USSTRATCOM NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

INTERIM UPDATE ON READINESS OF

THE 91 MISSILE WING

23-27 SEPTEMBER 2013
(U) **EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW:**

(U/FOUO) Bottom line, as an interim update to the Commander USSTRATCOM on the readiness of the 91 Missile Wing (MW), a USSTRATCOM team led by Brigadier General Fred Stoss visited the 91 MW on 22-27 September 2013. The team determined that the 91 MW conducts ICBM operations, maintenance, and security in a manner that is safe, secure and effective. Leadership across the wing is engaged and effective. The Operations Group has made significant progress in correcting the issues stemming from the recent Consolidated Unit Inspection (CUI). Maintenance technical operations were error-free. Security Forces and supporting elements performed exceptionally well during two delay/deny/recapture exercises. In summary, the 91 MW capably executes its day-to-day mission and is on a glide slope for a satisfactory result with their pending Nuclear Surety Inspection (NSI).

(U/FOUO) On 4-13 March 2013, Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC) conducted a CUI of the 91 MW. The overall CUI rating for the 91 MW was “SATISFACTORY” with 23 separately graded items. One item, ICBM Operations, was graded as “marginal,” all others were “satisfactory” or better. Two areas of concern primarily led to the “marginal” grade in ICBM Operations—sub-standard missile crew performance during simulator evaluation scenarios and in Emergency War Order (EWO) testing. Subsequently, root cause analysis and associated countermeasures were developed and implemented for these areas.

(U/FOUO) On 4-7 September 2013, HQ 20 AF conducted an Operations Assessment to validate the corrective actions focusing on the two areas of concern stemming from the CUI. During this assessment, missile crews performed well, with 11 of 12 crews passing evaluations in the simulator, and 72 of 75 crew members passing a no-notice EWO test. Both the evaluations and the tests were written and administered by Higher Headquarters and not the local unit.

(U/FOUO) On 22-30 September 2013, AFGSC conducted a Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit (NSSAV) to assist the 91 MW on a non-attribution basis. The HQ AFGSC team (that included HQ 20 AF personnel) was professional, thorough and had considerable subject-matter expertise. Four USSTRATCOM observers were present on 22-27 September 2013 to provide an interim update to Commander USSTRATCOM on the readiness of the 91 MW.

(U) **BACKGROUND:**

(U/FOUO) On 4-13 March 2013, AFGSC conducted a CUI on the 91 MW. The CUI is an AFGSC initiative that combines several inspections to reduce the overall inspection footprint, allowing units more time to train and to accomplish the mission. The overall CUI rating for the 91 MW was “SATISFACTORY” (on a 5-tier scale) with 23 separately graded items.

(U/FOUO) Of the 23 items, one item, ICBM Operations, was rated “marginal”—all others were graded “satisfactory,” or better. Sub-standard performance in the 91 Operations Group, specifically, in the Missile Procedures Trainer (MPT) and with Emergency War Order (EWO) testing, were the core factors for the “marginal” grade in ICBM Operations.

(U/FOUO) Figure 1 illustrates the cycle immediately prior to implementing the CUI initiative, named Combat Capability Evaluations (CCEs). A relative gap in performance between the 91
MW and other wings is indicated in the CCE inspection cycle prior to the most recent 91 MW CUI. Figure 1 also compares the most recent 91 MW CUI performance to the other missile wings.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Historical comparative analysis</th>
<th>MPT</th>
<th>EWO pass rate (Pass/Group: Test Avg)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>91 MW - CCE (26 Apr–7 May 2010)</strong></td>
<td>HQ 8  Q 3  UQ 2</td>
<td>91% (52/57; 95%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>90 MW - CCE (7-16 Feb 2011)</strong></td>
<td>HQ 14  Q 1  UQ 1</td>
<td>98% (55/56; 97%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>341 MW - CCE (21-30 Mar 2011)</strong></td>
<td>HQ 14  Q 2  UQ 0</td>
<td>96% (54/56; 97%)</td>
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</tbody>
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(U//FOUO) Note: The lack of data for the 90 MW CUI was due to minimal MPT testing and no EWO testing. The CUI inspection system was adjusted to include additional MPT testing and EWO testing in subsequent inspections.

(U//FOUO) Figure 1: Historical CCE Performance from 2010-11 Cycle and Recent CUI Performance from 2012-13 Cycle.

(U//FOUO) Furthermore, when analyzing inspection data more broadly and looking specifically at NSIs as well as Limited NSIs (LNSIs) and Defense NSIs (DNSIs), the 91 MW’s performance in other higher headquarters inspections is unremarkable in comparison to the other two MWs (see Figure 2 on the next page).
(U//FOUO) **Figure 2:** DNSI, NSI and LNSI Inspection Results (Satisfactory/Unsatisfactory) for the Missile Wings, 2008-2013.

(U) **ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS AND CORRECTIVE MEASURES:**

(U//FOUO) Following the 91 MW’s 2013 CUI, AFGSC initiated a Root Cause Analysis (RCA) effort led by HQ AFGSC, including additional personnel from HQ USSTRATCOM, HQ 20 AF and the 91 MW. The team determined the root causes of the issues discovered in ICBM Operations during the 2013 CUI and also proposed countermeasures. On 5 August 2013, Lieutenant General Kowalski, the Commander of AFGSC, presented the briefing to General Kehler, Commander USSTRATCOM. Four root causes were identified as well as associated counter-measures:

- (U//FOUO) Inadequate Training: Training products and tools were not properly utilized. Countermeasures included improving EWO self-study, instructor utilization, and incorporate nuclear surety and lessons learned.

- (U//FOUO) Measurement tools not properly implemented: The number of no-notice evaluations was insufficient and exams were not proctored. Countermeasures included proctoring exams, meeting requirements for no-notice evaluations, giving T-1 tests one month after training and 20 AF providing standardized exams on a quarterly basis.

- (U//FOUO) Lack of leadership: A culture of accountability was not fostered by operations group senior leadership. Countermeasures included establishing a professional development program, senior leader mentorship and encouraging constructive feedback.

