NATO COUNTERPROLIFERATION POLICY: A CASE STUDY IN ALLIANCE POLITICS

Jeffrey A. Larsen

INSS Occasional Paper 17

Proliferation Series

November 1997

USAF Institute for National Security Studies
US Air Force Academy, Colorado
The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Air Force, the Department of Defense, the US Government or any NATO member. This paper is approved for public release by SAF/PAS; distribution is unlimited. The findings of this paper are the result of research conducted from 1995-97 under the auspices of grants from INSS and the NATO Office of Public Affairs.

* * * * * * *

ABOUT THE AUTHOR: Dr. Jeffrey A. Larsen (Lt Colonel, USAF) is Senior Research Fellow and former Director of the USAF Institute for National Security Affairs at the US Air Force Academy. Prior to founding INSS, Colonel Larsen served as Chief of the International and Defense Policy Division in the Academy’s Department of Political Science. An Air Force Academy graduate, he is a command pilot with Master’s Degrees in national security affairs from the Naval Postgraduate School and international relations from Princeton University. He also earned his Ph.D. in politics from Princeton. Dr. Larsen was winner of a 1995-97 NATO Research Fellowship. His previous publications include: Arms Control Toward the 21st Century (with Greg Rattray); “Europe: The Security of a Region” in The Defense Policies of Nations (Murray & Viotti, 3rd edition); The Future of Nuclear Weapons in Europe (with Patrick Garrity); and The Politics of NATO Short-Range Nuclear Modernization 1983-90.

* * * * * * *

Comments pertaining to this paper are invited and should be forwarded to:

Director, USAF Institute for National Security Studies
HQ USAFA/DFES
2354 Fairchild Drive, Suite 5L27
USAF Academy, CO 80840
phone: 719-333-2717
fax: 719-333-2716
email: hayspl.dfe@usafa.af.mil

* * * * * * *

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreword</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Summary</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Background: Threat and Response</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rationale for a Counterproliferation Program</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance to NATO</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The US Defense Counterproliferation Initiative</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possible NATO Non/Counterproliferation Roles</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The NATO Proliferation Study Process</strong></td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Political Dimension—Nonproliferation</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Military Dimension—Counterproliferation</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase I: Threats</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase II: Implications</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase III: Capabilities and Shortfalls</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Consultation Process</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country Studies</strong></td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France: Leading Advocate of Counterproliferation</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany: Still Leery of Military Responses</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom: Solid Partner, Lower Force Levels</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conclusion</strong></td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future Requirements</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final Thoughts</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Endnotes</strong></td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 1</td>
<td>Counterproliferation Areas for Capability Enhancements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 2</td>
<td>Joint Committee on Proliferation (JCP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3</td>
<td>Senior Political-Military Group on Proliferation (SGP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 4</td>
<td>Senior Defense Group on Proliferation (DGP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 5</td>
<td>Tier I Needed Capabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 1</td>
<td>The Phase III Consultative Process (Illustrative)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FOREWORD

Lieutenant Colonel Jeff Larsen, our INSS Senior Research Fellow, presents in this paper the history of the development of NATO’s counterproliferation strategy. His study focuses on the period 1994-97, and compares how France, Germany, the UK and the US perceived the issue of WMD proliferation issues and of NATO’s possible role in meeting this new threat. It examines these states’ respective policy positions on nonproliferation, as well as the key areas of agreement and differences between them. The paper describes the development and structure of an agreed NATO policy dealing with nonproliferation and counterproliferation. It addresses the NATO committee structure and reports; compares the Alliance study to the US counterproliferation initiative; considers the domestic political considerations of Britain, France, and Germany; and suggests potential problems implementing the new program. Throughout the course of this study the author kept abreast of the efforts of the NATO working groups dealing with this same issue, and the effect of recent domestic political events in each country. We are pleased to offer this product of research accomplished by Colonel Larsen, INSS’s “Founding Father.”

About the Institute

INSS is primarily sponsored by the Policy Division, Nuclear and Counterproliferation Directorate, Headquarters US Air Force (USAF/XONP) and the Dean of the Faculty, US Air Force Academy. Our other current sponsors include: the Air Staff’s Directorate for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (USAF/XOI); OSD Net Assessment; the Defense Special Weapons Agency; the Army Environmental Policy Institute; and the On-Site Inspection Agency. The mission of the Institute is to promote national security research for the Department of Defense within the military academic community, and to support the Air Force national security education program.
Its primary purpose is to promote research in fields of interest to INSS’ sponsors: international security policy (especially arms control and nonproliferation/counterproliferation), Air Force planning issues, regional security policy, conflict in the information age (including the revolution in military affairs and information warfare), environmental security, and space policy.

INSS coordinates and focuses outside thinking in various disciplines and across services to develop new ideas for USAF policy making. The Institute develops topics, selects researchers from within the military academic community, and administers sponsored research. It also hosts conferences and workshops which facilitate the dissemination of information to a wide range of private and government organizations. INSS is in its sixth year of providing valuable, cost-effective research to meet the needs of the Air Staff and our other sponsors. We appreciate your continued interest in INSS and its research products.

PETER L. HAYS, Lt Colonel, USAF
Director, Institute for National Security Studies
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has become increasingly aware in recent years of a growing threat to its security and freedom of action. While this new threat is not nearly as well-defined as was the traditional Soviet Cold War threat, the increasing capabilities of potential proliferant states armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) could pose grave risks to NATO’s territory and population, to its forces operating in regional contexts, and to its freedom of action to conduct out of area operations. There is a growing consensus that this new concern must be addressed in both political and military terms. While the degree of support for specific programs varies by individual member state, the overall desire within the Alliance is to prevent future problems through common planning at the earliest possible stage. In addition, the US and its allies with global interests, France and the United Kingdom, have for years been trying to reorient the NATO Alliance toward power projection capabilities and deployable forces.

NATO undertook several activities after the 1991 Rome Summit that focused on preventing proliferation via traditional political means, and continuing work in the well-established field of passive defense. It also began developing a conceptual framework on air defense, to include ballistic missile and cruise missile defense technologies. All of these efforts, however, were by late 1993 considered insufficient to meet the new proliferation threat. There was a glaring absence of military measures available should prevention fail or deterrence break down. It was this shortcoming that the 1994 NATO Summit addressed.

In January 1994 the NATO Heads of State and Government, meeting in Brussels, emphasized that the proliferation of WMD and their delivery means posed a threat to international security and was a matter of concern to the Alliance. NATO’s new policy framework on proliferation was confirmed at the June 1994 Istanbul Ministerial meeting. NATO stressed that its response to this threat must include both political and military measures to
“discourage WMD proliferation and use, and, if necessary, to protect NATO territory, populations, and forces.”

The Alliance is well on its way toward developing plans to meet such threats. France and the US have led the alliance in its study of this issue. The European view of counterproliferation initiatives differs from the United States’ perspective through its greater emphasis on diplomatic, economic, and political means of countering WMD proliferation, but NATO does acknowledge the necessity for military options and preparedness.

Among the NATO members, France, the UK, and the United States have the most widespread interests and military reach around the world, and are therefore understandably most concerned over the implications of WMD proliferation with respect to those deployed forces. In addition, France, Italy, Greece, Turkey and Spain face increasingly hostile governments in many of the littoral states of the Mediterranean region and the Middle East.

The United States’ official list of shortfall priorities, developed through its Defense Counterproliferation Initiative, identified a number of key programs for increased funding and emphasis in four areas: intelligence, passive defenses, active defenses, and offensive counterforce capabilities. This list is very similar to NATO’s. That the US and NATO rankings overlap should come as no surprise, given that most of the items listed were common sense responses to this new threat, and given traditional American leadership in new military programs and strategies for the Alliance. Many needed programs are already underway.

The Senior Defense Group on Proliferation (DGP) was most concerned with the military ramifications and counterproliferation aspects of nonproliferation policy. This was an innovative dimension of North Atlantic cooperation, and was at least partly responsible for the French decision to return to the military side of the Alliance structure in late 1995. The North Atlantic Council approved the DGP’s conclusions and recommended work program in June 1996, and its doctrine and training proposals in June 1997.
Whether the Alliance can or will fund the new requirements identified by the DGP, however, remains problematic.

The DGP effort is an attempt to expedite those procurement processes which may best support NATO’s nonproliferation efforts, but it is only one part of the overall Alliance force development process. Deciding who pays, how much, and for what, will drive upcoming political discussions.

Based on the DGP studies, the Alliance concluded that it was unrealistic to expect that there were sufficient resources to defend and protect NATO populations from a WMD attack. It prefers, at least for the short-term, to rely on deterrence to inhibit would-be attackers, and to focus on protecting allied forces fighting in or deployed to an NBC environment.

The January 1994 Brussels Summit agreement was a defining event in the evolution of France’s post-Cold War relationship with the Alliance. France was quick to agree to the new proposals—including the call for a major Alliance study of the proliferation threat. France has always viewed developments in North Africa with more concern than other Europeans, and is therefore more in line with the United States in advocating a major new counterproliferation initiative. France’s role as the first co-chair of the DGP was no accident. France saw the DGP chairmanship as a test of its new relations with NATO and the United States.

Germany, on the other hand, feels that traditional nonproliferation means have served the West well so far. There is no hurry for the Alliance to develop more offensively oriented military options—particularly given the low current threat environment. Overall the issue is a peripheral one to most government officials and academics within the Federal Republic. Germans are also concerned with moral and legal questions when it comes to security issues. Hence their disregard for many of the areas under consideration in the American counterproliferation initiative, and in NATO’s DGP studies. German strategic analysts point out that it is difficult to open discussions on these issues within the German public.
The United Kingdom was an early advocate of a comprehensive political and military approach to the issue of WMD proliferation, hoping thereby to respond to the regional causes of such proliferation and provide the operational military means to deter and defend against these threats. The threat was not to London, but rather to its deployed forces. Given Britain’s history and far-flung interests, it took a global view to this issue, similar to that of the United States and France. While early discussions within the United Kingdom questioned the purpose of a NATO counterproliferation study, it eventually became a staunch supporter of the DGP effort.

The United States found that the NATO counterproliferation effort met most of its goals for the process. Nevertheless, it would prefer greater commitment by its European allies toward meeting the DGP’s force targets.

The NATO counterproliferation effort surely ranks as one of the most ambitious and successful in Alliance history. A concerted effort by an alliance facing a new series of threats in an uncertain world led to the development of a comprehensive overview of the threats, the capabilities needed to meet those threats, existing shortfalls, and a plan to correct those deficiencies. The DGP’s conclusions seem pragmatic, responsible, and modest. It remains to be seen, however, whether the Alliance has the will to pursue these new programs in an era of fiscal austerity, public apathy, seemingly low threat levels, and military downsizing. In other words, NATO’s proliferation agenda faces the same hurdles as have past programs involving nuclear modernization or changes to Alliance military strategy. All of them seemed unlikely to succeed, too, yet most were eventually accomplished through a combination of leadership, changing international circumstances and public perceptions, and the slow, methodical bureaucratic process. One suspects that the NATO counterproliferation effort will be equally successful, over the long term.
NATO COUNTERPROLIFERATION POLICY: A CASE STUDY IN ALLIANCE POLITICS

BACKGROUND: THREAT AND RESPONSE

We attach the utmost importance to preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and, where this has occurred, to reversing it through diplomatic means... [However,] as a defensive alliance, NATO is addressing the range of capabilities needed to discourage WMD proliferation and use. It must also be prepared, if necessary, to counter this risk and thereby protect NATO’s populations, territory, and forces.

Introduction

The global spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is a clear and well-recognized threat to the United States and its allies — a threat that will be exacerbated in future conflicts where it is unlikely the US will fight alone. Since building and maintaining coalitions in such conflicts will be crucial to the successful conduct of future wars, the ability to protect the coalition states’ populations, territories, and deployed forces from these weapons is of paramount importance. Indeed, the continuing existence of coalitions fighting against an aggressor with WMD may become problematic if it appears likely that the alliance’s populations, forces, or interests are at risk or within range of such weapons. One of the ways the US has been working to ensure an adequate response to any WMD threat is by developing with its allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) a common approach to
countering the efforts to acquire and potentially use nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) capabilities.²

With US prodding, the North Atlantic Alliance has become increasingly aware of a growing threat to its security and freedom of action. While this new threat is not nearly as well-defined as was the traditional Soviet threat of the Cold War, the increasing capabilities of potential proliferant states armed with weapons of mass destruction could pose grave risks to NATO’s territory and population, to its forces operating in regional contexts, and to its freedom of action to conduct out of area operations. There is a growing consensus that this new concern must be addressed in both political and military terms. While the degree of support for specific programs varies by individual member state, the Alliance has recognized that meeting this future crisis early through common planning and preparation is the only hope for an effective response to the proliferation challenge.

