RUSSIAN PERCEPTIONS OF NATO-LED PEACE KEEPING IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
Collapse of the former Yugoslavia and the split of the former Soviet Union happened almost simultaneously, along with interethnic disputes and conflicts in these multicultural, thus Russian interest in conflict resolution efforts in the Balkans, from operations in Bosnia to the situation around Albania and Kosovo. Russia supported in the U.N. main resolutions on peace keeping and peace enforcement in the former Yugoslavia and found resources to send a brigade to participate jointly with NATO troops in missions in Bosnia. Despite the political and diplomatic debates surrounding Russian involvement into NATO-led peace-keeping teams, this Russian-Western joint effort could be an example of practical interoperability, both diplomatic and military.

Peace-keeping and peace-enforcement functions by the NATO-led international coalition were relatively unsuccessfully for UNPROFOR and relatively successfully for IFOR/SFOR. Russian authors and politicians recognize NATO peace keeping as a sign of real and positive change. But the example of involvement in former Yugoslavia is not welcomed by most Russians, for several reasons.

First, NATO actions are perceived as biased. There is open distrust between NATO and Serbs, all the more because Russians and NATO feel each other to be on the different sides of the Yugoslavian conflict. Second, as many Russian politicians believe, NATO has violated or at least misinterpreted the U.N. mandate when it undertook bombing and heavy force. Third, as in many peace support operations everywhere in the world (and the United Nations has a long record for this), NATO was effective in doing the forceful part of the job but proved inadequate in finding political solutions. To the Russian mind that means that even in non-Article V missions NATO shows its qualities as a warrior and is best in performing mainly violent tasks.

RUSSIAN ATTITUDES AND NATO NON-ARTICLE V PEACE-KEEPING MISSIONS
In former Soviet perceptions of NATO there was a certain egocentrism that was partly transferred to Russian perceptions of the Alliance. NATO is seen as a mechanism whose whole existence and action rotates around Moscow and Russian military power. All moves by NATO (even, say, debates with Malta on breaking its participation in "Partnership for Peace") are interpreted by many Russian policy makers as aimed directly or indirectly either at cooperation or confrontation with Russia. Actions and intentions of both NATO and to-be-members are mostly estimated as indirect assault or pressure on Russia. The same is true for perception of NATO involvement in peace support missions in former Yugoslavia. Rarely they are estimated by Russian politicians from the point of view of internal logic of developments in the Balkans. More often NATO involvement was interpreted either as "rehearsal" of involvement into conflict resolution in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) or as biased support of Muslims against Slavs (Serbs), again indirectly pointed against Russia as a leading Slavic nation.

Such self-centrism was raised by decades of bipolar "zero-sum game" logic of the Cold War when all international relations in the Northern hemisphere and even worldwide were interpreted (and not only by Moscow and its proxies, but by Washington and its allies, too) as merely a projection of the juxtaposition of super powers: good-against-evil, us-versus-them.

This is why even today the NATO transformation that broadened the scope of NATO non-Article V missions is not well understood and or appreciated by Russian policy makers.

Obviously Russian public opinion underestimates the importance of such an "internal missions" of NATO as keeping European powers away from re-nationalization of defense, deterring mutual political (though not economic) claims, and stabilizing relations among Alliance members. Russians do understand common security arrangements, but in general NATO is still perceived by the majority of Russians as a unified Western military machine designed to wage land, sea and air battles.

The Gulf War, NATO peace support actions in former Yugoslavia, Russian peace support operations on the territory of other CIS states—these realities of post-Cold War world changed perceptions of the zones of responsibility. Clear division of spheres of influences in Europe ("iron curtain") has gone. But the same way NATO is aware of Russian military and diplomatic moves in the "Near abroad," Russia feels some sensitivity about growing NATO readiness for out-of-area operations. How far out-of-area is NATO ready to go? Under what circumstances? Are there any limitations and exceptions? Is it a doctrinal change or each out-of-area step is a matter for ad hoc decisions? Russian analysts inevitably pose these questions when studying this trend in the NATO transformation.

Undertaking massive military operations on the territory of non-NATO countries (in a divided geopolitical space of former Yugoslavia) was not an easy decision for NATO. But when precedent is created, it starts a chain of further steps violating old international "taboos." NATO proceeded from air-only operations to ground forces. Operation-related heavy military traffic through the territory of non-NATO countries like Hungary (with permission) and use of airfields by NATO aviation has become another "novelty." NATO "surgery" air strikes and use of armed forces in urban civilian surrounding were among many thresholds first stepped over by NATO in mid-1990s. An important line was crossed when NATO forces, in accordance with a new U.N. mandate, proceeded from peace keeping to peace enforcement. That meant that NATO undertook legally approved but forceful and violent actions against the will of a country on whose territory it had acted.

Transformation of NATO in the direction of active out-of-area military operations under the label of peace keeping and overstepping former "taboos" in this respect was viewed by Russia in a negative light. The Russian government was often criticized by various representatives of internal political opposition for its passive stand on the Yugoslavian issue which enabled Washington and NATO "to impose their interests" in this region.

COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED NATIONS
Cooperation of the United States and NATO with the United Nations in peace support and conflict resolution is a breakthrough in several respects. There was a growing distrust toward the United Nations in the United States (both among the public and government) in the 1980s and early 1990s. Very few analysts could imagine a decade ago that with U.S. influence in NATO, Washington would drive at an operational overlap between NATO and the United Nations. At the same time, the Soviet Union was actively backing the United Nations, and Russia continued to promote very active ties with the United Nations. So Moscow naturally was surprised when, in the absence of other relevant resources, the United Nations turned to NATO for help in Yugoslavia. It was noticed in Moscow that in 1992 NATO made the decision that it was ready to undertake operations under the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) mandate, and only six months later Brussels extended its offer to United Nations.

Acting on behalf of the United Nations to some degree projected a positive image of NATO to the Russian public. But the "no double key" demand of NATO (NATO didn’t wanted its chain of military command to be operationally subordinated to the United Nations) received many negative comments in the Russian media. Some commentators said that NATO used the U.N. mandate as a "carte blanch" and maintained its own interests in the region of Balkans under the "cover" of United Nations.

It is obvious that because of limitation of resources and more than a dozen simultaneous operations in different regions of the world, the United Nations needs help from NATO (or any other organization or coalition) in implementing most difficult peace support functions. The question is to what degree NATO needs the United Nations in the future after Bosnia. Many international organizations (the United Nations, OSCE, NATO, Red Cross, Council of Europe, and others) as well as over 400 nongovernmental organizations, united their efforts in Yugoslavia. This was unique demonstration of ability of international community to work in very complicated situations and at many levels of cooperation. At the same time, Bosnia taught lessons that cannot be ignored. Although united by general goals, each organization and group of states were promoting their own separate interests through the Bosnian peace process.

The Dayton Accords for Bosnia were reached under the leadership and influence of the United States. Political supervision over the process was given not to United Nations but to an ad hoc created High Representative who was separated from any U.N. structures. Only four months after the Dayton Accords and the arrival of the High Representative to Bosnia, more or less regular meetings started between regional representatives of the structures involved in peace implementation. While operating under the U.N. mandate, NATO forces in IFOR (later SFOR) were expecting more progress in political settlement not from U.N. political structures but from the separately created and administered mechanism created by Dayton agreements.

In Washington and in Brussels, a lesson was learned in the first stage of NATO action under the very limited U.N. mandate—UNPROFOR was relatively unsuccessful. "Mission crippled" put the whole future of cooperation between NATO and the United Nations under a big question mark. Only when on the stage of IFOR was NATO able to take full military control over planning and implementing the operation. The military tasks of the second half of the mission—political settlement and establishing a foundation for stable civil balance, to allow international military forces to leave—were considered in NATO circles as "not our direct responsibility."

Although relations between NATO and the United Nations were upgraded to a higher level by years of co-operation on occasion of actions in former Yugoslavia, it appears that further development of interoperability between NATO and the United Nations is probably not part of a current NATO agenda of Alliance transformation. U.N. authority remains respected but is not vital for the transformed Alliance.

OSCE AND NATO IN EUROPEAN PEACE KEEPING: WHO IS IN CHARGE?
Political history of the 1990s shows that the United States promote operations in conflict areas implemented either by U.S.-led ad hoc coalitions or by NATO, where Washington has a strong voice. At the same time, Washington typically remains skeptical about peace-keeping abilities of the United Nations and OSCE. Moscow, in contrast, stresses the role of the United Nations and especially conflict resolution potential of OSCE.

The OSCE was Moscow’s "old love," because the Soviet Union was one of the "founding fathers" of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in 1975. And—in contrast to NATO or even Council of Europe or European Parliament—in OSCE Russia feels like equal partner, not like a newcomer or alien. Russia constantly stresses the importance of the OSCE and the impossibility of promoting NATO as the leading European security structure until OSCE is alive and operating.

After all, OSCE—in contrast to NATO—provides a universal political representation of all—new and old, big and small—European states, plus the United States and Canada. And, in contrast to NATO, OSCE consciously orients itself toward political conflict resolution—exactly the function that Russia (with half-dozen regional conflicts on its borders) considers to be key for new security environment.

This does not mean Moscow does not see the obvious weaknesses of OSCE. Most of them, such as absence of mechanisms for obligatory implementation of decisions, the overload of more than 50 countries, the lack of financial and structure organization, the inability to undertake direct peace-keeping operations, etc., are clearly recognized by Russia. But who said that "transformation of OSCE" is easier than "transformation of NATO?" Russia agrees than in its current form OSCE cannot play a role of security guarantor. But in its current form NATO also cannot play such a role. It is supposed that NATO and OSCE should define functions and responsibilities. It is not in the interests of Russia for the security authority of OSCE (where Russia’s role is obvious and equal) to be taken over in significant part by NATO (where Russia’s role is close to alien). The existence of OSCE and Russia’s emphasis on it put a definite limit on the absorption of European collective security functions by NATO.

After the end of the Cold War, NATO invested a lot of effort in changing of its image. First, it has stressed a transformation from a military bloc to a primarily political organization where military functions are subordinated to political ones. This aspect of transformation was and remains crucial for adaptation of the Alliance to new age. Starting from d�tente of late 1960s, through Soviet-American summits and creation of the CSCE in 1970s, followed by disarmament treaties of the 1980s, the world community has acquired a growing belief that security could be even better provided through political mechanisms than through plain force and power. Collective security has become a respected notion. The balance of forces (still important by itself) is perceived by Europe as incomplete without embodiment in collective security political agreements, structures, and system of treaties.

