ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN PEACE AND WAR:
How Soldiers and Military Institutions Adapt

Edited by
William G. Braun, III
Stéfanie von Hlatky
Kim Richard Nossal

2016
Engagement Between Peace and War:
How Military Institutions Adapt
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The Kingston Conference on International Security Series
Centre for International and Defence Policy, Queen’s University
Kingston, Ontario
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College
Carlisle, Pennsylvania
# Table of Contents

Introduction

*William G. Braun III, Stéfanie von Hlatky, Kim Richard Nossal*

1 Civilian-Military Collaboration in Afghanistan: Looking Beyond Interdepartmental Turf Wars

*Caroline Leprince*

2 Interagency Cooperation in Afghanistan: The German Case

*Friedrich Schroeder*

3 Critical Skills for Soldier Leader Development

*Anna L. Sackett, Angela I. Karrasch, William S. Weyhrauch, and Ellen F. Goldman*

4 Institutional Leadership 2030: A Road to Institutional Excellence

*Bill Bentley*

5 Integrating the Soul from War to Peace: Required Capabilities for Just War, Moral Injury, and the U.S. Army Operating Concept

*Chaplain (Col.) Jonathan E. Shaw*

Envoi
Contributors

Bill Bentley is a senior staff officer, Professional Concepts and Leader Development, Military Personnel Generation, Department of National Defence, Ottawa

William G. Braun III is professor of practice, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College

Ellen F. Goldman is an associate professor of Human and Organizational Learning, Graduate School of Education and Human Development, Georgetown University and associate professor of Clinical Research and Leadership in the School of Medicine and Health Sciences.

Stéfanie von Hlatky is the director of the Centre for International and Defence Policy, Queen’s University

Angela I. Karrasch is a chief (GS15) for the U.S. Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social Sciences

Caroline Leprince is a senior policy analyst at Public Safety Canada and an associate fellow with the Raoul-Dandurand Chair of Strategic and Diplomatic Studies, Université du Québec à Montréal

Kim Richard Nossal is a professor in the Centre for International and Defence Policy, Queen’s University

Anna L. Sackett is a senior consultant for MDA Leadership Consulting, Minneapolis, MN

Chaplain (Col.) Jonathan E. Shaw is currently assigned as director of operations, U.S. Army Chaplain Corps, Pentagon

Friedrich Schroeder is a career diplomat and head of Reconstruction and Development for Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran at the German Federal Foreign Office (GFFO)

William S. Weyrauch is a postdoctoral research fellow at the U.S. Army Research Institute, Fort Leavenworth Field Unit
Introduction

William G. Braun III, Stéfanie von Hlatky, Kim Richard Nossal

Each year, partners from academia and the military join efforts to organize the Kingston Conference on International Security (KCIS). This conference is meant to inform debate and advance knowledge in the field of security and defence by identifying priorities in military affairs and convening world-class experts to engage with a series of common questions. The partners, the Centre for International and Defence Policy at Queen’s University, the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute, the Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Centre and the NATO Defense College, work together to develop a multifaceted program for what has become one of the leading international security conferences in North America.

The 2016 iteration of KCIS featured academic papers, many of which appear in this volume, but also presentations by high-ranking officials such as the former Canadian Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, Lieutenant-General Thibault and General Sir Richard Barrons, the UK’s former chief of Joint Forces Command. The conference theme was emblematic of how Western armed forces are witnessing higher levels of conflict, without seeing an uptick in the prevalence or intensity of interstate tensions. Aptly titled Engagement between Peace and War: How Soldiers and Military Institutions Adapt, the conference grappled with the complexity of that security environment, with special attention paid to how members of the armed forces should prepare for this uncertainty.

At the same time, the focus of KCIS is not exclusively on the military.
Each year, the conference provides in-depth analysis on defence policy priorities with a particular strategy in mind: advancing knowledge by tapping into research and expertise from academia, government, the armed forces, the private sector, and NGOs. Through multi-stakeholder collaboration, KCIS can cast an innovative lens on hybrid conflict and the vexing space that both state and non-state adversaries are exploiting. Here, we are referring to actors who are provoking the status quo using a wide range of tactics, from conventional to unconventional, from coercive to subversive activity.

Hybrid war is not a new form of warfare but a destructive combination of often-deniable tactics to achieve decisive political outcomes, such as the annexation of a territory, the creation of a caliphate, or the overthrow of a government.\(^1\) What is new is how information technology and social media are being used in coordinated disinformation campaigns by both states and non-state actors.\(^2\)

In the NATO context, for example, Russia’s objective has been to undermine NATO without provoking outright military retaliation. During the Cold War, the confrontation was characterized by mutually assured destruction. Now, it seems to be death by a thousand cuts. NATO leaders gathered in Poland in July of 2016, shortly after the KCIS conference, for the Warsaw Summit. During this Summit, they announced the deterrence and assurance measures, now known as Enhanced Forward Presence, intended to boost the collective defences of the alliance and to guard against both conventional and “hybrid” provocations.\(^3\)

As always, the threat perceptions and capabilities of twenty-eight different member states must be reconciled in the process.\(^4\) This is why

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our authors engage with interagency coordination and multinational cooperation as variables that can both impair and enhance governments’ abilities to respond nimbly to international challenges.

Coordination with partner countries and the European Union will also be ramped up. The EU has acknowledged as much in its Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats. Within this conflict space, the psychological component is as important, if not more important, than the physical component. The most challenging adversaries of today are provoking Western democracies by exploiting the vulnerabilities which are inherent to their political order. The hard part is knowing how to calibrate the response, as states aim to improve security and defense, in a way that does not compromise these collectively held norms and values. Engagement between peace and war means responding to these threats short of war, soliciting all sectors of society and building greater societal resilience as key elements of success.

To think through this increasingly complex conflict space, it is intriguing to learn about the diversity of assessment and response tools used by different organizations. Best practices in the realm of strategic communications, training and education, the protection of critical infrastructure or enhanced cooperation with partners and organizations, can certainly inform both national and international responses.

The importance of military education and training to promote the adaptability of our soldiers and military institutions should also be emphasized. In the grey zone of conflict, we need to create learning environments, described in the U.S. National Military Strategy as “building creative adaptive professionals who are skilled at leading organizational change while operating in environments of great complexity and uncertainty.” The authors included in this volume provide some answers to this challenge. They have concentrated on a number of thematic questions. How do we prepare our armed forces to achieve policy objectives in the ambiguous space between peace and war? What cultural awareness and human interactive skills would enhance the military’s ability to conduct operations at the lower end of the spectrum of con-

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lict? What are the defence policy, training, and doctrinal implications? The authors not only examine how military organizations and their partners adapt to rapidly changing conflict dynamics, but also how they play a part in managing the peace. In this environment, land forces continue to perform a highly-relevant role through engagement in the space between peace and war.

The two-day, six-panel conference that generated the papers in this volume was designed to address the adaptation of both soldiers and institutions. The first day set the stage, with two panels describing the security environment. The first panel provided a civilian perspective on security within the space between war and peace. It featured speakers representing interagency partners, international business, homeland defence, and economic perspectives. The second panel provided a military view of the same environment and the themes that were common between the two panels were particularly intriguing. Central among them was the inability of either group to exactly define the boundaries of this environment, but there was a clear appreciation and overlap in their descriptions of the central characteristics of it. The final panel of the first day focused on the individual soldier level of adaptation. This panel was predominantly an academic panel, drawing on research conducted in the United States and Canada that examined the individual knowledge, skills, and competencies required to understand this grey zone between war and peace, in addition to the leadership and cultural characteristics necessary to facilitate their development. The panel concluded with a topic often overlooked, or avoided, when discussing soldier adaptation: the moral, spiritual, and religious identity aspects of soldier resilience.

The second day of panels concentrated on institutional adaptation. The first panel made the transition from considering the perspective of the individual soldier to considering institutional perspectives. Three distinguished leaders presented the Army’s professional military education response to the need to develop adaptive soldiers and military leaders. The speakers included the Commander of the Canadian Defence Academy, the Commandant of the U.S. Army War College, and a noted researcher from the NATO Defense College. In addition to providing different international perspectives, each of these speakers tackled a different theme of soldier development: soldier training and education, senior leader development and strategic thinking, and adaptive education-training-exercises pedagogy respectively.

This transition panel was followed by an institutional adaptation
Introduction

The institutional adaptation panel provided several perspectives on how militaries have adapted to new and emerging missions that require interagency cooperation from the tactical to the national level. It ended with a provocative presentation on how militaries may need to re-examine how they think about campaigning in the security space between peace and war, and how campaign doctrine and design may need to be retooled to be more effective in this environment. The panel also touched on the difficulty of justifying military resources to effectively engage in this traditionally “non-military” environment, short of war.

The final panel provided a useful summary of the panels that went before, and offered a cogent insight into the policy implications of the various themes and analyses that had been presented over the two days of the conference. The two events, a fireside chat offering both a US and a Canadian policy perspective on grey zone competition, and a provocative keynote by General Sir Richard Barrons, Joint Forces Command, British Army, rounded out the higher level international and policy perspectives offered at the conference. The papers published in this volume capture the essence of the conference design, and demonstrate the level of intellectual rigor and analysis that went into the briefer remarks made in the conference presentations.

Five of the presentations from KCIS 2016 are reproduced here, reflecting the key theme of the conference: how institutions adapt to meet the challenges of hybrid warfare and develop soldiers’ competencies through education and adaptation.

We begin with two national perspectives from the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. Caroline Leprince examines the Canadian effort to implement a “whole-of-government,” or “comprehensive,” approach in Kandahar during Canada’s five-year deployment in southern Afghanistan from 2006 to 2011. Leprince argues that whole-of-government approaches that seek to create interagency structures and processes at the senior level are crucial for success in interventions in failed states, Canada’s Afghanistan mission. But she also argues that more attention should be paid to the issue of leadership, since leaders in the field can make a profound difference to how whole-of-government initiatives are actually implemented. She also suggests that governments need to remove the many structural barriers that place obstacles in the way of smooth interagency collaboration. Finally, Leprince is keenly aware that one of the difficulties of implementing a whole-of-government approach is that different agencies have very different cultures. Leprince
argues that there is a need for greater cultural awareness among the agencies that are expected to collaborate in the field.

Friedrich Schroeder offers a comparative perspective, from the German experience in Afghanistan. While Canada was in the south, Germany led PRTs in the northern provinces of Kunduz and Faizabad. Like the Canadians, the German stabilization efforts centred on a comprehensive—or whole-of-government—effort that involved the military, the foreign ministry, and Germany’s aid agency. Schroeder’s analysis of the implementation of the comprehensive approach focuses on two separate environments: the bureaucratic interagency environment at “home” in the capital, Berlin, and the environment in the field in Afghanistan. Like Leprince, Schroeder argues that much of the success of whole-of-government operations lie in the cultures of the very different organizations tasked with cooperating in the field. In Schroeder’s words, the comprehensive approach must start in the minds of the various participants.

Both Leprince and Schroeder focus on the importance of leadership in the field. Anna L. Sackett, Angela I. Karrasch, William S. Weyhrauch, and Ellen F. Goldman focus on the challenges of development leadership skills for the complex environment found in the space between war and peace. They argue that the key to leadership development is strategic thinking, which stresses continuous learning and adaptation to messy and unpredictable environments. Their chapter reports on research their team conducted to develop core competencies in strategic thinking and KSAs—knowledge, skills, and abilities.

Their findings suggested a number of recommendations. Sackett et al., like Leprince and Schroeder, identify organizational culture as a crucial element, since the individual cognitive process of strategic thinking occurs in an organizational context. Without an organizational culture that supports strategic thinking, they argue, it will be difficult to achieve those strategic goals. To create that support, Sackett and her colleagues propose providing opportunities to give soldiers the time to develop their strategic thinking skills and the means to develop those skills through skill-building exercises.

Bill Bentley then looks at the issue of institutional leadership in the future. Taking the report, Institutional Leadership 2030 (IL 2030), and the Canadian Armed Forces as his point of departure, he identifies not only the key challenges that armed forces will be confronting in the future, but sets out some ideas for the creation of a culture of institutional excellence, specifically focusing on the CAF. In his view, the development
of a culture of professionalization in the armed forces of the future depends partly on developing professional competencies, partly on synchronizing professional development, career planning, and personnel appraisal, and partly on integrating these strands in a leader development model.

Operating in complex conflict environments always involves the human dimension. Along with organizational culture and leadership development, attention needs to be paid to the soldier as a human being. Chaplain (Col.) Jonathan E. Shaw concludes the collection with a thought-provoking call for the integration of the spiritual in efforts to meet the challenges of hybrid war. Integrating the soul or the spirit—that component of the human being which is the locus of moral, spiritual, and religious identity, faith, and action, the animating force for the body and mind—is critical. As Shaw notes, we need to ensure that among the strategic requirements set out for managing the complexities from war to peace, we must always account for the moral, spiritual, and religious empowerment of soldiers. Shaw’s chapter explores the implications of moral injury and how one armed force—the U.S. Army—seeks to develop resilient and adaptive soldiers in a conflict environment that is ever-changing. It stresses the importance of the moral and the spiritual in this quest for resilience and adaptiveness.
Recent experiences in war-torn countries have put the spotlight on fragile states. The desire to achieve enduring outcomes in these complex grey zone environments has led to the implementation of national integrated approaches to post-conflict operations. These whole-of-government approaches were developed to rebuild fragile states and address security, stability, good governance, and development needs simultaneously. By bringing together the expertise of government departments and agencies best suited to address the crisis, these whole-of-government approaches hold the promise to accomplish greater interoperability in the host country and to overcome the grievances encountered in fragile states.

However this may be easier said than done. While a whole-of-government approach prompts collaboration, it cannot be assumed that integration will naturally take place amongst interdepartmental partners. Given the inherent contradictions in the mandates, interests, and fundamental values of the various bureaucratic partners, the likelihood of institutional resistance is to be expected. Cultural differences between civilian and military organizations are often listed as a reason why collaboration is difficult to achieve, however little attention has been given to date to the underlying causes of these tensions. This study therefore
questions whether cultural differences had a tangible impact on inter-agency collaboration. The hypothesis defended in this chapter argues that the greater the contradictions between the agencies and departments, the more it will limit possibilities for collaboration.

The case study selected for this research is based on Canada’s implementation of a whole-of-government approach at the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Kandahar, Afghanistan. In 2005 the Canadian International Policy Statement introduced its “3-D” approach—involving defence, diplomacy, and development—and presented it as the best way to make a difference in post-conflict situations.1 Canada’s involvement in the PRT is particularly interesting to study, as it combined the resources and expertise of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Correctional Service of Canada (CSC), and CIVPOL, a civilian police contingent of officers from various municipal and provincial police forces coordinated by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). Canada’s involvement with the PRT was a central element of the Canadian mission in Afghanistan in line with the intervention strategy newly adopted by the Canadian government.

To examine the cultural sensibilities of the departments and agencies involved at the Canadian-led PRT, this study uses the analytical framework of organizational culture developed by Edgar H. Schein. The first part of this chapter focuses on establishing a set of criteria to analyze the differences and similarities among the organizational cultures of the main contributing agencies that participated in the whole-of-government approach at the PRT. The second part of the chapter makes broad observations on the dynamics of the interactions that occurred between the interdepartmental partners at the PRT and highlights the sub-groups that naturally formed at the PRT, based mostly upon cultural affinities. The findings of this research can help military organizations adapt their doctrines and tailor their training to develop soldiers’ interactive skills and cultural awareness to working in interdepartmental settings.

Theory of Organizational Culture

Within the literature, the concept of organizational culture refers to an organization’s raison d’être, from which it derives the purpose and objectives it will pursue within its external environment. An organizational culture not only informs an organization’s way of approaching tasks in the pursuit of its mission, it is also reflected in the fundamental values, symbols and collective practices shared amongst the members of said organization. Schein, the leading theorist, defines organizational culture as:

the pattern of basic assumptions that a given group has invented, discovered, or developed in learning to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, and that have worked well enough to be considered as valid, and therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.2

Therefore, the rules and patterns of behaviour that are prescribed by the organizational culture are learned and internalized by the individuals who comprise the organization through acculturation processes. The organizational values and assumptions shape the fundamental worldviews of its members, and in return, influence the way a person perceives, makes decisions, and behaves daily in his environment. This learning process will shape the long-lasting cognitive and emotional responses of the members of the organization. In consequence, “the longer we live in a given culture, and the older the culture is, the more it will influence our perceptions, thoughts, and feelings.”3 When faced with unfamiliar circumstances, the reactions and adaptation mechanisms of an individual will be guided by the values and personal experiences instilled by the organizational culture.

Schein identified three levels of cultures, wherein each level describes the degree to which a cultural phenomenon is visible to an observer. The iceberg is often used as a metaphor to describe the levels of culture. At the surface, the most overt aspects of culture are the artifacts. Dress, language, logos, and rituals are all examples of artifacts. The next level of culture reflects an individual’s beliefs and values that

3. Ibid., 12.
are publicly espoused as well as those in use. Although beliefs and values are less visible, they can still be talked about. The deepest level of culture describes the underlying assumptions that guide organizational behaviour. These assumptions are often held subconsciously and are rarely questioned in everyday life. If a basic assumption becomes challenged within a group, members will find any behaviour based on other assumptions simply inconceivable.

