Putting Humpty Dumpty Together:
Reconstructing Peace in the Congo

Briefly...

• Standing today at a crossroads between war and peace, the Congo threatens either to drag the entire Central African region into a quagmire of conflict or to provide the engine of economic reconstruction necessary for stability and democratization.

• The Lusaka cease-fire agreement provides a last exit on the region’s highway to hell. The agreement validates both the territorial integrity of the Congo and the international responsibility to counter threats to international peace and stability, including the threat posed by those who committed the 1994 Rwandan genocide, insurgents who are now based in the Congo.

• The international community must provide robust support for the implementation of the Lusaka agreement, including its provisions for a national dialogue to address key issues of governance in the Congo and a for a joint military commission (JMC) to harmonize regional efforts to disarm or otherwise neutralize the numerous Congo-based insurgencies destabilizing neighboring countries.

• The international community must also direct support toward grassroots efforts at coexistence and reconciliation, toward democratic institution building and human rights advocacy in the Congo and the surrounding region, toward economic development as a tool of peacebuilding, and toward demobilization and reintegration.
Introduction

Twice in the past three years, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC, formerly known as Zaire) has exploded into a multicity conflict sparked by regional efforts to overthrow a sitting government. The 1996-97 war succeeded in dislodging the former Zairian dictator Mobutu Sese Seko. But the current effort, one that has deeply divided Africa and sparked its first nearly continentwide war, has failed to unseat Laurent Kabila’s government. A comprehensive cease-fire agreement negotiated in Lusaka provides a hopeful road map to regional peace, if the internal and external belligerents choose that path.

Three integral issues must be addressed in order to make possible stability and state construction in the Congo: a more equitable distribution of political and economic power throughout the Congo; a more effective counterinsurgency campaign against the nonstate actors that continue to feed off the Congolese vacuum and destabilize neighboring countries; and a more coherent strategy for addressing the boiling cauldron called the Kivus, the easternmost region of the Congo.

On a fundamental level, the reverberations of the 1994 Rwandan genocide and the ensuing refugee crisis in eastern Zaire continue to echo throughout Central Africa. If this legacy of genocide and the crisis of legitimacy of the Congolese state continue to remain unresolved by the region and unaddressed by the world, the war will likely continue and Africa’s efforts to forge its own renaissance will be severely undermined.

Two issues of international principle have collided in the Congolese conflagration. On the one hand is the international obligation to counter the threat to international peace and security—and the threat of genocide—posed by the ex-FAR/Interahamwe (the former Rwandan army and its allied militias which perpetrated the genocide) and other militias using Congolese soil as a base from which to launch attacks into neighboring countries and wreak havoc in the Congo. On the other hand is the need to uphold the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Congo and other states in the region. In response to a lack of seriousness on the part of the Congolese government regarding the first principle, Uganda and Rwanda overran the second principle and attempted to overthrow that government. Significantly, the cease-fire agreement negotiated in Lusaka affirmed both principles. It recognized that the Congo’s territorial integrity cannot be restored fully until its soil is no longer used as a launching pad for attacks committed by genocidaires, and that the belligerents in the war must work together to fulfill the requirements of these two principles.

The August 1998 invasion of the Congo by Rwanda and Uganda and Rwanda’s brutal counterinsurgency tactics in the Congo against the ex-FAR/Interahamwe have reduced many African governments’ sympathies for the antigenerocide agenda and increased regional impatience with Rwanda and Uganda and their violation of Congolese sovereignty. This situation in turn has increased Rwanda’s sense of isolation and its justifiable belief that little international support will be forthcoming for its effort to counter the genocidaires.

To further complicate matters, nearly all of the signatories to the cease-fire have moved militarily in ways that threaten the agreement. Most notably, tensions between erastwhile allies Uganda and Rwanda burst violently into the open in August 1999, threatening forward movement on the implementation of the cease-fire agreement. If regional interests are not harmonized and a common agenda not reconstructed soon, the Congo and the surrounding region will remain at war for the foreseeable future, with increasingly dire consequences for civilian populations, and raising for the first time since the 1960s the prospect that this vast country could degenerate into irreversible statelessness.
It should not be forgotten that the international community shares responsibility for the continuation of this culture of impunity, from its ignoring the 1972 genocide against Hutas in Burundi; to its generous Cold War-era support to Mobutu; its support for the Rwandan regime, which committed the 1994 genocide; its lack of response to the genocide itself; and its maintenance of and failure to disarm the genocidaires in the refugee camps in the two years following the genocide. The need for the international community to support the implementation of the Lusaka cease-fire agreement provides a major opportunity for a belated assumption of its responsibilities.

The Lusaka cease-fire agreement endeavors to halt the intra-Congo war, end the external attempt to overthrow the government, and coordinate efforts to contain and disarm foreign militias based in the Congo. It seeks a strategic realignment more focused on shared threats to regional security. The agreement starts a process toward restoring a common but informal understanding of the problem created by the Congolese vacuum and a recognition of the nonstate actors as the principal source of instability in Central Africa. The Lusaka agreement legitimizes and internationalizes the pursuit of these genocidaires and other nonstate actors and enlists the commitment of the Congolese government in the effort. Until these militia forces are clearly treated as a threat to international peace and security, the Congo will continue to be a breeding ground for regional conflict. Lending full support to the Lusaka agreement gives the international community an opportunity to help counter the continuing threat of genocide and regional instability.