This is why one of the main expectations of Russian policy makers concerning NATO transformation is a conversion of NATO from collective defense to collective security organization. Such a formula might not sound like a radical change to those acquainted with the history of European security institutions. But as a matter of fact, changing one word ("defense" to "security") requires quite radical change of missions and structure. Collective defense means that organizations concentrate on effective functioning in times of potential war and subordinates peace-time activities and structures to military preparations. Collective security functions require organizations to shift emphasis to conflict prevention and political means of conflict resolution. Military force becomes a last resort in a conflict- management arsenal.

Does NATO transform itself to the responsibilities of conflict monitoring, political conflict prevention, and conflict resolution? It does so partly, by establishing links with former adversaries, creating a category of partner nations, inviting them into joint political forums like NACC/EACC, and performing peace-keeping and peace-enforcement functions in conflict areas in Europe.

Is this transformation toward collective security organization full and complete? Far from it, not because of shortness of time but because NATO has no intention of changing from collective defense functions to a collective security forum that requires quite a different organization. A change is not wanted because of its membership (NATO is not an all-European structure) and because of the unwillingness to interfere into domestic conflicts (even if they have international overspill. NATO is not ready, for example, to invest efforts into settlement on Cyprus or in Ireland or to deal with sources of Hungarian-Romanian frictions (even after enlargement). NATO definitely is not ready to become an automatically called-for "fire-brigade" for any further ethnic conflicts in Yugoslavia. NATO is already somewhat tired of the peace-keeping mission and has a lot of internal skeptics about its use of resources for out-of-area peace keeping.

LESS-KNOWN PEACE KEEPING
Part of Eurasia where Russia and other new independent states are situated on the geostrategic space of the former Soviet Union remains one of the most conflicted areas of the world. Military force has been used or martial law implemented 28 times on the territory of the former Soviet Union since 1988. Long-lasting conflicts occurred or continue in the territories of Tadjikistan, South Ossetia/Georgia, Abkhazia/Georgia, North Ossetia /Ingushetia, Moldova /Transdnestria, and Chechnya. Several of this conflicts have become areas for multilateral peace-keeping operations modeled after U.N. peace-keeping practices, but initiated and implemented by Russia jointly with groups of the CIS countries. Understanding Russia’s security interests, its current role in Eurasia, and its approach to peace keeping it is very important in analyzing Russian involvement into these regional conflicts. How it projects power outside its borders could influence Russia’s relations with the United States and the West.

Russia and the CIS in the Conflict in Tadjikistan. Peace-support operations in Tadjikistan started full scale in October 1993, after the domestic civil war in this region that brought new leadership to power in the capital, Dushanbe. Many months of armed hostilities among the different clans and ethnic groupings took thousands of lives. Forces of opposition to the government had established connections with mujahadens in Afghanistan (tribal and ethnic interconnection between Afghans and Tadjiks is quite significant) who regularly entered the country through weakly controlled mountain border. The government at Dushanbe was also afraid of increasing and uncontrollable armed groupings in Tadjikistan itself with unclear and amorphous programs and goals and endless mutual hostilities leading to the bloody clashes and terrorizing of civilian population.

Initially it was decided that the military contingents of Russia, Kazakhstan, Kirgizia, Uzbekistan, and Tadjik governmental forces would compose peace-keeping forces. Months later, Tadjik forces were excluded from the international contingent as being too biased. Russia provided a large part of the forces—about 6,000 troops of the 201 motorized division (already situated at the) were strengthened by specially relocated and rotating contingents. Kirgizia and Uzbekistan provided small contingents, while the parliaments of Kazakhstan and later Kirgizia debated over participation in operations outside national borders. Fewer than 10,000 troops are involved in operations (in contrast to the approved but unrealized plans to extend to 25,000). While these forces are performing disengaging and disarming tasks, the separate but most important task of sealing the border between Tadjikistan and Afghanistan is performed by Russian border guards troops at the formal request of the Tadjik government.

Internal dynamic of the operations shifts from the main emphasis on cease-fire efforts and disarming armed groupings to the more effective and CIS-supported efforts to seal the border. These operations are expensive, and the bill is almost completely footed by Russia. Though many local gangs are disarmed and certain areas are controlled, continued intertribal hostilities contribute to destabilization of the region. The possible settlement in Tadjikistan is not a settlement between any visible "sides" of the conflict but rather a multilateral balance of power among numerous mutually hostile amorphous armed groupings under the constant influence of the border war.

U.N. observers were situated at the area following the CIS actions. At a later stage, an important mediator role was played by OSCE envoys and by the Islamic Conference. After many rounds of such a national roundtable, the multilateral Tadjik Peace Accords were signed in 1997. Negotiations and final procedures of concluding a multilateral agreement involved not only the current Tadjik government and leaders of the united opposition, but also representatives of neighboring Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kirgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, as well as international authorities of the United Nations, OSCE, and OIC. Thus the United Nations and OSCE have become partial guarantors of the peace accords.

Of course the agreements are not yet in the final stage of the peace settlement. The process of implementing the agreements requires the continuation of certain military peace-keeping functions. There are irregular (mostly moderate) violations of the agreements and mutual claims. At the same time certain progress in conflict resolution in the region was achieved, and the role of the peace-keeping operation in this process could be estimated as generally positive.