The inherent challenge with the wide range of departments and agencies involved in the whole-of-government approach is that each operates within its own cultural understanding of a situation and its own standard intervention practices. Studies on civil-military cooperation have revealed that the lack of familiarity between different communities may encourage mistrust and the promulgation of negative stereotypes between communities.\(^4\) It is therefore important to better understand how fundamental differences in organizational cultures can affect possibilities for collaboration when implementing this approach.

**Comparing Organizational Cultures**

In order to gain a better understanding of the interagency dynamics among the agencies and departments at the PRT in Kandahar, interviews were conducted with Canadian representatives that participated in Canada’s joint effort. Based on the information obtained in these interviews, the qualitative data were broken down to inductively generate broad themes to compare cultural differences among agencies and departments in Afghanistan. Six themes of comparison were retained: public documents; time appreciation; perception of failure; role in a war zone; importance of authority; styles of leadership and decision making.

Establishing these criteria helped identify the visible artifacts that distinguish the civilian and military cultures and facilitate the understanding of the values that lay behind these differences. This enabled

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the highlighting of the underlying principles that are often at the origin of the tensions observed among the different partners involved in a whole-of-government approach (e.g., defence, foreign affairs, development, police, and correctional service.)

Public documents

From an organizational standpoint, public documents reveal a lot of information about the espoused values of an organizational culture. The 2005 *International Policy Statement* (IPS) requested that each component of the diplomacy, defence, and development team provide a detailed document that would stand on its own as a complete statement of the government’s policy in each field. Each document offers an opportunity to analyze the mandate of each agency and department based on their cultural references, and to better understand the values and underlying principles that guided their actions during the Canadian intervention in Afghanistan.

From the standpoint of diplomacy, foreign policy is to be supported by development and defence assets. The strategy detailed for fragile or failed states focus primarily on conflict prevention, through the implementation of development programs on strengthening human rights and human security, and the use of diplomacy to promote conflict resolution and ensure a democratic transition.\(^5\) This is aligned with Foreign Affairs’s traditional mandate to be the leading department that represents Canada’s interests overseas. Therefore, this conception is consistent with the cultural patterns that guide the conduct of the Department of Foreign Affairs abroad.

For Defence, its conception is in line with the principles of counter-insurgency doctrine, which states that in order to address the root causes of grievances in a conflict, Armed Forces cannot win with military means alone and must integrate the expertise of multiple departments and agencies.\(^6\) In the discourse of the Armed Forces, civilians were seen as “force multipliers” and a necessary asset to solve the root causes of the insurgency. The military was meant to be an enabler by providing a secure environment for the partners in a whole-of-government situation to operate. However, the Defence statement also clearly

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Caroline Leprince

states that forces must be ready to operate in a three-block war context. The Armed Forces are thus required to be ready to operate in a variety of contexts involving combat and counter-insurgency operations, but also complex stabilization and reconstruction missions. When the security situation became too dangerous, the CAF engaged in a number of activities that does not traditionally fall under its mandate and engaged “in capacity building in all areas including humanitarian aid, reconstruction and development and governance efforts, when required.”

In the Development section of the IPS, the whole-of-government approach is only mentioned briefly, but without making any references to other departments. When CIDA uses the expression in the IPS, it does so by highlighting the importance to strengthen coherence for aid effectiveness and to follow the guiding principles of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) for allocating official development assistance (ODA). CIDA’s development programs follow the five aid effectiveness principles of the Declaration of Paris (2005): ownership, alignment, harmonization, managing for results, and mutual accountability.

This clearly demonstrates that the whole-of-government approach was understood differently by the main contributing partners of the 3-D (diplomacy, defence, and development) team. Each partner had a unique understanding that was based on the conceptions attributed to the whole-of-government approach in their specific field.

Time appreciation

The military and civilians operated under profoundly different timeframes. Military culture is clearly oriented towards achieving short-term goals. The CAF had a rapid battle rhythm; their definition of success and their timeframes were far more compressed. The Armed Forces always wanted to demonstrate that progress was being made in their area of operations. They felt a lot of pressure to deliver results to their headquarters and since they were on a six-month rotation, they went in with a mindset to “get it done.” The underlying principles hid-

7. Ibid, 8.
ing behind the conduct of the military is likely based on competition. Each battlegroup arriving in Afghanistan wanted to out-do the previous one. This competitiveness ultimately had adverse effects as there was often a lack of coherence among the strategic plans of the different rotations. The police and correctional services officers also felt the same sense of urgency. As the nature of their work is operational as well, they were eager to get results and obtain visible impacts quickly.

By comparison, development and governance stabilization officers did not feel the same pressure to perform under short timeframes. Their objectives to strengthen the Afghan government’s institutional capacity were part of a long-term vision. The milestones for the development projects spanned several years; their results would thus only be visible in the years, if not decades, to come. As a CIDA manager deployed in early 2008 put it, “I was at the front end of a three-year civilian surge. My view was, if it succeeded by March 2011, when our mandate was about to end, that was good enough. I did not have to do a ‘tick’ in the box by the time I left.”10 Civilians were comfortable starting a project and seeing their successor carry it on. In fact, their main concern was to implement sustainable initiatives for which local communities would take ownership once they were built.

The fact that the pace to deliver basic services to the population differed greatly between a counter-insurgency and development approach led to frictions in civilian and military relations. A core principle of counter-insurgency operations is to separate the population from the insurgents. In order to win the hearts and minds of the population, the military efforts focused almost immediately on the delivery of basic services to the population following the clear and hold phases. This was to demonstrate to the population the value of linking with their government, rather than to the insurgency. However, from the development perspective, strengthening the Afghan government’s institutional capacity to deliver core services takes time if the initiatives are to be sustainable. The consultative process is laborious, as it requires local stakeholders to make commitments, but is crucial to achieving the required effect. Before deciding to build a school, the civilian stabilization officer would coordinate with the ministry of education to ensure the construction plan agreed with the national education strategy and that sufficient resources would be allocated afterwards to maintain it. Consideration was also given to the recruitment and training of teachers,

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10. Telephone interview with CIDA manager, 12 December 2011.
allocating sufficient budget for salaries, and other education expenditures in classrooms. Counter-insurgency operations and development efforts have very different paces and expectations in the delivery of services. These profound differences in the underlying principles between military and civilian cultures led to important frustrations and misunderstandings in theatre.

**Perception of failure**

Because CIDA focused on capacity building, they attached greater importance to processes rather than results. For development workers, making mistakes was considered to be part of the learning process in developing new skills. Each failure was seen as an occasion for positive reinforcement. The rationale of development workers was that local authorities would not make the same mistake twice. Development workers therefore have greater resilience to what would be perceived by other cultures as failure.

In contrast, the military culture attaches great importance to the success of an operation, to the point where failure is judged very negatively. As the Canadian chief of the defence staff (CDS) asserted in a speech in 2016: “Winning is in our DNA.” Deciding not to take action is counter-intuitive for the Armed Forces; they are naturally inclined to “solve” problems themselves. The underlying principle behind this behaviour is likely related to the CAF training in which defeat is subconsciously associated with loss of life. Failure, from this perspective, is not an acceptable option.

**Adaptation to a war zone**

Civilian partners had fundamentally different conceptions of their roles in a war zone. A soldier with the CAF is trained from the outset to go to war. Soldiers learn to defend themselves against an enemy. In their training, they develop a sixth sense for danger. During patrols, they observe the pattern of life of the local nationals and learn to tell when a situation is getting dangerous. For civilians, by contrast, danger was a much less tangible concept. This is partly because civilians are simply not trained this way. In fact, the Canadian civilian advisers who were

deployed to Kandahar only received a few days of training before arriving in a hostile environment.

Police and correctional service officers found it much easier to adapt to a counter-insurgency environment. In their daily work they are regularly exposed to risks. As a correctional service officer noted, “For us, going to Kandahar meant to transfer our risk management principles that we apply in Canada to a war zone.” Police and correctional officers are aware that getting injured or even losing their life may occur while performing their duties. Danger and fear are an integral part of their job. Police and correctional service officers also shared a strong sense of camaraderie, similar to the one found in the military culture.

Importance of authority

As expected, authority plays a prominent role in military culture. However, the importance attached to hierarchy differed greatly between the civilian organizations involved at the PRT. First, the police and correctional service officers both work within hierarchical structures. They have ranks, follow orders, and abide by a code of conduct. In the public service, the Foreign Affairs department is considered to be the most hierarchical organization outside the security sector. In comparison, the culture of CIDA is more decentralized and horizontal.

Trades with strong cultures of authority tended to adopt very formal behaviours in their professional relationships. In their communications, soldiers were direct and to the point. They used formalities and marks of respect which had the effect of creating distance between people. In contrast, public servants adopted a more informal tone. Civilian managers sought to establish a sense of proximity with their employees and know them personally. More importance was given to personality and experience in a horizontal culture and titles and diplomas were often overlooked. Civilians were not accustomed to the direct behaviours of soldiers at first; they found them rude. It was observed, however, that after a long period of exposure to the military, civilians tended to modify their behaviour and adopt more aspects of military culture. This was perceived unconsciously as a way to improve their performance in their environment.

Styles of leadership and decision making

The behaviours of the leaders of an organization are highly indicative of what gets rewarded in a specific culture. For this reason, analyzing the different styles of leadership, and the methods by which the whole-of-government leaders made their decisions, gave an insightful view of each organization’s specificities.

Effective decision making is a critical skill to have in the military culture. Armed Forces commanders are expected to make decisions in high risk environments where lives could be at stake. Good military leaders will be evaluated on their capacity to make decisions in a short period of time. During offensive operations against insurgents in Kandahar, decisions had to be made in a matter of minutes; whereas during a diplomatic crisis, diplomats are expected to have good negotiating abilities. Good diplomatic skills are required to facilitate the search for acceptable compromises and be able to reach a negotiated consensus among internal stakeholders of a conflict. These decision-making processes are certainly more inclusive, but they are also very laborious and time-consuming.

With regards to styles of leadership, good military commanders will be evaluated on their capacity to command and give clear directions. The CAF trains its leaders to develop authoritarian and directive styles of leadership which is well-suited to the institution’s operational needs.14 Meanwhile executives in the public service are generally appreciated for being charismatic leaders with strong interpersonal skills. They will exert a more nuanced style of leadership and will try to reach consensus amongst their peers. The decision making and leadership styles of the military and civilians could not be more opposed. Since these skillsets are not complementary, they created profound misunderstandings among senior leaders of the whole-of-government approach.

An important contribution of this model is that it makes visible the fact that each cultural group—CIDA, CAF, DFAIT, CIVPOL and CSC—has a unique organizational culture based on artifacts, values, beliefs, and underlying hypothesis. Table 1.1 summarizes the main differences that were found in the civilian and military cultures based on the six criteria established to compare the main contributors to the Canadian whole-of-government approach.

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Comparing Affinities Between Cultures

The analysis of the dynamics of interactions that occurred between the interdepartmental partners at the PRT revealed that the groups were formed on the basis of organizational affinities. The results of these findings show how the agencies and departments involved at the PRT had an intuitive tendency to gather in three sub-groups: the military, the uniform services, and the civilians. The interdepartmental dynamics of interactions are depicted in the schematic model below (Figure 1.1). An important contribution of this model is that it makes visible the fact that each organizational culture predisposes its members to develop certain affinities with similar cultural groups.

The permeability of the cultures among the three sub-groups at the Kandahar PRT differed greatly. Put simply, this means that the members of a group had the capacity to distinguish those who are part of their wider in-group community and those who are excluded. In Figure 1.1, Table 1.1 summarizes the comparative analysis between organizational cultures of departments and agencies.

### Table 1.1 Summary Table of Comparative Analysis Between Organizational Cultures of Departments and Agencies

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criterion</th>
<th>Military Culture</th>
<th>Civilian Culture</th>
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<tr>
<td>Public documents</td>
<td>Counter-insurgency principles</td>
<td>Support foreign policy</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Three-block war</td>
<td>Aid effectiveness</td>
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<td>Time appreciation</td>
<td>Short-term objectives</td>
<td>Mid–long-term objectives</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Immediate results</td>
<td>Long-term results</td>
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<td>Perception of failure</td>
<td>Defeat</td>
<td>Learning process</td>
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<td>Role in war zone</td>
<td>Hostile environments</td>
<td>Embassy</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Accustomed to managing risks</td>
<td>Danger not a tangible concept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance attached to authority</td>
<td>Hierarchical structures</td>
<td>More horizontal structures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ranks</td>
<td>No visible signs of authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Order and discipline</td>
<td>Less formal interactions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Styles of leadership and decision making</td>
<td>Command capability Authoritarian leadership</td>
<td>Negotiate a consensus Strong interpersonal skills</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1.1, a thicker line is used to represent a strong impermeable culture; whereas a dotted line means that the culture is more permeable and likely to encourage external interactions. The military is clearly depicted as having a strong and impermeable culture; hence the interest to clearly distinguish them from the “uniform services” category. This should not be interpreted as a negative aspect of the culture, but rather it indicates a strong sense of belonging to the military culture. The uniform services on the other hand all worked in a security environment and shared a paramilitary culture. Nevertheless, the cultures of CIVPOL and CSC were considered to be more permeable and were able to act as a bridge between civilian and military cultures. The civilian culture was perceived as less resistant to external incursions. Civilians in fact had a strong desire to encourage interpenetration between their culture and the military.

It must be noted that the permeability of cultures did not prohibit interactions between the three sub-groups observed at the PRT. Individuals from different governmental organizations that worked together would often have lunch together. But it was observed nonetheless, especially at the beginning of a deployment, that individuals had a nat-
ural tendency to form under these three sub-groups.\textsuperscript{15}

In the Canadian Armed Forces, anyone who is not wearing the military uniform is seen as not being part of the in-group. The sense of identity among military personnel is very strong. When living on a base, military members are constantly immersed in their culture (lodging, support systems, social activities). No possible comparison can be made with public servants. In terms of interactions, soldiers had a tendency to interact together; they felt self-sustainable.

Similarly the “uniform services” shared paramilitary values in common due to the dangerous nature of their work: following orders, carrying guns, exerting discipline. They also shared a culture of action and they are focused on obtaining quick results. It was found that uniform services would reach out more to soldiers and it was easy for them to foster good relationships with military personnel.

Civilians deployed in a war zone obviously had a tendency to bond based on the fact that they were not wearing uniforms. Beyond this visible artifact, DFAIT and CIDA also had more cultural affinities in common than with the other sub-groups composed of soldiers and uniform services. Both political and development advisers had similar skill sets that focused on developing programs to strengthen governance structures and help the delivery of core services to the population. Unlike other whole-of-government partners’ engagements that were more action-oriented, most of the civilian advisers’ work required planning for sustainable initiatives and engaging with political leaders to consolidate Afghan institutions for the years to come. Civilians were the sub-group that felt the most pressing desire to encourage exchanges with the other sub-groups.

These results are likely attributable to the fact that the mission occurred in a highly militarized environment, in which the military culture was pre-eminent. Because the soldiers operated in a war zone on which their organizational worldviews are based, the soldiers were unable to notice the strength of their acculturation. Many whole-of-gov-

\textsuperscript{15}. During a pre-deployment exercise, Maple Guardian, behavioural observations taken early in the exercise revealed little if any civilian-military interactions. Neither the military or the civilians were seen to make an effort to integrate during the first week. After that, however, personal interactions with the military outside of regular duties on the exercise increased in frequency. See Katherine Banko, Caroline Leprince and Peter Gizewski, “Training for a Whole-of-Government Approach to Complex Civil-Military Operations: The Case of Exercise Maple Guardian 2010,” (Ottawa: Defence Research and Development Canada 2011), 8.
ernment partners criticized the Armed Forces’ tendency to impose their terminologies and models on others. DFAIT and CIDA constantly had to justify themselves when the way they were approaching their tasks were contrary to the military culture. Overall, the rationales that did not fit the military culture were considered illogical and incomprehensible by the dominant culture, and the cultural specificities of DFAIT and CIDA tended to be ignored.

By closely analyzing the six themes of comparison, it is possible to conclude that the civilian and military cultures were in opposition on almost all criteria: in their appreciation of time (short-term objectives vs. mid- to long-term), their perception of failure (defeat vs. learning process), the importance attached to authority (hierarchical structure vs. horizontal structure), and in their styles of leadership (command capability and authoritarian leadership vs. consensus and interpersonal skills). The important differences that existed in the civilian and military cultures were the source of friction and became at times an obstacle to collaboration.

Therefore, it is not surprising that the study revealed no affinities between the 3-D partners. This proves the hypothesis that when contradictions are great between organizational cultures, as demonstrated between the diplomacy, defence, and development partners, it is more difficult for them to collaborate since they share fewer cultural affinities. When asked if real collaboration actually took place at the PRT, a great majority of the partners interviewed answered positively. That being said, they all found it worth mentioning that this collaboration was possible due to the will and determination of the individuals at the PRT.