The US desires international political support and allied contributions to any operation and, therefore, needs to ensure that all participants are prepared with credible military capabilities for any environment.³ In this way all members of the Western coalition can share risks and responsibilities through cooperation in an agreed regime.

This paper studies NATO’s counterproliferation initiative and its attempt to develop an agreed Alliance policy regarding this issue. NATO’s future holds the likelihood of more bilateral or multilateral actions under the umbrella of NATO approval, without necessarily being a consensual NATO activity.⁴ In addition, while NATO’s core function will remain—to guarantee the freedom and physical security of its members—its day-to-day functions will change to lower level aspects of a broad range of security issues. As one analyst put it, this bodes a shift “from collective defense to collective responsibility sharing,”⁵ with
important ramifications for future non- or counterproliferation activities by the Alliance.  

Obvious questions arose in 1994 as to the consequences of this new proliferation debate on NATO strategy. This paper examines these questions by focusing on the actions of the Senior Defense Group on Proliferation (DGP), since the DGP was the body most concerned with the military ramifications and counterproliferation aspects of nonproliferation policy. This was an innovative dimension of North Atlantic cooperation, and was at least partly responsible for the French decision to return to the military side of the Alliance structure in late 1995. The North Atlantic Council approved the DGP’s conclusions and recommended work program in June 1996. Whether the Alliance can or will fund the new requirements identified by the DGP, however, remains problematic.

NATO’s counterproliferation effort surely ranks as one of the most ambitious in NATO’s history. As we shall see, a concerted effort by an alliance facing a new series of threats in an uncertain world led to the development of a comprehensive overview of the threats, the capabilities needed to meet those threats, existing shortfalls, and a plan to correct those deficiencies. It remains to be seen whether the Alliance has the will to pursue the programs recommended by the counterproliferation study. But given its past history in pursuing such major changes to Alliance policy and strategy (such as the MC 14/3 flexible response policy, the INF missile dual-track modernization program, or the Montebello Decision on short-range nuclear forces), it is logical to conclude that NATO’s counterproliferation agenda will be equally successful, over the long term.

**Background**
Historical cases of NATO doctrinal shifts and nuclear modernization provide numerous parallels for the recent counterproliferation study effort. Themes from the past resonate in the current debate. For example, the decisions made by the DGP regarding NATO requirements for countering WMD possession and use reflect the same role served by theater nuclear weapons in Europe: deterrence and reassurance. In the past, reassuring European allies that the US would remain by their side was a vital US responsibility, on a par with actual strategy and hardware decisions affecting the continent. In this case, it is the US which seems to need reassuring, and allied commitment to new counterproliferation systems would seem to provide that transatlantic link.

Traditionally the European allies have had concerns that the United States makes decisions which affect the Alliance as a whole without consulting them. This was the obvious case when, for example, President Carter canceled the neutron bomb in 1977, and again when President Reagan appeared to accept Gorbachev’s proposal for global nuclear disarmament at Reykjavik in 1986. Apparently some organizational learning has occurred within NATO; the effort begun in 1994 to study WMD proliferation and allied responses was truly a multinational cooperative project, with a European co-chair of the key committee—the DGP—from the start. Similarly, the Alliance’s willingness to consider, incorporate, and mold public opinion was more evident in this program than in the past, once again reflecting lessons learned from history. Finally, that Alliance members often have ulterior motives for agreeing to new doctrine or hardware systems is no secret, and has often been seen in the past. This may once again be the case regarding the DGP effort. Germany, for instance, may agree to certain programs in order to appear to be a good partner—although no one wants to make this a “litmus test” of Alliance loyalty, as was sometimes the
case for German acquiescence in nuclear matters during the Cold War. France saw this as an opportunity, and a test case, for greater involvement in the military side of the Alliance. And several of the smaller allied states are happy to support a shift in military strategy that may result in new military hardware transfers and logistical support from the bigger members, in particular the US.

Comparing the NATO decision to adopt the new strategy of flexible response with the current counterproliferation study may illuminate some of the constants and interesting reversals in Alliance politics over the past 30 years. In 1967 the Alliance agreed to accept a decision by the Military Committee (MC 14/3) to replace massive retaliation with flexible response as the overarching strategy for the Alliance. Flexible response had three main components: forward defense, flexible response, and nuclear deterrence. Comparing this decision with the ongoing counterproliferation discussions shows some parallels and some improvements in the decision-making process over the past 30 years. For instance, NATO only began considering flexible response a year after the Kennedy Administration had adopted it as the official military strategy of the United States. In the same way, NATO began the DGP effort one year after the US Counterproliferation Initiative was unveiled. The debate over MC 14/3 took five years, however, whereas the DGP accomplished most of its agenda in only two.

MC 14/3 was successfully adopted only after two major organizational changes took place. First, France left the military side of the Alliance in 1966, largely to protest American domination of the debate over flexible response and the direction this was taking the Alliance. Notably, the 1994 DGP study was begun in large part due to French prodding, and France’s desire to use this vehicle as a test case for returning to the military side of Alliance activities. The second change required for MC 14/3 was the creation of the Nuclear Planning Group
This body resulted from a conscious effort to involve the allies in the heretofore exclusively US and UK issues of nuclear decision making, including force structure, modernization, and stationing issues. The NPG performed a similar role in the DGP effort. In fact, the NPG Staff Group in Brussels simply took on a new hat in 1994 and became, when meeting as such, the DGP, with no change in personnel. The only differences between the NPG and DPG, in the case of most allies, were the types of issues discussed and the national MOD office which provided support to the staff group on a particular issue.

The lessons from NATO’s nuclear history are as applicable today as ever, and certainly apply to the major new Alliance doctrinal shift in the 1990s—the creation of an agreed NATO policy on counterproliferation. Indeed, the rule of thumb regarding NATO theater nuclear force modernization is equally applicable for the current program: “Regardless of military value, a weapon must pass strict political guidelines before it can be successfully deployed on the European continent.” The development of an agreed policy on proliferation has become a major goal for the North Atlantic Alliance. As the story unfolds in the following pages, the highly political nature of any Alliance strategy change will be evident.

**Rationale for a Counterproliferation Program**

In November 1991 the NATO leaders at the Rome Summit adopted the NATO Strategic Concept. This document noted the risks posed by “the buildup of military power and the proliferation of weapons technologies...including weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles capable of reaching the territory of some member states of the Alliance,” and identified the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles as problems requiring special attention by the Alliance. Similar concern had been expressed in the
United Nations. A 1992 Security Council resolution stated that the proliferation of WMD constituted a threat to international peace and security. President Clinton’s address to the UN General Assembly in September 1993 contained a similar message. Secretary of State Warren Christopher told his European counterparts in 1993 that “the most urgent arms control issue of the 1990s is proliferation… and strong, collective action by the US and Europe is required to deal with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, missiles for their delivery, and sophisticated conventional arms and dual-use technologies.”

Simultaneously the Alliance was undertaking a comprehensive review of its nuclear consultation processes and the Political Principles for the release of nuclear weapons. These discussions culminated in the 1992 meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group at Gleneagles, Scotland, in which the allies agreed to reduce their reliance on nuclear weapons, focus more on crisis management, and consider possible dispersal of remaining NATO nuclear assets as necessary to enhance survivability and readiness. Improved crisis management concepts and dispersal plans served, in part, to counteract growing concerns over WMD proliferation that arose in the following years.

At the October 1993 NATO Defense Ministers’ meeting in Travemunde, Germany, US Secretary of Defense Les Aspin proposed a counterproliferation initiative, which, despite a lukewarm reception by the European members, the Defense Planning Committee and Nuclear Planning Groups both discussed in their December meetings. That same month, in Washington, Secretary Aspin publicly unveiled the US Defense Counterproliferation Initiative.

In January 1994 the NATO Heads of State and Government met at the Brussels Summit, and re-emphasized that the proliferation of WMD and their delivery means posed a threat to international security and was a matter of concern to the alliance. This was a prelude to the
announcement, at the June 1994 Istanbul NATO Ministerial meeting, of NATO’s new policy framework on proliferation, in which the Alliance made several important observations. First, a number of states on NATO’s periphery were continuing to pursue weapons of mass destruction or their delivery means. WMD and their delivery means were perceived to pose a direct threat to the Alliance and its forces. And it was becoming obvious that WMD proliferation could occur despite traditional international nonproliferation efforts. NATO stressed that its response to the growing WMD threat must include both political and military measures to “discourage WMD proliferation and use, and, if necessary, to protect NATO territory, populations, and forces.” France and the US have since led the alliance in NATO’s detailed study of the issue of countering WMD proliferation.

What happened between the 1991 Rome and 1994 Brussels summits to increase the level of concern and response by NATO’s member states to the issue of proliferation? Several events conspired to bring about this change of attitude. The Western optimism that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, and the coalition’s victory in the Gulf War had waned in the years since these remarkable events. Findings published by the UN Special Commission on Iraq and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in their inspections of Baghdad’s weapons program following the Gulf War showed that Iraq was much further along in its development of nuclear capability than anyone had imagined. In addition, there were concerns within the Alliance about the possible emergence of a revanchist Russia. Furthermore, the failure of both Western Europe and NATO to prevent the war in Bosnia led some analysts to question the potential of weapons proliferation into the hands of states or groups with views antithetical to NATO’s. The West had just endured a 1992-94 crisis with North Korea surrounding possible diversion of fissile materials into a weapons
program and its intransigence toward IAEA inspectors, which raised concerns about WMD proliferation. Finally, Southern Flank NATO members’ worries about rogue states in the Middle East and North Africa procuring WMD weapons and delivery means, coupled with increasing concern over fissile materials control and smuggling in the former Soviet Union, were growing—especially after the widely reported captures of small amounts of plutonium and enriched uranium in Germany in summer 1994. All of these incidents led to widespread appreciation within the NATO community that traditional non-proliferation methods had failed to prevent Iraq and North Korea from obtaining at least rudimentary nuclear capabilities, and that other states could follow the same pattern. This was no longer an academic question; the security of the Alliance was now threatened from a new direction.

Importance to NATO

Why is WMD proliferation a NATO problem? NATO’s role under its strategic concept involves not only assuring the territorial defense of the members of the Alliance, but providing the foundation for a stable security environment in Europe. NATO also serves as a transatlantic forum for consultation on any issue affecting member security and vital interests, and acts as a coordinating body for efforts in these areas. In this sense, NATO is more than a collective security organization; it is the cornerstone for Europe’s future security framework.

The proliferation of WMD could undermine the achievement of a stable security environment in Europe. Such weapons potentially pose a direct military threat to Alliance members, especially those in Europe, as well as their deployed military forces around the globe. There is no one uniform proliferation threat to NATO. Rather, the potential threats can be thought of in categories such as the following:
• opponents armed with weapons of mass destruction and delivery means (such as ballistic missiles) in a direct confrontation with NATO military forces in a regional setting;
• direct military threats by rogue states possessing WMD capabilities against the territory and populations of NATO states;
• risks from shifts in regional power balances with global implications that were created by acquisition of WMD or delivery means;
• regional instabilities that are fueled by the proliferation of WMD and which negatively impact Western security;
• erosion of international norms and security systems;
• increased danger of accidents; and
• new avenues for international terrorism.21

Weapons of mass destruction are particularly sought after by states in unstable regions of the world, such as the Middle East, South Asia and East Asia. It is the Middle East and North Africa that most concern NATO, given the availability and range of existing medium range ballistic missiles. The purpose of these weapons in the hands of such states, it has been suggested, would primarily be to deter Western forces from becoming involved in regional conflicts by acting on public opinion within the individual states and international bodies providing the troops.22

NATO’s counterproliferation policy framework most directly addresses two of the categories listed above—threats against NATO forces involved in regional contingencies, and direct threats against NATO territory.23 The Alliance is well on its way toward developing plans to meet such threats. The European view of counterproliferation initiatives differs from the United States’ perspective in its greater emphasis on diplomatic, economic, and political means of countering WMD proliferation, although NATO acknowledges the necessity for military options and preparedness. Nevertheless, French and German
officials continue to insist that “counterproliferation” is not an acceptable NATO term and that the US focus on retaliation and pre-emptive strikes could seriously undermine nonproliferation efforts.24 Political disagreement within the Alliance over the necessity for pre-emptive attacks against rogue states with WMD capabilities is a further stumbling block to effective efforts to prepare NATO forces for a future WMD adversary.

Among the NATO members, France, Great Britain, and the United States have the most far-flung and complex interests and military reach around the world, and are therefore understandably most concerned over the implications of WMD proliferation with respect to those deployed forces. In addition, France, Italy, Greece, Turkey and Spain face increasingly hostile governments in many of the littoral states of the Mediterranean region,25 and Turkey has disputes with several potential proliferant states in the Middle East.26 Modern systems could potentially deliver WMD against the French homeland, for example, with little or no warning. France is quite concerned with countering these potential threats, particularly from the increasingly unstable South.27 Deterrence, in the form of vague nuclear threats, seems to be the preferred French response to these threats, as President Chirac reiterated in August 1995: “Only the [nuclear] deterrent force guarantees France against the possible use of weapons of mass destruction, of whatever type they may be.”28

No NATO policy will work without the active participation, or at least tacit support, of four key member states. By examining each of these four countries—France, Germany, Great Britain, and the United States—one can see the important role each plays in the development of agreed Alliance policies.