**Multinational War with a Multiplicity of Interests**

The two recent Congolese civil wars have been driven in large part by Rwanda's war with the ex-FAR/Interahamwe, Uganda's conflicts with various Sudan-supported militias, official Congolese support for or toleration of these forces, and the insecure position of Congolese Tutsi populations. The Kabila government was installed by the regional alliance that toppled Mobutu but then aroused the ire of all of its patrons by its chaotic management of the post-Mobutu era. However, when Rwanda and then Uganda moved to topple Kabila, what was left of the regional alliance crumbled, and other African countries moved to Kabila's defense. Most significantly, Zimbabwe could not countenance the attempt to overthrow Kabila in its perceived backyard, while Angola felt this development strengthened the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola's (UNITA's) hand in the region.

The Congolese war today is fashioned from a long chain of interlocking African conflicts. These include:
- The Congolese government versus assorted rebel groups
- The Rwandan government versus the Congolese government
- The Rwandan government versus Rwandan insurgents
- The Ugandan government versus Sudan-supported rebels
- The Ugandan government versus the Congolese government
- The Ugandan and Rwandan governments versus the Zimbabwean and Angolan governments
- Rwandan-backed Congolese rebels versus Ugandan-backed Congolese rebels
- The Ugandan government versus the Rwandan government
- The Burundian government versus Burundian rebel factions
- The Angolan government versus UNITA and anyone who supports UNITA
- Mai-Mai elements versus the Rwandan government and RCD (Rally for Congolese Democracy) forces
- Sudanese government versus the Ugandan government

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Since the advent of this war in August 1998, Kabila has been able to consolidate political support with a nationalist appeal both for Congolese sovereignty and to anti-Tutsi prejudice. But desertions and military setbacks have forced the Congolese government and its allies increasingly to rely on the support of ex-FAR/Interahamwe, ADF (the Allied Democratic Front of Uganda), and FDD (Forces for Democracy and Development from Burundi) units to slow the advance of its opponents. As early as November 1998, the UN Commission on Arms Flows charged the Congolese government with constructing an alliance with forces that committed the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. The Congolese, Ugandans, and Rwandans dispute which came first: cooperation with the genocidaires or the rebellion/intervention.

On the rebel side, the RCD and MLC (Movement for the Liberation of the Congo) are both collections of individuals, political parties, and militia forces. Both the RCD and MLC are heavily dependent on Rwanda and Uganda, respectively, for military support, although their ability to conduct independent operations is increasing. The parties—the rebels and their government backers alike—have overlapping but not identical agendas and interests. For example, the RCD represents a number of different interest groups, only some of which answer to Rwanda's instructions. Among these groups are unreconstructed Mobutuists, genuine progressives, and political opportunists. The perception that the Rwandan government controls the RCD has effectively prevented it from developing much grassroots support in the territories nominally under its control, so that it has yet to become a force greater than the sum of its parts.

Problems have emerged between Banyamulenge (Congolese Tutsi from South Kivu) elements of the RCD and the Rwandan government, and officials of both see certain tactics and behaviors of the other as undermining their shared objectives. Some Banyamulenge leaders say the issue of their physical insecurity—exacerbated by the two Congo wars—is being used by Rwanda as a rationale for its intervention. Nevertheless, if issues for which Banyamulenge forces are fighting are not addressed in the resolution of the current conflict, a third war could erupt some time in the not-too-distant future.

**Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi**

Uganda has moved more aggressively since the end of the Lusaka negotiations to assert its interests militarily, through support to rebel MLC advances, consolidation of control in Kisangani, and promotion of Wamba dia Wamba as the leader of the RCD.

Uganda's conflict with Sudan is in part driving its involvement in the Congo, as Sudan supports a variety of Ugandan militias to launch cross-border attacks from Congolese soil. The most notable militia is the ADF. Despite Uganda's support to oust Mobutu, the establishment of what was hoped would be a government more supportive of border security priorities, and Uganda's substantial operational independence in border regions, ADF militia attacks across the Congolese border have not diminished. As a result of these attacks, the humanitarian and security situation in the Rwenzori mountains region of southwest Uganda has deteriorated. Over 100,000 people have been displaced in Bundibugyo and Kasese districts.

Rwanda has a number of direct and indirect objectives behind its continuing involvement in the Congo: security promotion, by displacing its war into the Congo and thus moving associated human rights and security problems out of northwest Rwanda; nation-building, in order to leave behind a structure in the Congo that can fill the current vacuum of authority; economic expansion and commercial development, through the exploitation of minerals now and the rerouting of trade routes toward the east in the future; and human rights promotion, by protecting Congolese Tutsi populations and ensuring that ethnic cleansing or worse will not befall those populations. Indeed, Con-
golese Foreign Minister Yerodia told us that he worries that the Rwandan and Ugandan forces will not want to leave the Congo until the last ex-FAR/Interahamwe has been captured.

It is important to understand the context of traumatization and siege mentality that the 1994 genocide, the post-1993 ethnic cleansing efforts in the Kivus, and 1996–98 ex-FAR/Interahamwe assault on northwest Rwanda have produced in the Rwandan leadership. Against the backdrop of a lack of international support for the effort to counter the genocidaires, Rwanda acts as if its ends—the eradication of the threat of genocide—justify its means, no matter how unwelcome by or costly to local Congolese populations.

