. Cantonment administrators should consider inviting local restaurant owners and cooks to help manage the dining facility, provide training, and offer jobs to promising candidates. As part of on-the-job training, participants learn about proper food preparation and cooking; recipe development; organization of the kitchen and the dining room; proper cleaning practices; the ordering and storage of food staples; budgeting and management; and waste disposal. Graduates will thus have the basic skills for food service and have the opportunity for employment with participating restaurant owners and cooks.

Informal Transitional Justice

Tens of thousands of atrocities during a conflict are common. Because the existing judicial system cannot handle the case load, informal mechanisms of transitional justice (e.g., truth and reconciliation trials, cleansing ceremonies, and community justice) are a
practical measure. Such courts permit perpetrators to face their victims, admit to their crimes, and ask forgiveness. Judges from international organizations or the host government provide legitimacy to the process. The DDR task force coordinates for the identification, transportation, and accommodations for judges, village elders, and victims.

The purpose of the trials is to promote a healing process for the return of former combatants to their communities. If local communities refuse to welcome back these perpetrators, cantonment administrators must relocate them to other communities for a fresh start. Informal transitional justice courts do not obviate future legal cases against perpetrators of egregious atrocities. Once normalcy returns and the legal system recovers, formal judicial proceedings can revisit egregious cases for prosecution.

Cantonment administrators may consider using the community center or a separate facility for the courts and shall oversee the scheduling of trials. Cantonment administrators engage relevant stakeholders (i.e., UN and NGOs) to determine the average time needed for trials for planning purposes. Due to the heavy logistical and administrative requirements for informal transitional justice, cantonment administrators must start the proceedings at the earliest possible date.

Sports Fields and Community Centers

Sports fields for soccer, volleyball, and other simple games are essential features of cantonments. Sports activities are excellent means for running off energy and providing entertainment during free time. This outlet serves to tire out participants, who otherwise might pursue mischief instead of sleep. In any case,
sports activities keep former combatants entertained rather than languishing in their billets. To enforce segregation, children and families have their own sports field. Sports fields have the dual purpose of roll call in the morning and a parade ground for graduation.

The community center can serve as a place for worship, the informal courts, arts and crafts activities, town hall meetings, and gatherings for important announcements. Depending on the interests, different religions, and space requirements, cantonment administrators may establish multiple community centers.

**Graduation**

Graduation represents a major achievement for participants in the reintegration program, so cantonment administrators should treat graduation as a formal ceremony. Guest speakers, music, and a formal parade formation add to the occasion. The ceremony includes issuing basic education certificates, vocational training certificates, and reintegration graduation certificates. Since reintegration graduates use certificates as part of their resumes, they have intrinsic value.

As part of out-processing, cantonment administrators have graduates dismantle the shelters, turn-in cots, and assist with other decampment activities. Thereafter, cantonment administrators issue a take-home package (either some money or needed essentials) to graduates. Cantonment administrators should consider transportation for graduates to their home communities to forestall theft from potential criminals in the area and to accelerate their resettlement.
DDR Support Centers

DDR support centers are a way to increase coordination, cooperation, and collaboration among stakeholders (annex C). Located near DDR sites, they comprise billets, a dining facility, bathrooms, office space, conference rooms, recreation facilities, and an internet café for stakeholders involved in supporting the DDR sites. The basic intent of a DDR support center is to foster stakeholder interrelationships in a hospitable environment. Since many stakeholders are uncomfortable with the military, DDR support centers should minimize military features. Civil Affairs personnel are ideal administrators, and the DDR task force should consider forgoing the wear of uniforms in DDR support centers.

Aside from increased security, DDR support centers provide a medium for stakeholders to share information, coordinate activities, resolve problems, and pool resources (e.g., transportation, supplies, staff, and equipment). The internet café provides stakeholders with a reliable internet service for communicating with parent organizations, family, and friends. Given the proximity of all stakeholders in one locale, the ability to hold meetings, planning sessions, and regular briefings increases substantially.