- (U//FOUO) Insufficient leadership (e.g. Field Grade Officer) manning: Key mid-level leadership billets were left unmanned. Countermeasures included filling gapped billets, meeting combat requirements effectively, and utilizing Weapons Officers appropriately.

(U//FOUO) The effectiveness of the implemented countermeasures was subsequently validated via the HQ 20 AF Operational Assessment and the HQ AFGSC NSSAV.
(U) VALIDATION OF CORRECTIVE MEASURES:

(U//FOUO) HQ 20 AF Operational Assessment. On 4-7 September 2013, HQ 20 AF conducted an Operations Assessment focusing on 91 MW CUI areas of concern--performance issues in MPT scenarios and EWO testing. 20 AF observed 12 Missile Combat Crews in MPT scenarios resulting in all scoring Qualification Level 1 (Q1) or higher, with the exception of one Qualification Level 3 (Q3) rating. Seventy-five crew members received an EWO test yielding a 95.6% average and a 96% pass rate.

(U//FOUO) AFGSC NSSAV. On 23-30 September 2013, HQ AFGSC (with augmentation by HQ 20 AF) conducted a NSSAV to assist 91 MW on a non-attribution basis. The NSSAV focused on six mission areas: operations, PRP, maintenance, nuclear surety, nuclear security and nuclear certified equipment management. The AFGSC staff identified 23 strengths, 45 observations and 16 recommended improvement areas and the visit culminated with a comprehensive report provided to the 91 MW/CC.

(U//FOUO) USSTRATCOM Interim Update. On 23-27 September 2013, HQ USSTRATCOM conducted an independent interim update on the readiness of the 91 MW. Details are provided immediately below.

(U) USSTRATCOM Interim Update:

(U//FOUO) Bottom line, as an interim update to the Commander USSTRATCOM on readiness of the 91 MW, a USSTRATCOM team led by Brigadier General Fred Stoss determined the 91 MW conducts ICBM operations, maintenance, and security in a manner that is safe, secure and effective. Leadership across the wing is engaged and effective. The Operations Group has made significant progress in correcting the issues stemming from the recent CUI. Maintenance technical operations were error-free. Security Forces and supporting elements performed exceptionally well during two deny/delay/recapture exercises. In summary, the 91 MW capably executes its day-to-day mission and is on a glide slope for a satisfactory result with their pending NSI.

(U//FOUO) This interim assessment is based on the HQ AFGSC and HQ 20 AF visits/reports provided to USSTRATCOM, as well as observations by the USSTRATCOM team of select events during the NSSAV.

(U//FOUO) The HQ AFGSC team (that included HQ 20 AF personnel) was professional and thorough, and had considerable subject-matter expertise. Their assistance, observations and recommendations will further improve the wing. With that said, an NSSAV cannot look at every activity, task and/or team to ensure success for an upcoming NSI. The 91 MW must continue to be self-critical and find issues and problems, and then properly implement enduring corrective actions and validation measures.

(U//FOUO) Operations: Overall, the 91 OG demonstrated significant improvement post-CUI and performed well. Targeting assignments and coding were verified as correct with minor administrative discrepancies noted.

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(U//FOUO) MPT. Twelve NSI-type scenarios were presented to missile combat crews with three minor errors. The scenarios presented in the MPT tested security, weapon system safety rules, weapon system, and EWO knowledge. Missile combat crews demonstrated strong performances during the NSI-style MPT scenarios.

(U//FOUO) EWO Testing. The AFGSC NSSAV did not administer EWO testing. However, during the HQ 20 AF Operations Assessment, a significant number of crew members were tested (75 in total) and posted a 96% pass rate and an overall test score average of 95.6%. HQ USSTRATCOM and HQ AFGSC observed one EWO classroom training session. The training was thorough and the test was properly proctored.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessments after corrective measures</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>91 MW – CUI</strong> (4-13 Mar 2013)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>91 MW – 20AF Operations Assessment</strong> (4-7 Sep 2013)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q1</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>91 MW – AFGSC NSSAV</strong> (22-30 Sep 2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q1</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Cumulative</strong></td>
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<td>Q1</td>
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(U//FOUO) Figure 3: Comparison of MPT/EWO Performance of HQ 20 AF Operations Assessment & HQ AFGSC NSSAV to CUI.

(U//FOUO) Launch Control Center (LCC) Observations. AFGSC visited all 15 LCCs within a two-day period. Overall performance was solid.

(U//FOUO) Targeting. A complete targeting audit was accomplished by the 625 STOS/OSK personnel—all targeting was accurate with minor administrative issues.

(U//FOUO) Codes. All LF and LCC configuration records were reviewed with no discrepancies. Code controller and handler records were reviewed with minor administrative corrections.

(U//FOUO) Maintenance: Overall, the 91 MXG demonstrated the ability to execute maintenance actions with proficiency. AFGSC observed a variety of technical operations.
nuclear certified equipment management, payload-transporter maintenance/support equipment with only minor observations noted.

(U/FOUO) Technical Operations. AFGSC observed several technical operations with zero observations, to include tape-load start up, code-change verifier tasks, re-entry system mating and a NS50 MGS certification. Job knowledge, adherence to technical data, concern for safety as well as proper control of code components was noteworthy. The maintenance team chiefs were engaged, maintained control of the evolution and demonstrated expert knowledge.

(U/FOUO) Nuclear Certified Equipment. One hundred-forty five pieces of handling gear were inspected with minor discrepancies corrected on the spot.

(U/FOUO) Tools. Test. Tiedown and Handling Equipment. Most tools, test, tie-down and handling equipment were inspected as well as four Payload Transporter trailers and five tractors with minor observations.

(U/FOUO) Security: Overall, the 91 MW demonstrated a strong capability to protect, and if necessary, deny, delay and recapture critical assets. Defenders were motivated and performed well as a whole. More focus is warranted with procedural standardization for entry procedures, weapons storage/configuration/issue, and accomplishment of Air Force Instruction-mandated tasks for Security Forces.

(U/FOUO) Deny/Delay/Recapture Exercises. The results of the launch facility, convoy, and flight exercises indicate a ready security posture/force, to include the 54 Helicopter Squadron, Tactical and Convoy Response Flights, and in field security forces. A responsive and well-orchestrated response by the 91 MW demonstrated that they are capable and willing to provide a safe and secure missile complex.