Huge problems accompany Rwanda’s continuing intervention in the DRC: increased instability in eastern Congo; alienation of Congolese populations against Rwanda, with the latter seen as a force of occupation and puppet master of the RCD; the angering of other African countries, which resent Rwanda’s tactics and are suspicious that its agendas are irredentist and economic in nature; the delegitimization of the antigénocide effort; increasing resentment of local populations against Congolese Tutsi, thus ironically increasing Tutsi insecurity as long as Rwandan forces are on Congolese soil; undermining of local Congolese efforts at coexistence and reconciliation; and fueling of perceptions that Rwanda and Uganda have territorial ambitions in the Congo, perceptions that Kabila and some of his allies actively promote.

The Rebel Signatures

Tensions and disagreements between Uganda and Rwanda over the prosecution of the Congolese war, exacerbated by local disputes over the control of resources, manifested themselves at the worst possible juncture, when the governments and rebels were ready to sign the cease-fire agreement in Lusaka. The issue of the rebel signatures has been a pure power play on the part of the rebels and their backers. The process of determining the RCD’s leadership has been disputed and has reflected the difference in approach to the rebellion between Rwanda and Uganda.

During the second week of August 1999, this dispute erupted into open conflict in Kisangani between competing factions, with the support and involvement of Uganda and Rwanda. It is remarkable that these two governments would allow their disputes to deteriorate in this manner, jeopardizing the Lusaka peace agreement. Uganda is training militia to support Wamba dia Wamba, who heretofore had no forces, while Rwanda has actively suppressed local support for Wamba in Kisangani. Rwanda and the RCD-Goma leadership have little popular support in Kisangani, where resentment is building against Rwanda. Nevertheless, Uganda’s arming and marshalling of support for Wamba was provocative and ill-timed, even if his expulsion from the leadership of the RCD was “undemocratic,” as he and the Ugandans charge.

Just at the time when Ethiopia and Eritrea are closing in on the end of their destructive war, another conflict between erstwhile allies Uganda and Rwanda appeared to be in the making. But the leadership of both governments, determined not to allow this to happen, signed a cease-fire and cooperation agreement after intensive discussions and with the constructive contribution of U.S. envoys. The Rwanda-Uganda agreement crafted a creative solution to the impasse over the rebel signatures, allowing all fifty of the RCD’s founding members to sign the cease-fire document. But if the spirit of compromise is not sustained, both countries will walk over the edge of the cliff together, because no one will understand or support their reasons for conflict.

Burundi also faces insurgent attacks from two Hutu rebel movements based in the Congo—the FDD and Palipehutu. Government forces have deployed to eastern Congo to conduct counterinsurgency operations, sometimes in coordination with Rwandan,
Ugandan, and RCD forces. Burundi was not officially recognized as one of the external belligerents at the Lusaka peace talks, and thus was not a signatory. Nevertheless, the Burundian rebel groups were branded by the Lusaka agreement as nonstate actors that must be disarmed. The rebels will probably seek to go to Burundi or Tanzania if their disarmament appears imminent.

Allies Supporting Kabila

Zimbabwean President Mugabe refused to accept the move by Rwanda and Uganda to unseat Kabila and deployed his significant military forces to Kabila’s defense. The economic benefits—a secondary objective—came quickly, as a management contract for Gecamines, the main Katangan mining parastatal, was transferred to two Zimbabwean companies.

Since signing the cease-fire accord, Zimbabwean forces are regrouping, fortifying defenses, and concentrating troops in certain areas. Zimbabwe appears to have a strong commitment to withdrawing forces as soon as possible, as domestic sentiment against its involvement in the war and economic pressures mount. Zimbabwe needs an honorable exit, which a properly implemented Lusaka agreement provides.

Angola’s overriding interest is to contain UNITA’s movements throughout the region, particularly its ability to resupply. The Angolan government perceived some link between Rwanda, Uganda, and UNITA at the outset of the war, and the insertion of its forces surprised Rwandan troops advancing on Kinshasa and saved Kabila’s government. But since the beginning of 1999, Angola has been withdrawing most of its forces from DRC soil in response to the resumption of its internal war with UNITA. Nevertheless, the Angolan government still sees control of the central government in Kinshasa and of the border areas of Bandundu, Western Kasai, and Katanga as matters of vital interest, meaning that a direct threat to Kabila’s government in these areas could once again entail swift and massive Angolan intervention.

Other countries are less relevant to the Congolese government’s defense. Efforts include Namibia’s political and symbolic military support; Chad and Libya’s military aid; and Sudan’s occasional aerial bombings of rebel positions, arms transfers to the Congolese government, and support to the nonstate actors.

Nonstate Actors and Kivu Elements

The Lusaka cease-fire agreement identifies nine nonstate actors targeted for disarmament. The ex-FAR/Interahamwe have benefited most from the DRC conflict. Rearmed by the Congolese and Zimbabwean governments, they have experienced a rejuvenation. Some of the key ringleaders of the genocide, such as General Augustin Bizimungu, are alleged to be commanding ex-FAR/Interahamwe forces in the Congo, whose numbers are estimated to be between 10,000 and 30,000. If the Lusaka agreement is implemented, some ex-FAR/Interahamwe units will likely disperse in search of friendlier terrain, which might be found in the Kivus with some of the Mai-Mai and FDD units, or in Congo-Brazzaville or the Central African Republic. This dispersal will lead to a further internationalization of the genocidaires problem, making UN Security Council enforcement of the embargo against them even more vital. It will also lead to further fragmentation of the ineffective Congolese military, as its frontline militia pawns are disarmed or relocate. Some hope might be derived from the damaging impact these units have had on Congolese communities, leading many to reject their presence.