The obvious incentive for stakeholders is having a place to sleep, eat, and work at little or no cost to the parent organizations. DDR support centers should create an environment for rapport building among stakeholders. Dining rooms and recreation facilities provide informal settings for people to discuss business, form friendships, and simply relax. Consequently, cooperation and collaboration are more likely to result than in a formal setting.
DDR support centers may provide a more secure location for warehouses in lieu of the reintegration cantonment. A motor pool serves to maintain vehicles and equipment as well as a staging area for convoys. The communications center provides assured radio connection with the DDR task force headquarters. The medical station readily treats illnesses and injuries which are bound to occur occasionally.

DDR support centers are self-sufficient with generators, water, sewage, and other services for DDR stakeholders. They are far cheaper than renting facilities and competing for services in the local communities. Consequently, these centers make more efficient use of essential services and are more effective in garnering stakeholder collaboration. Like cantonments, DDR support centers are mobile and adaptable to the needs of the stakeholders.

**Conclusion**

The DDR program is an integral feature of security sector reform, permitting a host nation to demilitarize its society, reintegrate former warring factions into society, and begin the healing process after a devastating conflict. Since the UN, NGOs, and other traditional stakeholders have extensive experience in DDR, their involvement in a US-led DDR program is essential.

As the first step in SSR, the DDR program serves to promote the effective recruitment and vetting of personnel for the new military and police forces. DDR is a vehicle for the reduction of military and police forces to financially manageable levels, as well as contributing to regional stability.
Historically, DDR programs have a mixed record, so the US military must seek ways and means to foster success. The window of opportunity for a successful DDR program is short, so DDR planners must seek ways to minimize costs and optimize the time for implementation. Good planning, organization, and execution are the hallmarks of an effective DDR program. The intent of this primer is to provide a framework for planning considerations and implementation. As with all plans, effective execution is contingent on the initiative and adaptability of the practitioners.
## Annex A: Example Planning Matrix

### Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Planning

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time-table</th>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Responsibility</th>
<th>Stakeholders</th>
<th>Needed Resources</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D minus ##</td>
<td>Peace Negotiations</td>
<td>DOS</td>
<td>-HN Govt -Warring faction leaders -UN</td>
<td>-Facilities -Security forces -DDR task force LNOs</td>
<td>Site security arrangements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D minus ##</td>
<td>Peace Agreement</td>
<td>DOS</td>
<td>-DOS -DOD -UN -IOs -NGOs</td>
<td>-Printers -Copiers -Media</td>
<td>-All warring factions commit -Power sharing arrangements -New Army and police force composition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D minus ##</td>
<td>DDR Plan Complete</td>
<td>DDR TF</td>
<td>-HN Govt -USAID -IOs -NGOs</td>
<td>-Security forces -Camp LNOs -DDR site survey teams</td>
<td>-Establish LOS/ZOS -Consolidation camps -OPORD with DDR sites -Site surveys complete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time-table</td>
<td>Task</td>
<td>Responsibility</td>
<td>Stakeholders</td>
<td>Needed Resources</td>
<td>Remarks</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>D minus ##</td>
<td>Public Awareness Campaign</td>
<td>PAO</td>
<td>-HN Govt</td>
<td>-Media</td>
<td>-Peace agreement signed</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>-Local authorities</td>
<td>-HN announcements</td>
<td>-DDR intent</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Civil society</td>
<td>-Local town halls</td>
<td>-DDR sites with DTG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Social media/SM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTG #1</td>
<td>Disarm Site Locations</td>
<td>DDR TF teams</td>
<td>-Warring factions</td>
<td>-Collection facilities</td>
<td>-Catalogue weapons/munitions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTG #2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-UN</td>
<td>-Collection recorders</td>
<td>-Record keeping forms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTG #3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-NGOs</td>
<td>-Crates</td>
<td>-Package weapons/munitions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>. . .</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-HN Govt</td>
<td>-Transportation</td>
<td>-Transport collected weapons to central collection site</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTG ##</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Local Govts</td>
<td>-Water sites</td>
<td>-Identify weapons/munitions at CCS for new security forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTG #1</td>
<td>Demob Site Locations</td>
<td>DDR TF teams</td>
<td>-Warring factions</td>
<td>-Certificates printed</td>
<td>-Identify personnel for new Army and police forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTG #2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-PAO</td>
<td>-Media coverage</td>
<td>-Demobilization ceremony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTG #3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-UN</td>
<td>-Band</td>
<td>-Issue certificates of service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>. . .</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-HN Govt</td>
<td>-Guest speakers</td>
<td>-Transport recruits to Army and police reception centers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTG ##</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Local Govts</td>
<td>-Transportation for guest speakers and VIPs</td>
<td>-Issue cards for reintegration cantonment</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Local Populace</td>
<td>-Food and water</td>
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<tr>
<td>Time-table</td>
<td>Task</td>
<td>Responsibility</td>
<td>Stakeholders</td>
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<td>Remarks</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reintegration Phase</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>DTG #1</td>
<td>Cantonment Construction</td>
<td>DDR TF teams</td>
<td>-Local Govts</td>
<td>-Engineers</td>
<td>-Cantonment layout</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTG #2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Local communities</td>
<td>-Local labor</td>
<td>-Site construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTG #3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Barriers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>. . .</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Modular shelters: headquarters, in-processing, arms room, medical, accommodations, latrines, dining, warehouse, education, vocational, sports fields, multiple use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTG ##</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-verify status as vet</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In-processing</td>
<td>Cantonment administrator</td>
<td>-UN</td>
<td>-Two facilities</td>
<td>-Separate veterans by gender/age/family/disability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>-NGOs</td>
<td>-Admin clerks</td>
<td>-Determine special situation (forced marriage/sex slave/slave labor)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>-USAID</td>
<td>-Doctors</td>
<td>-Medical check</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>-Local community volunteers</td>
<td>-Dentists</td>
<td>-Issue picture ID</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-DDR TF</td>
<td>-Councilors</td>
<td>-Issue ration card</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Supply clerks</td>
<td>-Issue clothing/shoes</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-Stipend (if authorized)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Basic Education</td>
<td>Education administrator</td>
<td>-Local teachers</td>
<td>-Education facility</td>
<td>-Assign billets</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-NGOs</td>
<td>-Time available</td>
<td>-Child soldiers/some adults</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-USAID</td>
<td>-Establish links with teachers</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Life Skills Training</td>
<td>Education administrator</td>
<td>-NGOs</td>
<td>-Vocational facility</td>
<td>Two-hour class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-USAID</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vocational Training</td>
<td>Education administrator</td>
<td>-Local business leaders</td>
<td>-Vocational facility</td>
<td>-Time available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Local farmers</td>
<td>-Garden plot</td>
<td>-Local business leaders interview for jobs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-NGOs</td>
<td>-Livestock area</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time-table</td>
<td>Task</td>
<td>Responsibility</td>
<td>Stakeholders</td>
<td>Needed Resources</td>
<td>Remarks</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transi-</td>
<td>Judge advocate administrator</td>
<td>UN, NGOs</td>
<td>Multiple-use facility</td>
<td>-Transportation of witnesses -Determination of forgiveness -Acceptance of reintegration to home community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>tional Justice Trials</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sports Activities</td>
<td>Training administrator</td>
<td>Local community volunteers</td>
<td>Sports fields: soccer/volleyball</td>
<td>-Downtime activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Planned DTG</td>
<td>Graduation Ceremony</td>
<td>-Cantonment chief -Staff officers</td>
<td>-HN, UN, NGOs, Local community volunteers</td>
<td>Main sports field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Distribute certificates of reintegration completion and vocational training -Guest speakers -Band -Issue take-home package -Transportation to home community</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex B: Idealized DDR Cantonment

1. Weapons Storage Facility
2. Weapons Turn-in point for weapons earmarked for destruction
3. Improvising Facility
4. Barracks for single females (30)
5. Barracks for single males (30)
6. Barracks for families (192), segregated by whole, single parents, adolescents, and pregnant females
7. Barracks for male child soldiers (20)
8. Medical/Dental facilities
9. Schools
10. Vocational and life skill training facilities
11. Workshops
12. Shower and Bath Units
13. Dining Facility
14. Dining Facility Storage
15. Multifunctional facility
16. Ceremony Ground/sports field
17. Pedestrian gate
18. Service Road
19. Canopy Access Gate
20. Cargo Unloading Area
21. Generator
22. Children’s Athletic field
23. Cantonment Garden

Occupied to meet initial 2000
20 males, (re-locatable barracks)

Expansion Capabilities
54 by 50 foot re-locatable
33 by 33 foot re-locatable
15 by 15 foot re-locatable
11 by 60 containerized wash and bath unit