(U/FOUO) Missile Security Control and the Keys and Codes Control Center met all critical standards and accomplished their duties with precision and discipline.

(U) Other:

(U/FOUO) Personnel Reliability Program (PRP). The PRP across the wing, to include the important interaction with the 5 Bomb Wing, is effective. The AFGSC team reviewed 112 medical records with only minor discrepancies. In addition, 152 individual personnel folders and all Unfavorable Information Files were reviewed without any significant PRP concerns. The AFGSC team also interviewed ten Certifying Officials and fourteen Program Managers with no discrepancies or concerns.

(U/FOUO) Nuclear Surety Program. A total of 417 personnel were tested with one failure and an overall wing average of 93.6%.
USSTRATCOM IG

91 MV Exception

CAPT David G. Fry
Inspector General
28 June 2013

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This slide is classified: UNCLASSIFIED
Purpose

- Provide assessment of ICBM Operations portion of 91 MW Consolidated Unit Inspection (CUI)
- Provide assessment of Root Cause Analysis (RCA) for 91 MW CUI Marginal rating in ICBM Operations
- Recommend follow-on actions to ensure confidence in 91 MW ICBM Operations
USSTRATCOM IG with J3N SME Support Reviewed:

- 91 MW Consolidated Unit Inspection
  - Missile Procedures Trainer (MPT) Scenarios
  - Weapon System Tests
  - Code Handler Tests
  - Emergency War Order (EWO) Tests – High Missed Questions Examined
  - Schedule of Events

- 341 MW Consolidated Unit Inspection (December 2012)
  - Missile Procedures Trainer (MPT) Scenarios
  - Weapon System Tests
  - Code Handler Tests
  - Emergency War Order (EWO) Tests – High Missed Questions Examined

- 90 MW Consolidated Unit Inspection Report (May 2012)
- 341 MW Combat Capability Evaluation Report (March 2009)

Conclusion: 91 MW CUI was rigorous, fair, and consistent with previous ICBM inspections with similar objectives
Assessment of Root Cause Analysis

- USSTRATCOM IG with J3N SME Support
  - Interviewed
    - USSTRATCOM AFSO-21 Event Participants
    - AFGSC/IG, AFGSC/DA3, and TF-214 Leadership/SMEs
  - Reviewed
    - AFGSC/DA3 AFSO Event Briefing
    - AFSO-21 Root Cause Analysis (RCA) and Countermeasures

- Conclusion
  - AFSO-21 Event was deliberate and sufficiently detailed
  - RCA was methodical, thorough and effective
  - RCA Countermeasures are sufficiently comprehensive and appropriate to correct identified problem areas
Follow-on Actions

- RCA Countermeasure OPRs are identified and estimated completion dates are being established (15 July 2013)
  - USSTRATCOM Staff tracking AFGSC implementation through completion
Options

- Recommendation:

- Option 1:
  - Pros
  - Cons
- Option 2:
  - Pros
  - Cons

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Slide # 6
Other Materials Reviewed

- AFGSC/DA3 AFSO Event Briefing
- Weapon System Safety Rule (WSSR) Event
- 91 OG/CD “Did you Know?” E-Mail
- Air Force Smart Operations for the 21st Century (AFSO-21) Playbook
- AFSO-21 Event Survey Summation (Draft)
- AFGSC NORI Waiver for Inspection Realignment
- AFI90-201 AFGSC Supplement The Air Force Inspection System
- AFGSCI13-5301 Vol. 4 Rapid Execution and Combat Targeting (REACT) EWO Training and Evaluation Procedures (S)
General Kehler,

In response to your query, attached is the complete (unredacted) report of the Consolidated Unit Inspection (CUI) of the 91st Missile Wing (91 MW). The ICBM Operations grade of Marginal is addressed on pages 15 through 18.

<<...>>

While three minor deficiencies were assessed, the driving factors behind the Marginal rating in ICBM Operations were the Missile Combat Crew’s performance in Missile Procedures Trainers (MPT) and their results on an Emergency War Orders (EWO) test.

- Eleven Missile Combat Crews completed an IG-administered MPT evaluation resulting in five Q1s (qualified), three Q2s (qualified with deficiencies) and three Q3s (not qualified). This is significantly below the performance seen by the AFGSC IG on other evaluations.

- 36 missile combat crew members completed an IG-developed EWO test with a 75% pass rate and an overall test average of 93%. Passing score for an individual on this exam is 90%. A failure rate of 25% and an overall average of 93% is significantly worse than that seen on other inspections, which typically run less than 10% failure rate.

This was the first CUI of the 91 MW since the CUI program was implemented. I’ll provide you with the historical results for Nuclear Weapons inspections of the Missile Wings shortly.

v/r Dave

David G. Fry, CAPT, USN
Inspector General (J005)
U.S. Strategic Command
901 SAC Blvd STE 1H9
Offutt AFB NE 68113
Dave -- I’m going to give you a call shortly to discuss, but I’m also going to have our A3/5, Col Paul Johnson, put together a summary of actions taken, including results so far (we have a team at Minot right now).

Paul -- please put together a summary of your directorates support to date. Please also include the support from AFGSC/A3 as well as Col (sel) Sauls’ visit too.

V/r
Scott

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Vice Commander, 20 AF / TF-214
307.773.5210 (DSN 481)
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-----Original Message-----
From: FOX, SCOTT M Col USAF AFGSC 20 AF/CV <scott.fox@us.af.mil>
Sent: Thursday, May 09, 2013 3:10 PM
To: FOX, SCOTT M Col USAF AFGSC 20 AF/CV
Cc: CAREY, MICHAEL J MajGen USAF AFGSC 20 AF/CC; Stoss Ferdinand B Brig Gen GS-15 USAF AFGSC AFGSC/DA3; Fry David NMI CAPT USSTRATCOM J005; HESTERMAN, THOMAS P Col USAF AFGSC AFGSC/IG; NORDEL, DAVID R CMSgt USAF AFGSC 20 AF/CC; LtCol USAF AFGSC 20 AF/A3D
Subject: RE: Gen Kehler Testimony regarding 91 MW - Corrective Action Monitoring

Scott,

I just got off the phone with CAPT Dave Fry from USSTRATCOM/J005. We spoke about the things that were being done to ensure the 91st is successful and I mentioned that 20 AF (with assistance from A31) is currently conducting a re-look at the 91 OG. He said he would be interested in the results. I said that you would be the best person to speak with since it was 20 AF/CC directed.