A compromise was reached by both sides. Joint peace-keeping or "patrolling" forces were created on a trilaterally. They included Russian as well as Georgian and Ossetian patrol contingents. At the peak of operations, the trilateral contingent numbered up to 1,500 soldiers and officers representing (in approximately equal parts) Georgia, Russia, and Ossetia. Initially, the Russian part of the forces consisted of the 76th Airborne Division. Later contingents numberd 500 troops.

Political representatives of the three sides formed a consultative commission working in Tzhinval, the capital of South Ossetia. In 1994, the fourth side, North Ossetia, was involved into the negotiations and signed the agreements aimed at a political solution of the conflict. The trilateral military contingent is subordinated to the commission and is generally responsible for the settlement of the conflict and providing a working interface with the governments of Georgia and Russia and the authorities of South Ossetia. The trilateral patrolling cease-fire has been effective (with some violations from small, armed groupings and individuals).

As a result of political negotiations, demands for creating a separate and independent Ossetian state were withdrawn. The option of unification between North and South Ossetia through inclusion of South Ossetia in the Russian Federation (such a proposition was discussed at a certain stage of negotiations) was also put aside. Secession is undesirable not only for Georgia but also for central Russian authorities. At the current stage, political resolution rotates around the level and format of the economic, political, and cultural autonomy of South Ossetia within Georgian state.

. Armed hostilities on the territory of Abkhazian in Georgia lasted for three years. Peace keeping didn’t start until the Georgian-Abkhazian agreement on a cease-fire; disengagement was achieved May 14, 1994. The agreement mandated among Georgia, Abkhazia, and Russia the creation of a 12-kilometers security zone along the Inguri River as well as patrolling in the Kodor valley after withdrawal of Georgian troops and protection of the numerous returning refugees (especially in Galsky distrist) who had left Abkhazia during the civil war.

Georgians and Abkhazians both welcomed the CIS combined peace-keeping forces for Abkhazia and the OSCE international peace-keeping efforts in this area. While the CIS, as well as OSCE, later supported in principle the initiative of international peace keeping for the area, only Russia supplied military forces for this purpose. Practical involvement of the contingent was temporarily frozen for several months in the beginning of the operation by the veto of the upper chamber of the Russian Parliament. Nevertheless, around 1,100 Russian military men were located at the area for the whole duration of hostilities, with the mission to protect military installations and humanitarian supplies without interfering with the conflict. As in case of Moldova, where remaining 14th Russian Army troops should not be confused with the multilateral peace-keeping in Abkhazia, Russian troops (stationed there before the fall of the USSR) should be differentiated from the peace-keeping contingent mandated by the May 1994 agreements.

Of all the peace-keeping efforts on CIS territory, the case of Abkhazia/Georgia is the least successful. The operation was blessed by the formal decision of CIS heads, but no country but Russia donated military or financial support for it. Georgia applied several times to international authorities (the United Nations, OSCE, even NATO) for possible substitution of the Russian contingent by an international team under full international mandate, but reaction of the international organizations remained more than cautious. The United Nations supported the special resolution of the Russian mission and CIS regional conflict-resolution efforts but didn’t bring the issue to the Security Council for formal consideration of the U.N. mandate. CIS summits several times prolonged the CIS mandate for the operation.

Georgian authorities expected that the peace-keeping contingent would help Georgian refugees to return safely to Abkhazia but it was disappointed when the Russian contingent didn’t help much with this task. Several times between 1994 and 1998, hostilities and armed fighting broke out in Abkhazia. Events proved once more that peace keeping couldn’t be effective where sides would not forgo a military solution to the conflict. The peace-keeping contingent found itself between two enemies, unequipped for peace enforcement. In some ways the lack of success of the peace-keeping contingent in Abkhazia reminds calls to mind the misfortune of the UNPROFOR mission in the former Yugoslavia. But though sides may be dissatisfied that peace-keeping forces didn’t help them to achieve their political goals, the mission definitely played some deterrent role toward both sides and helped to save many lives.

Trilateral Operation in Moldova/ Transdnestria. Roots of another conflict on the territory of the CIS states where multilateral forces here involved dates back to 1992, when the Transdnestrian area (populated mainly with Russians) of the former Soviet Republic of Moldova rejected subordination to the government of the independent state of Moldova, created after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

A separatist Transdnestrian Moldavian Republic was proclaimed. The stakes were high for the Moldavian government as the secessionist region was industrially among the most developed in Moldova and produced the main energy resources for the whole state. The most skillful manpower was also concentrated there, along with the headquarters and garrisons of the former Soviet 14th Army.

Tensions exploded in summer 1992, with mass armed violence between Kishinev’s central authority supporters and proponents of Transdnestrian statehood. Then a trilateral preliminary political agreement was achieved among Russian, Moldavian, and Transdnestrian leaders; on July 21, 1992, a basic document "Agreements on the principles of peaceful settlement of the armed conflict in the Transdnestria region of the Republic of Moldova," was signed by President of Russia and President Snegur of Moldova. The third nonstate signatories were Transdnestrian leaders. This agreement has became a mandate for a quick disengagement by Russian troops, following trilateral patrolling of the area to prevent unauthorized use of arms or population clashes. It is important to stress that locally involved and biased contingents of the 14th Army were not used on the disengagement stage; instead, battalions of 45th Motorized Division of the Leningrad military district and the 106 Airborne Division were relocated to the area.