The recent historical context of the Kivus produces its own impetus to prolong the conflict. Eastern Congo—closely linked to Rwandan and Burundian instability—has pro-
vided fuel for wave after wave of fires throughout the Congo and the broader region, beginning with Mobutu’s manipulation of the Banyarwanda citizenship issue, to the influx of Rwandan refugees following the 1994 genocide, to the rearming of the genocidaires in the refugee camps, to the efforts to ethnically cleanse the Congolese Tutsi from North Kivu, to the ignition of both the 1996-97 war and the current conflict.

During the past year, Rwanda’s displacement of its war with the ex-FAR/Interahamwe into DRC has had an extremely negative effect on the Kivus by increasing insecurity and displacement and preventing economic reconstruction and expanded trade. The longer the war continues, the more conditions ripen for warlordism. All of the parties increasingly are arming themselves to protect their interests. Manipulation of ethnic differences in the Kivus fed by hate-mongering and economic insecurity is perhaps the key contributor to instability in the eastern DRC.

Mai-Mai elements provide an example. Mai-Mai have traditionally been a local defense mechanism for the properties of local communities. These indigenous militia have been involved in many of the uprisings that have occurred in the region since the colonial period. There are indications that Rwanda’s occupation of certain areas of the Congo is being used by some Mai-Mai leaders to mobilize beyond peasant militias in local areas and even develop ad hoc alliances with FDD and Interahamwe units. This mobilization can take on a strong anti-Tutsi edge, although some leaders told us that there is nothing inherently anti-Tutsi about the Mai-Mai movement, as many of the groups had actually formed to defend against Banyarwanda Hutu encroachments on their lands. Their associations with Interahamwe units are tactical, and likely do not represent a sharing of the latter’s genocidal ideology. Some Mai-Mai leaders—including key commanders Dunia and Louetcha—realized that they could not remain completely autonomous and atomized and that they needed to coalesce and coordinate to a greater degree. The erosion of alternative community structures, the deterioration of alternative means of livelihood for young men, and the ease of access to arms accelerates Mai-Mai recruitment.

Outside of the Mai-Mai structure, Congolese Hutu communities in North Kivu also have militias, we were told, which primarily protect agricultural interests. Mai-Mai leaders maintain that their militia is primarily anti-Rwandan, countering what they see as an attempt by Rwandans to use Kivu as an outlet for their demographic and economic problems. In this view, while Hutu Banyarwanda and Mai-Mai may at present find themselves in tactical alliances against Congolese Tutsi, these arrangements are inherently unstable, as the Mai-Mai view all Congolese Hutu and Tutsi as a threat.

Economic and Social Roots of Congolese Conflict

The free-for-all over Congo’s vast natural resources fuels the conflict. Some belligerents are using state military budgets to finance their involvement in the war while individuals close to the leadership plunder the vast resources of the Congo. This amounts to state subsidization of personal enrichment. Even for those that are not benefiting personally, all parties to the conflict are exporting minerals to help defray war expenses. This self-financing of the war effort also reduces the potency of donor leverage for peace.

The Congolese government has sought to take over control of diamond sales, has outlawed such sales in dollars, and is seizing goods destined for export and exporting them directly. Rwanda is exporting tantalite and other minerals, while Uganda is exporting gold and diamonds. Zimbabwe may be earning $10 million a month in diamond exports, and is girding to protect Mbuji-Mayi’s mines—Kinshasa’s key remaining revenue source—from possible attack.
Competition for land, resources, and favored positions in a poverty-stricken environment fuels rivalries between Tutsi and non-Tutsi populations.

The longer the war keeps rumbling along and the vacuum of governance persists, the more opportunities will exist for an increase in transnational threats based in or emanating from the Congo.

Policy Responses

As mentioned, three issues must be addressed to bring peace to the Congo: equitable distribution of power throughout the Congo; integrated, coordinated and multifaceted counterinsurgency campaigns against the nonstate actors that continue to feed off the DRC vacuum and destabilize neighboring countries; and a coherent strategy for addressing the boiling cauldron called Kivu. The Lusaka agreement attempts to address the first two issues but fails to fully elaborate a strategy for resolving the complex issues specific to eastern Congo.

If the international community is serious about peace in Central Africa, meaningful support for the Lusaka agreement for addressing the first two issues is required, as is a concerted effort to understand better and respond to Kivu-based problems that are not dealt with by the agreement. This means that some kind of peace dividend must be forthcoming for all parties willing to engage in a process towards peace. The United States, European Union (EU), World Bank, UN development agencies, and other donors must be prepared to allocate or shift resources immediately to support both the Lusaka agreement's implementation and the broader priorities outlined below. If the international community does not pay now, it will be forced to pay much more later in further rounds of crisis response.

Success will require the use of both incentives and pressures during the implementation process. In addition to the provision of aid as an incentive, pressures must be exerted. Discussion could center around specific and graduated sanctions that would be applied uniformly against any violator of the Lusaka terms. And when the United Nations
and OAU endorse the agreement, any country that violates the agreement—signatory or nonsignatory—through the provision of arms or sanctuary to the nonstate actors should be sanctioned. All sides in the conflict think that the others need to be pressured to implement the agreement in good faith, so a package of transparent pressures and incentives should be constructed multilaterally.

Doing so would require a much greater degree of international coordination than exists presently. Major donors should give consideration to a Friends of Peace in the Congo mechanism, which could harness international actions and build on examples of coordination, such as the World Bank Trust Fund for the DRC. It could also help coordinate diplomatic support for the agreement’s implementation, particularly for the important task of cajoling key parties to implement fully all the provisions of the agreement, such as Rwanda’s timetable for withdrawal, Zimbabwe’s support for JMC actions, and the Congo’s constructive participation in planning for the national dialogue.