This demonstrates that the approach has failed to provide sufficient guidelines to enable a joint interdepartmental effort at the PRT. Relying solely on individuals’ good will to ensure collaboration is not going to work when competing interests, power, and politics come into play. Hence the important role that must be played by the government to guarantee that adequate structures are in place to facilitate exchanges and collaboration between the whole-of-government partners.
Conclusion

As future conflicts are likely to occur within weak and fragile states, Canada must be ready to operate in complex environments. To ensure the success of future interventions, the appropriate interagency structures and processes must be developed at a senior level within the government that specify how coordination and collaboration must occur when deploying foreign policy instruments. The hard-won lessons learned in Afghanistan can help better prepare Canada for the challenges of the twenty-first century. Critical lessons on the whole-of-government approach stemming from the Afghanistan experience should be focusing on three pillars: leadership, structural changes, and cultural awareness.

The leadership component is key in a whole-of-government setting as interoperability between organizations is based on trust built between people. It is therefore important to nurture relationships as it was demonstrated again and again that good people can overcome bad systems. The selection of personnel in leadership positions is key. Personalities play an important role in encouraging a positive attitude towards the whole-of-government engagement. Leaders are not only expected to establish relationships with other partners, they are also responsible to create an environment that fosters collaboration. Senior leaders must send a strong message to all the members at all the levels of their organizations on the importance of working together. It is also important to highlight the shared commitments pursued by all whole-of-government contributors as it helps bring a sense of community.

When good leadership is in place, efforts should be dedicated to initiate structural changes and remove obstacles to collaboration. Attention should be given to implement flexible mechanisms in order to facilitate interoperability. There is an evident need to adopt integrated planning mechanisms. The report of the Expert Panel on Integrated Business and Human Resources Planning in the Federal Public Service is a reference on the topic and it argues that integrated planning must be simple in order to work. Simple arrangements can help a great deal in preparing whole-of-government partners for success. The first step consists of ensuring that at the beginning of the intervention, all stakeholders have a shared understanding of the goals of the mission. Then, an action plan

can be developed, in which each partner must identify the specific actions and milestones they aim to accomplish to support the goals of the intervention. Roles and responsibilities of each contributor must also be clarified to delineate the respective mandates and spheres of responsibility of each military and civilian organization. It is also important to establish a governance structure and decide how decisions will be taken at various stages of the mission before tensions arise.

The financial and decision-making authority must be decentralized to the field. An important impediment to collaboration for civilian departments in Afghanistan was that they had little authority to design and implement projects to allocate funds. Decentralizing decision-making authorities to the field ensures better results as personnel in the field have an acute understanding of the security environment in which activities are taking place. As well, delegating authority allows for a better sense of prioritization as it is easier to take into account the actual needs of the population. It also reduces the lack of coherence often found in heavy bureaucracies. Finally, when delegated authorities are in place, it allows those affected to adjust to changing requirements, which can be a particularly important consideration in conflict situations.

More opportunities should be offered to increase cultural awareness among departments and agencies’ specific cultures and mindsets, such as through joint training exercises, cultural training courses, secondments and staff exchanges. Encourage opportunities that provide a more in-depth understanding of other departments and agencies. In order to facilitate a positive adaptation from the organizations involved in a whole-of-government setting, a proper recognition of cultural differences among the organizations is essential and needs to be encouraged through socialization and training opportunities. Joint training exercises involving both military and civilian personnel prior to deployment proved to contribute to improving operational efficiency. The military exercise, Maple Guardian, became mandatory training in 2009 for civilians wanting to deploy to Afghanistan. Upon returning from their Afghan mission, many felt that the joint training had given them an invaluable opportunity to generate relationships with their counterparts, which in turn significantly enhanced coordination in theatre. As well, certain skills should be taught in cultural intelligence training to encourage the adoption of attitudes such as respect for each other’s expertise, and confidence that each will act in the best interests of those who seek help. Although these training opportunities may appear as a
distraction from core departmental activities, managers should support these activities as it will benefit the organization in the long term.

Although challenges will likely happen while implementing a whole-of-government approach, the recommendations discussed above, and the interagency training suggested, will increase the possibilities to achieve mission effectiveness. The payoffs yielded by an effective whole-of-government approach are worth the effort as it will help to improve Canada’s response in complex missions.
Interagency Cooperation in Afghanistan: The German Case

Friedrich Schroeder

When the German government initiated its efforts in Afghanistan civilian reconstruction at the Bonn Conference in December 2001, it had in mind rebuilding not just the country’s infrastructure, but also transforming it into a stable regional hub based on democratic principles. But how to go about it? Early on in its endeavour to give a civilian face to its contribution to Afghan nation building, the German government, and especially the Auswärtiges Amt (Federal Foreign Office, or FFO), focused on Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in order to integrate civilian personnel into a military setting. It thereby created the groundwork for what later on would constitute the basis of future stability operations.1

This chapter will focus on five issues. First, what was the German government’s general approach to civilian reconstruction in Afghanistan at the outset of its endeavours, and who were the relevant stakeholders? Second, what did the process of interagency cooperation look like in practice—both in the field at the PRTs and at home in Berlin? Third, the chapter will examine the new thinking in the post-International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) era, especially the relatively new stabilization approach. Fourth, it will shed light on the essential

lessons learned (again: both in the field and in the capital). Finally, it will ask what is next for Germany’s stabilization efforts—in Afghanistan and beyond.

**The German Approach to Civilian Reconstruction in Afghanistan**

German reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan always have been—and continue to be—a multi-agency endeavour requiring a “comprehensive approach.” In some other countries, this is called a whole-of-government approach, “joined-up government,” or the 3-D approach (for diplomacy, development, and defence). At the federal level, the FFO, the Ministry of Defence (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, BMVg), the Ministry of the Interior (Bundesministerium des Innern, BMI) and the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit, BMZ) were all involved from the outset, with the FFO taking a special role inasmuch as it provided the nucleus for the creation of the Afghanistan-Pakistan Task Force. For several years, this was the government body that was metaphorically in the driver’s seat to steer Germany’s Afghanistan policy.

On the implementation side, there was a multitude of players in the field. The Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) and the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) were (and still are) the decisive players on the ground. In addition, scores of German and international NGOs are active in Afghanistan. There are national and local actors, various military and civilian outfits, and countless partners on the Afghan side, most importantly, of course, the Afghan Government of National Unity as well as the provincial and district governments. Two key international actors are NATO and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), whose role has been to coordinate military and civilian efforts.

Indeed, the interaction of these institutions continues to be complicated. Coordination is never easy, but in a fragile environment such as Afghanistan, problems of coordination multiply. In this specific setting,

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2. In the German security community, the comprehensive approach (Vernetzte Sicherheit) first played a role in the federal government’s 2006 white paper: download Weißbuch 2006 from the BMVg website. For the original comprehensive approach in a NATO context, see http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf. For a debate within the German context, see Sabine Jaberg, *Vernetzte Sicherheit? Phänomenologische Rekonstruktion und kritische Reflexion eines Zentralbegriffs im Weißbuch 2006* (Hamburg: Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr. SOW kontrovers 5, 2009), 7.
Interagency cooperation is only possible if all sides act in unison. This is easier in the field than in the capital, however, as challenging living conditions tend to focus all involved on the problem instead of directing their energy towards bureaucratic competition.

**Interagency Cooperation at the PRTs and in Berlin**

The German PRTs created in 2003 (PRT Kunduz and PAT [Provincial Advisory Team] Taloquan/PRT Faizabad) were specifically set up with interagency cooperation in mind. They had a *Doppelspitze* (i.e., “double top”) governance structure from the outset: a military colonel and a civilian diplomat worked together to coordinate civil-military relations and fill the comprehensive approach with life. In bi-weekly Development and Stability Board meetings, they coordinated their actions with the various implementing organizations and, of course, with the Afghan government. In a process involving years of planning and preparation, PRTs were eventually transferred from military to civilian leadership in Feyzabad in 2011 and in Kunduz in 2012. They were then handed over to the Afghan partners a year later. In an example of successful cooperation, the FFO and the BMVg worked closely together to achieve this aim. However, PRTs mostly maintained a military dimension to the very end.

What is important when looking at the distribution of bureaucratic power in Berlin is the so-called *Ressortprinzip* (subsidiarity principle). It implies that the various ministries involved all regulate their own reconstruction efforts, with no ministry superceding the others. Until July 2015, the German government did indeed have an overarching coordination body, the Afghanistan-Pakistan Task Force at the FFO, headed by a special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP).³ Line ministries would meet on a monthly basis in the so-called *Ressortrunde* (working level meeting). The most important forum for German interagency decision making was—and continues to be—the *Staatssekretärsrunde*, the regular meeting of top senior officials.⁴ It is at this table in the Chancellor’s Office that longer-term strategic aims are formulated. It is also the major clearing house for differences of opinion between individual ministries.

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³. The position of the SRAP was merged with the office of one of the two FFO political directors in July 2015.
⁴. The *Staatssekretärsrunde* met monthly until early 2015, when it started meeting on a bi-monthly basis.
On a bilateral basis, the FFO and the BMZ meet on a regular basis and generally maintain close relations on the working level. The BMVg maintains an officer within the FFO’s country desk on Afghanistan, thereby ensuring a close linkage. The BMI meets regularly with the FFO when it comes to planning the future of the police program in Afghanistan (German Police Project Team/GPPT).

**New Thinking on Stabilization after ISAF**

The creation of the Directorate-General for Crisis Prevention, Stabilization, Post-Conflict Peacebuilding and Humanitarian Assistance at the FFO in 2015 is of special significance. The advantages of creating a larger outfit dealing with crises around the entire globe, instead of focusing on Afghanistan and Pakistan only, are evident: there is a spillover effect towards working with other regions. Very often, instruments used in Afghanistan are being put to good use in other theatres. As the Afghanistan-Pakistan Task Force was dissolved, it emerged that Afghanistan was just one of many stabilization efforts worldwide. This has to do with media attention as well: as Afghanistan has left the headlines, other international crises, such as Syria and Iraq, have taken centre stage.

As mentioned above, the different “house cultures” of the four ministries involved in Afghan reconstruction in Germany (FFO, BMZ, BMI, BMVg) all have their peculiarities and sometimes make it tedious to work in a coherent fashion. What is special about the Federal Foreign Office is that it is trying to overcome the disconnect between new stabilization efforts and classical development aid. Stabilization really found its place bridging the gap between humanitarian aid and classical development cooperation.

Germany has endorsed stabilization efforts only recently. The FFO took its inspiration from the Stabilization Unit of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), as well as other international players. The main reason for the new demand for stabilization was the relatively slow progress of classical development cooperation—projects often took many months to get off the ground and then another couple of years to yield initial results. This process is different from classical development cooperation, which is focused on the long term and on being sustainable. The idea behind FFO projects is short- to medium-term political and economic stabilization, which can then be linked up to development projects later on.

As the then German foreign minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, put
it at the 2014 Munich Security Conference, Germany needs to be able to act (and react) “earlier, more decisively and more substantially.” 5 The objective is clear: Germany wants to improve its early warning mechanisms and sharpen the (civilian) instruments in its foreign policy toolbox in order to fulfill the minister’s promise. At the same time, the creation of this new Directorate-General is one (certainly not the only) answer to the demand for an increased German role in the international sphere. Germany, as the largest and economically strongest member state of the European Union, increasingly has to shoulder responsibilities worldwide—whether it likes it or not.

Stabilization measures are supposed to act swiftly, pointedly, and visibly in order to counteract acute problems. They are meant to bring tangible development results to the people affected. Among others, the FFO supports the training of Afghan police forces, the build-up of infrastructure such as schools, roads and markets, higher education and culture, the health system, administration and legal structures, peace and reconciliation efforts, and local and national elections. 6

While the FFO—in a somewhat ad hoc fashion—gained first-hand experience in stabilization within its Afghanistan-Pakistan Task Force with the creation of the new Directorate-General, it has channelled these efforts into standard operating procedures. Stabilization has become the norm. In Afghanistan alone, the FFO maintains more than 80 projects. It has spent almost €4 billion on reconstruction efforts in the country, making it the second-largest bilateral donor after the United States.

**Essential Lessons Learned—in the Field and in the Capital**

By looking at lessons learned from the field, various questions arise: Why did the Bundeswehr open up to civilian reconstruction efforts at all? 7 What were the expectations the civilian side had when deciding to be part of the PRT structure? The two German PRTs created in 2003

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Friedrich Schröder

(Kunduz and Faizabad) were specifically set up with interagency cooperation as the centrepiece. As mentioned, there was a Doppelspitze (double hat) with a military colonel and a civilian diplomat at the top. In everyday operations, this was not always without controversy: often, the military side had resources (money, material, personnel) at its disposal that the civilian side did not. Even if the civilian side had the financial resources, this was not evident at first as it would usually choose a very low-key approach. To give an example: a uniformed colonel accompanied by three armored vehicles and a staff of ten looks much more impressive to the average Afghan interlocutor than a single civilian in an ordinary car driving alone.

In the Berlin arena, the German inter-ministerial lessons learned process and its outcomes are of particular interest. Although these outcomes were never explicitly committed to paper,8 they proved valuable in making the transition to stabilization in other regional contexts. Taking the lessons from Afghanistan to a Syria, Iraq, or Libya, for example, is an endeavour the Federal Foreign Office has placed at the very heart of its Review 2014 process when it created the new Directorate-General for Crisis Prevention, Stabilization, Post-Conflict Peacebuilding and Humanitarian Assistance in 2015.

Institutional learning and adaptation in civilian reconstruction in Afghanistan show that, in interagency cooperation, more than just “peaceful coexistence” is needed. It is not enough that both the military and the civilian sides tolerate or even accept each other. They have to actively try to work together. The often-cited comprehensive approach starts in the minds of participants—there has to be an acceptance strategy of different “house cultures” between soldiers and diplomats.

This plays out in various ways, the most important one being joint communication. There should be joint briefings, regular meetings (such as the Development and Stability Board at the PRTs), and—most importantly—there has to be proactive information sharing. In many cases, the military side has more current and more detailed information at its disposal. It needs to share this knowledge openly with its civilian counterparts. If the military and civilians are to work together effectively, there should be no Herrschaftswissen (or “insider knowledge”) that gives one side a superior position.

8. Except of course for the Progress Reports published every six months until 2014. See www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Aussenpolitik/RegionaleSchwerpunkte/AfghanistanZentralasien/Fortschrittsbericht-node.html
Also, there has to be a joint staff, preferably working in one building. What Germany experienced in its PRTs was very often a spatial divide between the “soldiers’ world” and the “diplomats’ world.” This was counterproductive, as it lead to confrontational situations. Again, the comprehensive approach starts in the minds of the participants.

In addition, there should be joint preparation for civilians and soldiers. This includes language and intercultural knowledge training, and cannot be achieved in just a few days’ time. Preparation can only succeed if the relevant human resources departments make sure that there is enough personnel to enable colleagues going on a mission to train properly with their counterparts from the civilian and/or military side. In this training, a joint analysis and planning of reconstruction efforts should take place, blurring the line between purely military and purely civilian efforts. What the Netherlands did in preparing its soldiers and diplomats sets a good example and can serve as an inspiration for Germany in the future.

When it comes to tracking civilian reconstruction and development, it is important to work with the same set of tools. A joint database early on in the first phase of reconstruction is very helpful. The current-day Afghanistan Development Tracker database is very helpful, but took several years to build. Ideally, there should be a database first, and then the projects should follow in order to fill it with content.

Stabilization is essentially about money, so budgets should be clearly defined. Who can use which funds for what—and how? Do funds have to be spent annually (leading to increased spending just before the end of the budget year), or can they be carried over to the next budget cycle? Can a joint budget (perhaps including veto rights) be helpful in creating the necessary coordination?

Another lesson for Germany is that stabilization should move slightly away from the classic “clear, hold, build” scenario that is entirely carried out by the Bundeswehr. Instead, experience suggests that “clear” and “hold” should be carried out by the Bundeswehr and local security forces (in Afghanistan, the Afghan National Security Forces, or ANSF). But the “build” function should be divided: “stabilize” should be the domain of the FFO and “develop” should be headed by the BMZ. It is essential that FFO and the BMZ coordinate their efforts even more closely in the future.
What’s Next for Germany’s Stabilization Efforts in Afghanistan?

Civilian reconstruction and stabilization measures have taken a new approach in Germany with the so-called Review 2014 process. With the creation of an entirely new Directorate-General for Crisis Prevention, Stabilization, Post-Conflict Peacebuilding and Humanitarian Assistance, stabilization is here to stay. It was expedient to go from a task force approach to the creation of a whole new Directorate-General. It has enhanced interagency cooperation, although this interagency cooperation was not always as effective as it could have been in Afghanistan.

In many respects, Afghanistan will continue to serve as a model, enabling the German government to take the lessons from the field to other regional contexts such as Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Mali. In all of these endeavours, a comprehensive approach is needed, starting at the ministry level (country desks, humanitarian aid, stabilization measures) to the government level (FFO, BMZ, BMVg, BMI), to the EU and international level. Germany will not always find a modus operandi between different agencies as it has done in Afghanistan. However, the immense, complex, and tedious coordination efforts are worth it. There is of course no blueprint for stabilization. But the German commitment to Afghanistan has left a lasting impact on all of its future efforts in this regard.