After disengagement and cease-fire peace enforcement operations (started July 23, 1992), the operation passed in early August to a peace-keeping format; trilateral peace-keeping forces were composed of four Russian battalions (around 1,800 troops) plus three Moldavian and three Transdnestrian battalions supplied by the conflicting sides. The United Control Commission was created as a main multilateral political organ to supervise peace-support efforts and was responsible for further diplomatic negotiations and a peaceful settlement of the crisis. Formally all military authorities involved in peace keeping were under the jurisdiction of the Commission. Although a full political settlement was not provided, no significant reported cases of armed violence have occurred in the region since 1992.

A long-term OSCE observer mission set up in the region on the long-term basis works in cooperation with trilateral Moldavian-Russian-Transdnestrian political commission, which reports on the moderate progress in restoring stability. The political situation is moving toward preservation of higher level of autonomy for the Transdnestrian region, while it remains within Moldova.

The presence of Russian forces in Transdnestria and the political support the separatist Transdnestrian government finds among certain political circles in Moscow poison official Russian-Moldavian relations and motivate the government in Chisinau to appeal to the West, specifically to NATO for security guarantees. This allows some critics of the current foreign policy in Moscow to argue that the strategic interests of Russia it require to withdraw residual forces from Transdnestria, otherwise Moscow indirectly "fuels" plans of further NATO enlargement and diminishes the possibility of involvement of Moldova in the CIS and Tashkent Treaty.

It also should be understood that in the initial stages (1991-93), the task of protecting the rights of the Russian population in other CIS states was almost automatically considered by Moscow as approval to become involved in the conflict-resolution affairs of other regions. In the several years since then, however, this problem has decreased. Transdnestrian leaders failed to undermine the official dialogue between Russian and Moldavian authorities, although they engaged the political opposition in Russia, including extremist and radical-nationalist groups—an alignment that lessened any prospects of a strategic alliance between official Moscow and the unrecognized Transdnestrian Republic.

When General Alexander Lebed, former commander of the former 14th Army in Transdnestria, returned to Russia, he became involved in politics. He joined the presidential electoral race in 1996 and was elected a Krasnoyarsk governor in 1998. Because he did not include support of Russian military presence in far-off located Transdnestria into his electoral slogans, the idea of a Russian-oriented "island" in Moldova lost its former strongest proponent and leader.

Full withdrawal of any remaining parts of the former 14th Soviet Army from Moldova does not necessarily require abandonment of trilateral peace-keeping operations in Transdnestria. The formal contingent of Russian troops participating in the peace-keeping operation is much smaller than the initial number of 500 troops.

All this explains why of Russia’s withdrawal from conflict in Moldova seems more probable than attempts to gamble on affirming Russian interests through open support of the unrecognized quasi-state of Transdnestria. A lot would depend upon the lobbying skills of Transdnestrians leaders and their Moscow connections. Russia definitely would stay involved in political and human rights, because of the Russian minority in Moldova, but there are little signs that it will use this issue as a "Trojan Horse" for projection of any other "strategic interests" onto the shores of Black Sea. It’s more likely that cooperation with official Chisinau (rather than with its political opponents in Tiraspol) would bring more political dividends to Russia in this region in terms of reestablishing of Moldova’s interest in political, economic, and may be even security issues with the CIS.

LEGAL ASPECTS OF PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS IN THE CIS
Important clarifications should be made concerning the character of conflict resolution actions undertaken by Russia and other CIS states. The U.N. Charter postulates clearly that regional organizations or agreements could deal on their own with the matters of regional and local conflicts until the situation demands any enforcement toward the states. Otherwise, mediation, peace-keeping, peace-building, preventive diplomacy activities are allowed to be undertaken not only under the U.N. Security Council mandate but also under provisions of regional interstate structures during the time states or groups of states are waiting for the appropriate decision and mandate from the U.N. Security Council.

The criterion whether or not any actions are enforcement actions is a position of the state toward which the actions are applied. Enforcement actions of the type used in the U.N. Charter in Chapter VII are the actions by the Security Council, and especially actions with the use of armed force undertaken against the will and without permission or agreement of the target state. When the actions are undertaken in accordance with the formal request or agreement of the state on which territory the conflict takes place (or agreement of several states involved into the conflict as sides), then the international involvement is not considered as enforcement.

It’s important to realize that the use of armed forces by themselves is not necessarily a feature of enforcing actions. All peace-keeping operations started under requests or under agreement from the hostile sides involve the presence or use of armed forces. During peace-keeping operations, for example, armed violence could be used by peacekeepers to reestablish order against unauthorized local armed groupings or as a self-defense measure against local forces rejecting a cease-fire. Such use of force does not change the legal nature of the operation.

From this point of view, none of the known collective operations on the territory of the CIS states in 1992-95 could be considered an enforcement operation (in the Chapter VII meaning), as far as legal agreements between the conflict sides were concluded prior to start of the actions and the actions were undertaken under the expressed will and written international agreements with the authorities of the states on whose territories the conflicts emerged.

Agreement on the framework of the operation in South Ossetia involves all interested parties: Georgia, South Ossetia, North Ossetia, and Russia, plus representatives from these areas were included in the multilateral Political Control Commission that supervised the operation. In Moldova/ Transdnestria, the initial agreement was an interstate agreement between the heads of states of Moldova and Russia. The agreement to start forces disengagement was also signed by the highest political leader of the nonstate conflict party, the Transdnestrian government. The task was to disengage parties, contingents, and groupings of armed civilians, while authorities agreed to the use of a third disengaging force to stop uncontrolled violence.