Each of these issues must be addressed at multiple levels. For example:

• The question of citizenship status of Congolese Tutsi populations remains explosive. A comprehensive social, legal, and economic strategy must be fashioned for this issue, including community meetings on coexistence, civic education, free movement of people, economic development, secure land tenure, protection of individual and group rights, and local defense mechanisms. The law on citizenship should be crafted with maximum transparency and consultation, and could be part of a broader constitutional process. Addressing the broader security concerns of Congolese Tutsi (without fuelling perceptions of special treatment) might enhance the case for an earlier departure of Rwandan troops, a trade-off that many Congolese might be willing to make.

• Elements of the ex-FAR/Interahamwe, the ADF, and other groups must be separated from civilian populations and disarmed. To conduct a successful counterinsurgency campaign, strategists must deploy military, judicial, political, social, and economic tools. In northwest Rwanda, the Rwandan government was successful in transforming what began as a brutal military offensive against the ex-FAR/Interahamwe and suspected sympathizers into a more comprehensive counterinsurgency operation. The strategy involved the creation of local defense groups that acted as a “neighborhood watch” against the Interahamwe, the development of a popular education campaign about the Interahamwe, the reintegration of sizable numbers of ex-FAR into the Rwandan military, the provision of humanitarian support with limited donor assistance, the holding of local elections, and the aggressive separation—with local leadership—of armed and unarmed elements of the population. The JMC must adopt such an integrated strategy, along with a demobilization program aimed at reintegrating nongenocidaires militia.

Encouraging Peace Processes

National and Regional Levels

Even if it ultimately falls apart, it is important to recognize the tremendous achievement of the long and winding African-led peace process that resulted in the Lusaka cease-fire agreement. Zambia, Tanzania, Mozambique, and South Africa all played crucial roles in bringing about a process which culminated in the creation of the ceasefire document, which addresses most of the fundamental issues fueling the conflict. The United States also played an important behind-the-scenes role in support of the African
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At this critical juncture, while parties determine whether Lusaka will be implemented, it is imperative that the United States be actively engaged on a daily basis with all of the parties. In addition to the work already being done by U.S. embassies in the region, Special Envoy Howard Wolpe—perhaps with an enhanced mandate—and other appropriate, high-level assistance and personnel from Washington must work through in great detail with all the parties (including the rebels) each aspect of the agreement. Common understanding of the way forward in each area will be key during implementation, and continuous discussion will be necessary around contentious issues, to supplement the efforts of the JMC. Ideally, this would be done in close coordination or even jointly with EU Envoy Aldo Ajello and other key international actors.

At the national and regional levels, just as in the Horn of Africa, mechanisms for bilateral technical and political consultation are needed in the Great Lakes region. For example, the Rwandan and Ugandan governments, assumed to be close enough that they would not consider coming to blows (just as was the case with Ethiopia and Eritrea before their war), require some kind of institutionalized channel of communication on a broad array of issues, to which the United States and others could contribute technical assistance. The JMC will provide a potential vehicle for regional military cooperation and dispute resolution. And bilateral mechanisms for discussing future relations are needed for all of the governments involved in the Congo, particularly between Rwanda and Congo.

Opportunities for conflict resolution between neighboring countries and their own insurgencies must be supported as well. Enhanced efforts to accelerate the pace of the Burundian peace talks in Arusha may be under way, and there are indications that some elements of the ADF may be interested in negotiating with the Ugandan government.

Local Level

In the Kivus, Rwanda, and Burundi, local populations speak of the importance of peaceful cohabitation, coexistence, and even reconciliation. More enlightened leaders see the importance of getting the ethnic-hatred genie back in the bottle before more serious damage is done. Local initiatives—some rooted deeply in grassroots conflict management traditions—promoting these values and exploring practical ways of living together occur throughout the Great Lakes region, usually with little outside support. Other efforts under way focus on campaigns against the Interahamwe and separation of local populations from militia forces. Much more could be done with very small amounts of flexible resources provided to communities where coexistence is occurring or being promoted.

Banyamulenge civilians will not be protected by laws alone, or by the Rwandan government and/or the international community. The Banyamulenge community—along with other Congolese Tutsi populations—requires social acceptance. Some traditional leaders and intellectuals in South Kivu have begun conflict-resolution initiatives between Banyamulenge and other local communities or Mai-Mai leaders. These initiatives are unlikely to lead to truly stable outcomes as long as the war continues and as long as there is a vacuum of legitimacy at the level of the provincial government, which for nearly a century has been the broker and guarantor of such arrangements.

Some efforts have made progress. For example, in an area called Kasiba where killings had left tensions very high, large community meetings were held, during which citizens vented accusations and discussed the way forward. The communities created a committee to follow through on resolutions of the meetings, such as the reestablishment of the livestock market. Other efforts are under way by Kivu communities to separate civilian

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populations from armed groups and to invite armed groups to lay down their weapons and reintegrate. It is in the context of these kinds of initiatives that international community representatives should be contacting Mai-Mai leaders. Ignoring them will only strengthen their resolve to undermine national and regional agreements in defense of their perceived interests.

In North Kivu, an institution called the Barza (the Council of the Wise)—in which all eight ethnic groups residing in the region participate—has been resurrected. During a series of consultations, participants established that no community has the right to question the nationality of another community, particularly on the basis of physical appearance. They also decided that no one can be thrown out of a job or house on the basis of ethnic origin. The Barza and other local institutions try to address land and other disputes before these issues require adjudication. The Pacification Commission is also promoting coexistence, and has held seminars involving representatives of different groups aimed at helping to revive traditional authority and conflict resolution mechanisms. Efforts are also under way by Kivu-based groups to invite Congolese Tutsi refugees back to North Kivu. These local groups are building houses for the returnees and sensitizing the local communities. A more serious effort should be made to analyze these local efforts to determine which are genuine.