**France.** The 1994 French *White Paper* on defense called WMD proliferation one of the major challenges for international security
and for French defense. France is specifically concerned about missile-delivered WMD from North Africa or the Mediterranean region. It is also concerned about global proliferation trends because of the widespread deployment of French forces overseas. WMD raises the stakes for French force deployments in strategic areas outside Europe. It is therefore generally supportive of both the US and NATO counterproliferation efforts; indeed, one writer called the January 1994 Brussels Summit agreement “a defining event in the evolution of France’s post-Cold War relationship with the Alliance,” since France was quick to agree to the proposals—including the call for a major Alliance study of the proliferation threat.

Germany. The long-standing debate within Germany over its proper role in the world, which rested to a great extent on an interpretation of its Basic Law that German military forces could not be deployed outside its borders, faces new pressures from a world that demands that Germany assume its proper responsibilities in the international system. Chancellor Kohl, in his victory speech to the opening of the Bundestag in November 1994, reiterated that Germany would play an increasing role in peacekeeping missions and honor its international obligations. The German White Paper 1994 agreed. Given the radical changes in the international security environment in the early 1990’s, Germany “must assume new international responsibility,” and “the Federal Government is prepared to assume this responsibility.” It also called nonproliferation of WMD a “priority task of security policy in the years ahead.” At the same time, the White Paper reiterated Germany’s long-standing renunciation of the manufacture, possession of, and control over nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. In 1993 Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel emphasized that “Following the end of the East-West confrontation, the
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is becoming one of the major dangers to world peace.³⁷

**United Kingdom.** Britain was an early advocate of a comprehensive political and military approach to the issue of WMD proliferation, hoping thereby to respond to the regional causes of such proliferation and provide the operational military means to deter and defend against these threats.³⁸ The threat was not to London, but rather to its deployed forces. Given Britain’s history and far-flung interests, it took a global approach to this issue, similar to that of the United States and France.

British Foreign Secretary Rifkind put his country’s position succinctly, noting that while “the nature of the threat to NATO Europe may have changed, the central role of the Atlantic Alliance as the guarantor of European security has not. We cannot ignore the fundamental threat of a direct attack on an Alliance member. The circumstances of such aggression against a NATO Ally may be very different from those of the Cold War, but the principle of collective security is the same.”³⁹

**The US Defense Counterproliferation Initiative**

_The proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons ("weapons of mass destruction") and of the means of delivering such weapons, constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States, and [I] hereby declare a national emergency to deal with that threat._

--- President William J. Clinton, November 1994⁴⁰

In 1994 the United States became once again the setting for bureaucratic struggles over a major new initiative, as the Departments of State, Defense, and other federal organizations squabbled over
responsibility for the counterproliferation initiative (CPI). The Pentagon viewed CPI as the military subset of nonproliferation, a position not held by the State Department, which initially saw the CPI as a challenge to its lead role in existing nonproliferation efforts and regimes. The stakes were high, involving considerable new and redirected funding for CPI projects and acquisition. The larger questions, however, still had to be answered: Who was or should be the lead agency in charge of this effort? Which approach—State’s or Defense’s—was more appropriate? The situation was made less clear by divided government, the result of the Republican party takeover of both houses of Congress in January 1995, dealing with a Democratic administration. Bureaucratic infighting over resources was nothing new, of course, and did not necessarily imply disagreement over the goals of the CPI, but it did reflect the importance and potential impact of this new program.

Much of the rationale for the US CPI can be found in lessons from the Gulf War. America’s inability to fight a modern war in an NBC environment was made clear through combat preparations attempted in the sands of Saudi Arabia and Iraq—and deficiencies noted in the after-action report on Desert Storm. The 1993 Bottom-Up Review, which identified the need to reorient the US armed forces to fight two nearly simultaneous regional wars (and in which the threat or use of WMD was anticipated to be high in most scenarios), supported the findings of the war, and added credence to this shortcoming. These studies buttressed a series of publications by Harvard University’s Center for Science and International Affairs on the threat of “loose nukes” from the former Soviet Union.

The US Counterproliferation Initiative was spawned in the 1992 Defense Science Board summer study on ways to counter WMD proliferation. The Board’s report was presented in spring 1993, and the
formal CPI was announced in December 1993. The Department of Defense had its own DOD Counterproliferation Policy in place by May 1994. A follow-on missions and functions study began in October 1994. In addition, in 1994 Congress passed legislation creating a chemical-biological defense program to consolidate all DOD passive defense efforts. And a DOD directive on counterproliferation issued in July 1996 delineated specific responsibilities, formalized relationships between organizations, and established common terms of reference. This last act showed that, in accordance with the wishes of two Secretaries of Defense, CPI was becoming broadly accepted across the appropriate government agencies, rather than being kept apart as a separate program. Secretaries of Defense Aspin and Perry resisted the impulse to set up CPI as a separate and distinct program and organization, as had been done for the strategic defense initiative. They wanted to instill concern over proliferation across missions and services, rather than make it just an acquisition program.

Acquisition programs led the policy world in the early American debate on counterproliferation. In many ways the process was started through technological determinism—the national laboratories and research and development community developed capabilities and solutions to problems that the US government didn’t even know it faced.

Among the military services, the Air Force formulated a program well ahead of the Army and Navy, and by late 1994 had already addressed the mix of policy, tactics, and forces in its “Counterproliferation Road Map.” In the summer of 1994 the Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) team within each of the major regional warfighting commands identified four major categories where the Department of Defense could provide expertise to the Defense Counterproliferation Policy: nonproliferation, active defense, passive
defense, and counterforce. In some regions of the world the leading role for developing such bilateral or multilateral linkages was given to the theater Commanders in Chief (CINCs) under a joint staff concept plan. The NATO counterproliferation effort was undertaken largely by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. By contrast, responsibility for projects and discussions with non-European states, largely nontraditional allies, are much more widely dispersed within the US government.

The 1994 National Defense Authorization Act required the establishment of an inter-agency review committee composed of representatives from the Departments of Defense, State, Energy, the Intelligence Community, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, to report on US nonproliferation and counterproliferation activities and programs. This Nonproliferation Program Review Committee (NPRC) performed a top-down overview of existing, planned, and proposed capabilities and technologies, as well as a description of priorities and program options. Its findings identified several high-priority shortfalls in 16 “capability areas for progress” to address current and future national non and counterproliferation needs. Fourteen of those areas were considered to be underfunded.

In 1995 the Joint Chiefs of Staff created their own list of capability areas that they felt essential to pursue for national security. This list, which was developed by the Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment team with inputs from the regional CINCs, was essentially the same as the 1994 NPRC study, although some of the rankings changed. The CINCs put the highest priority on those areas where the most leverage could be gained through increased funding so as to get the best capabilities into the field quickly.

The JWCA list was adopted by the Counterproliferation Program Review Committee (CPRC). The CPRC, created as a result of the 1995 National Defense Authorization Act, was chaired by the
Secretary of Defense and composed of the Secretary of Energy, Director of Central Intelligence, and Chairman of the JCS. It was tasked with assessing the success of represented agencies in implementing the recommendations of its predecessor organization, the NPRC, to review activities related to countering proliferation, and to make recommendations to modify those programs as required to address shortfalls in existing and programmed capabilities. It also coordinates counterproliferation program efforts to avoid redundancy and maximize efficiency among those government agencies involved.

The list which follows is the United States’ official determination of shortfall priorities, as approved by the JWCA and the CPRC. It is very close to the list NATO prepared in the DGP Phase III report.

Table 1: US Counterproliferation Areas for Capability Enhancements

- Detection, identification, and characterization of biological and chemical warfare agents
- Cruise missile defense
- Theater ballistic missile defense
- Detection, characterization, and defeat of underground WMD facilities
- Collection, analysis, and dissemination of actionable intelligence to the warfighter
- Robust passive defense to enable continued operations on the NBC battlefield
- Biological warfare vaccine research, development, testing, evaluation and production
- Planning and targeting for above ground infrastructure
- Target planning for WMD targets
- Biological/chemical agent defeat
• Detection and tracking of WMD and WMD-related shipments
• Prompt mobile target detection and defeat
• Support for Special Operations Forces
• Defense against paramilitary, covert delivery, and terrorist WMD threats
• Support export control activities of the US government
• Support inspection and monitoring activities of verifiable arms control agreements and regimes

Similarities between these two lists should come as no surprise, given that most of the items listed are common sense responses to this new threat, and given traditional American leadership in new military programs and strategies for the Alliance. The Areas for Capability Enhancement focus on conventional weaponry and passive defenses, although nuclear deterrence still plays a significant role in Alliance strategy. There are also long-term plans to develop active defenses in theaters of particular interest.

There will not necessarily arise any new systems or programs as the result of this effort. Many necessary programs are already underway; indeed, as one official told the author, the United States alone has two or three systems in research and development for each of the bullet items in Table 1. In many cases, as well, an existing or planned capability has multiple uses in areas beyond counterproliferation. Some new or newly emphasized areas that may come out of this study, however, include biological agent detection and identification, and layered ballistic missile defenses. The likelihood of the latter is questionable, however, given the well-known concerns over cost and effectiveness of a BMD system. In short, while technology may help in certain vulnerability areas, there are no “silver bullets” available to the US or NATO in their quest for counterproliferation tools.
In July 1996 the Department of Defense held the inaugural meeting of its new Counterproliferation Council, chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Its purpose is to provide coordination and oversight for DOD-wide efforts at training, exercising, and equipping US forces for operations in an NBC environment. The initial series of meetings were intended to focus on institutionalizing counterproliferation in the joint planning and doctrine development process, joint training and exercises, and on interagency and allied cooperation.60

By early 1997 considerable progress had been made in many areas of the capabilities enhancement list. The FY97 DoD budget dedicated $1.7 billion to efforts supporting thirteen items on the list, and earmarked an additional $2.9 billion for theater ballistic missile defenses.61 The largest recipients of funding were in the following areas: detection, identification, and characterization of BW/CW agents; robust passive defense to enable continued operations on the NBC battlefield; prompt mobile target detection and defeat; and support for inspection and monitoring activities of verifiable arms control agreements and regimes.62

In addition, the US government seems to have accepted the importance and permanence of the issue, and is beginning to incorporate counterproliferation in organizational mind-sets. Evidence of this has been seen in the new interagency bodies and review requirements established since 1994.63 These include the DOD Counterproliferation Council, established in 1996; the Counterproliferation Program Review Committee, which reviews counterproliferation related research, development, and acquisition programs of the represented departments (DOD, State, CIA, and JCS); the CP Support Program, created in January 1996 to take stock of efforts to date and review all DOD counterproliferation related programs; and the 1994 Chemical and
Biological Defense Program. In addition, counterproliferation concerns are firmly embedded in the 1997 *Quadrennial Defense Review*. The Counterproliferation Initiative, criticized and reviled in many quarters when first introduced, has apparently achieved the acceptance it needs to remain a viable program.

**Possible NATO Non- and Counterproliferation Roles**

NATO is seen as the only international body with the competence to counter the consequences of proliferation... the political ‘mileage’ for NATO will come from its defense-related contribution in a situation where traditional nonproliferation mechanisms have failed.