Two other operations, one in Abkhazia/Georgia and one in Tadjikistan, were mandated by the heads of states of the CIS through the regional interstate organization, the CIS.

REGIONAL SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS
It is widely accepted in the international community that collective security and conflict resolution efforts in a world scale are to be led and monitored by the United Nations as the most universal international authority. At the same time while assuming the role of the universal peace keeping and conflict resolution mechanism, the United Nations obviously cannot operate simultaneously and equally effectively in many regions of the world. An important part of the conflict regulation is left to the regional organizations.

There is a growing tendency toward broader and more active involvement of regional organizations in regional peace keeping and conflict resolution. Under provisions of Chapter VIII of the U.N. Charter, regional organizations created by states could collectively undertake legitimate political, economic, military and other measures to deal with regional conflicts and stabilize regional situation. Under different historic circumstances organizations like the CSCE/OSCE, League of Arab States, Organization of Latin American States, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization were using credentials of the U.N. Charter Chapter VIII to legitimize their collective security arrangements and actions.

The same is true for the region of the Commonwealth of the Independent States on the geo-strategic space of the former Soviet Union. Russia remains the economically and politically dominating power of the region. At the same time, other CIS states more of less apply U.N. mechanisms to introduce truly international mechanisms and norms of international law into the relations among former Soviet republics.

In many regions a tendency could be observed toward creation of the "triangles" consisting of a great power, a regional organization, and the United Nations. Such a balance, if obtained, could substantially stabilize a region and neutralize conflicts. Even in Africa, where peace keeping is tremendously difficult, certain stabilizing results were achieved through triangles, such as "France-OAU-UN" and "Britain-British Commonwealth-UN" in conflicts on the African Horn, in Congo, and between Niger and Benin, Senegal and Mauritania, Algeria and Morocco.

If Russia would continue to develop a policy of recognizing U.N. peace-keeping potential, another unique regional mechanism could be established in triangle "Russia-Commonwealth of the Independent States-United Nations," which might be very effective for the conflict resolution on the conflict-rich area of the former Soviet Union.

While fully recognizing the ultimate mandating authority of the United Nations and legitimate credentials of the OSCE in the field of peace keeping, Russia very actively supports and promotes peace-keeping activities undertaken through the mechanism of the CIS. The question whether the CIS could be considered a regional organization is not a question of just geographical curiosity but an issue of legal importance. Formerly, regions were defined merely geographically—Africa, Latin America, etc.—but in recent decades geographical criteria are supplemented by functional approach. The notion of "region" in international law expanded to include countries of different continents united by some functional multidimensional agreements and treaties. For example, the United States and Canada as well as Turkmenistan, Tadjikistan, Kirgizstan, and Uzbekistan are legally recognized as parts of the OSCE, which in turn is considered a regional organization in compliance with the Chapter VIII of the U.N. Charter. Comparably League of Arab States unites Arabic countries situated partly in Africa and partly in Asia.

But such an approach goes too far. Within the CIS administration circles in Minsk and in the Moscow-based Staff for CIS Military Cooperation, a different distinction is adopted. Only multilateral operations in Tadjikistan are considered full- scale CIS peace-keeping operations, while operations in Abkhazia/Georgia approved by CIS stay almost purely Russian.

Operation in Tadjikistan have a clear CIS mandate signed by the heads of all CIS states (who all participated at the Tashkent treaty at the moment of decision on involvement into Tadjik conflict). It is the only operation where command is subordinated directly to the CIS collective organs—to the Council of Heads of States, Councils of Foreign Affairs, and Defense Ministers. The operation is administered not by national ministries of defense but by the International Staff for CIS Military Cooperation that nominates commanders on a rotational basis. From this point of view, only this operation has the legal right to be considered the regional peace-keeping CIS operation. Other cases on the territories of Georgia (in South Ossetia) and Moldova (in Transdnestria) are trilateral operations on the basis of the interstate agreements.

As for the operations performed completely internally by the decision of Russian authorities and with the use of Russian forces on the territory of Russian Federation (in North Ossetia/Ingushetia and in Chechnya), they are police operations to reestablish internal civil order. These actions do not have international character and are neither peace keeping nor peace enforcing by definition or content.

The nature and character of armed actions in the conflict areas on the territory of the CIS states are in constant dispute between the politicians and analysts of the Western and CIS countries. Most of these operations have several important features in common that influence the attitude of the world community toward CIS conflict-resolution activities:

• First, U.N. Security Council decisions concerning conflict cases on the territory of the CIS states are absent. At the same time its important to know that CIS states including Russia, supports international intervention for conflict resolution in the CIS, if it has support from the United Nations or OSCE. The United Nations is constantly updated about the status of operations in Tadjikistan, Georgia, and Moldova. Georgia, for example, applied to the OCSE, CIS, and United Nations with a request to conduct international peace-keeping operations in Abkhazia. There are OSCE decisions concerning conflicts and calling for peace-keeping operations in Nagorno-Karabakh and in Georgia/Abkhazia.

• An innovation of CIS conflict-resolution practices is the involvement in the peace-keeping processes of the representatives of the hostile parties, to include military contingents supplied by them. As described in case of South Ossetia, both Georgian and South Ossetian military patrol battalions are patrolling the area jointly with the Russian troops. In Transdnestria, three Moldavian and three Transdnestrian battalions compose a trilateral peace-keeping force jointly with four battalions supplied by Russia. Practical reports show high efficiency of local joint patrolling with the military representing both hostile parties.