In addition to intercommunal mechanisms, many of our interlocutors called for civic education or peace education campaigns. Congolese nongovernmental organizations have launched a “Civil Society Campaign for Peace” that aims to undertake peace advocacy initiatives, prepare populations for the national dialogue called for in the Lusaka agreement, conduct surveys on the consequences of the war, hold discussion and training sessions on conflict resolution, develop written materials, and strengthen local groups and initiatives promoting coexistence and reconciliation. It will provide an important link between populations in the east and west, as civil society organizations on all sides of the conflict will be participating.

**Democratic Institution Building**

If implemented properly, the national dialogue called for in the Lusaka agreement will be a major opportunity to address fundamental issues related to the reconstruction of the state. This initiative must be inclusive, involving participation from all Congolese regions through consultative mechanisms and allowing ample time for full input. The selection of a neutral facilitator will be key. The Congolese government, rebels, political parties, and civil society groups must all be properly represented at the dialogue.

The RCD will press a number of issues at the dialogue, including federalism, regional autonomy, and citizenship rights for Banyarwanda populations. Kivu residents in particular, to the extent that they are represented, will press for a federal government in the Congo that will allow the Kivus to be managed by Kivu residents. This sentiment is shared by leaders of other provinces throughout the DRC, and will be advocated strongly in any debate about the nature of the state. The constituency for decentralization and federalism has been very strong since the fall of Mobutu. The Kabila regime’s failure to deliver on this with any consistency is its greatest political liability, although the issue is counterbalanced and obfuscated by the strong pull of nationalist sentiment engendered by the war. For federalism to be successful, the rights of minorities will have to be protected by both judicial and administrative oversight, and resource control will have to be devolved as well.

Most external actors have chosen not to engage with the various rebel factions and administrations, worried about the potential signal such engagement might send of support for the insurgency or a lack of concern for the Congo’s territorial integrity. But even...
absent engagement, erroneous perceptions are widespread that this engagement is under way anyway, particularly with respect to the United States. Without any presumption of recognition and as part of a transition process linked to the implementation of the Lusaka agreement, the United States and other governments should regularly and collectively engage the RCD, MLC, political party officials, and civil society leaders in rebel-held zones on a host of fundamental rights and democracy issues. Increased involvement by U.S.-based democracy institutes during the transition period linked to the Lusaka implementation, with party and civil society representatives from both east and west, should be planned now and be the subject of close cooperation between key donor governments and agencies. The development of future leadership should be a key objective throughout the Congo.

Neighboring countries must also be engaged as robustly as the Congo to expand opportunities for political participation and accelerate transitions to democratic rule. U.S. public statements are more effective when they advocate for democracy throughout the region rather than just in the Congo. The Lusaka process can be a catalyst for promoting dialogue and democracy throughout the Great Lakes region. Specifically, Rwanda should advance more rapidly in its electoral schedule, moving to prefect and parliament elections as soon as logistically possible; Burundi should address core issues of power sharing within the context of its Tanzania-based peace process; Uganda should ensure a level playing field for its current debates on the nature of pluralism and accept the popular will on the issue; and Zimbabwe should liberalize further in advance of the next elections. Power sharing and inclusiveness in all of these countries will lay the groundwork for eliminating support for insurgents.

As in most African countries, civil society in the DRC is a raucous, inconsistent, vibrant collection of interests, ambitions, and aspirations. Some groups are working on behalf of their communities, genuinely striving for development and coexistence. Others are simply repackaged political parties. A disturbing factor, though, is the extent to which some civil society groups appear to be fueling the sentiment in the Kivus against Tutsi or Rwandan populations. Some of these civil society leaders are feeding to the outside world misinformation about the scope of human rights abuses by all parties. Because such abuses exist, misinformation finds receptive audiences, particularly those seeking sensationalist angles that can compete with Kosovo, Sierra Leone, and Sudan for the world’s attention. Civil society is largely given a free ride in international circles because of dutiful allegiance to freedom of speech and assembly. But civil society must be challenged to use responsibly their influence, information channels, and leadership.

Human Rights Promotion

As long as the ex-FAR/Interahamwe remain a threat based in the Congo, Rwandan and Ugandan forces are unlikely to depart. In the east, in addition to establishing the rule of law, some closure will have to come on the issue of citizenship, and minority rights will have to be perceived to be ensured. At that juncture, if the ex-FAR/Interahamwe threat were to be minimized, Rwanda would have no further justification for remaining in eastern Congo.

As mentioned, the citizenship issue is explosive. The Congolese Tutsi population is a minute percentage of the national total. Although numbers are hotly disputed (we heard estimates that ranged from 30,000 to one million), the total is likely less than one percent of the Congo’s population. The Lusaka cease-fire agreement—to which the Congolese government is a signatory—put forward the principle of citizenship for anyone in Congo at the time of independence.
and the approach to establishing the law on nationality should be consultative and transparent.