Note

The views are the author’s own and do not reflect or constitute official German Federal Foreign Office policy.
Critical Skills for Soldier Leader Development

Anna L. Sackett, Angela I. Karrasch, William S. Weyhrauch, and Ellen F. Goldman

The broad space between war and peace is full of complex, ambiguous, and unfamiliar tasks and problems. Although time and resources should be dedicated to forecasting the nature of the future environment, it is impossible to accurately predict the full range of threats and challenges that will emerge. In his initial message to the Army in August 2015, the chief of staff of the U.S. Army, General Mark A. Milley, described his top priority as readiness: “Our solemn commitment must always be to never send [our soldiers] into harm’s way untrained, poorly led, undermanned, or with less than the best equipment we can provide.”¹ Maintaining readiness includes being prepared to face unanticipated uncertainty in the environment.

The U.S. Army recognizes the need to thrive under uncertainty as one of its central “warfighting challenges”: “How to develop agile, adaptive, and innovative leaders who thrive in conditions of uncertainty and chaos and are capable of visualizing, describing, directing, and leading and assessing operations in complex environments and

against adaptive enemies.”\(^2\) Soldiers at all levels need to be able to perform when faced with complex, ambiguous, and unfamiliar problems. Because of the inherent nature of these problems, the focus cannot be solely on attempting to forecast the specifics of future problems. Rather, the Army must also focus on developing the skills needed to tackle complex problems in any context to meet the requirement of operating in an ever-changing, complex, ambiguous environment.

While accurate forecasting is important, the broader ability to think strategically is crucial, and must be continuously developed. Although strategic thinking is a relatively familiar term, the literature does not provide a consistent definition. Therefore, it is important to explain how we use this term.

Contrasted with the specific military concepts of “strategy,” “strategic leadership,” and “strategic planning,” the term “strategic thinking” as we use it here refers to the critical skillset required to solve complex, ambiguous, and unfamiliar problems, and is applied to inform and improve decision making. Strategic thinking has been described as a “messy process of informal learning,”\(^3\) emphasizing continuous learning and adaptation. Strategic thinking is also described as a creative, dynamic, and responsive process that occurs within unpredictable environments.\(^4\) Further, strategic thinking allows leaders to “recognize and take advantage of newly emerging opportunities,”\(^5\) which translates to being adaptive and agile.

Referring to the rapid changes that characterize many strategic environments, Jeane Liedtka notes that “the need to create a capability for strategic thinking at multiple organizational levels has increasingly been recognized as central to creating and sustaining competitive advantage.”\(^6\) It is important to note that strategic thinking must occur at multiple organizational levels. In a military context, this means that strategic thinking is not limited to thinking at the strategic level of war. Strategic thinking, if not strategic decision making, can happen at any


level in the Army; Army leaders must think strategically about tactical-, operational-, as well as strategic-level problems. Further, Army leaders must practice strategic thinking in tactical and operational environments, to prepare themselves for strategic-level assignments.

Recognizing the need to improve understanding of strategic thinking in a military context, the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) conducted research examining the strategic thinking tasks facing senior Army leaders, the skills needed to face such tasks, and the ways in which those skills have been and should be developed. To examine these questions, ARI interviewed commanders, staff members, and civilians who had been involved with strategic planning in the Army. The purpose was to elicit the types of missions and tasks which they had encountered that required strategic thinking. The participants described a wide range of specific tasks, all sharing similar characteristics of complexity, ambiguity, and unfamiliarity. For example, to develop understanding of the environment, commanders noted that they could not afford to simply review information analyzed by their staffs. Rather, they were required to be more involved in co-creating an evolving understanding of the environment. Furthermore, they described the need to continuously reassess their understanding under complex and constantly changing circumstances.

In lieu of specific guidance, participants described struggling with the need to create their own mission statements with little help from their chain of command. To further complicate matters, participants were operating in environments where there were no right answers, and where multiple future endstates were possible. Moreover, compressed timelines constrained participants’ opportunities to reflect and think proactively. Instead, problem solving tended to be reactive. Without appropriate time for reflection, participants felt that much of the necessary learning required was lost.

Facing unfamiliar tasks, participants described steep learning curves and insufficient resources to facilitate learning other than by trial and error. In combat environments, errors can result in the loss of life and/or major losses of equipment or other resources. Participants experienced

7. Anna Sackett et al., Enhancing the Strategic Capability of the Army: An investigation of Strategic Thinking Tasks, Skills, and Development (ARI Research Report 1995: Fort Belvoir, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 2016). The results reported in this chapter come from this report; more detail can be found in the original.
difficulty knowing where to search for the information they needed in the absence of doctrine, relevant historical examples, templates, or specific guidance from above.

U.S. Army leaders described being unprepared for the complex tasks and challenges outlined above. It is not surprising that Army leaders are faced with complex problems. However, the question remains: How can we better prepare soldiers to solve problems and make informed decisions while operating in the ambiguous space between war and peace?

**Strategic Thinking Competencies**

Rather than focusing on the specific problems that might emerge, ARI focused research on maintaining soldier readiness by identifying and developing strategic thinking skills needed to tackle complex, ambiguous, and unfamiliar problems. Using the insights from interview participants and combining it with the existing scholarship in military, management, and psychological literatures, ARI identified six competencies that underlie the individual cognitive process of strategic thinking. As depicted in Table 3.1, these competencies include comprehensive information gathering, learning, critical thinking, innovative thinking, thinking in time, and systems thinking.

While developing the six competencies, ARI recognized that much of what the participants were describing as essential to strategic thinking represented concepts that enable strategic thinking and its integration into plans and operations, rather than specific cognitive skills and activities that are integral to the individual cognitive process of strategic thinking. Nonetheless, these insights are important. Therefore, as shown in Table 3.2, they were classified separately as strategic thinking enablers: knowledge, collaboration, communication, and emotional regulation.

**Developing Strategic Thinking Ability**

In addition to identifying the strategic thinking competencies and enablers, ARI explored how Army leaders are currently developing these skills through various methods. ARI asked participants about the experiences that helped them develop strategic thinking ability. Their responses covered several general categories of experiences: professional military education (PME), advanced civilian education, special assignments (teaching, joint and interagency, exposure to general officers (GOs), strategic-level assignments, and exposure to strategic and/or
Table 3.1 Strategic Thinking Competencies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic Thinking Competencies and Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities (KSAs)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Comprehensive Information Gathering</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scanning the environment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Seeking information from disparate sources</td>
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<tr>
<td>Open mindedness, suspension of judgment</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Learning</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iterative testing, continuous learning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reflection and metacognition</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conceptual ability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Critical Thinking</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identifying the central and peripheral elements of a situation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Questioning, challenging assumptions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comfort with nuance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Innovative Thinking</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generating creative and novel ideas and approaches</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reframing understanding when existing concepts falter</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Thinking in Time</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding historical and contemporary contexts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pattern recognition</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Systems Thinking</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identifying and comprehending complex and dynamic interdependencies between entities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3.2  Strategic Thinking Enablers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic Thinking Enablers and KSAs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Knowledge</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broad general knowledge forming a foundation of awareness of, e.g., general history, global trends, geo-politics, socio-cultural forces, economics, military, technology, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deep knowledge of the context of a strategic problem, e.g., relevant groups, stakeholders, cultures, relationships, regional history, capabilities, processes, public opinion, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Collaboration</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Team building, e.g., team composition, identifying and balancing strengths and weaknesses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Team leadership, managing conflict, interpersonal dynamics, climate, trust, consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Networking and relationship building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization, project management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Communication</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Message tailoring, understanding the audience, creating narratives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective oral, written, and visual communication skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal tact and professionalism, especially during debate or disagreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candor and self-confidence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concisely communicating complex issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narrative ability, storytelling, engaging an audience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence skills, persuasion, negotiation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Emotional Regulation</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-awareness and self-control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respectful of others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intellectual humility, controlling the impact of personal biases, self-interest, and values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding limits of control and responsibility</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
complex problems), mentorship, self-development, and other experience outside the military.

To examine the existing PME related to strategic thinking, ARI collected and analyzed the relevant PME programs of instruction (POI) and interviewed faculty and curriculum developers. A leader development framework by Conger was used to examine the balance of educational activities with respect to four main approaches: conceptual understanding, skill building, feedback, and personal growth through reflection.\(^8\) A balance of all four approaches to leader development is recommended. While the POI examined did touch on all four approaches, the emphasis was on conceptual understanding, primarily through classroom-based learning (i.e., history, definitions, case studies, etc.).

Skill-building activities described in the POI centred on reviewing, analyzing, and comprehending information, with noticeably few activities related to creating, synthesizing, or evaluating information. It is important to note that there is no formal requirement for Army PME to develop the strategic thinking competencies, so learning objectives are not currently focused on developing these critical skills required for leader development to promote readiness.

The POI did include some feedback, generally provided at an individual level and in summative form, rather than focusing on specific feedback aimed at helping students understand their strengths and areas for improvement. Further, feedback tended to be focused more on the strategic thinking enablers, rather than the strategic thinking competencies. Also, the POI often included group activities, yet group-level feedback was not described, nor was feedback from peers.

According to Conger, personal growth stems from reflection, yet reflection was seldom mentioned in any formal descriptions of the course content. When reflection was used, it tended to be on the content of the course material, rather than on processes (how something was done) or premises (underlying assumptions).\(^9\) To achieve deep levels of learning, all three types of reflection are required. Also, group reflection was not mentioned and its inclusion would improve learning.

The researchers also analyzed developmental experiences outside of

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Table 3.3 Strategic Thinking Developmental Experiences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personal Growth</th>
<th>Conceptual Understanding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civilian education* **</td>
<td>Civilian education* **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teaching**</td>
<td>Teaching**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mentorship**</td>
<td>Mentorship**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exposure to GOs</td>
<td>Joint and Interagency assignments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working with another culture</td>
<td>Exposure to GOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fellowships*</td>
<td>Strategic-level assignments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exposure to strategic/complex problems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Working with another culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fellowships*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reading widely</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feedback</td>
<td>Skill Building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian education* **</td>
<td>Civilian education* **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teaching**</td>
<td>Teaching**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mentorship**</td>
<td>Mentorship**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exposure to GOs</td>
<td>Exposure to strategic/complex problems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Working with another culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fellowships*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Civilian education and fellowships may vary greatly depending on institution and/or program.
**Experiences that incorporate all four approaches.
PME using Conger’s leader development framework. The other developmental experiences described in the research are mapped to Conger’s four approaches to leader development in Table 3.3.

The three experiences that are most likely to incorporate all four approaches to leader development are advanced civilian education, teaching, and quality mentorship. According to the participants, the main benefits of advanced civilian education were the academic rigour, exposure to perspectives outside the military, greater amount of feedback, and more time for reflection.

Considering the amount of time soldiers spend outside of PME, it is important to consider assignments as a key opportunity to develop strategic thinking. According to the participants, teaching assignments can be a particularly good opportunity to develop strategic thinking skills. Teaching provides an opportunity to develop deep conceptual understanding of a topic area, which addresses one of Conger’s leader development approaches, but also facilitates development of deep knowledge in a specific area, which is a strategic thinking enabler. Teaching in the classroom also provides the opportunity to develop and practice all of the strategic thinking competencies, including comprehensive information gathering (e.g., considering broad inputs, scanning the environment), learning (e.g., participants described teaching assignments as allowing more time for reflection), critical thinking (e.g., conveying meaningful connections throughout content presentation), innovative thinking (e.g., finding creative ways to hold students’ attention and present information), thinking in time (e.g., anticipating questions from students), and systems thinking (e.g., synthesizing concepts into a coherent whole). Similar benefits from teaching can occur outside of the classroom, given the right opportunity.

Other assignments also develop strategic thinking ability and make use of multiple leader developmental approaches. The assignments that were described as the most developmental for conceptual understanding were joint and interagency assignments, exposure to general officers, strategic-level assignments, exposure to strategic and/or complex problems, and fellowships because they all have the potential to expose soldiers to different perspectives, values, and processes. Assignments also have the potential to provide skill-building opportunities, such as being in an assignment in which repeated exposure to complex problems occurs, thus allowing soldiers to practice the skills needed to address

such problems. Feedback and personal growth opportunities may also exist in some assignments, but, according to the data, to a lesser extent. For example, assignments in which there is regular exposure to general officers can develop strategic thinking ability if soldiers are given constructive feedback on ways in which they can improve on the strategic thinking competencies and enablers. In addition, fellowships have the potential to provide opportunities for development if the program allows time for deep reflection. Overall, assignments that allow time for reflection and the ability to take risks (e.g., develop creative solutions to problems) are more likely to develop strategic thinking ability.

Finally, quality mentorship has the potential to significantly develop strategic thinking ability. However, quality mentorship tends to be difficult to find in any organization, as it depends greatly on natural relationship dynamics. The most unique aspect of mentorship is the focus on feedback, which is less emphasized in other developmental activities. Mentorship is also developmental because it can provide access to others’ perspectives and thought processes and provide opportunities to practice strategic thinking skills through collaborative problem solving. Mentors can also encourage quality reflection and provide insight into how to reflect fully. Further, mentors can emphasize the importance of building time for reflection into the daily routine.

**Challenges and Recommendations**

There are a number of recommendations that are relevant for developing critical skills for soldier leader development. It was noted that Army leaders who were interviewed did not have a common set of terms for discussing strategic thinking. A shared lexicon for strategic thinking would help inculcate strategic thinking into the values and culture of the Army. Developing a shared lexicon would enable Army leaders to more clearly express their experiences, both successes and failures, and increase the attention placed on strategic thinking throughout the Army. Although strategic thinking is, at its core, an individual cognitive process, all strategic thinking occurs within an organizational context. Therefore, the organizational culture must support strategic thinking to ensure the Army fully benefits from the strategic thinking of individual leaders.11

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A common lexicon for strategic thinking facilitates improvements to the design of educational programs and curriculum, ensuring that the competencies and enablers are highlighted and developed throughout PME in a consistent and effective way. Part of that lexicon should formally differentiate between all terms involving “strategy” or “strategic” to reduce confusion and enable effective conversations about strategic thinking competencies and the existing concepts related to the strategic level of war.

Nearly every participant recognized that developing strategic thinking ability takes time; therefore development should start earlier in soldiers’ careers so that by the time Army leaders are faced with the highest level of complex problems, they are prepared. With the evolution of the internet and increased accessibility to globe-spanning information technology, tactical and operational decisions and incidents can quickly impact international audiences. In this environment, all soldiers must have a core understanding of their organization’s strategic goals and understand strategic consequences of their actions.

ARI’s findings indicate a need for more opportunities to practice skills, reflect, and receive personalized feedback. Following a comprehensive leader development program will ensure soldiers are prepared for the wide range of tasks they will face in the space between war and peace. In one attempt to address the gap in skill-building opportunities, ARI has developed four skill-building exercises to promote development of strategic thinking ability and is transitioning them to various stakeholders throughout the Army. The skill-building exercises are set up to provide opportunities for soldiers at any level to practice the skills of reflective thinking, questioning, systems thinking, synthesis/creation, thinking in time/strategic foresight, information gathering, self-awareness, hypothesis generation, cognitive flexibility, and visualizing.

While the skill-building exercises can be used in any context (e.g., a commander can run them with his or her staff), formal school environments, such as PME, will inevitably be the primary venue. However, it is important that comprehensive leader development opportunities are provided outside of PME, as well. Assignments can have great impact on development, so fostering leader climates throughout the

Army that allow for strategic thinking, skill-building opportunities is critical to the long-term readiness of the force. Clearly, soldiers must focus on achieving their missions first. However, the Army can use talent management practices to identify, promote, and utilize those soldiers who can think strategically to improve readiness. For example, selection boards can communicate to the force about what is valued in Army culture. To promote strategic thinking, Army leaders should align career incentives with demonstrated strategic thinking ability. In addition, ensuring selection boards value and promote soldiers who have taken explicit “broadening” assignments (including the assignments highlighted in the development section above, such as teaching) and a diverse range of other assignments will enhance the overall strategic capability of the Army. Utilizing talent management practices to increase the value placed on strategic thinking ability will help create an Army culture that systemically emphasizes the importance of strategic thinking development.

Conclusion

The Army has already begun to address concerns with developing strategic thinking capability. The U.S. Army War College is now designated as the proponent for strategy education. The Strategy Education Community of Interest was established in September 2014, and has since become a sub-committee of the Army Learning Coordination Council, working on emphasizing strategic thinking development across the Army. In addition, the Army has been emphasizing broadening experiences and talent management, which will also help address this issue. Overall, developing strategic thinking skills addresses General Milley’s top priority by ensuring soldiers develop the skills needed to maintain readiness in the ambiguous space between war and peace.

Notes

This research was partially supported by the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) contract W5J9CQ-11-C-0040. The views, opinions, and findings contained in this paper are solely those of the authors and should not be construed as an official U.S. Department of the Army or U.S. Department of Defense position, policy, or decision, unless so designated by other documentation.

Anna L. Sackett, Ph.D. and Angela I. Karrasch, Ph.D. are with the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences; William S. Weyhrauch, Ph.D. is with the Consortium Research Fellows Program; Ellen F. Goldman, Ed.D. is with The George Washington University.