I have cc’d CAPT Fry on this email.

Best,
Scott

1
Gen Kehler has asked his IG, USN CAPT Dave Fry, to monitor the 91st MW recovery. Can you please read his note below and keep him in the loop as we move forward?

VR,
Tom

---Original Message------
From: Fry David NMI CAPT USSTRATCOM/J005 [mailto:FRYDG@stratcom.mil]
Sent: Thursday, May 09, 2013 12:21 PM
To: HESTERMAN, THOMAS P Col USAF AFGSC AFGSC/IG
Cc: GS-15 USAF AFGSC AFGSC/DA3; HESTERMAN, THOMAS P Col USAF AFGSC AFGSC/IG;
GS-15 USAF AFGSC/IG2; Fry David NMI CAPT USSTRATCOM/J005
Subject: Gen Kehler Testimony regarding 91 MW - Corrective Action Monitoring

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Tom,

I'm meeting with Gen Kehler tomorrow afternoon to provide him with COAs regarding how I will "review the previous inspection's results as well as the responses to it by commanders at Minot." Would appreciate the opportunity to discuss with you the AFGSC plan to monitor the unit's corrective action to see where USSTRATCOM can fit in.

Also, while I have the CUI report, I'd appreciate any additional info you could send me regarding the other issues (PCC, etc) that Lt Col Folds mentioned in his e-mail (which I do have a copy of).

v/r Dave

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By ROBERT BURNS
WASHINGTON (AP) — The general who commands the nation's nuclear forces said Thursday he has ordered further review of failings discovered among Air Force officers who operate nuclear missiles. But he told Congress Thursday he was not alarmed by their shortcomings.

Gen. Robert Kehler, commander of U.S. Strategic Command, told a House Armed Services panel that the Air Force assured him it is searching for root causes of the problem among missile launch officers at Minot Air Force Base, N.D.

"As I sit here today I don't see anything that would cause me to lose confidence" in their ability to perform their mission, Kehler said.

The Associated Press reported Wednesday that a March inspection of the 91st Missile Wing at Minot gave the missile crews the equivalent of a "D" grade in missile operations, leading to the removal from duty of an unprecedented 17 officers.

Kehler said he has told the Strategic Command's inspector general to review the results of the Minot inspection, which was performed by the Air Force Global Strike Command. That command is responsible for the missile unit's training and readiness but would cede responsibility for them to Strategic Command in time of war.

Kehler said "the Air Force is digging into this," and that his command's inspector general will review the previous inspection's results as well as the responses to it by commanders at Minot.

"This has my personal attention," Kehler said.

Kehler's comments stood in contrast to the tone of a confidential email obtained by the AP in which a senior officer at Minot sketched a picture of a troubled nuclear unit.

"We are, in fact, in a crisis right now," Lt. Col. Jay Folds, a deputy commander at Minot, told subordinates in the April 12 email. His group is responsible for all Minuteman 3 missile launch crews at Minot.

In his email, Folds lamented the remarkably poor reviews the launch officers received in the March inspection. Their missile launch skills were rated "marginal," which the Air Force told the AP was the equivalent of a "D" grade.

Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel responded to the AP report on Wednesday by demanding more information from the Air Force. The service's top general, Gen. Mark Welsh, said the problem does not suggest a lack of proper control over the nuclear missiles but rather was a symptom of turmoil in the ranks.

"The idea that we have people not performing to the standard we expect will never be good and we won't tolerate it," Welsh said when questioned about the problem at a congressional hearing on budget issues.

Underlying the Minot situation is a sense among some that the Air Force's nuclear mission is a dying field, as the government considers further reducing the size of the U.S. arsenal.

Welsh noted that because there are a limited number of command positions to which missile launch officers can aspire within the nuclear force, those officers tend to believe they have no future.

"That's actually not the case, but that's the view when you're in the operational force," Welsh said. "We have to deal with that."
Hagel himself, before he was defense secretary, signed a plan put forward a year ago by the private group Global Zero to eliminate the Air Force’s intercontinental ballistic missiles and to eventually eliminate all nuclear weapons. At his Senate confirmation hearing, he said he supports President Barack Obama’s goal of zero nuclear weapons but only through negotiations.

Hagel’s spokesman, George Little, said the defense secretary was briefed on the Minot situation as reported by the AP on Wednesday and that he be provided more details.

Welsh’s civilian boss, Air Force Secretary Michael Donley, suggested a silver lining to the trouble at Minot. The fact that Minot commanders identified 17 underperformers was evidence that the Air Force has strengthened its monitoring of the nuclear force, he said. And he stressed that launch crew members typically are relatively junior officers — lieutenants and captains — with limited service experience.

It is the duty of commanders, Donley said, to "ride herd" on those young officers with "this awesome responsibility" of controlling missiles capable of destroying entire countries.

Donley noted that he is particularly sensitive to any indication of weakness in the nuclear force because he took over as Air Force secretary in October 2008 after his predecessor, Michael Wynne, was fired by then-Defense Secretary Robert Gates for a series of nuclear embarrassments. Donley was charged with cleaning up the problem.

It appeared the Minot force, which is one of three responsible for controlling — and, if necessary, launching — the Air Force’s 450 strategic nuclear missiles, is an outlier.

The Air Force told the AP on Wednesday that the two other missile wings — at Malmstrom Air Force Base, Mont., and at F.E. Warren Air Force Base, Wyo. — earned scores of "excellent" in the most recent inspection of their ICBM launch skills. That is two notches above the "marginal" rating at Minot and one notch below the highest rating of "outstanding."

Each of the three wings operates 150 Minuteman 3 missiles.

The Malmstrom unit was inspected in December 2012, the F.E. Warren unit in May 2012.