Rights to land and land use are inextricably linked to legal questions regarding nationality. Traditional land use arrangements allowed for ownership by the community, which in turn allows those outside the community who petition the local chiefs for land to use it. Non-Tutsi populations in Kivu claim that Tutsi communities are disrespectful of these traditions and asserting ownership. Further problems were inherited from the distortions resulting from both the colonial plantation economy and the land grabbing during the Mobutu era. The issue of land use—like citizenship—needs to be addressed through a consultative process that produces a fair and transparent way forward, including a way to increase everyone's stake by improved land use patterns, rather than simply adjudicating disputes. Perhaps the U.S. Great Lakes Justice Initiative could provide resources and forums for such a process to occur.

Creating the International Coalition Against Genocide (ICAG), envisioned by the Entebbe Summit participants in March 1998, might provide a forum for more intensive international coordination in support of efforts to counter the genocidaire. This is particularly relevant in the context of the implementation of the Lusaka agreement and would be an important adjunct to the JMC. Specifically, ICAG could examine ways to strengthen and enforce UN Security Council sanctions against the ex-FAR/Interahamwe and their arms suppliers, improve export controls and customs enforcement throughout the region, create mechanisms for sharing key information and intelligence about movements of genocidaire and their suppliers, and help build dossiers against key ex-FAR/Interahamwe figures still active in the DRC conflict. ICAG could contribute to making some of the ringleaders and commanders international fugitives and share information that could contribute to the arrest and transfer of the accused to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda or to Rwanda's judicial system.

Human rights reporting in eastern Congo has been problematic due to the lack of field verification of many of the charges made. The UN Human Rights Commission must do more extensive field research before it makes sweeping allegations. This need is relevant not just to current events but also to the process of following upon the massacres in Zaire during the 1996-97 war. Unsubstantiated allegations only feed the rumor mill and fuel local desires to check Tutsi (and Hutu) aspirations by whatever means perceived to be necessary. Ironically, this situation increases impunity and vigilante justice. It also makes coexistence more difficult by exacerbating intercommunal relations, particularly when false or exaggerated allegations pass as fact.

**Economic Development Support**

In the months following the signing of the Lusaka cease-fire agreement, the provision of fast-disbursing development and investment resources will be critical, especially for the rehabilitation of the Kivu economy. If it is difficult to generate development funds, greater flexibility in the use of humanitarian aid for development purposes would go part way toward filling the gap. For the United States, the Office of Transition Initiatives, the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, Economic Support Funds, and Pentagon drawdown funds will be important sources of support, in addition to regular development assistance. The U.S. Congress must make more funds available for consolidating Central African peace, because in the zero-sum game of foreign aid, increases for the DRC mean decreases for the Nigerian transition or other pressing priorities.

Throughout the DRC, there is a pressing need to begin the process of constructing a viable road network. At the most micro level, supporting local labor to build village roads...
will increase profits going to farmers by reducing the need for middlemen. Roads will
connect people and help in the process of reunifying the country.

Economic assistance should be part of the package of incentives used to lure Rwandan
militia fighting in the Congo back to Rwanda. Increased resources should be
targeted to northwest Rwanda to consolidate the progress made in breaking the insurgency
during the last year and to prepare local communities for the reintegration of
ex-militia not accused of genocide. This reintegration would entail an extensive demo-
bilization strategy. The population must perceive quick economic benefits from the
successful campaign against the ex-FAR/Interahamwe. This is a critical part of the
strategy of separating hard-core genocidaires from others—civilians and military—who
could return and reintegrate into Rwandan society but fear revenge attacks or a pre-
sumption of guilt.

In eastern Congo, development and humanitarian initiatives should endeavor to cre-
ate opportunities for neighboring communities to cooperate and mix for economic and
social reasons. Ethnic isolation should be countered through support for markets, region-
al schools and other initiatives in a common-areas strategy. Resources also should be
used to support alternative livelihoods for those who otherwise perceive their best
option to be joining a Mai-Mai unit.

Regionally, during the Lusaka agreement implementation period, concerted efforts
should be made to advance regional economic planning, bringing together governments in
the region to jointly consider initiatives to draw foreign investment, develop infra-
structure, and promote trade in the region. Commercial and developmental activities that
bring mutual benefits will increase the shared stake in stability and promote collective
efforts to protect peace and security. For example, Uganda has long advocated the con-
struction of the Beni-Kisangani highway to link the Atlantic and Indian Oceans.

Enhancing Security

The Lusaka agreement acknowledges that all states have a collective obligation to
fight against and break ties with genocidaires. Rwanda believes this agreement will
provide the necessary international legitimacy to its efforts to counter genocidaires,
wherever they are. It also legitimizes Uganda's battles against Sudan-supported militias,
Angola's pursuit of UNITA, and Burundi's efforts to contain cross-border rebel attacks.
Lusaka can become a means of increased pressure on the FDD and Palipehutu to nego-
tiate, the ex-FAR/Interahamwe to return home, the ADF to disband, and UNITA to find
alternative havens.

In short, formalizing the regional security framework that neighboring states inform-
ally shared before this latest Congolese conflict would reunify the region around a
common platform against the non-state actors that undermine the Congo's territorial
integrity. In advance of the Lusaka agreement, the United States played a particularly
important behind-the-scenes role on this issue.

The eastern allies fear that the Congolese and Zimbabwean governments will not con-
tribute to the collective task of tracking and disarming the ex-FAR/Interahamwe, given
that the two governments are accused of training, equipping, and fighting alongside
these forces. In an encouraging sign, a high-ranking Zimbabwean military official told
us, "If this war is to end, we have to surrender these people to Rwanda and Uganda." But
on the other hand, a high-ranking Congolese military official has said that there are
no ex-FAR/Interahamwe fighting with Congolese armed forces - a position that defies
the evidence, may enable these militia to disengage and escape more easily, and makes
implementing the Lusaka agreement more difficult.
For their part, the Congolese government and its allies do not believe that the Ugandan and Rwandan governments are sincere about ending their effort to unseat President Kabila. The international community must step up its efforts to build bridges between the belligerents, especially in the early stages of peace agreement implementation.