In Tadjikistan, however, where participating sides and especially CIS officials are more attentive to obliging international and U.N. standards, contingents supplied to the international peace-keeping forces by the Tadjik government itself were excluded in the later stages from the of the international force.

• From the military-technical point of view, operations in the CIS are often accused of using heavy weapons and warlike tactics as well as regular armed forces soldiers for the civilian operations instead of specially trained and equipped purely "peace keepers." That was especially true before first rotation, when there was a visible lack of specifically trained soldiers and officers. Since late 1993, the situation has changed: special training camps and sites have been expanded, and Russian conscripts are not sent to hostile area. All Russian military peace-keeping forces are now volunteers and undergo training comparable to that of the Russian peacekeepers sent to the U.N. contingent in the former Yugoslavia.

The main changes in international peace implementation practices observed by various analysts can be summarized as follows:

Practically all these features are applicable to operations of the Russian Armed Forces in CIS conflicts. The practical side of NATO-led operations in Bosnia and of Russian-led operations in the CIS demonstrate significant similarities in trends and problems of modern peace keeping in ethnically motivated conflicts.

Still, analysts in both Russia and the West tend to think that a "new Yalta" has taken place invisibly as a result of the self-affirmation of Russia as a leading power at the former Soviet space and the complete change of foreign policy in the Central European powers and some new independent states. What spoken and unspoken rules of the "new Yalta" are mutually recognized in current policies of Russia and Western nations? These temporary "rules of the geopolitical game" could be defined as follows:

• With the end of the Cold War, the main threats to Russia’s security are from the inside: domestic instability, interethnic frictions, economic crises, risk of undemocratic change of political regime, etc. Thus Russia’s basic share of responsibilities in promoting European security is first of all a "homework" of assuring stability, democracy and conflict resolution on its own territory.

• After the end of the Cold War, nations of Central Eastern Europe (former Warsaw Pact members) reaffirmed their attribution and attraction to the Western political, economic and cultural mainstream. Russia has refrained from any efforts to return these states into its own sphere of influence by force. The West (and institutions like the EU, WEU, and NATO, in particular) openly take certain responsibilities to assure reform of these countries and their inclusion into the "area of European stability."

• After the end of the Cold War and creation of the new independent states, their infrastructure and similar reforms make a natural continuation of their special ties. With exception of the three Baltic states, the CIS countries seem to be "the other side," in the eyes of Western nations. The West refrains from any open efforts to undermine or stop integration the CIS.

• After the end of the Cold War and explosion of numerous interethnic and political conflicts on the territory of the former Soviet Union, none of the global or European institutions (United Nations, EU, NATO, WEU, OSCE, Council of Europe, etc.) expressed readiness to take responsibility for conflict resolution, peace keeping, or peace enforcement in the former Soviet Union. Russia, backed by CIS structures, took responsibility for conflict resolution and containment of conflicts among the CIS states. It is somewhat challenged in this role by Ukraine and the Baltic states, but is more or less recognized by international organizations and other CIS nations themselves.

The end of the Cold War meant a complete change to the security agenda of both the West and Russia, resulting in a reorientation from East-West confrontation toward joint efforts against new risks and challenges to international security (like international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, interethnic rivalries and local conflicts, etc.). However, one of the not so much spoken of realities of the mid-1990s was the a rebirth of East-West frictions and potential confrontation (now embodied by growing frictions between Russia and NATO) with all the traditional "worst case military scenarios," regional arms race, mutual suspicions, and threat perceptions.

NATURE OF CONTRADICTIONS:  NOT EXACTLY A SECURITY
It is very important that in the post-Cold War world there is no ideological conflict between Russia and the West. Basic security interests of the West could be assured if democratic political regimes are preserved in the new independent states and first of all in Russia. Projection of Russia’s geopolitical interests have been reduced from global to regional area. Further, Russia’s interests, either in economic or in military terms, are not contradictory to those of the NATO nations.

In its turn, the basic security interests of Russia could be protected and assured without interference in major Western spheres of economic, political, cultural, or military influence. Russia’s withdrawal from Central Eastern Europe is final, and no attempts of forceful reaffirmation in this region can be imagined under the current circumstances. Rivalry for allies and resources in the Third World (Western-Soviet rivalry through proxies in Africa, Latin America, and Asia) gave way to very limited rivalry for economic presence, and even this is of peripheral priority for Russia nowadays.

Instabilities in areas like the Transcaucasus, Crimea, Moldova, or Central Asia (areas which Russia considers important for its own stability and security) are not caused by Western interference or presence. Fortunately there are no visible attempts from anybody to interpret seriously these local historically rooted instabilities and conflicts as projections of Russian-Western contradictions. If the West practices prudence and self-restraint, regional CIS conflicts should continue to be remain out of the Western-Russian agenda for mutual benefit.

This analysis of Russia’s interests in a post-Cold War world concludes that a current absence of mutually satisfactory relations between Russia and the West is not caused by territorial claims, or clash of influence, or conflict of economic interests. Neither the political orientation of Central and Eastern European nations nor the status of Russian CIS neighbors or Russian involvement in CIS hostile areas is at stake. There is no serious expectation on either side of a major massive war between the United States and Russia, of a nuclear exchange, or of a conventional force "battle for territories."