There was considerable debate at the January 1994 NATO summit over the American push for a new counterproliferation initiative. Germany, in particular, was initially concerned about the US counterproliferation effort. The US did not present the rationale for CPI to the European allies in a very convincing way. Bonn, for instance, perceived that CPI meant a turn away from traditional nonproliferation efforts towards more military responses. The result of the summit discussions was a compromise within NATO to create a policy framework to consider nonproliferation. Some Alliance members were not convinced that “prevention” and “defense” against WMD proliferation outside of Europe were desirable or necessary strategies for the alliance. But when the chance came to link the CPI to NATO through the new effort, Germany was happy to participate, hoping thereby to have some influence on the American program. The debate settled down considerably in the two years after the Brussels Summit.
decision, as people began to realize that it was a relatively modest effort, and likely to remain so, and that counterproliferation meant more than simply preemptive offensive operations. Counterproliferation is now seen by most participants as an adjunct to nonproliferation, not a substitute for it.68

There were four general approaches which the alliance might have taken in developing an agreed policy on counterproliferation: defusing proliferation incentives; enforcing international sanctions against proliferators; offensive military action against proliferators; and developing ballistic missile defenses.69 The first two areas would supplement existing operations undertaken by other international organizations. Defusing incentives would entail measures such as promoting democratic control over military forces, peacekeeping operations, and maintaining stability in Europe for reassurance to the NATO allies. This could include efforts within existing NATO bodies, including the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace (PfP).70

Second, NATO could use traditional military measures to enforce or support international measures sanctioned by the United Nations, particularly within its sphere of interest—nominally, those states that are members of the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The third area, offensive operations against proliferators, is the approach NATO has been least likely to pursue in the past, since it is inherently a defensive alliance. However, offensive operations in a regional conflict may actually be seen as a form of preemptive defense, particularly when one’s forces are threatened by WMD. And recent “out-of-area” operations, such as in Bosnia, may reflect greater willingness on the part of the Alliance to pursue actions deemed necessary that in an earlier era may have been politically impossible. One analyst has pointed out that the Atlantic Alliance is no
longer a cooperative defense organization, but a “coalition in waiting” as it prepares to respond to the newest threat or conflict on its periphery.71

The last option, pursuing BMD, would be merely a continuation of NATO’s traditional collective defense role, extrapolated to the threats posed by the new post-Cold War world. Nevertheless, it must overcome residual skepticism by some European members engendered by the SDI program in the 1980’s—a program to which critics point in comparison with counterproliferation as an example of yet another regularly appearing, big new American program.72 Despite these qualms, some Europeans, especially the French, recognized that proliferation might eventually turn into an acute problem requiring military responses. Even Germany is beginning to accept the possibility that traditional approaches to nonproliferation may fail, so there is a need to think about military preparations should that occur.73

The NATO counterproliferation efforts pleased many member states, especially France. Some French officials pointed out that this was the first example of a true “European pillar” in NATO defense planning.74 With the active support of most NATO members, including one which had not played a military role in the Alliance for over 25 years, the need for and development of a NATO counterproliferation strategy had obviously made an impact on the Alliance and its often slow bureaucratic process. It is to that process—the inside story—that we now turn.

NATO PROLIFERATION STUDY PROCESS

NATO undertook several activities after the 1991 Rome Summit that focused on preventing proliferation via traditional political means—export controls, coordination of efforts to control sensitive technologies, and so on. In addition, it continued its work in the well-
established field of passive defense, including protective measures for individual soldiers against chemical agents. It began developing a conceptual framework on air defense, to include ballistic missile and cruise missile defense technologies. All of these efforts, however, were by late 1993 considered insufficient to meet the growing threat of proliferation. There was a glaring absence of military measures available should prevention fail or deterrence break down. It was this shortcoming that the NATO Heads of State and Government addressed in their January 1994 summit communiqué, which called proliferation a threat to international security.

The North Atlantic Council (NAC) meeting in Istanbul in June 1994 laid out guidelines for the development of an agreed NATO strategy on nonproliferation. The ministers stressed that, in keeping with NATO tradition, any solution must have both a political and a military dimension. Accordingly, three committees were created to develop NATO’s nonproliferation policy: the Senior Political-Military Group on Proliferation (SGP); the Senior Defense Group on Proliferation (DGP); and the Joint Committee on Proliferation (JCP). We shall review the organizations created to deal with the proliferation issue in some detail, because their makeup and approaches shed valuable light on the development process of this major NATO program.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2: Joint Committee on Proliferation (JCP)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Senior Political-Military Group on Proliferation (SGP) and Senior Defense Group on Proliferation (DGP) meeting as a single body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Meets irregularly to report SGP and DGP findings to North Atlantic Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Chaired by NATO Deputy Secretary General</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There were also existing bodies of related interest within NATO whose studies have been subsumed to some degree by the new
committees. As one analyst pointed out, “there is a bewildering variety of these groups, often operating without coordination.” These include the NATO Air Defense Committee (NADC), chaired by the Deputy Secretary General and tasked with assessing the conceptual and operational aspects of extended air defense (EAD). In June 1992 the North Atlantic Council tasked the NADC with investigating approaches to ballistic missile defenses, as well. The NAC adopted a conceptual framework for EAD in June 1993. Another interested body is the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD). The CNAD has several sub groups, including an ad hoc group studying EAD and TMD, chaired by the United States, with 8 member nations and made up of non-NATO staff. It was created in October 1993, and presented its findings to the CNAD in April 1995.

To complement the SGP’s political efforts, the Senior Defense Group on Proliferation (DGP) was created to conduct parallel studies in a collegial, non-competitive atmosphere. While given equal status, and with no guidance as to which committee would finish first or have priority, the DGP quickly became the focus of Alliance military efforts involving policy, force structure, and acquisition, and was the venue in which the United States exhibited the most interest. One of the tasks of the DGP was to gather together disparate groups working on various aspects of counterproliferation over the previous three years, re-direct and focus their efforts, and consider their findings without necessarily accepting their recommendations. Unfortunately, the mandate for continuing the DGP beyond June 1996 did not give it the authority to oversee or consolidate the efforts of any of these other groups.

While the United States called its new effort a “Counterproliferation Initiative,” the term counterproliferation was explicitly not used within official NATO documents, including the January 1994 framework initiatives. Nevertheless, this semantic
distinction could not uncouple the links between the US Counterproliferation Initiative and the 1994 NATO Initiative. Both had two major components: prevention and protection. The money going into the US CPI efforts will, as in past cases of new strategies, eventually translate into new technologies for NATO’s use. Intelligence sharing is a key component of both plans. In addition, one of the primary objectives of the US CPI is a theater missile defense (TMD) capability. While some European groups initially doubted the value of this, several NATO member states are seriously pursuing TMD, and SHAPE has completed a multinational memo of understanding on extended air defense. The biggest difference between the two efforts—CPI and NATO’s counterproliferation study—was simply the two year head start the US had on Europe.

**The Political Dimension—Nonproliferation**

The political dimension of NATO’s approach involves the traditional nonproliferation goal of preventing proliferation from occurring in the first place. Should proliferation occur, the allies would attempt to reverse it through diplomatic means. The primary focus of such nonproliferation efforts is outside of NATO, in other organizations and regimes to which NATO and its member states contribute—including the United Nations and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) regime. The Alliance acts as one more venue for discussion and coordination of efforts in this regard. Another aspect of the political dimension involves reaching out to NATO’s neighbors to the East, educating these states as to the dangers inherent in the proliferation problem and working with them to develop mutual programs to stem the spread of WMD materials and knowledge. The Alliance has conducted a series of *ad hoc* meetings with Russia and other countries in a “16+1”
setting to discuss issues of proliferation, and may continue these discussions in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.

NATO discussion on the political dimension of proliferation centered in the Senior Political-Military Group on Proliferation. The SGP, comprised of representatives of each member state (including France), began its work by considering the political, security, economic, and other factors which drive state desires for acquiring weapons of mass destruction. It undertook a geopolitical, strategic approach to proliferation, considering the sources of conflict and the underlying causes of proliferation. The SGP then turned its attention to the instruments available to NATO and its member states to discourage proliferation by affecting a would-be proliferator’s motivations.

Table 3: Senior Political-Military Group on Proliferation (SGP)

- Chaired by NATO Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs
- Participants from Ministries of Foreign Affairs/State Department
- Supports, without duplicating, existing international bodies and institutions pursuing political solutions to proliferation
- Sets out the Alliance’s policy framework, including contributions to wider efforts by the international community with respect to nonproliferation

Some observers have pointed out that the SGP was created in large part to appease the French, given their tradition of political-military oversight. The United States was more interested in the military studies by the Senior Defense Group on Proliferation, but eventually grew to accept the SGP as useful for certain other related arenas—as long as there were limits to its interference with the DGP efforts.

Toward the end of its original charter the SGP expanded its interests to encompass a number of additional groups. In the spring of
1996 it incorporated the Group on Nuclear Weapons (GNW), a political body examining the control of weapons and fissile materials in the former Soviet Union. The GNW agreed to dis-establish itself in favor of holding discussions on issues of interest within the SGP. \(^9^2\) Similarly, there was some discussion in 1996 on including the Political Committee with Disarmament Experts, which met semi-annually, within the SGP. In May 1996 the North Atlantic Council extended the SGP’s charter with an expanded mandate calling on members to assess and discuss the disposition of weapons of mass destruction in Russia, and to discuss proliferation issues with Partnership for Peace (PfP) countries. \(^9^3\)

**The Military Dimension—Counterproliferation**

The military dimension of the Alliance plan involved the creation of a committee to study the problem and suggest possible responses or solutions to proliferation or the possible use of a weapon of mass destruction, either against NATO or one of its members, or on NATO’s borders. NATO hoped thereby to strengthen the deterrence capabilities of its military forces, showing a potentially hostile proliferant that it could not coerce or defeat the Alliance through the use or threatened use of WMD.

The DGP began its work by taking a three-phased approach to considering the threat and possible Alliance responses. Phase I was a risk assessment, Phase II looked at implications of proliferation and required capabilities, and Phase III assessed NATO’s current plans, forces, and capabilities, identifying shortfalls within the Alliance. The initial emphasis was on shortfalls in equipment and technologies, rather than on doctrine. Future discussions in the DGP will focus on the implementation of corrective actions to repair the capabilities requirements list.
The DGP co-chairmen include one North American and one European, on a rotating basis. The first two chairs were from the United States and France. Great Britain replaced France in 1995, Italy became co-chair in 1996, and Germany took on the role in 1997. Future European chairs will come from alternating geographical regions of the Alliance.

Table 4: Senior Defense Group on Proliferation (DGP)

- Participants from Ministries of Defense and NATO military staffs
  -- Members the same as national staffs for Nuclear Planning Group
- Address military capabilities needed to discourage WMD proliferation and use, protect NATO territory, populations, and military forces
- Co-chaired by a North American and a European country
- DGP Steering Group addresses common issues, e.g. intel, C3I, deterrence
- Studies done in a four-step process:
  -- Address risks to Alliance from the proliferation of WMD
  -- Determine implications for the Alliance’s defense posture
  -- Assess current Alliance capabilities to counter these threats
  -- Determine capability shortfalls and possible remedies
- First report on threats presented to NAC in Brussels December 94
- Second report on implications for NATO’s defense posture and needed counterproliferation capabilities presented to NAC in Brussels November 95
- Third report on current shortfalls and how to achieve those capabilities presented to NAC in Berlin June 96
NATO determined early in the process that its defense response to proliferation risks should be guided by the following principles: ensuring Alliance cohesion, maintaining freedom of action, reassuring allies and partners, ensuring effective consultation, complementing nonproliferation efforts, complementing nuclear deterrence, ensuring a balanced mix of capabilities, prioritizing needed capabilities, controlling all phases of conflict, evolving capabilities as the threat evolved, emphasizing system mobility, and integrating NBC-related concepts into planning.94

**Phase I: Threats.** During its first phase the DGP conducted a classified assessment of risks facing the Alliance. An ad hoc committee of the DGP developed a questionnaire for states on their view of the threats and risk assessments. According to public sources, the DGP’s findings validated the concerns expressed by the heads of state and government in their January 1994 summit communiqué, and reiterated by defense ministers at the June 1994 Istanbul NAC meeting.95 The report made evident the need to differentiate between types of threats and types of weapons. For instance, nuclear weapons seem to be most prized by proliferants, but biological weapons seem to have emerged as a key threat, and proliferant states (as well as non-state actors, such as terrorist groups) still prize chemical weapons for their psychological value.96 Similarly, the report differentiated between regional actors and their different cultural personalities, focusing on a few key states of greatest concern. It is understood that likely proliferant states may behave much differently than the opponents whom NATO faced during the Cold War.97 Finally, it considered technological trends to the year 2010, and examined the trading links between suppliers and client states with respect to WMD technology, materials, and expertise.98
The findings of the DGP risk assessment also shaped the SGP’s views. According to some sources, the SGP lost its focus soon after beginning its studies in 1994. Following the DGP’s success in its regional approach to threat analysis, the SGP also began using regional scenarios for its studies, with much greater success the result.99

This phase of the study was difficult to conclude, due to political sensitivities within certain NATO member states over addressing specific regions or nations of proliferation concern. The group had difficulty reaching its eventual consensus on assessments of certain countries. NATO did not wish to look like it was seeking new enemies, nor simply creating a rationale for continued funding.100 The DGP’s Phase I work was completed in December 1994.