Bibliography


Institutional Leadership 2030: A Road to Institutional Excellence

Bill Bentley

Introduction

Since its inception, the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) has continually adapted and evolved to fulfill its primary mandate to defend Canada and its interests. Central to this mandate is maintaining the trust that Canadians have in the CAF. The requirement for trust between the CAF and Canadians, alongside the complex environment of modern armed conflict, makes it imperative that all members of Canada’s military share a common understanding of the concept of military professionalism and strive to embrace a culture of institutional excellence. To remain a strong, effective and responsive profession in the face of today’s many challenges, military leaders at all levels need to understand what is required of them and look to continually enhance the profession’s status.

The purpose of this chapter is to propose a pathway to achieving institutional excellence. It is informed by a number of recent studies and policy documents,¹ and takes account of a number of developments, at

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¹ Notable documents include Canada, Chief of Defence Staff, Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy, 2009); Department of National Defence, “Canadian Officership in the 21st Century: Detailed
home and abroad, and by other changes inside the CAF. The proposed pathway principally entails, first, shifting from a task-based professional development approach to adopting a competency-based model; and second, building an effective and coherent talent management system that harmonizes, among other things, the way the institution develops, appraises, and manages military personnel from recruitment to retirement.

Institutional Leadership 2030 (IL 2030) identifies the central challenges that confront the organization, and articulates a set of ideas that are necessary to inculcate and incentivize behaviours to foster and maintain a culture of institutional excellence within the CAF.

There are four sections in IL 2030: the context within and against which the CAF must conduct and manage its affairs and activities, the challenges that undermine excellence within the institution, a model of institutional excellence (IE), and enabling framework to foster and inculcate a culture of IE.

Contextual Space and Backdrop

To fulfill its solemn duty and obligations to Canadians, the CAF must have a high level of professional excellence. In order to achieve professional excellence, the CAF must be cognizant of, and attuned to, the complex international security environment, the operational environment, and the institutional environment (governmental processes, policies and the like, and society). To each of these we turn.

International environment

While economic interdependence continues to characterize the global economy, the unevenness of its results within countries and across regions, coupled with the proliferation of virulent transnational actors with the resources and networks to threaten global security, have necessitated a rethinking of the utility of force in the post-9/11 world. The hybrid nature of these threats suggests that military force alone may not always prevail in every situation and in some circumstances may fall

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short of the desired outcomes. Thus, it is imperative to consider the modalities for enlisting and harnessing the broad range of power Canada can muster to oppose the contemporary threats against the homeland, its allies, and partners abroad.

Operational environment

Against the backdrop of the contemporary international security environment, it is recognized that the operating environment is undergoing fundamental shifts. The critical factors in this transformation are time, innovation, and adaptation. The enemy we face capitalizes and seizes upon innovation to exploit our ability to adapt. To seize the initiative, the institution needs to evolve capacities quicker, to keep pace and challenge the use and means of force of the adversary.

Institutional environment

It takes considerable resources—human and physical—to meet the conventional and non-conventional threats to Canada, our allies, and partners around the world. While no single military organization is able to meet the new security challenges alone, what the CAF is able to do is shaped in part by the fiscal environment and multitude of competing interests and priorities within the governmental system. To this end, it is important that the CAF cultivates and maintains stronger links with other security partners across all levels of government in Canada so that they understand and appreciate what it brings to the security and defence of the country beyond external theatre operations. In addition to maintaining strong ties, the CAF needs to internalize the significance, role, and reach of central agencies such as the Privy Council Office (PCO), the Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS) and Finance Canada in their process roles of rationalizing competing government priorities and objectives.

Society is another element of the institutional environment worthy of close attention for the CAF. As an organization, the CAF needs to ensure that it is in tune and attuned to the rest of Canada. This includes reflecting Canada’s social and cultural diversity in its composition at all levels. In addition, it entails ensuring that its professional ethos and ethics are firmly anchored in Canada’s overarching societal values. Last but not least, the CAF needs to gain a deeper understanding of the inimitable but not irreconcilable tensions and competition between national security and other aspects of security such as human, environ-
mental and health (pandemics), among others.

The Challenges

Against the backdrop of the international, operational and institutional environments discussed in the previous section, the challenges facing the CAF can be summed up as follows:

*Reassessing the “utility of force”: As traditional distinctions between defence and security fade, change may be required as a result of the national dialogue addressing the question: “What is the proper balance and role of military force among all of the other elements of national power?” Do we have the force structure required to operate across the spectrum of conflict and the tool kit to maintain our armed forces against current and emerging threats?*

*Aligning CAF culture in accordance with CAF professional ethos and evolving societal expectations: Recurring issues of harassment and other forms of unprofessional behaviour and conduct, on one hand, and struggles to reflect Canada’s cultural and gender mosaic, on the other hand, cast negative light and attention on the organization. To strive for IE, the CAF not only must fall in line through its actions and sustained commitment with the rest of the country, but where possible lead the country on some of the progressive issues.*

*Achieving greater alignment and stewardship of resources against priorities: In a resource constrained environment, and alongside a multitude of competing interests and priorities for resources and attention from other government departments, the CAF must demonstrate top-down unity of effort and purpose, among other things.*

Institutional excellence

Over its illustrious history, the CAF has demonstrated tactical and operational effectiveness in the pursuit of government objectives. This performance has been largely based on a decisive advantage generated by relatively well-equipped and highly capable personnel—the CAF’s greatest asset. While the CAF’s operational effectiveness is not in doubt, some of the challenges discussed in the previous section demand different and complementary skills and competencies. This is especially the case given greater interdependence within and across government
departments with the advent of whole-of-government operations, and more significantly increased reliance on other network of governments and partners in countering the myriad of security threats and challenges in the post-9/11 world.

Drawing from and building on some of the best practices found in multilateral and multinational organizations including businesses, the report details a model of IE that can serve the CAF well in addressing some of the challenges to greater institutional effectiveness. For our purposes, IE can be described as a state in which an organization achieves an optimal alignment of three properties articulated in Figure 4.1: “Running the Business,” “Whole-of-Government,” and “Operational Excellence.” In the CAF’s context more specifically, this involves an alignment of its ability to develop and sustain military strategy (running the business) to connecting that strategy through better articulation of its needs and stewardship of resources, human and physical, to grand strategy (i.e., achieving national objectives through a whole-of-government approach, among others); in turn, connecting and then implementing that strategy at the operational/tactical level (operational excellence). But as important, if not more, the CAF must also cultivate and uphold a professional identity and military ethos that is reflective of Canadian values to maintain the trust and confidence of the population it serves. Figure 4.1 presents the interrelationships of these elements.

To achieve IE, an organization must have the commitment, persistence, and support of all members of the institution. A critical ingredient in this regard is an agile, adaptable, skilled, and knowledgeable workforce: in essence, having the right people with the right skills and knowledge at the right time. Unlike other organizations, the CAF must generate its leaders from within its own ranks, taking care to systematically educate, train, and prepare members to assume different roles as they also are given greater responsibilities throughout their careers. This human capability dimension of defence is a long-term investment that requires careful and deliberate planning.

Our Conduct: Professional Identity and Military Ethos

The role of the profession of arms in Canada is the planning, generation, development, and ordered application of military force in accordance
with government direction.\textsuperscript{2} It is defined in terms of four attributes—expertise, responsibility, military ethos, and identity as depicted in Figure 4.2. The Canadian military is, in fact, an institution of dual character. It is at the same time both a governmental bureaucracy and a military profession. Notwithstanding this dual role, the profession must always act as the soul of the institution (the CAF).

The professional construct is fundamental if we are to ensure that a professional culture prevails at all times. This is also essential if we are to retain the trust and remain relevant to society. The professional construct provides the sine qua non dictating our daily interaction with others in achieving mission success at the institutional and tactical level. The fundamentals of the construct must be reviewed periodically across our developmental periods to ensure that our members understand its raison d’être and the associated vulnerabilities and liabilities

\textsuperscript{2} Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada (Canada, 2009).
associated with conduct that is not aligned with the construct. Each of the attributes of the professional construct is discussed in some detail below.

Military ethos

The CAF military ethos is central and as such encompasses the values that define our conduct at home and abroad. It includes the responsibilities to respect the civic values of liberal democracy, including rule of law; the ethical values governing how we interact with others, including the way we conduct operations; and the core military values of duty, loyalty, integrity, and courage.\(^3\) IE demands that CAF leadership be responsible for preparing all military personnel to be mission ready for war fighting and for all types of operations and military functions at home and abroad. Mission readiness requires the CAF institution to care for and support the wellness of its military personnel and their families. This includes supporting the development of all human dimensions: physical, intellectual, psychological, social, familial, and spiritual. The operational culture of the CAF involves the professional and personal development of military personnel and their families. As

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3. Courage is contained inside other concepts like discipline, initiative and trust—Mark Twain.
the call to the profession of arms often exposes them to extreme situations—raising deep moral and spiritual questions—a holistic vision of wellness and readiness is essential to support the care of the body, mind, soul, and spirit.

**Expertise**

The expertise that distinguishes the profession of arms from all others is made up of tactics, operational art, military strategy, and grand strategy. A large number of other disciplines supplement this theory-based body of knowledge.

**Responsibility**

Members of the profession of arms have both an external and internal responsibility. Externally, they are responsible through the Government of Canada to Canadian citizens. Internally, they are responsible to maintain and strengthen the profession itself by ensuring that their conduct is aligned with their values and beliefs to maintain operational effectiveness, trust, respect, inclusiveness, and credibility.

**Identity**

This is the inward and outward manifestation of the sum of all the other attributes of the profession: expertise, responsibility, and military ethos. The military professional’s identity includes the awareness that resilience—physical, mental and spiritual—is a necessary component of their profession. Identity also encompasses the commitment to the wellness of subordinates and of all comrades in arms.

Professional excellence is, of course, not only about “the fight”; it is entirely dependent on the CAF military ethos, which guides both how military force is applied and the individual and collective conduct of all members of the profession of arms, both on and off duty. The military ethos is the foundation upon which the CAF profession rests. The values inherent in the military ethos ensure subordination to civil authority and bind the profession to Canadian society. The CAF must be seen to embody fundamental Canadian values such as diversity, respect of human dignity, and fairness; in so doing, Canadian society sees itself in us. Without it, the trust, confidence and support of Canadian citizens would be lost. Members of the profession-of-arms do not work in silos. They must first work with one another to create a synergy between
multiple teams, units, and formations. Second, members of the profession must interact with others (e.g., allied forces, whole-of-government, and civilian authorities) to generate strategic or tactical effects. Lastly, if we are to recruit and retain our members, the profession must ensure that our people are at the centre of our actions.

It is a fine art indeed to achieve our organizational work, while also balancing individual and family requirements. That commitment must be both up and down, as in the member’s commitment to the CAF through their actions, and the CAF’s commitment to its members through our support policies and actions. These supportive actions are equally important at home in garrison as well as when deployed on operations.

Institutional leaders are stewards of the profession. Internally, it is crucial that CAF leaders take care to attend to the well-being of CAF members in all respects. This commitment will result in a reciprocal commitment on the part of CAF military professionals to the institution as a whole.

**Our Operations: Operational Excellence**

The CAF has an extraordinary record of delivering tactical excellence across a whole spectrum of operations. Since 1945, a substantial professional force has maintained a training philosophy and methodology that constantly hones the necessary combat skills on land, at sea, and in the air. Relatively well-equipped units are usually well prepared and ready to act in short order. Alongside a well-oiled training regime is a body of tactical and operational doctrine that enables effective joint operations and a high degree of interoperability in combined operations, especially with the United Nations and with our NATO alliance partners. Underpinning all these factors is a leadership doctrine that stresses mission success, warrior spirit, morale, cohesion, and the well-being of all members of the team. Leaders direct, motivate, and enable subordinates to accomplish their tasks professionally while maintaining or creating capabilities to ensure mission success. CAF leaders consistently display a spirit of physical and moral courage, and are committed to performing their duty with honour. Beyond conforming to standard procedures and adhering to doctrinal precepts, CAF leaders are always expected to think in innovative ways and seize the initiative whenever required.

At the same time, tactical performance is shaped by attitudes devel-
oped by members of the profession in response to the care taken of them and their families at home in garrison. This is the basis of ongoing trust and confidence.

**Our Business: “Running the Business” and Military Strategy**

Military strategy calls forth essential drivers, on which rests its operational effectiveness; drivers that enable the means (campaigns and tactical operations) to be applied. These drivers include policy, force structure, equipment programs, infrastructure, financial systems, human resources systems, information technology, and public affairs.

This clearly is a military-civilian effort; i.e., the full “Defence Team” running the business. The strength of the drivers, in terms of quality and quantity, offers assurances of operational effectiveness with the right force structure and level of readiness to respond to government direction. Efficiencies leading to economies can be achieved by right-sizing the drivers to ensure continuous support of the government’s priorities while remaining cognizant of the fiscal realities of the day.

The efficient and economical operation of the institution of the CAF viewed, in part, as a business enterprise is an absolute requirement for IE. This requires, first, a strong sense of corporate unity within the Defence Team as a whole. Civilian assistant deputy ministers (ADMs) and Level 1 organizations, together with their staff, must understand and respect their mutual roles in the institution and how each contributes to the excellence that is sought. Second, the Defence Team, thereafter, must operate seamlessly with the wider “town” keeping all stakeholders connected across the domains of policy, procurement and finance, and human resources, among others.

Clear and continuous strategic leadership, management, and administration of the institution based on best practices and knowledge drawn from the public sector, the corporate world and other militaries are essential. It is here that entrepreneurial behaviour must be understood and reinforced. The qualities and competencies required at this level can be reflected in the Canadian military ethos. As such, the

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4. Helmuth von Moltke defined strategy as the continued development of the original leading thought in accordance with the constantly changing circumstances. Quoted in Quintin Barry, *Moltke and His Generals: A Study in Leadership* (London: Helion and Company, 2015), 340. The thinking, conceptual formulation of strategy is the original leading thought and running the business is the continued development of the original idea.
profession would continue to place great value on the warrior spirit at the tactical level. However, it would emphasize what could be considered the entrepreneurial spirit at the politico-strategic level. Therefore, professionals will seek opportunities to enhance security and defence through smart practices.

There is currently a growing level of recognition among the institution’s interlocutors, partners, and stakeholders that management of resources is an ongoing area for improvement. In some instances, the senior leadership of the institution has earned a poor reputation regarding the broader question of resource allocation as a whole. All of these areas are encompassed in one way or another by the subject of public administration, best defined as the discipline that prepares civil servants for leadership roles in the public service. It focuses on the social, economic, and political spheres within which public servants operate and provides the necessary skills and knowledge to effectively and reliably lead and ensure accountability to Parliament. Of course, military professionals are not defined as public administrators nor do officers spend their whole career in Ottawa, even as general/flag officers. Nonetheless, senior CAF institutional leaders must gain the knowledge through education and experience to share and embrace this space with their civilian colleagues.

In the running of the business, IE requires that military professionals possess a range of capabilities far different from those routinely found at the tactical and operational level of operations. These would include, for example, entrepreneurial spirit, systems thinking, and participative leadership styles. Beyond these, decisive management knowledge gained through education and experience must drive the way we handle the key critical functions inherent to running the business.

Our Partners: The Utility of Force and Whole-of-Government

It is no longer profound to state that the contemporary security environment will remain ambiguous, amorphous, and volatile. The sovereign state perhaps no longer holds the monopoly of all components of power, but it remains the defining player. At the same time, there is a profusion of actors on the world stage with enhanced agility and impact, enabled by technology. In fact, the whole issue of the utility of force in relation to the causes and effects of conflict needs to be reassessed. The use of military force is no longer as straightforward or as often decisive as was once conventionally thought. Attending to the myr-
iad challenges places a premium on not only creating strategic thinkers and leaders, but on developing more critically the capacity and ability to enlist the full panoply of instruments of national power, of which the armed forces is just one.

Military force, however, remains a necessary ingredient pursuant to national policy. The utility of such force is no longer simply in its state-on-state application or even necessarily force-on-force, although these roles remain relevant. In today’s environment, we often fight “among the people,” not on a battlefield removed from the people. Moreover, the dimensions of the battlespace have expanded from the traditional ones from land, sea, and air to cyber and space. The ends for which we fight are changing from the hard objectives that decide a political outcome to those of establishing conditions in which the outcome may be decided.5 The utility of force may also be found in its application to training foreign forces and other elements of nation building, or in a variety of coalition/NATO/UN operations, including conventional deterrence and peace support operations.

In the first instance, the Defence Team must work together to optimize running the business thus generating an effective, affordable, and sustainable military strategy. Military strategy is then connected to the broader grand strategy formulated from among all national security practitioners. National security strategy or grand strategy brings to bear all the elements of national power when dealing with the complex problems facing Canada today in response to policy direction. It is here that Canada’s military strategy connects the institution of the CAF to all of the other national security practitioners who are involved in the development and prosecution of Canada’s grand strategy. Pending the establishment of more formal structures that will enable whole-of-government alignment, the CAF must continue to contribute to the strengthening of an informal community of practice of national security professionals focusing on the joint development of essential common core competencies.