Major points of dispute and major divergence of interests concentrate around the definition and international recognition of the general place and role of the new Russia (politically reborn and dramatically weakened in comparison to the Soviet Union) in world policy, economy and security architecture. To a significant degree Russian-NATO frictions are not at all caused by security concerns but represent a projection of uneasy political process of "reaffirmation" of a re-born Russia within a club of great powers. Inevitably this issue is deeply intertwined with the definition and recognition of place, role, and basic functions of NATO in a "grand design" of European policy and security.

Neither Russia nor the United States is firmly settled the post-Cold War world, and both still adhere to old stereotypes of former political interests and residual behavior inherited from decades of Cold War. The only way to stability lays through a chain of compromises between the United States and Russia and NATO and Russia in this new world, the world without any systemic East-West clash but with an unfinished security architecture.

IS RUSSIAN-AMERICAN COOPERATION FEASIBLE?
The system of international peace-support interference in regional and local conflicts will inevitably remain in demand in the early 21st century. How can the United States and Russia contribute to it? There are two basic scenarios in this respect:

• Parallel (competing) Peace keeping. One approach would be to elaborate a kind of new "division of spheres of responsibilities" according to a kind of "New Yalta" rules. In such a case Russia would continue to rely upon itself and upon the CIS mechanisms (regional integration) to settle the conflicts in the area where Russian geopolitical interests clearly dominate. Both Russia and the United States would perform as "regional policemen," taking responsibility for stabilizing the area of influence. This would create not two but three systems of peace-keeping activities and practices.

—The United States would continue the scheme of US-led ad hoc coalitions that might use international mandates from the United Nations, OAS, and OSCE for interference in hot spots.

—Russia would develop its practice of "legal interference" in the conflicts on the former Soviet geopolitical space under bilateral interstate agreements with governments of the CIS states or would lead small CIS-mandated coalitions on the basis of the Tashkent Treaty on Collective Security to do regional peace keeping.

—The United Nations (hopefully at that time joined by OSCE and/or WEU) would continue the burden of about a dozen of simultaneous peace keeping and humanitarian aid involvement every year, relying more upon the traditional support of Nordic and neutral countries than of the great powers.

This trilateral scheme could be stable if "zones of interests and influence" of Russia and the United States didn’t overlap. Potential clash or frictions could emerge in case of conflicts of interethnic or economic nature in such areas as the Baltic states and the Transcaucasus, where not only neighboring Russia but also the United States have vested interests. Instabilities around Afghanistan/Tadjikistan could also remain a source for Russian-Western misunderstanding for years.

• Joint Peace Keeping Under International Credentials. Another scenario envisions interoperability between Russia and America in future areas of conflict. But such an interoperability is very difficult to expect without applying the common denominator of the United Nations (or the OSCE). Russia would very improbably be willing to become a loyal member of another "Dayton"—a peaceful resolution scheme elaborated on American territory, tailored by American diplomats, and marginalizing the United Nations.

Russian and American militaries could practice joint peace-keeping exercises to improve technical interoperability, but political framework for joint practical implementation of obtained skills would remain (from the Russian point of view) very traditional. If a clear U.N. mandate is required for an international peace keeping or peace enforcement operation, then Russian and American military could serve together under the U.N. banners. In this case the core problem would be to improve American-Russian interaction (or trade-off) within the U.N. Security Council, where all mandates and rules of engagement for future international peace keeping would be elaborated.

To a certain degree Russia is ready for the internationalization of the conflict resolution on the CIS territory and deeper involvement of the United Nations into Tadjik or Abkhasian operations. At the same time, this path contains seeds of destabilization of the whole system of U.N.-based peace keeping, if the great powers project their geopolitical "ego" in the peace-keeping area.

As William J. Durch rightly stresses in his paper, even a symbolic joint contribution in the form of Russian and American military observers in U.N. operations could be of great importance. International peace keeping cannot survive if the United States and Russia distant themselves by seeking other models of conflict resolution.

While U.N. and OSCE framework would be politically most comfortable for Russia to share efforts with the United States, it is most probable that the NATO would play an important practical role in future peace keeping. Brussels is very careful not to play a mandate-issuing role and thus not to compete with the United Nations or OSCE in legal terms. But in practice, NATO does compete with these international structures as a decisionmaking center and source of diplomatic initiatives when it comes to regional conflict resolution. And the case of Russian-NATO cooperation in Bosnia sets a very timely and important positive precedent. Moreover, the Partnership for Peace framework and mil-to-mil cooperation programs set the momentum for Russian-NATO joint exercises and actions. Peace keeping is a rare and very valuable platform on which NATO and Russia could circumvent residual ideological obstacles to cooperation and develop initial practical interoperability.

The future of cooperation in peace keeping partly depends upon nature and geography of conflicts in the early 21st century. Russia and the United States could be united by the challenges if conflicts don’t put them on the different sides of the fence. At the same, time conflicts in the Baltic area or the Balkans could quickly polarize great nations by their attitudes toward peace keeping and interference.

Future U.S.-Russian cooperation in peace keeping might fall apart because of an inability to find the appropriate place for the new Russia in the new security architecture of Eurasia. But it is not less true that future U.S.-Russian cooperation in peace keeping might become an important vehicle and unique platform for improving and upgrading the general security architecture of the early 21st century to one of cooperation rather than confrontation.