**Phase II: Implications and Needed Capabilities.** Phase Two of the DGP effort took the results of the threat analysis and examined the implications for NATO’s defense posture. This report was presented to the North Atlantic Council in its December 1995 ministerial session. The report focused on NATO’s ability to protect its territory and people from the threat of WMD, as well as to safely deploy NATO military forces on contingency missions into areas of potential WMD use.101 Working groups in the Phase Two study looked at passive defenses, such as personnel protective measures; active defenses, including extended air defense (which work coincided with that being undertaken by the NATO Air Defence Committee and the Conference of National Armaments Directors); and proactive military operations—the areas most closely linked to ideas found in the United States’ counterproliferation initiative. Germany served as chair of the response capabilities subcommittee—a conscious decision by the other DGP members, taken to ensure that any NATO response met the more
sensitive standard of German approval for non-provocative and well-considered action.\textsuperscript{102}

The Phase Two study addressed the political-military consequences of the threat and the necessary capabilities for Alliance response by looking at illustrative scenarios already identified in this paper: direct threats to NATO territory; threats against the Alliance’s ability to intervene in regional conflicts; and threats to other out of area missions, such as peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. It was divided into two parts. The first part considered how contingencies of concern to NATO might be altered by WMD use; the second identified a range of capabilities needed by the Alliance, given the WMD threat to NATO.\textsuperscript{103}

According to the report, the greatest threat posed by proliferation of WMD and their delivery means in the foreseeable future is to deployed NATO forces. Accordingly, NATO forces will be most vulnerable to attack while entering the region, when forces are concentrated at ports and airfields. NATO should therefore give first priority to protecting those forces involved in regional contingencies. A potential adversary may see possession of WMD as a means of overcoming NATO conventional force superiority. WMD could alter the military balance in a region if it were to succeed in degrading the operating capability of NATO deployed forces, either directly or indirectly. Politically, non-uniform capabilities for dealing with WMD attack among the NATO coalition members could offer an adversary opportunities for exploitation. And civilian reaction to WMD use in a region may have an impact on NATO resolve or ability to conduct operations.\textsuperscript{104}

There were also several implications for NATO force capabilities from the report’s findings. Military capabilities complement prevention efforts, so all of the Alliance’s military capabilities have a
role in devaluing NBC weapons. In addition, no one capability alone will suffice. The Alliance requires a mix of capabilities which will serve deterrence and, should it prove necessary, combat. Conventional forces, passive defenses, and intelligence and surveillance means must be included with nuclear considerations of deterrence and defense. And finally, the Alliance should place greatest emphasis on its core capabilities.

The DGP then listed its prioritized capability requirements. This list provides the touchstone for future efforts in developing and acquiring new systems to enhance NATO defenses. The Tier I capabilities were identified by their multiple and synergistic value to the Alliance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5: Tier I Required (Core) Capabilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>(not rank ordered)</em>(^{105})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Strategic and operational intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Automated and deployable command, control and communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Wide area ground surveillance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Standoff and point biological and chemical agent detection, identification, and warning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Extended air defenses, including tactical ballistic missile defense for deployed forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• NBC individual protective equipment for deployed forces</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tier I capabilities are “core integrative military capabilities that make the most substantial contributions to the Alliance’s politico-military objectives for dealing with proliferation; serve as force multipliers to increase the overall effectiveness of the Alliance’s defence posture for dealing with proliferation risks; and respond to existing conditions and expected near term trends.”\(^{106}\) The DGP report emphasized that these
core capabilities for Alliance defense must be incorporated into national planning and training procedures in order to be fully effective.

Beyond these top priority needs, the DGP identified additional capabilities that would contribute significantly to the Alliance’s political aims and operational objectives for dealing with existing or expected proliferation risks. These Tier II capabilities included advanced computer applications, reconnaissance platforms and sensors, layered missile defenses, medical countermeasures, and special munitions capable of countering WMD.107

**Phase III: Capabilities and Shortfalls.** The DGP’s third effort addressed current NATO and national capabilities, identified deficiencies, and examined areas for improvement and cooperation. In the Phase Three report, presented to the NAC in June 1996, the DGP prioritized defense systems requirements and recommended that NATO institutionalize this assessment process in future defense planning efforts by the Alliance.108 It also suggested enhanced multinational training and exercises. These improvements in NATO’s ability to counter the risks posed by proliferation should reinforce and complement international efforts to stop the spread of WMD by demonstrating the Alliance’s resolve to meet this threat.109 What the Alliance is trying to do is develop a general base of capabilities that can do multiple taskings, and be available for later expansion. One area in which there is already publicly acknowledged cooperation between the US counterproliferation initiative and NATO organizations is an American offer to share ballistic missile early warning information with NATO allies. SHAPE is developing a concept of operations to implement this offer, in conjunction with the NADC and the CNAD.110

The NAC approved the report’s recommendations for military capabilities improvements and its work program and schedule at its 1996
Berlin ministerial session. The Defense Ministers endorsed the DGP’s efforts at their meeting in Brussels the following week, and pointed out the need for greater emphasis on protecting deployed troops in light of the Alliance carrying out new, non-Article 5 missions. For the first time in 12 years, in fact, the NAC authorized an accelerated “catch-up” process to incorporate the recommended DGP programs in the two year force goals, the most recent report for which had just been given to Defense Ministers. Specifically, the NAC approved the DGP’s comprehensive program of 39 action plans designed to implement needed programs across numerous NATO bodies. Each action plan has defined milestones so that the DGP can monitor progress in achieving these goals.

Once these hardware issues were approved, the Ministers endorsed the Alliance plans for counterproliferation doctrine, training, exercises and planning guidance—known as “Guidance for Effective Military Operations in an NBC Environment”—in June 1997.

**Implementation.** The major hurdle to accomplishing any of this, of course, is money. The DGP effort is an attempt to expedite those procurement processes that may best support NATO’s nonproliferation efforts, but it is only one part of the overall Alliance force development process. Representatives of several states have unofficially said they are unable to support additional spending for new projects, so the question must be asked: what will NATO be willing to give up to have new capabilities within its current budget? Deciding who pays, and for what, will drive much of the political discussion in future DGP meetings. In addition, there continue to be indications that not all of the allies have given their whole-hearted support to the counterproliferation effort. Statements by Germany that counterproliferation may appear nefarious to potential opponents, and French denunciation of the concept of
preemptive counterforce strikes, show that there are still issues for future discussion within the Alliance.\textsuperscript{116} The DGP will continue to monitor progress toward achieving its 39 recommended action plans, which are designed to improve or achieve the core capabilities identified in Table 5. The DGP will also serve as a forum for explaining NATO’s nonproliferation efforts to member states and PfP members.\textsuperscript{117}

In summer 1996, military authorities at SHAPE and NATO were tasked with developing and initiating new force proposals and revising the 1996 NATO Force Goals, taking into account the 39 recommendations of the DGP. Since the 1996 Force Goals had already been approved at the June 1996 Defense Planning Committee meeting,\textsuperscript{118} the DGP recommended a “catch-up” phase of force proposals be added as an extension of the 1996 Force Goals process. Following review in the NATO capitals, these revisions and a new draft Force Goals (including costing data) were presented to, and approved by, the Defense Ministers in their December 1996 ministerial.\textsuperscript{119} One of the results of the July 1997 NATO summit meeting in Spain was agreement to pursue ways of “further enhancing our political and defence efforts against the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and their delivery means.”\textsuperscript{120} France had earlier expressed its desire to be a full partner in participating in these decisions, and in cooperating in such a catch-up process with NATO force planning as necessary over the next five years.\textsuperscript{121}

Interestingly, the DGP effort was essentially the work of five key nations: the US, France, UK, Germany, and the Netherlands. Given that the most direct threat facing NATO comes against the Southern flank of the Alliance, it was surprising to some participants that various Mediterranean member states were not more involved.\textsuperscript{122}

\section*{The Consultation Process}
To better illustrate the process of NATO’s efforts in this major effort, let us take a more in-depth look at the process and timing of the Phase III study. Figure 1 gives some indication of the complex consultation involved in the development of an agreed NATO statement. When the third phase of the DGP studies began in late 1995, it was obvious that the member states required supplemental questioning to determine shortfalls and needed capabilities, beyond what was discussed in the DGP. This additional information would come via the means of a questionnaire. This process was accepted by all NATO members as a valid way of accomplishing the shortfall identification.

The DGP asked the Military Committee and the major NATO military commands (NMCs) for military advice in this phase. A questionnaire was sent by the International Military Staff to each nation, and their inputs were synthesized by the SHAPE staff before a summary was sent to the Military Committee for review. This questionnaire included a checklist created by SHAPE, SACLANT, and the DGP, and asked several specific questions based on the tiers from the Phase II report: Was this area identified in Phase II really a shortfall? Could it be addressed with an existing capability? Did the Alliance need a new capability? How should the issue be addressed—in a NATO forum, or by individual nations? And finally, what was the best approach to the problem—a NATO force proposal, or some other method? The international staff assumed that NMC’s had lists of the current capabilities, which they would use to develop their responses.123

The questionnaire was sent to the states in mid-September 1995. Most of the nations answered quickly. In the United States, the questionnaire went to OSD/ISP/CP (DOD counterproliferation plans and policy), then to the Joint Staff, which tasked each of the military services for their inputs. A memorandum from Assistant Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter on 22 December 1995 included a supplemental
questionnaire to the NATO Defense Planning Questionnaire (DPQ), which had last been done in mid-1995. (In the future, NATO hopes to incorporate these questions in the biannual DPQ.) The questionnaire was sent to many organizations across Washington, including the JCS, OSD, CIA, DIA, and BMDO. The Joint Staff captured the service inputs (which, given the timing and short suspense for a response, were in many cases done by duty officers in each office over the Christmas vacation). Within the US Air Force, for example, XOXI (the national security negotiations division, lead agency on counterproliferation issues) sent a tasking to the other Air Staff offices (plans, intelligence, acquisition, civil engineering, and so on) on 26 December. These findings were consolidated and submitted to the Joint Staff on 17 January 1996. JCS/J-5 requested additional time from OSD for its overall military response, which it forwarded on 24 January. After combining these inputs with those from the other agencies around Washington, OSD sent the official US response to the questionnaire back to the NATO Military Committee.124
FIGURE 1: THE PHASE III CONSULTATIVE PROCESS (illustrative)
Shortly after receiving the national responses to the questionnaire, the DGP Steering Committee and representatives from the US DOD and JCS met in a week-long workshop in suburban Washington, DC, to review and synthesize the results, which were then presented to the NATO Military Committee. The Military Committee’s assessment then went to the major commands and the nations for further review and comment. This happened within approximately three weeks of gathering all the country inputs—a very fast turnaround time for an international alliance. The assessment listed each of the shortfall areas, and gave a tentative answer as to whether the Alliance could meet the shortfall, based on individual states’ capabilities. The nations then reviewed the Military Committee’s assessment to ensure that it accurately reflected their views, responses, and capabilities, and to fill any holes in the capabilities chart with systems or programs that may have been left out of the earlier questionnaire.

There was considerable pressure from lobbyists during this phase, as each contractor, and each nation, tried to persuade the group that its particular system or program was the best choice to meet a particular shortfall. Lobbyist pressure was particularly intense in the realm of ABM systems.

The DGP study effort, of which this example of the consultation process involved in Phase III is merely illustrative, was one of the most dramatically successful studies in NATO’s history. As a result of institutional memory developed from earlier major efforts, including the neutron bomb fiasco in the 1970’s, the dual-track INF missile modernization program in the early 1980’s, and the aborted SNF modernization effort in the late 1980’s, the Alliance had finally developed a process for expeditiously developing the data and consensus necessary for early resolution of an issue. This process was marked by
several aspects that may prove useful in future Alliance efforts: consensus by the heads of state and government of all member nations on the need for such an analytical effort; a grand strategy and blueprint for the entire project from the beginning; quick turnaround times on required questionnaires; and a conscientious effort on the part of all members to achieve an agreed policy against a known threat in as short a time as possible.

Following this in-depth look at the consultative process in the United States, let us now turn to the other three major actors in the NATO nonproliferation study: France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. Together, these four nations led the Alliance efforts to meet this new threat.
COUNTRY STUDIES
NATO’s counterproliferation process initially lasted two years and achieved several major goals as put forth at the 1994 Summit. The key players in this effort were the four major powers of the Alliance who led the study and will provide the bulk of any funding or needed systems.

**France: Leading Proponent of Counterproliferation Planning**

France viewed the entire DGP effort, and in particular the committee set up, as the first example of a true European pillar working within NATO defense circles, striving to solve an important issue through partnership and open discussion. The Alliance counterproliferation effort buttresses France’s preexisting movement toward greater participation in NATO affairs. The fact that France was the first co-chair of the DGP was no accident. In fact, the entire NATO counterproliferation initiative was, according to officials in Paris, a French proposal. France saw the DGP chairmanship as a test of its new relations with NATO, a chance to see how things might work in this new relationship, both with the Alliance and with the United States. The French government was happy with the DGP process and its accomplishments, which has led to greater involvement in other areas—including a renewed interest in military cooperation with the Alliance.

Events such as the end of the Cold War, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, German unification, and the possibility of US disengagement from Europe have all contributed to the long-standing French desire for greater European defense cooperation. But while France may have preferred to use the West European Union (WEU) or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) for joint military actions or the development of options to respond to the proliferation of WMD, it recognized the limits of these organizations. The failure of these European organizations to resolve the war in former
Yugoslavia put their current value in sharp perspective. Closer security linkages between the WEU and NATO, announced in May 1996, may attenuate some of these lost dreams, calling as they do for the operationalization of a European pillar within or in cooperation with NATO, rather than completely independent of the Alliance.  