Unity of command and whole-of-government unity of effort are, without a doubt, key objectives in responding to the challenges of the contemporary security environment. A central challenge is the reality of increasing demand for security in the context of the competition for

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resources required for all government programs. Here, there needs to be recognition that a balance between security and other requirements must be achieved. A key responsibility of military professionals is to provide advice on how to achieve the optimum balance between the resources allocated and the capacity to react to emergencies and respond to international stability and security. As such, institutional agility is required to shape capabilities and capacities to act in a complex world. Institutional agility is improved through enhanced communication, mutual understanding, and selection of courses of action that will lead to the achievement of IE.

**Establishing an Enabling Framework for IL 2030**

*IL 2030* is focused on fostering and inculcating a culture of IE within the CAF while sustaining operational excellence. It is based on building an effective and coherent talent management system that synchronizes professional development (PD), career planning (CP) and personnel appraisal (PA). A key element of this system is a paradigm shift which decisively moves from a training-to-task methodology to competency-based development.

As discussed, the CAF is able to deliver on operations. In light of the ever-increasing competition for resources at home and the associated higher level of cost dealing with materiel, the CAF must remain agile and adaptive to novel ways of leading the institution in order to ensure that it continues to have the right people, in the right positions, equipped with modern capabilities in order to maintain our operational excellence. Recognizing the context within which the CAF must operate and the institutional vulnerabilities that threaten to undermine excellence within the institution, *IL 2030* proposes a pathway to addressing these vulnerabilities and others.

**The shift to competencies**

The CAF is transitioning towards the use of competencies for articulating officer and NCM specifications, for performance appraisal and for framing professional military education and professional development. While applicable at all rank levels, this competency-based approach is particularly suited for senior positions within the organization and at the strategic or institutional levels. The CAF framework for describing the competency-based approach is the leader development framework (LDF).
Figure 4.3 The Leader Development Framework (LDF)

The LDF is based on five meta-competencies that illustrate a progression of prescribed performance from the tactical level through the operational and military strategic level, to the politico-strategic level, for officers and NCMs. The LDF is depicted in Figure 4.3.

The meta-competencies are defined below from right to left:

Professional ideology is the primus inter pares among the meta-competencies. It represents the claim to a unique, theory-based body of knowledge (practical and abstract) that distinguishes the profession of arms from all other professions and occupations. In addition, it includes an ethical system that governs the conduct of members of the profession and how their specialized knowledge is applied. The function of the profession of arms is the ordered application of military strategy in accordance with governmental direction, and the theory-based body of knowledge is that of tactics, operations, military strategy, and grand strategy. The ethical system required is embodied in the Canadian military ethos.

Change capacities are those competencies that enable institutional leaders to lead and manage change from day-to-day perturbations in the environment up to and including paradigm shifts in how the profession of arms must be structured and employed.\(^6\)

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6. This capacity and process is discussed in very practical terms in Robert Gates, A
Social capacities are those competencies that enable leaders at all levels to build effective teams, operate effectively in large complex organizational cultures and build strong partnerships with external agencies, particularly other government departments, international organizations, alliances, and partners. This requires the development of specific interpersonal relationship competencies, as well as one’s emotional and cultural intelligence.

Cognitive capacities are those competencies that enable intellectual agility and the ability to cope with both difficult and complicated problems as well as complex issues, sometimes referred to as “wicked problems.” War and conflict are best understood as complex, adaptive systems which require highly competent systems thinkers.

Expertise constitutes those skill sets, knowledge, and competencies that enable mastery of the profession’s theory-based body of knowledge as well as a wide range of supplementary disciplines that support the effective and efficient prosecution of the profession’s role and mandate. Such supporting disciplines include history, international relations, sociology, psychology, engineering, and science. The expertise required at the strategic level to lead the institution builds on the expertise acquired at the tactical level and must be developed through higher level institutions of learning for both the officers and the NCM corps.

Within each meta-competency are specific competencies that must be progressively developed as individuals advance in rank and/or position along the tactical to strategic continuum. These competencies, which are fully detailed in the CAF competency dictionary,7 are outlined in Figure 4.5. The competencies are developed through a combination of training, education, experience, and self-development. Further, they are assessed as part of the integrated personnel appraisal function to determine strengths, as well as areas for further development.

**Leader competencies linked to IE**

Institutional excellence is framed by professional identity, operational excellence, running the business, and whole-of-government (see Figure 4.1). Each of these functions is supported and strengthened by competencies drawn from the leader development framework as described in Passion For Leadership: Lessons on Change and Reform from Fifty Years of Public Service (New York: Alfred Knopf, 2016).

Bill Bentley

Figure 4.4  CAF Competencies Ordered with LDF Meta-Competencies*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expertise</th>
<th>Cognitive Capacities</th>
<th>Social Capacities</th>
<th>Change Capacities</th>
<th>Professional Ideology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personnel and Resource Management</td>
<td>Analytical Thinking</td>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>Stress Management and Resilience</td>
<td>Credibility and Influence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning and Organizing</td>
<td>Innovation</td>
<td>Teamwork</td>
<td>Developing Others</td>
<td>Commitment to CAF Military Ethos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical/Professional Proficiency</td>
<td>Interpersonal Relations</td>
<td>Developing Self</td>
<td>Action Orientation and Initiative</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Awareness</td>
<td>Partnering</td>
<td>Adaptability</td>
<td>Ethical Reasoning</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Envisioning</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Detailed descriptions outlining the definition of each competency, from the tactical to strategic level, is available in the The Canadian Armed Forces Competency Dictionary (Director General Military Personnel Research and Analysis, NDHQ, Ottawa, 2015).

at Figure 4.3. Although there is a degree of overlap, each function has particular competencies most associated with the nature and/or prosecution of that function.

Professional identity is shaped primarily by the capacity for ethical reasoning (including moral reasoning); a demonstrable commitment to the CAF military ethos; stress management and resilience (physical, mental, and moral); and the commitment to continual self-development as well as the constant development of others. Because IE is at all times anchored in professionalism, these competencies are applied on a daily basis by CAF members operating in any of the other three functions (operational excellence, running the business, and whole-of-government).

Operational excellence is shaped primarily by technical professional proficiency, teamwork, and interpersonal relations. At the tactical level, everything depends on well-led teams. There is always a premium placed on the capacity of all team members to develop close, trusted, personal relations with all colleagues. At the tactical level, teams are trained to the highest standards of tactical excellence—knowledge, skills, doctrine, and technique.

Running the business is shaped primarily by envisioning, innovation, analytical thinking (including systems thinking and critical thinking), personnel/resource management, planning and organizing, organizational awareness, action orientation and initiative, and adaptability.
Strategists must first be able to envisage the end-state sought. They must be able to adjust to ever-changing circumstances and innovating to overcome obstacles. They must then develop, create, and organize the ways and means to achieve the desired end-state. These ways and means always involve people, resources, and equipment all in their particular organizational cultures. Whole-of-government is shaped primarily by envisioning, organizational awareness, partnering, credibility and influence, and communication. Beyond defining a simple military aim, military strategists must be able to go further, and envisage a grand strategic end-state within the context of governmental policy. The competencies required go beyond interpersonal relationships and demand the capacity to work across multiple government departments, allied militaries, and the diplomatic, developmental, and economic dimensions of grand strategy. Strategic communication competency is essential. IE demands that CAF institutional leaders maintain credibility and influence with all partners.

The need to integrate

The current human resources (HR) sub-systems—professional development (PD), career planning (CP), and performance appraisal (PA) at the moment operate somewhat autonomously. They are prosecuted in silos with no strong “connective tissue” to rationalize the system as a whole and create the necessary synergy. These three sub-systems can be better integrated to develop all competencies necessary to achieve and then sustain IE (see Figure 4.5).

The Leader Development Model

The LDM provides the second part of the proposed pathway to achieving IE by presenting a framework for an effective and coherent talent management system that develops, appraises, and manages military personnel from recruitment to retirement. The LDM was developed beginning in 2013 after the leader development framework had been brought to maturity. The LDM is a conceptual HR model that represents the continuous and interdependent nature of the three HR processes of personal appraisal, career planning, and professional development. It is designed to harness the necessary HR functions to produce the right person with the right qualifications in the right place at the right time. The competencies which operationalize the LDF provide the linkage between the three HR processes. The result is that the whole is much
greater than the sum of the parts. Conceptually, the LDM is depicted in Figure 4.6.

The required competencies for professional development are described in a range of documents all of which are based on the general specifications (GS) and CAF common qualification standards (QS). At the lower rank levels, service and specialty specifications and QS play a major role in defining the required competencies. At the more senior rank levels, the service and specialty specifications play a lesser role, and as such CAF common PD becomes the major formal means of obtaining the knowledge, skills, and attributes required to develop the desired competencies. Given that the focus of IL 2030 is the development of the required competencies for senior level leaders, the focus should be on CAF common DP4 and 5. Going forward, to ensure that the common CAF PD provides the required knowledge, skills, and attributes to develop the competencies required for IE while maintaining operational excellence, a comprehensive end-to-end review of the PD
System from Developmental Period (DP) 1 to 5 for officers and NCM’s needs to be conducted. While the review will examine all DP levels, from an IL 2030 perspective it is the review of DP 3, 4, and 5 that are of particular significance.

In DP1, officer cadets and junior leaders are socialized into the profession of arms and acquire the rudimentary skills largely through training, to become members of effective teams. DP2 is focused on the tactical level and is mainly concerned with developing professionals capable of effectively leading people and executing roles and missions within their respective Services. The primary means of developing the desired competencies at the DP2 level is through Service specific training and education. Notwithstanding this fact, there is a requirement identified by the separate Services for a common CAF component to ensure that all achieve an acceptable capability in terms of overall CAF knowledge, writing skills, critical thinking, and reinforcement of a common CAF ethos.
DP3 and DP4 expand PD into the operational and strategic domains and are mainly concerned with joint, combined, and whole-of-government operations. Here the leadership focus begins to shift to leading the institution. For officers, the current system for producing excellent, formally staffed trained personnel, for the ranks of major, lieutenant-colonel and colonel is working well; however, those not selected to move rapidly through this system are under-developed and as a result are often mis-employed. All, not just those destined for the most senior positions, require effective career management and continuous professional development if the CAF is to continue to be a relevant and agile organization. This is the issue of the so-called “frozen-middle” of major and lieutenant-colonels, who are not professionally developed and as such lack the required competencies for either operational or institutional excellence. This issue must be addressed, and the weakness in the system must be rectified. One possible solution to this issue is the development of a “pathway system” that takes the individual from the rank of major through to and inclusive of the rank of colonel8 in order to ensure that our members have the knowledge required to add value and optimize the organization.

By using the pathways as a complete system, the CAF would create diversity of thought, invest across the full range of human capital within the CAF, and invest in multiple members to enhance the institution. The pathways provide teams, which comprise individuals developed along these different pathways, that ensure breadth of experience in some areas and depth of knowledge in others.

For NCMs, DP3 develops individuals at the rank of master corporal/MS and Sgt/PO2, and at DP4 WO/PO1 and MWO/CPO2. In these developmental periods, NCMs gain leadership experience and proficiency through the employment in jobs with increased span of control and responsibilities. At DP3, the formal PD activities are focused at the tactical levels to develop leadership and management skills. At DP4, the focus shifts to developing those competencies required for employment as a member of command and staff teams within a headquarters,

8. The CAF system proposed is similar to, and in some measure inspired by, the one being developed in the UK. The UK Defence People and Training Board (DPTB) has directed the UK military to develop a PD Pathway that enables 2, 3, and 4 star officers to lead a complex and sophisticated organization in a challenging strategic, operational, and business environment, and also produces effective supporting personnel to turn their thoughts into successful outcomes. This is also similar to approaches being done in the US and Australia. (UK) Defence Education Pathway Review, 9 February 2016.
ending with the competencies needed to develop strategic vision and senior level staff and leadership roles often outside of their occupation and service. In order to meet the needs of performing the staff and leadership functions at senior levels, NCMs will require professional development to provide the necessary competencies needed to achieve institutional as well as operational excellence. As such, the current NCM DP 3 and 4 needs to be reviewed to ensure these competencies are met.

DP5 is the period for the ongoing professional development of general officers and flag officers—brigadier-generals and upwards inclusive of lieutenant-general and chief warrant officers/chief petty officer 1. General and flag officers ultimately hold primary responsibility and accountability to the government for the formulation of military strategy and its interpretation into grand strategy alongside with their national security professional colleagues.

A DP5 program will be developed consisting of three components: common general and flag officers PME, continuing GOFO PD, and executive education. The DP5 program will be supported by the GOFO portal which is a virtual space intended as an arena for GOFOs to engage in a variety of formal and informal learning activities and events supportive of the three components of DP5.

The executive education component is premised on the synergy and synthesis of, at best, three things: theory, practice, and experience. It is designed as an immersive learning experience of two to three days’ duration that empowers course members to reflect in key areas and affords the opportunity for them to step back from daily responsibilities, hone their professional knowledge and skills, and engage in learning in an executive modality.

If we are to develop the NCMs who are able to operate at the institutional level, we must ensure they are enabled through professional development, which includes a breadth of experience that spans beyond unit employment at the tactical level, in order for them to obtain the desired competencies. To accomplish this, there is a requirement to examine the desired roles and professional needs of CWO/CPO1, specifically in how they contribute to institutional excellence. Appointed CWO/CPO1 need to be exposed to the institutional level to ensure institutional excellence; as such, a DP5 program needs to be developed to provide the requisite body of knowledge to increase their understanding of how we run the business and connect military strategy to grand strategy. As outlined above, a DP5 program will be developed consisting of three components—common PME, continuing PD, and executive
education. The DP5 program will be supported by a CWO portal which will be continuously updated to expand this professional development. Beyond education, they also need to gain experience through specific assignments at the strategic level.

In addition to the development of NCM designated for senior appointments, the professional development requirements of all MWO and CWO for employment beyond the unit level needs to be examined to ensure they can continue to contribute to institutional excellence as key staff and advisers across the full range of CAF level positions.

Under this system, individuals will be assessed through an instrument named the performance appraisal and talent management system (PATMS). The CAF competency dictionary will be embedded directly into the PATMS which is an excellent way to illustrate how the LDF via the CAF competency dictionary will support this component of the LDM. The new PATMS instrument will clearly separate performance from potential and will be fully automated. It will ensure that effective talent identification is in place to drive the opportunities gained by professional development. It will also identify the areas in which the specific strength of our personnel can be best used to deliver institutional excellence through the career planning component of the LDM.

Career planning is influenced by the LDF in order to develop and improve competencies and/or exploit the required competencies to improve and sustain IE. The LDM and the development of CAF leaders is based primarily on competencies derived from the five meta-competencies of expertise, cognitive capacities, social capacities, change capacities, and professional ideology. Career planning aims at a balance of employment to properly develop competencies in all five meta-competencies across the LDF. Normally, this will involve an appropriate mix of appointments, both command and staff, at the tactical and strategic levels, as well as Service and institutional postings.

Knowledge management is closely associated with career planning. Rapid rotation and short tours can easily result in the loss of essential knowledge to run the business effectively. At the same time, institutional stability is adversely impacted through such career actions. Environmental commanders, branch advisers, and career managers will carefully consider the tempo of personnel turnover, balancing the issue of knowledge management with the exigencies of the service and personal aspirations. As such, a review of the direction of assignments will be instituted to optimize IE while at the same time achieve greater retention. On a similar plane a review of the conditions of service will
also be initiated to improve the career opportunities between full time and part time members.

Succession planning for senior officers and NCMs must ensure that individuals are provided with opportunities to have their knowledge, competencies, and skill sets developed in domains that sustain institutional excellence as well as operational effectiveness.

**Conclusion**

It is clear that at the core of the profession of arms is our leadership doctrine that guides how we lead our people and the institution, and how we maintain our extraordinary relationship of trust with Canadians. *Officership 2020* and *NCM Corps 2020* served its purpose and remains an excellent template to ensure that we maintain this trust and credibility by focusing on operational excellence. It made a significant contribution to renewing the CAF by setting out a systematic approach to the professional development of officers and non-commissioned members. However, we now need to build upon that success and that important work so that we not only maintain our institutional effectiveness but progress to a goal of institutional excellence.

In concert with all stakeholders, we need to use *IL 2030* to create and nurture a culture of IE by developing the competencies that are necessary to lead at the institutional as well as the tactical level. All members of the institution, and the profession embedded in it, will be expected to support the intent of *IL 2030*. Leaders at all ranks and levels will take the necessary measures to ensure that the end state of the highest level of IE is achieved through the execution of the LDM. Finally, senior institutional leaders have a special responsibility to guarantee that the guidance contained in *IL 2030* is followed and that the specific directions are implemented.
Changes in political power tend to bring both good and bad. Candidates may promise utopia but, upon election, tend to achieve limited improvements in some areas at the cost of others. The same may be said of societal shifts in power through digitization and secularization. Digitization may improve the performance of cell phones, automobiles, and financial management systems, but it also opens individuals, businesses, and even armed forces to potentially crippling cyberattacks. Secularization may protect people of minority faiths from religious discrimination, but it also limits religious freedom in public. In the United States, for example, secularization strengthens the establishment clause of the First Amendment at the cost of the free exercise clause.¹

Societal shifts will invariably have an impact on how we think about national security challenges from war to peace, grey zone competition before war, and even hybrid warfare. On the positive side of the ledger, digitization and secularization may advance the objectivity of network-

¹. “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” U.S. Constitution, Amendment 1.
systems-, and capability-based analysis. That said, digitization and secularization also make it harder to accurately assess the human dimension and related soldier competencies for human resilience and mission accomplishment. This is because people are not morally neutral human genome data sets. They are enfleshed souls that find identity, meaning, and motivation in moral, spiritual, and religious realms—as do families, communities, and cultures. Against the press of digitization and secularization, the human dimension must include moral, spiritual, and religious analysis to fully grasp and engage human behaviour, motivation, and empowerment. Sun Tzu put it this way: “Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in danger.”