Michael Corgan, a nuclear weapons officer in the Navy in the 1960s, said the Air Force cannot afford to let its launch control crews lose focus on their mission.

"The kinds of things that caused those Air Force officers to be rated 'marginal' could well be what seem like trivial errors," Corgan said. "But in the nuke business you are not supposed to get anything wrong — anything." Corgan is a professor of international relations at Boston University.

Sen. Dick Durbin, D-Ill., chairman of the Senate Appropriations defense subcommittee, expressed outrage, telling Welsh and Donley that the AP report revealed a problem that "could not be more troubling."

The 17 cases mark the Air Force’s most extensive sidelining ever of launch crew members, according to Lt. Col. Angie Blair, a spokeswoman for Air Force Global Strike Command, which oversees the missile units as well as nuclear-capable bombers. The 91st Missile Wing has 150 officers assigned to launch control duty.

In his congressional testimony, Welsh said Folds and other senior commanders determined that the problematic launch officers had "more of an attitude problem than a proficiency problem."

He said he wished Folds had "used different language" in his email.

"The word 'rot' didn't excite me, but it got my attention," Welsh said, adding that he does not believe "rot" is the problem. "I don't believe we have a nuclear surety risk at Minot Air Force Base," referring to the danger of an accident or unauthorized launch.
The email obtained by the AP describes a culture of indifference at Minot, with at least one intentional violation of missile safety rules and an apparent unwillingness among some to challenge or report those who violate rules.

In addition to the 17, possible disciplinary action is pending against one other officer at Minot who investigators found had intentionally broken a safety rule in an unspecified act that could have compromised the secret codes that enable the launching of missiles that stand on high alert in underground silos in the nation’s midsection. Officials said there was no compromise of missile safety or security.

Advising his troops on April 12 that they had "fallen," Folds wrote that drastic corrective action was required because "we didn’t wake up" after the March inspection that he said amounted to a failure, even though the unit’s overall performance technically was rated "satisfactory."

"And now we’re discovering such rot in the crew force that your behavior while on alert is accepting of" weapons safety rule violations, possible code compromises and other failings, "all in the name of not inconveniencing yourselves," Folds wrote.

Folds also complained about unwarranted questioning of orders from superior officers by launch crews and failure to address superiors with the proper respect.

"It takes real leaders to lead through a crisis and we are, in fact, in a crisis right now," he wrote.
Gen Stoss -- I hope the following answers your question. Should you require more info, please let me know.

CAPT Fry -- FYI -- as I know you have been tasked with this by Gen Kehler, I wanted to include you as well. I'll give you a call tomorrow to discuss further.

V/r
Scott

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-----Original Message-----
From: HADERLIE, BRYAN K Col USAF AFGSC 91 OG/CC
Sent: Thursday, May 09, 2013 5:38 PM
To: FOX, SCOTT M Col USAF AFGSC 20 AF/CV; VERCHER, ROBERT J Col USAF AFGSC 91 MW/CC; SUMMERS, THOMAS A Col USAF AFGSC 91 MW/CC; LtCol USAF AFGSC 91 OG/CD
Cc: CAREY, MICHAEL J MajGen USAF AFGSC 20 AF/CC; Col USAF AFGSC 20 AF/A3; GS-15 USAF AFGSC AFGSC/DA3; LtCol USAF AFGSC AFGSC/CCX; NORDEL, DAVID R CMSgt USAF AFGSC 20 AF/CCC
Subject: RE: Additional RFI from STRATCOM

Col Fox,
Our response to STRATCOM RFIs:

What were the reasons for the 17 (now 19) officers decertification? All were decertified for failure to maintain job proficiency, failure to demonstrate professionalism, or both.

- Did some have poor performance in the CUI (eval performance, EWO test

1
performance? If so, how many?
Yes. Of the original 17, 9 took a CUI test and 9 failed; 2 were rated
unqualified in their CUI simulator evaluations. NOTE: of the 2 additional
officers who were later decertified for substandard performance, 1 took the
CUI test and failed.

- Did some have poor performance on subsequent EWO testing (i.e. the test
given after the IG or from Malmstrom)? If so, how many?
Yes. The day after the CUI performance, we asked the IG to administer the
test to 40 more officers. Of the original 17, 5 took that test and 4
failed. NOTE: we had 7 overall failures on this test.
Additionally, on 8 April, we administered another no-notice test locally; 26
total officers tested. Of the original 17, 6 took the test and 5 failed.

- What other reasons were they decertified for?
No other reasons exist for decertifying these officers.

v/r
Col Haderlie
BRYAN K HADERLIE, Colonel, USAF
Commander, 91st Operations Group
Comm: (701)723-3213 DSN: 453-3213

-----Original Message-----
From: FOX, SCOTT M Col USAF AFGSC 20 AF/CV
Sent: Thursday, May 09, 2013 2:12 PM
To: VERCHER, ROBERT J Col USAF AFGSC 91 MW/CC; SUMMERS, THOMAS A Col USAF
AFGSC 91 MW/CV; HADERLIE, BRYAN K Col USAF AFGSC 91 OG/CC
LtCol USAF AFGSC 91 OG/CD
Cc: CAREY, MICHAEL J MajGen USAF AFGSC 20 AF/CC; FOX, SCOTT M Col USAF AFGSC
20 AF/CV; Col USAF AFGSC 20 AF/A3; GS-15 USAF AFGSC AFGSC/DA3
LtCol USAF AFGSC AFGSC/CCX; NORDEL, DAVID R CMSgt USAF AFGSC 20
AF/CCC
Subject: Additional RFI from STRATCOM
Importance: High

91 MW Leaders -- next question is from Gen Stoss:

What were the reasons for the 17 (now 19) officers decertification? He's
not looking for specifics by officer, but is looking for a response that
describes the following:

- Did some have poor performance in the CUI (eval performance, EWO test
performance)? If so, how many?
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- Did some have poor performance on subsequent EWO testing (i.e. the test given after the IG or from Malmstrom)? If so, how many?

- Was the officer associated with the referenced WSSR violation part of that #?

- What other reasons were they decertified for?

I believe we have parts of this answer in other responses, so my apologies for asking kind of the same question again...but he is prepping to inform the CDRUSSTRATCOM & I think a consolidated, concise answer is easier for you to provide.