France will cooperate with its allies as long as Alliance plans don’t affect French freedom of action, or the French domestic defense industrial base. Indeed, France hopes to reap big economic benefits from a CP program, an incentive that also strengthens its support for these efforts. Some have argued that France may choose to participate in NATO a la carte, rather than accepting the full political and military menu, in order to limit its role and responsibilities in new and costly NATO programs. Perhaps, but it definitely wants to be part of any counterproliferation programs, for reasons already mentioned. Ironically, however, in 1996, after leading the Alliance into agreement on the need for new initiatives to counter proliferation threats, budgetary concerns and force structure cuts forced France to withdraw from at least one major defensive program having implications for counterproliferation: the medium extended air defense system (MEADS).

Many counterproliferation programs under consideration are inordinately expensive, so France desires partners in cooperative ventures. It also recognizes the probability of conducting future operations with the US, whether bilaterally or multinationally, and would like to coordinate plans and programs in advance. A key question for France will be how it adapts its deterrence doctrine to a new world of WMD threats in regional conflicts. Some French officials point out that nuclear deterrence, while difficult to measure, seems to influence potential proliferants (witness Hussein’s caution in the Gulf War), so France is unwilling to abandon its tools for “ultimate warning.”
France recognized that the dramatic changes in the European security environment during the first five years of the 1990’s had made NATO more important than ever before, rather than less so. This caused a small but agonizing reappraisal within France of its role and place in the larger European security context, and its decisions to pursue closer links with NATO’s military bodies.\textsuperscript{141} This has been most obvious in France’s decision to be an active participant, leader, and first co-chair of the DGP, the first time it has joined a NATO defense committee since 1966.\textsuperscript{142} At the same time, France has become active in NATO’s Military Committee, and will henceforth allow its defense minister to “regularly take part in the work of the Alliance, alongside his colleagues.”\textsuperscript{143} In announcing this decision in December 1995 in Brussels, France opened the door for expanded participation and cooperation with its NATO allies in future military activities. It has already agreed to take its place in different bodies under the jurisdiction of the Military Committee, and is working on closer working relations with SHAPE.\textsuperscript{144} It may also hope to procure partners in new technological endeavors, such as missile defenses, and ensure through a binding cooperative alliance that Germany continues to forswear nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{145} One means of doing this was made public in early 1997: the possible extension of France’s nuclear deterrent umbrella over a willing Germany.\textsuperscript{146}

At the same time, however, France does not want to surrender even the perception of national control over its ultimate deterrent, the \textit{force de frappe}. It has decided not to participate in the NATO Nuclear Planning Group, for example, fearing that this would mean “strategic subordination to the United States.”\textsuperscript{147} Nevertheless, as French security expert David Yost has recently pointed out, France’s increasing involvement in NATO military affairs and apparent new flexibility regarding NATO consultative processes “could lead to a greater
transatlantic consensus on principles of nuclear deterrence and employment,” with all of the implications this holds for counterproliferation activities. Similarly, France wants no part in the Defense Planning Committee (DPC) as it currently stands, since the DPC manages the Alliance’s integrated military system, not all of which France agrees with, and French national character prefers stronger civilian control over any military—whether national or allied. It would prefer to see an evolutionary change within NATO to greater control by the North Atlantic Council and the Military Committee (as the NAC’s key implementing body over nuclear policy). The DPC will deal with matters relating to the integrated military structure, but France shall continue to use bilateral agreements to regulate its relations with NATO in this realm. Nevertheless, certain elements of the French security community can foresee their eventual involvement in the DPC if it were to discuss nuclear matters. NATO, however, is not ready to make this commitment.

The presidential election in May 1995 resulted in tangible changes to this renewed French interest in closer relations with NATO and the US, as Jacques Chirac and his conservative party reclaimed power after a long period of socialist control of the Elysees under François Mitterand. The leaders of the new government were ready to pursue higher levels of interaction with NATO and were willing to abandon some of Mitterand’s caution in this regard. Of course, no French party of any political persuasion is willing to abandon the tenets of Guallist defense and security policy, given the reverence in which DeGaulle is still held by the French public. But Chirac returned to these roots more decisively than Mitterand ever dared, stating in a speech to ambassadors in Paris in August 1995 that French deterrent forces protected France and its vital interests against both nuclear powers and any use of WMD by a proliferant. This was the first time a French
president so bluntly rattled the nuclear saber by stating “don’t tread on me,” and represented a major change from France’s earlier preference for emphasizing the prevention of proliferation as its first goal.\textsuperscript{155}

The 1997 French general election returned the Socialist party to power, forcing the new government to deal with Chirac’s conservative presidency. During the campaign Prime Minister Lionel Jospin was generally critical of Chirac’s rapprochement to NATO in recent years. Early indications were that the new government wished to reconsider some of the more dramatic decisions by the president in moving France closer to NATO’s military committees, although the Socialist platform had made little mention of defense issues during the election. Speculation was therefore that Chirac would retain security issues in the traditional domain of the president, despite grumbling by the Socialist opposition.

\textbf{Germany: Still Leery of Military Options}

For the most part Germany lacks interest in the issue of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The German public generally sees no threat. While some German analysts recognize a vague threat to the NATO Alliance, especially to its Southern tier, and the need for some German response under the guise of SHAPE, there is currently no well-defined direct threat against German territory or people. Indeed, at least one or two of the potential adversaries discussed in NATO’s Phase I threat assessment are countries with which Germany maintains good relations.\textsuperscript{156} Germany feels, as do other European states, that traditional nonproliferation means have served the West well so far, so there is no hurry to change NATO’s emphasis to more offensively oriented military options—particularly given the low threat environment. (France, on the other hand, has always viewed developments in North Africa with more concern than other Europeans, and is therefore more in
line with the United States in advocating a major new counterproliferation initiative.) Germany sees the proliferation threat as a side issue, of no great importance, but rather a peripheral problem to most government officials and academics within the Federal Republic—particularly when compared to the more pressing issue of NATO enlargement.\textsuperscript{157}

Germans are primarily concerned with moral and legal questions when it comes to security issues, rather than purely military aspects. German strategic analysts point out that it is difficult to even open discussions on these issues within the German public. Germany has grown very defensively oriented; offensive military actions appear unseemly to many Germans. Nor is there any real interest in these specific issues, nor in military matters at all, as long as they don’t cost much or become a political issue. Many Germans feel that terrorist actions, for instance, rightfully belong to the arena of police activity, rather than the military realm.\textsuperscript{158} NATO will have a hard time selling any new counterproliferation initiative to the FRG.

Within the German government, the Ministry of Defense takes the problem and threat of proliferation more seriously than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is traditionally leery of any military answer to a problem. Yet even within the MOD the low level of concern can be seen by the fact that the one section in Bundeswehr headquarters that deals with NBC defense is scheduled to close by 1998.\textsuperscript{159} This is of particular concern to the Luftwaffe, as it reorganizes its internal structure in 1997 to rely less on standing forces and more on reaction forces. The belief in Luftwaffe headquarters, as they translate NATO doctrine into operational requirements, is that such forces will require more NBC training, capabilities, and associated infrastructure to protect deployed forces against these threats—particularly since the MFA could choose to deploy Germany’s military forces on short notice in concert with an
Alliance operation. But there is doubt about the level of money or support that will be forthcoming to make this training happen once the current Luftwaffe Chief of Staff, who is favorably disposed toward NBC defense efforts, retires.  

Germany, despite its general wealth, faces severe monetary pressures as a result of its reunification and the huge economic and environmental problems it inherited from the Eastern Länder, as well as by moving its capital to Berlin. There is simply no additional money available to support any new major efforts such as those envisioned by some counterproliferation enthusiasts. Some Germans feel that big new projects, such as a theater ballistic missile system, are not only unnecessary, but a transparent attempt by the US to try and procure help paying for what is essentially an American program. 

Germany may be willing to support certain aspects of the NATO DGP effort, but most likely under the rubric of being a good NATO partner, rather than for any true belief in the value of a project. In particular, Germany may decide to participate in strictly defensive systems or arrangements, such as passive defenses and possibly active point missile defenses, should a missile threat against the German homeland be shown. In this regard, Germany differs from France in the rationale it chooses for potentially supporting a TMD program. France wants such a system to protect its deployed forces and as a boost to its military industries, but fears that building TMD could signal a lack of confidence in its force de frappe deterrent. Germany, on the other hand, recognizes the possibility that nuclear deterrence might fail, and therefore views TMD as a prudent defense for the homeland. Germany will certainly not be interested in offensive or preemptive measures, nor in measures involving WMD use by NATO under any circumstances. As Foreign Minister Kinkel has pointed out, Germany believes that “military enforcement pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN
Charter against proliferators is only conceivable as a final resort in the event of a threat to international security and peace. In other words, military measures always require legitimization by the UN Security Council—except in defence against armed attack.\textsuperscript{163}

Finally, there is the issue of economic cooperation between Germany and France on certain programs in the DGP list. Some Germans wonder whether France is sincere in its push for certain programs or systems as being in the best interest of the Alliance or Europe, or whether it supports only those that appear to be in France’s best interest. On the other hand, the German MOD has been generally pro-French with respect to armaments production and procurement, and agreed with France early on that NATO’s counterproliferation effort was the right thing to do.\textsuperscript{164}

We can project the likely arguments heard in the public debate in Germany over whether to support the NATO nonproliferation efforts. On the one hand, yes, it is good to be prepared, and prudent to develop plans and defenses against known threats. On the other hand, there are no current direct threats against Germany, and given the financial burdens of more pressing issues, funding for new NATO projects is unlikely to be forthcoming. Questions of likelihood and cost will most likely overrule those of prudence, should it come to such a Hobson’s choice.

Finally, some observers note that a major change for the good of general European security and stability is a territorially satiated Germany. Germany, according to this view, is no longer a front line state, as it was in the Cold War, and no longer views security issues from a territorial perspective.\textsuperscript{165} Yet, when it comes to new issues which may require German commitment and resources, it can quickly reverse this attitude. As one analyst put it, Germany’s self-perceived role in Alliance security matters is to provide large numbers of conventional ground
forces to deter a revanchist Russia in Central Europe. The other NATO members can worry about out-of-area issues, including new threats created by WMD proliferation, because of the security provided by Germany in the core of Europe.\textsuperscript{166}

If Germany does decide it must participate more aggressively in counterproliferation efforts in order to show that it is a good NATO partner, it will focus its support and efforts on homeland defense, rather than protecting troops deployed on out-of-area missions. Germany, as this shows, has not yet fully adapted to the new international strategic environment, which is in many ways less benign that was the Cold War. As one German analyst put it, “the dangers of the old East-West divide have been replaced by the uncertainties of a new world in disorder.”\textsuperscript{167} The FRG must recognize that some issues cannot be solved diplomatically, no matter how sincere it wishes they could be.

The United Kingdom: Steady Partner at Lower Force Levels

The United Kingdom has generally been very positive about the NATO nonproliferation process. While there was some initial nervousness within the body politic of the UK when the United States announced its counterproliferation initiative, the government has been very supportive. Early concerns within the public debate revolved around the preemptive nature of the CPI and its renewed emphasis on ballistic missile defense. There was some wariness among elements of the political and academic communities that counterproliferation was a simply an American cover for advancing BMD. Over time, however, as in Germany, people in Britain began to realize that counterproliferation was not a replacement for nonproliferation efforts, but could support those efforts as long as it did not become overly weighted toward military solutions and was kept in proportion to other NATO programs.\textsuperscript{168}
The UK stressed that NATO’s nonproliferation efforts were aimed not only at ballistic missiles and nuclear threats. Biological weapons posed an equally serious problem. The broad nature of potential WMD threats forced the Alliance, under Britain’s lead, to consider a range of available responses, including active defenses. While British policy makers tended to overemphasize theater ballistic missile defenses in the early going, TMD eventually became categorized among other possible types of defense systems. The UK had an industrial BMD research and development strategy well ahead of any policy, so it welcomed the opportunity for this in-depth analysis of the issues, problems, and potential solutions.169

The fact that the UK has only a minimal deterrence capability does not affect its support level for NATO efforts. Nevertheless, it would prefer to keep NATO’s BMD efforts within the constraints imposed by the ABM Treaty and the 1995 NPT extension in order to maintain the efficacy of its remaining nuclear forces and their threat to Russia.170

There is currently no British government support for increased defense spending for any reason. Fortunately for the government, defense spending is at the moment not a public issue. Nor, for that matter, is the question of proliferation. Occasionally the topic will reach the news, as when former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher discussed the threat of WMD proliferation and the need for the Western Alliance to develop a BMD capability in her Fulton, Missouri speech of March 1996.171 For the most part, however, the UK believes that similar high profile issues in the past have commonly resulted in programs smaller than those initially proposed, despite having a great initial impetus.