Military operations span a continuum from war to peace. The soldier on the ground provides necessary means, but needs strength of soul to overcome moral fog and friction, and achieve operational ends. This chapter makes the case that the soldier’s moral, spiritual, and religious empowerment is a strategic requirement. The chapter examines related military capabilities, pursues three lines of inquiry—just war, moral injury, and the U.S. Army Operating Concept—and concludes with recommendations for meeting the strategic requirement to enable human resilience and mission success.

Before proceeding, I need to provide context in three areas. First, because this chapter examines military capabilities, its recommendations will engage force management domains. Force management is a set of Department of Defense (DoD) processes that considers national strategic requirements, checks to see if required military capabilities are being delivered to combatant commanders and, if not, develops and integrates those capabilities through changes in doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leader development and education, personnel management, facilities, or policy. The United States military calls these DOTMLPF-P domains. The idea is to use the most appropriate and easily resourced domains to build the required capabilities.

Second, because this chapter focuses on the human dimension, its recommendations will inevitably lean toward the functional imperative or the social imperative. The functional imperative is to accomplish the mission, to create the most combat-effective unit possible. The social imperative is to keep faith with society, to shape the unit to reflect society’s values. There is a tension between the two, but leaders must

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negotiate both.

Finally, because this chapter discusses the soul, it is important to offer a definition up front. By soul, I mean that component of the human being which is the locus of moral, spiritual, and religious identity, faith, and action. It is sometimes called spirit, the animating force for the body and mind.

With this preface, we turn to our first line of inquiry to examine required capabilities for the soldier’s moral, spiritual, and religious empowerment from war to peace.

Just War

Consider this adapted parable.

Two men went up to the temple to pray. One was a realist, the other a just war practitioner. The realist stood and prayed thus with himself, “God, I thank You that I am not like other men—those who feign piety, virtue, and values, or even as this just war practitioner. I am honest about power. ‘The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.’ Power justifies its own use, and might makes right.” And the just war practitioner, standing afar off, would not so much as raise his eyes up to heaven, but beat his breast, saying, “‘War is the mournful work of sustaining relative goods in the face of greater evils.’ War is morally dubious, and must be undertaken with greatest care and as a last resort. God, be merciful to me, a part of the military instrument of national power!” I tell you, this man went down to his house justified rather than the other, for everyone who wields power exultantly will be humbled, and he who wields power humbly will be exalted.

I begin with this parable for two reasons. First, the parable’s main point of comparison highlights the enduring moral contribution of the Western just war tradition—to restrain war and promote the state’s

mournful, careful application of military power, aiming at a better, more just peace. Second, the parable’s content shows the pathos of the military practitioner. Between the extremes of “peace at all costs” (pассивism) and “might makes right” (realism), the state will at times turn to military power to achieve “a better, more just peace” (just war tradition). God willing, justice will be served, but the warrior must still bear the human cost.

This is where the Western just war tradition runs into the problem of the soldier’s soul. It is what I call *jus incurvatus in se*, justice curved in on itself. St. Augustine spoke of *homo incurvatus in se*, sinful man curved in on himself and away from God and others. A similar thing happens in war, when the warfighter, as the instrument of justice, must coerce or take life. Thankfully the just war tradition provides the state with *jus ad bellum* criteria for going to war justly. The state should ensure legitimate authority, just cause, last resort, just intent, etc. before committing military forces in combat. The just war tradition also gives the military *jus in bello* criteria for prosecuting a war justly. Rules of engagement must honour the criteria of discrimination and proportionality. But the state rightly going to war (*jus ad bellum*) and the military rightly prosecuting war (*jus in bello*) do not address the justification that likely matters most to the warfighter (*jus incurvatus in se*). How should the warfighter justify his own violent actions to himself or to God? Here is where justice curves in on itself, on the warfighter who metes out justice.

If the enduring moral contribution of the Western just war tradition is to restrain war and promote the state’s mournful, careful application of military power, to achieve a better, more just peace, *jus incurvatus in

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7. Western culture’s increasing rejection of moral objectivism magnifies the problem. Moral objectivism makes the case for a common morality that imprints human nature. By natural or divine law, people possess reason and share a basic understanding of good and bad, right and wrong. For example, people should follow the Golden Rule and treat others as they would like to be treated (St. Matt. 7:12). A common moral framework provides a basis for addressing the struggles of the soldier’s soul.

se seeks that peace for the peacemaker, the warfighter.\(^9\)

Providing inner peace to the soldier is a strategic requirement. Without such peace, personal resilience will be worn down, endangering long-term mission accomplishment. With such peace, however, both functional and social imperatives will be reinforced, optimizing unit effectiveness by providing for the deepest needs of soldiers.

Does the current military force meet this strategic requirement? What capabilities, if any, are required to justify to the warfighter his or her own violent actions? To begin to answer these questions of warfighter empowerment, we turn to the related problem of moral injury.

**Moral Injury**

If *jus incurvatus in se* reveals a just war problem in the human dimension, moral injury confirms the actual pain and suffering. The writing of Pulitzer Prize winner David Wood provides powerful documentation:

> How do we begin to accept that Nick Rudolph, a thoughtful, sandy-haired Californian, was sent to war as a 22-year-old Marine and in a desperate gun battle outside Marjah, Afghanistan, found himself killing an Afghan boy? …

> Can we imagine ourselves back on that awful day in the summer of 2010, in the hot firefight that went on for nine hours? Men frenzied with exhaustion and reckless exuberance, eyes and throats burning from dust and smoke, in a battle that erupted after Taliban insurgents castrated a young boy in the village, knowing his family would summon nearby Marines for help and the Marines would come, walking right into a deadly ambush.

> Here’s Nick, pausing in a lull. He spots somebody darting around the corner of an adobe wall, firing assault rifle shots at him and his Marines. Nick raises his M-4 carbine. He sees the shooter is a child, maybe 13. With only a split second to decide, he squeezes the trigger and ends the boy’s life.

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9. Modern just war ethicists are generally silent on the human dimension of just war. Lieutenant General James M. Dubik, U.S. Army (Ret.), is an exception. He has raised the issue in terms of *jus post bellum*, a nascent just war category that examines moral requirements that may apply to those who “win” wars, e.g., to restore authority, rebuild infrastructure, or provide security. See his foreword, “Expanding Our Understanding of the Moral Dimension of War,” in Nancy Sherman’s recent, insightful work on moral injury: *After War: Healing the Moral Wounds of our Soldiers* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), xi–xvii.
The body hits the ground. Now what?

“We just collected up that weapon and kept moving,” Nick explained. …

There is a long silence after Nick finishes the story. He’s lived with it for more than three years and the telling still catches in his throat. Eventually, he sighs. “He was just a kid. But I’m sorry, I’m trying not to get shot and I don’t want any of my brothers getting hurt, so when you are put in that kind of situation … it’s shitty that you have to, like … shoot him.

“You know it’s wrong. But … you have no choice.”

Almost 2 million men and women who served in Iraq or Afghanistan are flooding homeward, profoundly affected by war. Their experiences have been vivid. Dazzling in the ups, terrifying and depressing in the downs. The burning devotion of the small-unit brotherhood, the adrenaline rush of danger, the nagging fear and loneliness, the pride of service. The thrill of raw power, the brutal ecstasy of life on the edge. “It was,” said Nick, “the worst, best experience of my life.”

But the boy’s death haunts him, mired in the swamp of moral confusion and contradiction so familiar to returning veterans of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

It is what experts are coming to identify as a moral injury: the pain that results from damage to a person’s moral foundation. In contrast to Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, which springs from fear, moral injury is a violation of what each of us considers right or wrong. … [It] is increasingly acknowledged as the signature wound of this generation of veterans: a bruise on the soul, akin to grief or sorrow, with lasting impact on the individuals and on their families.10

David Wood’s account is compelling, and his distinction between PTSD and moral injury is endorsed by a mountain of recent works and studies.

Distinguishing between PTSD and moral injury is critical, because it is from the strategic requirement that the military determines capabilities needed to help soldiers. If no distinction is made, then required capabilities retain the current PTSD focus, and the problem becomes circular. Adapting the proverb, if all you have is a PTSD hammer, everything looks like a PTSD nail. We need that hammer, but also other tools.

The American Psychiatric Association offers official PTSD diagnostic criteria that run to over fifty lines of text, but also provides a simplified definition. PTSD is “an anxiety problem that develops in some people after extremely traumatic events, such as combat, crime, an accident or natural disaster,” often accompanied by flashbacks, nightmares, avoidance of event reminders, and severe, disruptive anxiety. Symptoms include a highly mobilized state of mind and body, persistent perception of danger, chronic health problems, feelings of fear and helplessness, and alcohol and drug abuse.

Only in the last twenty-five years have experts rigorously sought to define moral injury and distinguish it from PTSD. Jonathan Shay, a doctor and clinical psychiatrist, launched his seminal 1994 work, *Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character* after years of support to Vietnam veterans. For Shay, moral injury results when a person with legitimate authority betrays “what’s right” in a high stakes situation. Moral injury is a complicating overlay to physical and psychological injury. He notes, “Veterans can usually recover from horror, fear, and grief once they return to civilian life, so long as ‘what’s right’ has not also been violated.”

Ten years later, Larry Dewey, chief of psychiatry at the Boise, Idaho Veterans Affairs Medical Center, and professor of psychiatry at the University of Washington School of Medicine, published his comprehensive work, *War and Redemption*. It is based on his experiences spanning

15. Larry Dewey, *War and Redemption: Treatment and Recovery in Combat-related Posttrau-
over twenty years in treating combat veterans diagnosed with PTSD. For Dewey, PTSD reflects physiological and psychological symptoms caused by traumatic stress, but moral injury reflects “moral, spiritual and existential pain” caused by killing, or being part of the killing enterprise, in war. This results in “estrangement from God and humanity.”

Edward Tick, psychotherapist and executive director of Soldier’s Heart, a veterans’ healing initiative, authored his groundbreaking *War and the Soul* in 2005. Tick sees the arena of war as wounding the warrior’s soul and entire community. For Tick, moral injury damages self-awareness, rationality, volition, aesthetics, love, intimacy, imagination, and participation in the divine. Moreover, the more unjust the war and its conduct, the greater the moral injury.

An important 2009 study by Brett T. Litz et al. provides a helpful overview of PTSD and moral injury, establishes terms of reference, and offers a helpful conceptual framework. The study finds that PTSD is triggered when death, threatened death, or serious injury affects a victim or witness so as to bring fear, horror, or helplessness. Personal safety is lost. Moral injury is triggered when an event violates deeply held moral values so as to bring guilt, shame, or anger. The morally injured individual may be the perpetrator, the victim, or a witness. Personal trust is lost. See Table 5.1.

The 2012 work of Rita Nakashima Brock and Gabriella Lettini, *Soul Repair: Recovering from Moral Injury after War*, is noteworthy for its insights into moral injury and its candid assessment of a related military capability. For Brock and Lettini,

Moral injury results when soldiers violate their core moral beliefs, and in evaluating their behavior negatively, they feel they no longer live in a reliable, meaningful world and can no longer be re-

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18. “When the cause is unjust, whether it is the immediate individual action or the pursuit of an entire war, moral injury is inevitable.” Edward Tick, “Military Service, Moral Injury and Spiritual Wounding,” *The Military Chaplain* 89, no. 1 (Spring 2016): 4–8, quote at 5.
Table 5.1 Distinctive Elements of PTSD and Moral Injury*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PTSD</th>
<th>Moral Injury</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Triggering Event</strong></td>
<td>Actual or threatened death or serious injury</td>
<td>Acts that violate deeply held moral values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individual's role at time of event</strong></td>
<td>Victim or witness</td>
<td>Perpetrator, victim, or witness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Predominant painful emotion</strong></td>
<td>Fear, horror, helplessness</td>
<td>Guilt, shame, anger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Physiological arousal</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>What necessity is lost?</strong></td>
<td>Safety</td>
<td>Trust</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


They may feel this even if what they did was warranted and unavoidable. Killing, torturing prisoners, abusing dead bodies, or failing to prevent such acts can elicit moral injury. ... It can even emerge from witnessing a friend get killed and feeling survivor guilt.\(^{20}\)

This expansive view of moral injury may help explain high rates of suicide and PTSD for military who have served in Afghanistan and Iraq. Certainly rates are high because trauma has been high. But there is something here of the tool bag analogy, for the DoD does not yet officially recognize moral injury. Standard PTSD treatment targets trauma to the body and mind through cognitive behavioral therapy, prolonged exposure therapy, eye movement desensitization and reprocessing, and medication, but usually bypasses moral and spiritual injury. This opens the door for misdiagnosis or mistreatment—either failing to diagnose moral injury or failing to include moral and spiritual content within PTSD treatment.

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20. Rita Nakashima Brock and Gabriella Lettini, *Soul Repair: Recovering from Moral Injury after War* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2012), xv. Brock is research professor and co-director of the Soul Repair Center at Brite Divinity School, Fort Worth, TX. Lettini is dean of the faculty and the Aurelia Henry Reinhardt Professor of Theological Ethics and Studies in Public Ministry at Starr King School for the Ministry–Graduate Theological Union, Berkeley, CA.
The problem may go beyond this passive failure to treat moral injury. Brock and Lettini’s view is that the U.S. Army’s Comprehensive Soldier and Family Fitness (CSF2) program, with its spiritual dimension strategy, may unwittingly deepen moral injury. They critique CSF2’s form of spirituality as “spiritual fitness without moral conscience,” one that favours positive thinking over moral engagement. CSF2 resilience exercises ask soldiers “to practice seeing events in a neutral light instead of labeling them as good or bad.” Brock and Lettini argue that this ignores war’s moral tensions, neutralizes matters of conscience, runs counter to religious and moral traditions, and actually damages souls. “Conscience is grounded in empathy and compassion for others and the capacity to recognize what is good and to know when something is profoundly wrong. That so many veterans manage to hold on to moral conscience in the face of so much pressure to suppress it, and suffer to the point of suicide rather than abandon their souls, is testimony to the resilience of conscience.”

To sum up, within the growing body of research on moral injury, each study has its own accent, but together they persuasively argue that moral injury must be addressed on its own terms, which are moral, spiritual, and religious. This is problematic for the military, which has shown hesitancy toward—perhaps even bias against—acknowledging the dimension of the soul. Military resilience, fitness, and medical concepts focus almost exclusively on the neuro-biological. The military does not officially recognize moral injury. Silence on moral injury may reflect the functional imperative of combat effectiveness, but this does not justify turning a blind eye to the nature of moral injury and the social imperative of compassion.

21. On CSF2, see U.S. Department of the Army, Comprehensive Soldier and Family Fitness, Army Regulation 350-53 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, June 19, 2014). CSF2 is a critical resource within the U.S. Army’s Ready and Resilient campaign, which “integrates and synchronizes multiple efforts and initiatives to improve readiness and resilience of the Total Army… Ready and Resilient will build upon mental, physical, emotional, behavioral and spiritual resources … to manage the rigors and challenges of a demanding profession.” The Army’s Ready and Resilient website offers objectives and critical resources for the first four categories, but not for the spiritual: https://www.army.mil/readyandresilient. For a critique on the omission of religion and spirituality within the Ready and Resilient campaign and the CSF2 program, see Brian Koyn, “Religious Participation: The Missing Link in the Ready and Resilient Campaign,” Military Review 95, no. 5 (September-October 2015): 2–12.

Integrating the Soul from War to Peace: Required Capabilities

Men against Fire, an epic work on World War II combat effectiveness, illustrates how this tension between the imperatives can play out in war. U.S. Army combat historian S. L. A. Marshall found that only about one quarter of American soldiers fired on the enemy when engaged in combat. He credited American morality, but questioned the combat efficiency.