Suspense is tomorrow first thing...so please provide to me tonight & I'll push to Gen Stoss.

I've cc'd AFGSC CCX & A3 for their info & will copy them on the response too.

V/r
Scott
From: Maj USSTRATCOM/J005
Sent: Friday, May 10, 2013 3:42 PM
To: Fry David NMI CAPT USSTRATCOM/J005
Subject: J38 POC for Minot Project
Signed By: J38 POC for Minot Project

Categories: Only To Me

CAPT,

Our J38 POC will be Maj J381 J381 stratcom.mil, D505713@dodiis.ic.gov.

They guy I asked in J37 asked Col when he walked through the office.

Very Respectfully,

Maj, USAF
Chief, ICBM Inspections / Assistant IG
USSTRATCOM J005

J005 Collective: J005@stratcom.mil
Dave,
I'll have my inspectors gather up the scripts, tests, SOE, etc if we have them and try to get you what we can early next week.

VR,
Tom

-----Original Message-----
From: Fry David NMI CAPT USSTRATCOM/J005 [mailto:FRYDG@stratcom.mil]
Sent: Friday, May 10, 2013 3:50 PM
To: HESTERMAN, THOMAS P Col USAF AFGSC AFGSC/IG; Col USAF AFGSC AFGSC/DA3; FOX, SCOTT M Col USAF AFGSC 20 AF/CV; Col USSTRATCOM/J38
Cc: CAREY, MICHAEL J MajGen USAF AFGSC 20 AF/CC; Stoss Ferdinand B Brig Gen USSTRATCOM/J3N; Col USAF AFGSC AFGSC/DIG; Col USAF AFGSC 20 AF/A3; Maj USSTRATCOM/J381; J005~U
Subject: 91 MW CUI Results - USSTRATCOM IG Review - Road Ahead

I met with Gen Kehler this morning and received his guidance on the road ahead. He wants me to conduct a review of the 91 MW CUI (ICBM Operations) to determine what happened and why, and to review the corrective and follow up actions. Once I'm satisfied, he anticipates a brief from Generals Kowalski and Carey. The purpose is to ensure his continued confidence in the unit's ability to conduct its mission.

To move forward with this review, I request the following:

- 91 MW CUI Schedule of Events
- Specific scenarios used in MPTs and the EWO exams given at:
  o 91 MW CUI (4-13 March 2013)
  o 341 MW CUI (3-11 December 2012)
  o 90 MW CUI (7-15 May 2012)
- Detailed results of the above (if available) (e.g. trainer evaluation sheets, exam grade matrices)
- Any Root Cause Analysis (RCA) documented to date
- Any corrective Plan of Action and Milestones (or other similar documentation) generated/approved by the unit and/or HHQ.

I realize that some of this may already have been provided to us here in the HQ (particularly the scenarios/exams). Also, I don’t have an activated JWICS and/or Gold account. Mr. from J38 has been assigned to work for me for the duration of this review and can receive TS material. Contact info is Mr. J381, DSN .

Once we've received and reviewed the documentation listed above, I'd like to host a VTC to discuss.

Some points to consider:
- The RCA and this review need to address the issues raised by Lt Col Folds in his e-mail.
- When was the last Unit Climate Assessment conducted by the unit?

Gen Kehler did not establish any specific timeline for either the completion of this review, or for completion of corrective action and follow-up. He did specifically say:

Please feel free to chime in with any items/thoughts I'm not considering. I appreciate the open channels of communication to date.

Finally, I'm sure most, if not all, of you have already seen Gen Kehler's testimony on this issue, but I've included it below for reference.

v/r Dave

David G. Fry, CAPT, USN

Inspector General (J005)
U.S. Strategic Command
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Offutt AFB NE 68113
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SIPRNet: frydg@stratcom.smil.mil <mailto:frydg@stratcom.smil.mil>
Phone: (402) 294-2029; DSN 271-2029
Fax: (402) 294-5969

ROGERS:

General Kehler, you and I met yesterday and discussed briefly the breaking news about the 17 officers who were decertified from alert duty at Minot. For the committee, and we're going to reserve judgment until the DOD and Air Force has made their findings, but could you tell all of us generally what these officers' responsibilities were? And then what happened, to the best of your knowledge?

KEHLER:

Yes, Mr. Chairman. The nuclear-capable units have the highest standards and they undergo very, very difficult inspections. In those inspections, which are conducted by the services, the inspectors look at a number of different categories of activities within one of these units.

One of those categories -- and each are graded separately -- one of those categories is the performance of the missile operations crews. These are the crewmembers that man the underground launch control centers, essentially. They're very young. They're typically second lieutenants, first lieutenants, captains in some cases. And again, their standards are very high.

During this particular inspection which, again, was an Air Force inspection, not a Strategic Command inspection, as I understand it, there were some performance issues with -- with that piece of the overall inspection that dealt with the missile crewmembers themselves. Typically, that's written tests, by the way, or they take them into a simulator and they have them perform their paces in a simulator. I -- I've taken many of those myself over the years. They are extremely difficult and filled with scenarios that you typically would not see in the real world, so to speak.

This has my personal attention. Because it's a nuclear unit, I review the inspection results of all of the nuclear units, both in the Air Force and the Navy as they -- they come across my desk. In some cases, the Strategic Command inspector general observes those. They did not observe this one, but in some cases they do observe these.
And so each of these gets my personal attention. This one in particular has my personal attention. I've spoken with the commander of Air Force Global Strike Command, the parent unit that's involved here. I've gone back and I have looked at the inspection results -- the nuclear inspection results of this particular unit over the last three or four years, all of which have been satisfactory, by the way.

I have asked the Strategic Command inspector general to go review this specific inspection and -- and the responses to it. I think the unit is moving aggressively. I think you saw that in some of the press reporting, the very aggressive steps being taken her for decertification of some of the crewmembers, et cetera.

I believe they're working on getting to root cause. And as I sit here today, I don't see anything that could cause me to lose confidence in that ability's (sic) unit to perform the mission safely and effectively. So, I'll continue to watch this very carefully. I know the Air Force is -- is digging into this very deliberately. But at this point, sir, I remain confident in that unit's ability to perform its mission.