The UK may push to pursue medium-range defense capabilities, since they currently have none. This would allow it to protect its deployed forces, rather than British national territory, and would
represent a modest effort to acquire limited capabilities to defend against an emerging WMD threat. Perhaps the only new big-ticket system to come out of this NATO effort, in British eyes, would be an Extended Air Defense program. These hopes were diminished, of course, by France’s decision to withdraw from MEADS. In addition, the UK recognizes other small areas in which it would be worth pursuing counterproliferation capabilities, such as a biological weapons immunization policy.

With respect to the future of the Senior Defense Group on Proliferation, the United Kingdom believed that the issue of proliferation should have been considered within NATO’s core committees, the existing force planning process, the CNAD equipment cooperation arena, and so on, rather than by a unique committee with a limited charter and life-span such as the DGP. There may have been some need to keep the DGP around for a couple of years to ensure that these issues did get embedded in the appropriate committees, and to consider further policy choices and issues, but they did not support the idea of the DGP remaining in place indefinitely. Similarly, the British held that the SGP was created simply as a political counterbalance to the DGP, and had served its purpose. The ongoing work of the SGP could easily be merged with the mandate of other existing NATO bodies, which would have continued thinking about the political aspects of proliferation. Nevertheless, Britain concurred in extending the mandate of both groups at the June 1996 NAC meeting.

Britain has long committed its submarine forces to NATO strategy. In keeping with this record, it now has promised to dedicate a portion of its Trident missile force to NATO for use in a sub-strategic role, should that become necessary. Such theater weapons, wielded by a European ally but used on behalf of the entire Alliance, could prove to be a decisive deterrent against a proliferant state or group threatening the
use of WMD against a NATO member. Britain thus supports, albeit perhaps unwittingly, the long-standing French call for a European pillar of the Alliance in security matters. The Trident commitment also makes up for the loss to SACEUR of Britain’s dual-capable aircraft employing the WE 177 nuclear gravity bomb, which will be phased out of the UK weapons inventory over the course of the next several years. By guaranteeing a certain number of SLBM missiles and warheads to SACEUR, the UK guarantees its own role in the continuing nuclear strategy of the Alliance, as well as making a significant contribution to NATO’s ultimate deterrent against WMD threats or use.

The election of a new government in 1997 is not expected to alter Britain’s position vis-à-vis NATO’s nonproliferation policy, or its support for these efforts. The Labour party did not campaign on issues of foreign policy, and its policy positions were closely aligned with the Tory party on most defense-related issues.
CONCLUSION

Operationalizing the Framework: Future NATO Requirements

Although progress in the DGP clearly suggests a growing recognition of proliferation as a serious security threat, the argument that traditional non-proliferation prevention policies and programs are sufficient to meet the challenge may prevail in some capitals, especially when decision-makers are confronted with hard policy and fiscal choices. If this occurs, NATO will almost certainly fail to take the steps necessary to meet the threat.178

Some European NATO officials have stated that the June 1996 DGP Report in no way committed them to funding any of the proposed action plans. Competing interests (especially NATO expansion and its associated costs), decreasing budgets, and lack of an immediately perceived threat make some European allies unenthusiastic about funding any ambitious new programs, including the recommended counterproliferation plans.179

There are also several unanswered political aspects to the Alliance’s ability to implement the DGP’s new programs. One of the most important is that some capitals will be unwilling to abandon their emphasis on traditional diplomatic and economic means to try and stop proliferation. They may see military measures, even if only in the planning stage, as counterproductive to their other efforts if misinterpreted by a potential proliferant. Yet the Alliance cannot afford to give up on nonproliferation efforts, nor fail to prudently prepare for the possibility that these efforts may fail. In the latter case, the Alliance must proceed with developing strategies and procuring necessary military capabilities in order to adapt
itself to the new international security environment—one which includes the increasing risk of facing a WMD-armed adversary in some regional contingency, or of being directly threatened by a Mediterranean or Middle Eastern pariah state. Attaining such military capabilities would enhance NATO’s deterrent posture, and new conventional weapons would lessen its reliance on nuclear forces for deterrence and potential counterproliferation use. As Robert Joseph has written, “deterrence through denial is a stronger foundation for NATO policy than the concept of massive retaliation which... would be perceived as disproportionate or otherwise inappropriate.”

Theater ballistic missile defenses would play a role in this revitalized defense posture. Given the radically changed strategic threat to Europe, past concerns over strategic defenses require reconsideration by the Alliance.

Dividing responsibilities among states or organizations may be one way to finance these new programs. Reallocation of resources is the more likely path, however, and perhaps the only means of funding the DGP’s work program, given fiscal and political realities. But will any ally be willing to pursue this path? The options for NATO members appear to be either increased budgets or cutbacks in existing programs. Neither of these seems likely. In fact, as many observers within NATO pointed out, it may take a significant public catastrophe, such as WMD terrorist threat, accident, or use in a regional conflict to awaken the nations to the need for preparedness against these possibilities.

Assuming that the Alliance does agree to pursue new counterproliferation capabilities, there are three possible funding options for the DGP work programs. First, NATO could ask its members to individually procure the necessary systems to meet the identified shortfalls. The US is already doing this in many areas. Second, several states could share the costs of these systems. Third, the Alliance could
set up a common funding infrastructure to purchase outright these
programs for NATO, on the model of the AWACS aircraft system.182

In 1996 the DGP recommended, and the NAC endorsed, that
the focus of its near-term force revisions be on the protection of
deployed troops, through defenses and response capabilities.183 As one
European analyst put it, “NATO’s main emphasis…will inevitably focus
on defensive measures in cases where nonproliferation has failed.”184
The most likely forces for deployment out-of-area, in combat or
nontraditional roles, are the Combined Joint Task Force and ACE Rapid
Reaction Corps. Both groups would be equipped and prepared to operate
in an NBC environment.

The view of the DGP is that the threat of retaliation with
overwhelming force, including the option of using nuclear weapons,
should deter the possibility of WMD use against NATO forces or
territory. Should deterrence fail, NATO already possesses the capability
to strike back at the aggressor. Although some states on NATO’s
periphery are pursuing long-range ballistic missiles with WMD
capabilities, the DGP felt that current BMD efforts to meet this long-term
threat were adequate, not requiring a big, new NATO program.185 The
Alliance will instead address the more likely situation of preparing and
protecting NATO forces participating in out-of-area operations facing
the threat of CW or BW use—situations not only more likely, but also
less expensive to counter. Despite some second guessing by certain
allies, most will support the new program. Another analyst summed it
up in terms of rational actor theory: “Although the allies have a number
of concerns about the NATO counterproliferation initiative, these
concerns are outweighed by the perceived benefits of the initiative to the
Alliance and to the individual nations.”186

NATO, needing an organization to follow-up the DGP studies
and ensure the implementation of its recommendations, chose to extend
the DGP itself as the body most capable of accomplishing this task. The DGP membership comprises particular expertise to help NATO in several areas: developing doctrine, planning, training and exercises involving WMD proliferation scenarios; assessing the effectiveness of NATO’s defense response to proliferation, particularly the implementation of the DGP’s recommendations from its three reports; and serving as the forum for enlarged discussions of WMD proliferation issues with PfP countries. A Steering Group was established within the DGP to oversee and coordinate these efforts. The NAC reaffirmed in May 1997 that “these political and defense efforts against proliferation remain an integral part of adaptation to the new security environment and [we] welcome further consultations and cooperation with Partner countries to address the common security risks posed by proliferation.” The DGP, in short, has become a well-established body capable of monitoring the next phase of NATO’s nonproliferation program as it moves into the actual fielding of new concepts and capabilities.

Final Thoughts

At the end of the two-year DGP study the Alliance concluded that it was unrealistic to expect that there were sufficient resources to defend and protect NATO populations from a WMD attack—despite the grand rhetoric of the 1994 summit communiqué. The Alliance prefers in the short-term to rely on traditional forms of deterrence to inhibit would-be attackers, while focusing on passive defenses in order to protect allied forces fighting or deployed in a potential NBC environment.

This process also provided a means of reorienting the Alliance to a power projection mode, focusing on providing military capabilities to Southwest Asia. This represented a realignment of traditional NATO missions and created a collective security organization no longer aimed
at Russia but concerned with issues “on or beyond the NATO periphery.” In this agenda the US, France, and the UK were in agreement.\textsuperscript{190}

So what is the likely role for each of our four countries of interest in this paper? As mentioned at the start, no Alliance program is capable of succeeding without the implicit support and agreement of these major powers.

**France** is also likely to continue its solid support for a NATO counterproliferation capability. It will rely on its nuclear deterrent capability for the ultimate defense of the French homeland, but it will also continue to move toward greater cooperation within NATO’s military bodies for, among other reasons, the purpose of ensuring that the Alliance develops solid capabilities to deter and defend against potential proliferant states and groups along its Southern flank—the region of direct and immediate concern to France. This is likely to remain true despite the shift in government power following the 1997 elections.

**Great Britain** will continue to be supportive of the Alliance efforts, as well. Unfortunately, Britain has no desire to increase its diminishing levels of defense funding. Hence its fiscal contributions to the action plans and larger NATO programmatic responses to this threat will be minimal. Neither NATO commitments nor defense policies were issues in the election.

**Germany** will likely continue to offer modest but grudging support for a defensive counterproliferation effort within NATO, as much in order to maintain its position as a good partner as for any true belief in the value or need for such programs. But it will continue to oppose offensive or counterforce aspects of an Alliance nonproliferation program.

**The United States**, for its part, will continue to lead the Alliance in its efforts in the counterproliferation arena. In fact, the US is so committed to its Defense Counterproliferation Initiative and the need
for a parallel NATO program that it will “go it alone” if necessary. Should the Alliance change its mind, or refuse to adequately fund the DGP’s recommended action program, the United States will still continue to develop and field new capabilities to protect and defend itself against future threats stemming from the proliferation of WMD. Nevertheless, the US has repeatedly emphasized that CPI welcomes and requires allied involvement and multinational cooperation to succeed.¹⁹¹

For the US, the NATO counterproliferation effort met or exceeded every one of the unspoken US objectives for the DGP and NATO in this effort. These goals can be summarized as follows:

- Build political consensus regarding the NBC threat and the need for defense and counterforce measures;
- Embed counterproliferation as an organizing principle in every facet of NATO defense activity (as well as in the US DOD);
- Adapt NATO’s deterrence posture to new threats;
- Reduce potential Alliance vulnerabilities and safeguard the ability of NATO forces to accomplish missions despite NBC threat or attack;
- Reorient NATO toward power projection through defense planning; and
- Provide a venue for France to participate in defense policy planning discussions.¹⁹²

From a US perspective, the NATO counterproliferation effort was generally successful. It set new standards for timely, consensual decisions within the Alliance, and got NATO up to speed regarding counterproliferation in a very short period of time. It was also refreshing to have discussions on a major doctrinal shift conducted primarily at the Assistant Secretary levels, rarely requiring intervention by the President or other senior officials, as had proved necessary in past cases of NATO strategy changes or hardware upgrades.

Yet while the Alliance achieved political consensus and made great progress in embedding counterproliferation thinking across the
board, from the US point of view the allies still have a long way to go. As of late 1997 the US was somewhat disappointed in the lack of allied commitment to increased power projection capabilities, including such areas as airlift and reinforcement abilities, theater missile defenses, and other requirements for projecting forces at or beyond the NATO periphery. The United States plans to continue using the DGP as a venue for addressing these issues with its European allies.  

* * * * *

The NATO counterproliferation effort ranks as one of the most ambitious programs in NATO’s history. A concerted effort by an Alliance facing a new series of threats in an uncertain world led to the development of a comprehensive overview of threats, capabilities needed to meet those threats, existing shortfalls, and a plan to correct those deficiencies. As two past chairmen of the DGP recently wrote, “the pace and scale of the DGP’s achievements since May 1994 represent a remarkable story for the Alliance and for transatlantic cooperation.” The DGP’s conclusions seem pragmatic, responsible, and modest. It remains to be seen whether the Alliance has the will to pursue these new programs and systems in an era of fiscal austerity, public apathy, apparent low threat levels, and military downsizing. In other words, NATO’s nonproliferation agenda faces the same hurdles as have most other historical changes in Alliance perspective—the dual track INF decision, the SNF modernization debate, and the shift to flexible response in MC 14/3. All of them seemed unlikely to succeed, yet all were accomplished through a combination of leadership, changing international circumstances and public perceptions, and the slow, methodical bureaucratic process. One would expect that the NATO nonproliferation effort will be equally successful, over the long term.
ENDNOTES

1 “Final Communiqué,” Communiqué M-DPC/NPG-1 (95) 57, NATO Press Service, 8 June 1995.