The average and normally healthy individual—the man that can endure the mental and physical stresses of combat—still has such an inner and usually unrealized resistance toward killing a fellow man that he will not of his own volition take life if it is possible to turn away from that responsibility. … At the vital point, he becomes a conscientious objector, unknowingly. That is something to the American credit. But it is likewise something which needs to be analyzed and understood if we are to prevail against it in the interests of battle efficiency.23

Dave Grossman’s volume, On Killing, explores the related pain of citizens raised by a society never to kill, serving as soldiers trained to kill.24 Grossman argues, “Killing is what war is all about, and killing in combat, by its very nature, causes deep wounds of pain and guilt.”25 Waging war necessarily presents an internal, as well as an external, struggle: “The force of darkness and destruction within us is balanced with a force of light and love for our fellow man. These forces struggle and strive within the heart of each of us. … We cannot know life if we do not acknowledge death.”26

Here our inquiry necessarily engages theology. The struggle to find life in the context of death has been documented in liturgical proclamations of the Easter resurrection for 2,000 years. Grossman’s quote touch-

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24. David A. Grossman, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society, rev. ed. (New York: Back Bay Books, 2009). Grossman argues that combat is necessarily impulsive, i.e., exercised according to the impulse to defend one’s life or the life of a comrade. Battle drills hinge on taking such impulses and forming effective, often lethal, “instinctive” responses. For Grossman, close-quarters killing merges experientially with the procreative act. “The link between sex and war and the process of denial in both fields are well represented by Richard Heckler’s observation that ‘it is in the mythological marriage of Ares [the god of war] and Aphrodite [the god of sex] that Harmonia is born,’” 137.
26. Ibid., 137.
es the Latin antiphon, *Media vita in morte sumus* ("In the midst of life we are in death"), dating perhaps from 750 CE. The entire antiphon reads:

In the midst of life we are in death;
From whom can we seek help?
From You alone, O Lord,
Who by our sins are justly angered.
Holy God, holy and mighty, holy and merciful Savior;
Deliver us not into the bitterness of eternal death.27

*Media vita* expresses well the existential and theological struggle of soldiers who, in taking life, face their own culpability and mortality. Theologian Werner Elert calls this form of moral injury *Urerlebnis* (the primal experience of God). It includes guilt from sin, but grows into hostility toward God. A corrupted world leaves none uncompromised, so even “doing one’s best” condemns the conscience before a hidden God who controls all and who holds each person accountable. In theology, *Urerlebnis* leads to a brokenness which makes room for wholeness and healing. The wounded seek help in community before the revealed God, who brings peace by participating in their pain, taking their punishment, and overcoming it.28 This is the power of religious redemption for human reconciliation and moral healing. The morally injured soul requires authentic moral engagement.

Existential theologian Paul Tillich calls humanity’s primal experience “the anxiety of non-being,” threatening man with emptiness, guilt, condemnation, and death.29 Here we sense the depth of moral injury suffered by veterans, and the possibility of an open horizon through religious, spiritual, and moral means. Notions of moral injury as mere

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27. Commission on Worship of The Lutheran Church–Missouri Synod, *Pastoral Care Companion* (St. Louis: Concordia, 2007), 126.
deficiency in spiritual fitness and positive thinking are inadequate.

Moral injury may overlay the physical and mental trauma of war, but it must be addressed on its own terms. Killing, seeing a friend killed, failing to prevent immoral acts—any violation of deeply held moral values and spiritual meaning—can trigger debilitating guilt, shame, and anxiety in the soul. It is a strategic military requirement to offer soldiers a way of redemption that brings help and healing for such deep wounds.

Society needs effective warriors for its defence, but the very practice of warfighting attacks the empathy, conscience, and faith needed to sustain soldiers. This is the paradox of the moral warrior. This tension recapitulates *jus incurvatus in se*, which seeks inner peace for the peacemaker.

We now turn to our third line of inquiry, the U.S. Army Operating Concept (AOC). Our assessments of just war and moral injury have shown that integrating the soul is a strategic requirement for empowering soldiers as warfighters. How does the AOC, together with its supporting Army Human Dimension Strategy, address related capabilities?

**The U.S. Army Operating Concept**

In 2014, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command published *The U.S. Army Operating Concept (AOC): Win in a Complex World.* In the broadest terms, the AOC focuses on the years 2020–2040 and seeks to provide a conceptual framework for winning that will synchronize all elements of national power and “provide the Joint Force with multiple options, integrate the efforts of multiple partners, operate across multiple domains, and present our enemies and adversaries with multiple dilemmas.” In a world viewed as unknowable and constantly changing, the AOC does not try to tell the future, but instead describes the likely operational environment, discusses strategic challenges, and covers principles and tenets for how the Army will operate.

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31. TRADOC, AOC, iii.
32. The AOC describes a likely operational environment with increased momentum in the areas of human interaction, adversary overmatch, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cyber- and counter-space capabilities, urban size, and operational complexities. TRADOC, AOC, 10–12.
Given the range of assigned missions, the multiplicity of partners and domains, the diversity of security challenges, and especially the unknowable and changing future, the AOC ends up emphasizing capabilities that are broad and adaptive rather than narrow and fixed. The continuities of war take precedence over changing forms of warfare, such as grey zone or hybrid warfare.

This, in turn, leads the AOC to seek to develop resilient and adaptive soldiers through a technology focus area called human performance optimization:

Advances in cognitive, behavioral, and learning sciences will improve critical thinking, increase cognitive and physical performance, foster intuition and social empathy, improve health and stamina, facilitate talent management, enhance leader training, and strengthen unit cohesion. Human performance technologies will help the Army develop adaptive leaders, resilient Soldiers, and cohesive teams that thrive in uncertain, dangerous, and chaotic environments.\(^{33}\)

The Army Human Dimension Strategy (AHDS), published in 2015, fleshes out this required capability around two key concepts: optimizing human performance and building teams that thrive in operational ambiguity and chaos.\(^{34}\) The AHDS also offers supporting objectives for improving physical and mental performance, and building individual and team resilience and adaptability.

Assessing the human dimension capability within the AOC and AHDS, it is important to note the sound research documented in the cognitive and physical realms of human performance optimization. The AHDS will almost certainly help improve physical and mental performance, and build a measure of individual and team resilience and adaptability. By integrating mission command, earned trust, and the Army Ethic, the AOC and its supporting AHDS keep chiefly on solid ground—but not entirely.

In a profession that iconizes spirit and sacrifice, it is surprising to find absolute faith in scientific physical and mental performance enhancement and social science adaptation theory, to the exclusion of the deeper aspects of what it means to be human. There is an emerg-
ing, near-Orwellian omission of religion, spirituality, and morality—silence regarding how individuals, teams, and the larger community find strength in God, family, religious fellowship, spiritual discipline, and/or moral values to confront ambiguity, darkness, and even death. There is a certain sterility in the AOC and AHDS that misses these enlivening elements which soldiers and families bring with them into the military, which are further shaped by their military experiences, and which empower service across the spectrum of operations from war to peace. And the fact that the particulars vary—that soldiers claim different religions, forms of spirituality, or moral values—only highlights the overarching omission. An adaptable and resilient human dimension capability requires nurturing the moral, spiritual, and religious commitments of soldiers. This honours the personal demands of just war, moral injury, and the free exercise of religion.

This is where the AHDS and human performance optimization need to improve. Faith in scientific physical and mental performance enhancement and social science adaptation theory may be well placed, as scoped by the AOC and AHDS, but faith can extend farther based on a fuller understanding of what it means to be human.

We must ask: What capability is required to build character in soldiers, to build resolve against all odds, to empower soldiers to find trust after moral injury, to find peace when the demands of justice curve in on the warrior, to find affirmation when faced morally with guilt, spiritually with emptiness, and unequivocally with death? Such moral challenges have always existed for soldiers. The capability must strengthen the body and mind, but also the soul, the essential element of human empowerment.

Moral, spiritual, and religious empowerment has long been a military strategic requirement that leaders have worked to ensure. In 1941 as the United States anticipated the war that lay ahead, General George C. Marshall affirmed the operational importance of the soldier’s soul:

> The soldier’s heart, the soldier’s spirit, the soldier’s soul, are everything. Unless the soldier’s soul sustains him he cannot be relied on and will fail himself and his commander and his country in the end. … It is true that war is fought with physical weapons of flame and steel but it is not the mere possession of these weapons, or the use of them, that wins the struggle. They are indispensable but in the final analysis it is the human spirit that achieves the ultimate decision.35

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35. From George C. Marshall’s speech on 15 June 1941 at Trinity College, Hartford,
Similarly, General William Slim credited the spiritual foundation of morale, over the physical and mental foundations, as decisive. Reflecting on having turned the completely demoralized Fourteenth Army into an effective fighting unit in the Burma Campaign, Slim wrote,

Morale … is that intangible force which will move a whole group of men to give their last ounce to achieve something, without counting the cost to themselves; that makes them feel they are part of something greater than themselves. If they are to feel that, their morale must; if it is to endure—and the essence of morale is that it should endure—have certain foundations. These foundations are spiritual, intellectual, and material, and that is the order of their importance. Spiritual first, because only spiritual foundations can stand real strain.36

In his 1962 Thayer Award Address, General Douglas MacArthur also offered an assessment of the soldier’s spirit anchored in the divine. After more than fifty years of military service, he concluded that:

The soldier, above all other men, is required to practice the greatest act of religious training—sacrifice.

In battle and in the face of danger and death, he discloses those divine attributes which his Maker gave when he created man in his own image. No physical courage and no brute instinct can take the place of the Divine help which alone can sustain him.37

This strategic requirement for strength of soul cannot be relegated to the mists of history. Harold Koenig, Dana E. King, and Verna Ben-

ner Carson have compiled a monumental collection of peer-reviewed quantitative research demonstrating the positive correlation of religion to health: 1,200 studies from 1872 to 2000, and 2,100 from 2000 to 2010. Over two-thirds of the studies found religious/spiritual people to be healthier, emotionally more positive, and socially more stable, with lower rates of depression, suicidal ideation, and substance abuse. In a 2012 review, Koenig emphasized the requirement for spirituality within human care.

The research findings, a desire to provide high-quality care, and simply common sense, all underscore the need to integrate spirituality into patient care. ... At stake is the health and wellbeing of our patients and satisfaction that we as health care providers experience in delivering care that addresses the whole person—body, mind, and spirit.

The Army’s own 2009 combat soldier survey, Excellence in Character, Ethics, and Leadership (EXCEL), reached similar conclusions on the operational importance of religion and spirituality to well-being and human empowerment. Based on quantitative research data gathered from over 1,250 soldiers in the combat zone of Iraq, the study found “notable correlations between spirituality, ethical attitudes and action, and personal resilience. ... Three specific factors emerged as correlative and included within the domain of spirituality: connection to others, religious identification, and hopeful outlook.”

It is interesting that almost all military senior leaders today have studied the great war theorist Carl von Clausewitz, but many have missed his insights on the role of the spirit in soldier empowerment and operational success. It is commonplace for American students of Clausewitz to identify his paradoxical trinity as the government providing the aims of war, the people providing the passions for war, and the military providing the talent to fight the war. But these three—government,
people, and military—were actually projections onto the power structures of his day. They were projections of the paradoxical trinity present within the human being—reason (mind), emotions (body), and spirit (soul). For Clausewitz, reason tended to limit war and set objectives, emotions kindled the violence of war, and spirit exercised creativity in the context of war’s uncertainties and probabilities. The spirit was at work through the military, so that coup d’oeil penetrated the fog of war and determination overcame the friction of war.41

Conclusion: Required Capabilities for the Soldier’s Soul

In sum, the demands of justice curved in on the warfighter, the distinctive nature of moral injury, the complexities and ambiguities of the AOC, the philosophical and theological depth of what it means to be human, the historical understanding of battlefield empowerment, the volume of peer-reviewed quantitative research studies, and even the Clausewitzian theory of war with its paradoxical trinity all underscore the strategic requirement to strengthen the soul of the warrior. The soldier requires moral, spiritual, and religious empowerment for human resilience and mission success. And the fact that soldiers turn to different religious faiths, spiritual practices, and moral constructs to strengthen their souls only confirms the need to bring forward broad DOTMLPF-P solution sets that integrate the soul, to develop resilient soldiers and adaptive leaders who succeed. Recommendations include:

**Doctrine**

1. Adjust the AHDS beyond human performance optimization to include empowerment from moral commitments, spirituality, and religion. Acknowledge the breadth of what it means to be human. Establish a chaplain in the Army Human Dimension Capability Development organization within the Mission Command Center of Excellence. Doctrine talks about how soldiers fight, so it is essential to include more holistically how soldiers are empowered to fight.42

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41. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976). On the paradoxical trinity, see 75. On projection onto the power structures of his day, see 89. On coup d’oeil and determination, see 102. Clausewitz also sees the spirit at work in the intellect and character of military leaders, but these are not central to his paradoxical trinity; 104–105.

42. The Army Human Dimension Capability Development organization will operate as part of AHDS governance. The organization will analyze human dimension efforts
2. Adjust the Army Ethic framework to include the moral, spiritual, and religious foundations of the individual, built on an understanding of the human as body, mind, and spirit. This will provide a better basis for addressing just war qualms, moral injury, and spiritual empowerment. The Army Ethic articulates the moral dimension at the heart of the Army Profession, and its current expression is otherwise sound.43

3. Adjust doctrinal terms throughout the Army lexicon to honor moral injury and sacrifice, reducing dehumanization. For example, change “ramp ceremony” to “fallen soldier farewell,” or “boots on the ground” to “soldier presence.”44

Organization

4. Resource chaplains and religious affairs specialists at every battalion and higher echelon, and at garrison and forward bases, to strengthen the soldier’s soul. These unit ministry teams (UMTs) deliver the DoD’s Title 10 religious support and pastoral care for all soldiers, families, and authorized civilians. UMT forward presence is essential for helping soldiers in “the valley of the shadow” of moral injury and just war qualms. Operational unit UMTs deliver support across the spectrum of operations. They also add faith-based capability and capacity for UMTs assigned to garrisons and forward bases, who provide comprehensive religious support and pastoral care programs.45

Training

and capability gaps, develop and implement solutions, and ensure unity of effort among Army-wide stakeholders; TRADOC, AHDS, 10–11.


44. “A ramp ceremony is a solemn ceremony for a service member who dies while deployed,” U.S. Department of the Army, Religious Support to Funerals and Memorial Ceremonies and Services, Army Techniques Publication 1-05.02, Change 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, November 12, 2013), paragraph 2-18, 2–3.

45. At the battalion level, the UMT consists of one chaplain (officer) and one religious affairs specialist (enlisted). See U.S. Department of the Army, Religious Activities: Army Chaplain Corps Activities, Army Regulation 165-1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, June 23, 2015).
5. Train soldiers on combat effectiveness and moral healing, to reduce rates of just war qualms and moral injury. Conduct this training during initial entry training; before, during, and after deployments; and during transition from the military. Military effectiveness may require reflexive firing, but spiritual survival requires candid discussions of the personal cost of just war, moral injury, and healing.46

Leader development and education

6. Educate the force on quantitative research documenting how religious and spiritual practice within communities of faith correlates positively with health, relationship stability, and positive emotions. Broaden the CSF2 program to include this research and offer links to faith communities.

7. Adjust leader development curricula during career education and pre-command courses to include discussion of religious, spiritual, and moral resources to address just war qualms and moral injury.

Policy

8. Adjust DoD policy to honour and celebrate religious traditions with the same prominence as other equal opportunity protected categories.47 Use a recurring DoD observance to honour the military contributions of soldiers of various faiths and to support spiritual empowerment for personal resilience and mission success.

9. Adjust DoD policy to recognize and resource treatment for moral injury. Moral injury may overlay traumatic stress, but must be recognized and treated on its own terms. Place a chaplain on the

46. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to catalog and assess community practices, spiritual disciplines, and theological insights that lift up those pressed down by just war curated in on the warfighter, that help those suffering moral injury and emptiness, that redeem those threatened by guilt, condemnation, and death. Each of the authors referenced above makes significant contributions. Of particular note, Walzer documents the moral friction of just war solutions, Tick focuses on restorative community rituals such as purification and storytelling, Elert reveals a God who suffers for and with His people and brings peace through His victory over death, and Dewey shows how truth, mercy, service, and forgiveness bring meaning and healing.

PTSD/moral injury treatment team. Use a recurring DoD observance and a new award for moral courage to highlight this commitment to soldiers.

10. Adjust DoD policy to include religious, spiritual, and moral elements within medical treatment protocols to ensure holistic care. Medical teams should ask patients if they self-identify according to any faith-specific beliefs or practices, ask if they have any related concerns or requests, and then consider appropriate referrals in treatment plans.

Change is hard, but wisdom is vindicated by her children. Integrating the soul for human empowerment in the military raises questions on the limits of secularization, digitization, and human performance optimization. But it offers a way forward that takes seriously the breadth of what it means to be human, the gravity of prosecuting just war and suffering moral injury, and the moral aspiration of finding motivation and life, even in the midst of death. I encourage stakeholders to take a balanced approach that honours the First Amendment’s establishment and free exercise clauses, the functional and social imperatives, and the limited costs of these proposals. I remain hopeful because the strategic requirement is crystal clear: the soldier requires moral, spiritual, and religious empowerment for human resilience and mission success in military operations from war to peace.

**Note**

The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policy of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the United States government.
Envoi

These papers represent the presentations made at the conference that best captured the central themes of each panel, while providing deeper context and a richer exploration of the data and analysis. If the papers have sparked an interest, consider viewing the remainder of the presentations—they are available on the Kingston Conference on International Security website at http://www.queensu.ca/kcis/home.

While you are there, have a look at the 2017 Kingston Conference on International Security agenda. We look forward to national security stakeholders and critical thinkers joining us at next year’s conference entitled, “Developing the Super Soldier: Enhancing Military Performance.” At the 2017 conference we will expand on the soldier development theme from 2016, taking a closer look at cutting-edge ways that soldier performance will be enhanced through optimization, intervention, and augmentation. This conference will take place 12–14 June 2017 in Kingston. Keep a lookout for our conference report, panel videos, and compilation of papers following this important event.