I do think they reacted very aggressively to the -- to the mistakes that they saw. They don't accept those mistakes. And at some level, I think what you're seeing here is a product of the increased scrutiny and the increased diligence that is going into these inspections and the responses to them.

So, again, I would prefer to -- to have a little bit more fidelity, I think, on -- on what the Air Force will eventually discover here as they continue to dig for root causes. But today, I would be concerned if every unit had 100 percent passing. I think that would suggest to me that -- that we -- that we weren't being tough enough in inspections.

So, the fact that errors were made in an inspection in and of themselves doesn't trouble me much. It's what are the root causes and what are the consequences. And again, sir, to date I don't see any reason to have less than full confidence in this unit. But we're going to continue to work with the Air Force on this, and I have in fact asked my inspector general to work with the Air Force to make sure that we have a complete picture.

INSPECTOR GENERAL SENSITIVE INFORMATION - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY: The information contained in this e-mail and any accompanying attachments may contain Inspector General sensitive information, which is protected from mandatory disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 USC 552. It should not be released to unauthorized persons. If you are not the intended recipient of this information, any disclosure, copying, distribution, or the taking of any action in reliance on this information is prohibited. If you received this e-mail in error, please notify us immediately by return e-mail or by calling (402) 294-2029, DSN 271-2029.
Thanks Dave,

Wasn't aware of specific prohibition but not surprised. We’re working off the list of submariners you ID below as well.

More to follow.

VR,
DT

----- Original Message ----- 
From: Fry David NMI CAPT USSTRATCOM/J005
Sent: Saturday, May 11, 2013 03:52 PM
To: Thompson David D Brig Gen USSTRATCOM/DJ3; Haley John R RADM USSTRATCOM/J3; Stoss Ferdinand B Brig Gen USSTRATCOM/J3N
Subject: Re: STRATCOM Participation in Minot Review

General,

I'm not sure about Gen Kehler's intention, nor how he views this effort in relationship to the review he tasked me to conduct.

While I'm not certain of Gen Kowalski's inclusion of my name in his e-mail, I assume it’s because I've already reached out to HB Brual and others to chart the road ahead and gather data for the review that Gen Kehler tasked me with.

One problem with me participating as a team member on a Team is that as an IG I am prohibited by DODI from being a member of a non-IG assistance team. That said, if Gen Kehler...

If Gen Kehler desires me to remain independent (to allow me to objectively evaluate AFGSC actions as opposed to having to critique the actions of a team that I was part of), then options for Post Command Submariners at STRATCOM are:

CAPT (J3C)
CAPT (JFCC GS J51)
CAPT (J8)
CAPT (J9)

Will stand by for direction.

V/r Dave

----- Original Message ----- 
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
From: Thompson David D Brig Gen USSTRATCOM/DJ3  
Sent: Saturday, May 11, 2013 09:46 AM Central Standard Time  
To: Fry David NMI CAPT USSTRATCOM/J005  
Cc: Haley John R RADM USSTRATCOM/J3; Stoss Ferdinand B Brig Gen USSTRATCOM/J3N  
Subject: STRATCOM Participation in Minot Review

Dave,

General Kehler called last night and asked we consider how STRATCOM might participate in an AFGSC review team being assembled to go to Minot. Via separate assessment we arrived at the conclusion that a Navy submariner, post command O-5 or O-6, would be the best add to the team.

Has Gen Kowalski arrived at the same conclusion, or has he added you here as the placeholder while we deliberate? In any case, we believe you are the best choice to participate. Your thoughts?

VR,
DT Thompson

----- Original Message ----- 
From: KOWALSKI, JAMES M LtGen USAF AFGSC AFGSC/CC [mailto:james.kowalski@us.af.mil]
Sent: Friday, May 10, 2013 09:34 PM
To: Kehler C Robert Gen USSTRATCOM/J0CC
Cc: [mailto:james.kowalski@us.af.mil]  
GS-15 USAF AFGSC AFGSC/DS; HESTERMAN, THOMAS, EVERETT H MajGen USAF AFGSC AFGSC/CV; GUSKIN, JOHN C LtCol USAF AFGSC AFGSC/CCX; CAREY, MICHAEL J MajGen USAF AFGSC 20 AF/CC; VERCHER, ROBERT J Col USAF AFGSC 91 MW/CC; CIV USAF AFGSC AFGSC/CVO; BROWNE, JAMES S BGen USAF AFGSC AFGSC/A3  
Subject:

Gen Kehler,

Here’s our way ahead & timeline for the RCA. [mailto:james.kowalski@us.af.mil] Col former 341 MW/CC and AFI/CC, will lead the team, which will include AFSO 21 Black Belts from AFGSC HQ and 20AF, a technical advisor (previous 90 OSS/CC), and a STRATCOM rep (currently CAPT Fry).

Root Cause Analysis
- Today: Our AFSO21 team worked with 20AF to develop the Event Charter
- Mon-Tue (13-14 May): RCA prep continues. AFGSC/CV signs Event Charter and sends out RCA announcement
- Thu-Sun (16-19 May): RCA event. Milestones and Countermeasures developed
- Mon (20 May): Lessons learned efforts begin and flow directly after RCA

RCA Focus Areas
- Chain of Command Communications
- Reporting Violations or Incidents
- HQ Staff / NAF / Wing Coordination
- HHQ evaluations, Unit Stan eval, Training
- Discipline / Morale (Leadership / Supervisory / Individual) related perceptions / concerns
- Unit Level Communication

----- Original Message ----- 
From: KOWALSKI, JAMES M LtGen USAF AFGSC AFGSC/CC [mailto:james.kowalski@us.af.mil]
Sent: Friday, May 10, 2013 09:34 PM
To: Kehler C Robert Gen USSTRATCOM/J0CC
Cc: [mailto:james.kowalski@us.af.mil]  
GS-15 USAF AFGSC AFGSC/DS; HESTERMAN, THOMAS, EVERETT H MajGen USAF AFGSC AFGSC/CV; GUSKIN, JOHN C LtCol USAF AFGSC AFGSC/CCX; CAREY, MICHAEL J MajGen USAF AFGSC 20 AF/CC; VERCHER, ROBERT J Col USAF AFGSC 91 MW/CC; CIV USAF AFGSC AFGSC/CVO; BROWNE, JAMES S BGen USAF AFGSC AFGSC/A3  
Subject:
Data Collection Methods
- VTC
- Face-to-face Interviews (to include decertified crew members)
- Two-person Interview Teams at each Location (to include decertified crew members)
- Standardized Interview Questionnaire

Way-ahead
- May – updates provided as we collect data
- 20 May - 12 Jul: Evaluate corrective actions
- 12 Jul – 31 Jul: Draft Collection Report
- 31 Jul: Final Report to AFGSC/CC (brief to CSAF and CDRUSSTRATCOM as required)

We have the team lined up and ready to go and I'll convey commander's intent. Will keep you posted with anything significant.