4 This prediction has been borne out by the announcement, in early May 1996, of closer security linkages, including intelligence and code sharing, between the Western European Union and NATO. This fits in nicely with the long-standing French desire for an independent European security pillar, albeit in a more practical manner by its ties to NATO. See, for example, “NATO Strengthens Role of European Members at Spring Conference,” The Week in Germany, 7 June 1996, p. 1.


6 Traditional nonproliferation efforts include such approaches as export controls, critical materials lists, supplier embargoes, arms control agreements, and legal and political restrictions. Counterproliferation, on the other hand, usually implies military responses to the proliferation threat, particularly once nonproliferation has failed. Even these definitions are blurry, however, in the United States there was considerable friction over developing agreed interagency distinctions in the early going of the CPI. For more on these definitional debates, see Guy B. Roberts, “NATO’s Response to the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Emerging Reality of NATO’s Ambitious Program,” paper prepared for the USAF Institute for National Security Studies, September 1996, fn.29, pp. 13-14.


8 Ibid., p. 138.


Christopher Urges Collective Action on Proliferation,” Text of Statement in Luxembourg, United States Information Service (USIS), Wireless File, 10 June 1993.

Based on interviews with officers at SHAPE and NATO, spring 1996.


For example, NATO’s role in the development of Europe’s future security structure is seen by the inclusion of new member states through enlargement to the East; the Partnership for Peace program; and the creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and its successor, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. See Gregory L. Schulte, “Responding to Proliferation—NATO’s Role,” NATO Review, July 1995, pp. 15-19, and Sergio Balanzino, “Deepening Partnership: The Key to Long-Term Stability in Europe,” NATO Review, July-August 1997, pp. 10-16.


23 Krause, p. 146.
25 Such as Algeria, Libya, and Iraq.
26 Including Iraq, Iran, and Syria.
37 Policy Statement on ‘German 10-Point Initiative on Non Proliferation Policy,’ Dr Klaus Kinkel, Statements & Speeches, German Information Center, New York, 15 December 1993, p. 2.
38 Joseph, p. 118.
39 British Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind, speech to The Atlantic Council of the United Kingdom, Bath, UK, 2 November 1995, quoted in Stephen P. Lambert


41Interviews in Washington, fall 1994.

42Ibid. For more on the definitional debate that occurred over these terms, see Roberts, fn. 29, pp. 13-14.


44See, for example, Kurt M. Campbell, Ashton B. Carter, Steven E. Miller, and Charles A. Zraket, Soviet Nuclear Fixion: Control of the Nuclear Arsenal in a Disintegrating Soviet Union (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University CSIA, 1991); Allison, Carter, Miller and Philip Zelikow, editors, Cooperative Denuclearization: From Pledges to Deeds (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University CSIA, 1993); and, continuing in the series, Allison, Miller, Owen R. Cote, Jr., and Richard A. Falkenrath, Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy: Containing the Threat of Loose Russian Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), and John M. Shields and William C. Potter, editors, Dismantling the Cold War: US and NIS Perspectives on the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997). Note that Ashton Carter was the co-editor of the first two books in this series, and then became the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, a position which allowed him to influence government policy along the lines of the recommendations in his academic papers.


50 The author, in his role as INSS Director, was the nominal host for one of the first acquisition gatherings to discuss counterproliferation technologies, held at the Air Force Academy, January 1994.


52 These initial categories have since been expanded to encompass seven functional areas: proliferation prevention, strategic and tactical intelligence, battlefield surveillance, WMD counterforce, active defense, passive defense, and countering paramilitary, covert delivery, and terrorist WMD threats. Report on Activities and Programs for Countering Proliferation, May 1996, p. 5.


54 1995 Report on Activities and Programs for Countering Proliferation, p. 27.


57 Based on interviews with counterproliferation officers in NATO, SHAPE, USEUCOM, and JCS, spring 1996.

58 From 1995 Report on Activities and Programs for Countering Proliferation, p. 73, and reconfirmed in the 1996 Report. This is a prioritized list of recommendations by the CPRC and is based on the 1994 NPRC Nonproliferation/Counterproliferation Areas for Progress and the JCS/CINC prioritized counterproliferation capabilities (the JWCA shortfall priorities list).

59 Interviews in Paris, Brussels, and SHAPE, spring 1996. For an excellent in-depth discussion of this dilemma and NATO’s budgetary problems meeting the requirements set forth by the DGP effort, see Roberts.


63 Ibid., pp. 21-22.

64 1997 DOD Report to Congress, p. 50.

65 Quadrennial Defense Review.
Rühle, p. 315.

Interviews in Germany, spring 1996.

Rühle, pp. 313-4.

Ruhle, pp. 315-6.

David Greenwood, quoted in Sloan, p. 15.

For example, Goldring, p. 12.

Interviews in Germany, spring 1996.

Interviews in Paris and Brussels, spring 1996.

Joseph, p. 119.


Roberts, fn. 144, p. 59.

The Assistant Secretary General for Defense Support recommended in a June 1994 memorandum that these groups draft a strategy paper orchestrating the development and deployment of a NATO EAD/TMD capability. This would serve as the alliance enabling mechanism for deployment of such a capability early in the next century, if the alliance decided to do so. Unpublished memorandum by Robin Beard, June 1994.


Rühle, p. 319. National military authorities (NMAs) are currently refining a Military Operational Requirement for EAD, which is essentially BMD or TMD. Initially there were no formal lateral links or overlapping membership between these groups, although the NATO International Staff and the NMAs are represented on most of them. At the May 1994 NAC meeting, Germany and Denmark called for coordination between EAD and proliferation efforts. In one of his last acts, in August 1994 Secretary General Manfred Wörner tasked the representatives from CNAD and NADC to attend DPG meetings.

Martin, p. 34.

Interviews at NATO, spring 1996.

Interviews in Paris and Brussels, spring 1996.

Roberts, p. 59.

January 1994 NATO Summit Declaration; and Rühle, pp. 313-320.
Memorandum from the NATO Secretary General, “Coordination of Alliance Activities Concerning the Defence Aspects of NATO’s Response to Proliferation,” 2 August 1994.

Schulte, p. 16.


NATO’s Approach to Proliferation,” Basic Fact Sheet No. 8, NATO Office of Information and Press, September 1995, p. 2.

Interviews at NATO and Paris, spring 1996.

Interviews at NATO, spring 1996.

Schulte, p. 18.

Joseph, pp. 121-2.

Joseph, p. 122.


Interviews at NATO, spring 1996.

Interviews with NATO officials, spring 1996.

Schulte, p. 18, and Basic Fact Sheet, No. 8, p. 3.

Interviews at NATO, spring 1996.

Interviews with NATO staff members, 1995-96; also Carter and Omand, p. 13.

This list from Joseph, pp. 123-4.

List from NATO Press Release, 29 November 1995, pp. 3-4. It is important to note that this list is not rank-ordered, per US wishes.


Schulte, p. 18; Carter and Omand, p. 12.

110 Martin, p. 34.


115 “Interviews at SHAPE and NATO, spring 1996.

116 “See, for example, Erlich, p. 30.

117 Carter and Omand, p. 15.


119 Roberts, p. 36. NATO Force Goals are six year plans, updated every two years, which establish targets for individual nations’ contributions toward achieving the Alliance’s Strategic Concept.


122 “Interviews in Brussels, spring 1996.

123 “Interviews at NATO, SHAPE, and Washington, spring 1996.

124 “This simplified version of the consultation and response process within the Pentagon is drawn from interviews with key participants in Washington, spring 1996. The question that begs answering, of course, is how complete and in-depth any ally’s response could be given the short time period allowed—particularly since it was over the Christmas season.

125 “Unofficial flow chart from NATO staff, winter 1995/96, which captures the spirit of multinational consultation on a major work effort.

126 “The group met at the offices of Science Applications International Corporation in McLean, VA. SAIC provided contract support for the DGP’s studies. Interviews in Washington, summer 1997.

127 “Interviews at SHAPE, spring 1996.


129 “Interviews in Europe, spring 1996.


69
Officials in Washington confirmed that the NATO three-committee structure was a French proposal. Interviews in Paris, spring 1996, and Washington, summer 1997.

Interviews in Paris, spring 1996.

“Allied Perceptions of WMD Proliferation,” p. 3.


Interviews with US-CREST Counterproliferation Working Group participants, Oct 94; also “Allied Perceptions of WMD Proliferation,” paper prepared by the Center for Counterproliferation Research, National Defense University, fall 1994, p. 3.


“France Quits Anti-Missile Project,” London Financial Times, 17 April 1996, p. 3. MEADS is a multinational air defense system funded jointly by Italy, Germany, the US, and formerly France.

Such adaptation could take the form of intra-regional deployment of NATO’s dual capable aircraft, for example.


See Johnsen and Young.

Johnsen and Young, p. 11.

Minister of Defense Harve de Charette, in a speech to the North Atlantic Council, 5 Dec 1995, quoted in Grant, p. 58.


Joseph, p. 117.


Yost, p. 113.

Yost, p. 114.

Grant, pp. 65-66.

Millon, p. 15.

Interviews with French and NATO officials, spring 1996.

Grant, p. 64.

Johnsen and Young, p. 7.

Interviews in Paris, spring 1996. One analyst has suggested that only a Guallist president could move so far toward NATO and away from Guallist principles of independence without being ridiculed for doing so; in other words, “only Nixon could go to China.” Anand Menon, “French Shift to NATO Hails End of the European Army Dream,” The European, 16-22 May 1996, p. 14.

Interviews in Germany and at NATO, spring 1996.

Interviews in Europe, spring 1996.

Interviews in Germany, spring 1996.

Interviews in Bonn, spring 1996.

Interviews in Germany, spring 1996. The issue of military preparedness, or lack thereof, to meet an NBC threat in an operational environment is not peculiar to Germany. See, for instance, the discussion on NATO’s Survive to Operate concept in Kurt J. Klingenberger, “Sustaining NATO Air Operations in an NBC Environment,” paper prepared for The Atlantic Council of the United States, June 1996.

Interviews in Germany, spring 1996.

Interviews in Germany, spring 1996.

Kinkel, “German 10-Point Initiative on Non-Proliferation Policy,” p. 3.

Interviews in Germany, spring 1996. Defense Minister Volker Rühe supported France’s efforts to return to NATO’s military bodies and to have greater European presence at the top levels of the Alliance as a precondition to full French participation. “Germany Backs France on NATO Reform,” The Week in Germany, 18 October 1996, p. 2.

Kühnhardt, p. 107.

Interviews in Germany, spring 1996.

Kühnhardt, p. 111.

Interviews in Europe, spring 1996.

Interviews in Europe, spring 1996; also “The United Kingdom and Proliferation” in “Allied Perceptions of WMD Proliferation,” p. 3.

Interviews at SHAPE and NATO, spring 1996.

71
Thatcher claimed that NATO “provides the best available mechanism for coordinating the contribution of America’s allies to a global system of ballistic missile defense—that is, one providing protection against missile attack from whatever source it comes.” “Making ‘Iron Curtain’ Speech, Thatcher Calls for ‘Atlantic Partnership,’” The Associated Press, 9 March 1996, internet: http://www.nando.net/newsroom.

Interviews in Europe, spring 1996. Great Britain has had no aerial defense system since the Bloodhound missile was removed from service in the late 1980’s.

Interviews in Brussels, spring 1996.


For more detail on the potential uses for Britain’s substrategic Trident force, see Lambert and Miller, Chapter 4.

Joseph, p. 126.


Joseph, p. 127.

Roberts recognizes this dilemma in his paper, and suggests that there may be three areas of possible increased alliance preparation for these contingencies at little cost. His recommendations are: 1) to focus on collaborative intelligence sharing and analysis through the creation of a NATO Proliferation Risk Intelligence and Analysis Center; 2) to support common funding and burden sharing, using the Technical Cooperation Program as a model; and 3) to reorient doctrine by creating realistic training and exercises for selected forces to operate in out-of-area WMD environments. Roberts, pp. 48-50.

Roberts, pp. 62-64.


Rühle, p. 319.

Roberts, pp. 39-41.


Roberts, p. 34.

189 Roberts, p. 68.


192 Interviews with DOD officials in Washington, summer 1997, and *Quadrennial Defense Review*.


194 Carter and Omand, p. 11.
1. **Explaining Weapons Proliferation: Going Beyond the Security Dilemma.** Gregory J. Rattray, July 1994

2. **The Ukrainian Military: Instrument for Defense or Domestic Challenge?** Oleg Strekal, November 1994

3. **North Korea’s Nuclear Program: The Clinton Administration’s Response.** William E. Berry, Jr., March 1995


6. **Nuclear Proliferation: Diminishing Threat?** William H. Kincade, December 1995

7. **Nuclear Proliferation: The Diplomatic Role of Non-Weaponized Programs.** Rosalind R. Reynolds, January 1996


9. **The International Legal Implications of Information Warfare.** Richard W. Aldrich, April 1996