VR

Jim
General Kehler’s Testimony to HASC Regarding 91st Missile Wing
9 May 2013

ROGERS:

General Kehler, you and I met yesterday and discussed briefly the breaking news about the 17 officers who were decertified from alert duty at Minot. For the committee, and we're going to reserve judgment until the DOD and Air Force have made their findings, but could you tell all of us generally what these officers' responsibilities were? And then what happened, to the best of your knowledge?

KEHLER:

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WILCO Sir.

We will continue the internal review of the RCA and also review the subsequent steps of the eight step problem solving process as it proceeds, to include determining methods to ensure enduring, validated corrective measures are implemented.

We'll schedule IPRs with you as this progresses.

V/R
Fred

-----Original Message-----
From: Kehler C Robert Gen USSTRATCOM/J0CC
Sent: Saturday, June 15, 2013 10:10 AM
To: Giardina Timothy M VADM USSTRATCOM/J0CD; Haley John R RADM USSTRATCOM/J3; Thompson David D Brig Gen USSTRATCOM/DJ3; Stoss Ferdinand B Brig Gen USSTRATCOM/J3N
Cc: Fry David NMI CAPT USSTRATCOM/J005; COL USSTRATCOM/J0CCE
Subject: Minot Follow-on Actions

Gents,

CRK
Dave,

You are correct. I mis-spoke. 20th provides the SMEs w/ AFGSC oversight.

R/ Scott

-----Original Message-----
From: Fry David NMI CAPT USSTRATCOM/J005
Sent: Tuesday, June 25, 2013 11:50 AM
To: GS15 USSTRATCOM/AFGSC LNO
Subject: RE: Checking In

Scott,

Rgr. Thanks, although I thought that AFGSC was OPR for CUI and that 20AF provided the bodies to the AFGSC IG team for the ICBM Ops portion of the CUI. Maybe only a minor distinction.

r/Dave

David G. Fry, CAPT, USN
USSTRATCOM Inspector General (J005)
Phone: (402) 294-2029; DSN 271-2029

-----Original Message-----
From: GS15 USSTRATCOM/AFGSC LNO
Sent: Tuesday, June 25, 2013 11:45 AM
To: Fry David NMI CAPT USSTRATCOM/J005
Subject: Checking In

Dave,

I spoke to both Maj Gen Carey & RADM Haley concerning the RCA. RADM Haley asked me to circle back with him after the BFG to Gen Kehler. Both
FOs are in 'G' regarding the way ahead...

> 15 Jul for a process to implement the Counter Measures (CMs)

> The process going forward extends beyond the 91st...& will take time. Maj Gen Carey's is working through the process of defining which of the CM's are applicable to the other 2 wings

> A close & transparent coord process between STRAT, AFGSC & 20th is essential--& positive

R/ Scott

GS-15, DAF
Air Force Global Strike LNO to USSTRATCOM
Rgr. Thanks. Does the AFGSC Nuclear Surety Council meet via VTC such that we could just observe that? Would save having to ping for status and possible make it easier for all.

v/r Dave

-----Original Message-----
From: Col USAF AFGSC AFGSC/DA3 [mailto:Frydg@stratcom.mil]
Sent: Monday, July 01, 2013 4:42 PM
To: Fry David NMI CAPT USSTRATCOM/J005
Subject: RE: Minot RCA / Countermeasures

Dave,
We are tracking the status of each recommendation through the AFGSC Nuclear Surety Council; the Council is chaired by the AFGSC Vice Commander.

The first step is complete with the assignment of OPRs. The next step is to determine which recommendation will be accepted and implemented. The OPRs are reviewing the RCA recommendations at this time.

V/R

-----Original Message-----
From: Fry David NMI CAPT USSTRATCOM/J005 [mailto:Frydg@stratcom.mil]
Sent: Monday, July 01, 2013 4:28 PM
To: Col USAF AFGSC AFGSC/DA3
Subject: Minot RCA / Countermeasures

Do you have a process by which you’re tracking updates and completion of the countermeasures? Just trying to figure out the best way to stay plugged in to the progress being made.

v/r Dave

David G. Fry, CAPT, USN
Inspector General (J005)
Speaking Truth STRATCOM Feb 14 042

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U.S. Strategic Command
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Offutt AFB NE 68113
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Fax: (402) 294-5969

-----Original Message-----
From: (o)(6) USAF AFGSC AFGSC/DA3 [email]
Sent: Monday, June 10, 2013 6:57 PM
To: Fry David NMI CAPT USSTRATCOM/J005 CAPT USSTRATCOM/J84
Subject: FW: AFSO Tabs 1-5

Received rejects, will send in 2 parts. #1

-----Original Message-----
From: (o)(6) USAF AFGSC AFGSC/DA3 [email]
Sent: Monday, June 10, 2013 6:54 PM
To: Fry David NMI CAPT USSTRATCOM/J005 CAPT USSTRATCOM/J84 [email]
Subject: AFSO Tabs 1-5

David,

Attached were the supporting documentation that I used to brief Gen Kehler today (Tabs 1-5). Tab 6 was the 40 countermeasures that we were going to assess (word document). We are still coordinating the OPRs for the countermeasures.

Please advise if you have any questions in interpreting the data.

Please keep all of this close hold.

Best

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