The JMC is the key to the success of the entire cease-fire and subsequent peace consolidation. It must identify, assemble, register, and disarm nonstate militias. Doing so requires a rupture of the militias’ current tactical alliances with the Congolese and Zimbabwean governments, and their separation from civilian populations traveling with them and often used as human shields. To succeed, international support for the mission will have to be robust: helping to plan for the logistical needs of the JMC; providing transport and communication support to the observers and JMC units; supporting the creation of an intelligence and information net; creating a mechanism to quarter and transfer militia that are captured or surrender, and providing the resources necessary to make it work; and supporting the reintegration in Rwanda of combatants (into the army or civilian life) not accused of genocide. In Operation Joint Endeavor, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization peace enforcement mission in Bosnia, the well-resourced JMC process was considered to be a vital mechanism for ensuring compliance with the peace agreement. The United States should sponsor the eventual UN Security Council resolution that would give the JMC the appropriate enforcement authority.

The quick functioning of the information net will be an important confidence-building measure. It should be depoliticized and confidential, operating on the technical level among military officers, and well removed from politicians who might use information or sources in ways that would cause one or more parties to withdraw from the mechanism. Congo will require assurances that ex-FAR/Interahamwe units will not simply be killed once they are identified, but that there are procedures in place to differentiate hard-core genocidaires from others who were caught up in the war. There will also have to be some decision about whether every single member of every militia unit will be pursued, or whether leadership structures will be targeted.

Furthermore, while the UN observers are deployed, civil affairs units should maximize their impact by supporting local efforts at building infrastructure, and not lose this opportunity to get a head start on the immense task of postwar reconstruction. The UN mission should also include human rights trainers and development officers, to make the most of the deployment period.

There will have to be a clear and quantifiable end state to the Lusaka agreement implementation process, to reassure Congolese that the withdrawal of forces will occur if certain objectives are met, and to reassure the Rwandans and Ugandans that their objectives will be supported within the framework of the Lusaka implementation.

Integrating DRC government forces with those of the RCD and MLC will also be a difficult task, requiring extensive negotiation and international oversight. The lack of a consistent chain of command in the Congolese military will make implementation of the merger extremely problematic. Zimbabwe is already working to develop a more comprehensive system of Congolese military ranking so that the systems can be merged.

Reintegrating ex-FAR into the Rwandan army has been a key ingredient to the strategy of luring both refugees and non-genocidaires insurgents back to Rwanda. The Rwandan army says that it has reintegrated 14,000 ex-FAR since 1994. The likelihood that a high percentage of the remaining ex-FAR/Interahamwe in the DRC are hard-core genocidaires makes an incentive-based strategy for their return to Rwanda problematic. Justice needs to be served for those guilty of genocide. A blanket amnesty would destroy efforts at breaking the cycle of impunity, but a blanket offer to allow all of those in the Congo to return and only be judged if accused would be one element of a comprehensive strategy. Again, a multifaceted counterinsurgency strategy is key. The

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international community should help in sending messages that it is safe to go back. An important ingredient of the strategy would be development aid for facilitating reintegration of those who do go back as well as for Rwandan plans to demobilize over half of its current army.

In the Congo itself, Rwandan and RCD forces should endeavor to be more protective of communities being preyed upon by Interahamwe units and support local initiatives at separating civilian populations from the parasitic control of militias. Human rights abuses by Rwandan and RCD forces must be vigorously and transparently prosecuted. Without this initiative, nearly everything they say they are fighting for is put at risk because of the increasing opposition of Congolese communities to their presence and agenda.

The Way Ahead

The wars within the Congo and (to a lesser extent) between Ethiopia and Eritrea demonstrate the lack of faith key African actors have in international institutions. Rwanda’s certainty that the world would not support its efforts to counter the genocidaire, and lack of reliance of both Eritrea and Ethiopia on international mechanisms for preventing their border dispute from becoming a war, highlight this crisis of faith and lead to increasing reliance on vigilante international justice, accompanied by serious abuses of human rights. The responsibility for restoring faith lies on both sides: the international institutions must be made to respond appropriately, and African states must agree to abide by international rules and standards, particularly with respect to cross-border military action. Although the use of force will sometimes be necessary, more dialogue at this juncture about when and how will reduce the likelihood of the unnecessary use of force as the option of first resort.

One of the victims of the Congolese and Ethiopia–Eritrea conflicts has been U.S. policy toward Africa. The vision of more enlightened leaders who could work together to bring stability and economic integration to Africa has been damaged severely. The vision needs to be reconstructed, with the same worthy objectives but this time more careful and balanced, less reliant on certain leaders, and more reliant on the establishment of institutions that transcend individual leadership and provide a firmer foundation for democratic development.

In that context, it might be worth exploring an Entebbe II summit, at which a high-ranking U.S. official could reconvene the participants in the 1998 Entebbe summit in which President Clinton participated, and reexamine some of the objectives set forth at that time in the sobering aftermath of these destructive conflicts. Such a conference could aim to address some of the fundamental themes of President Clinton’s policy toward Africa, including cooperative efforts to shrink zones of instability, counter genocide, and promote democracy and human rights. Other donor countries and African officials could be invited to diversify perspectives and provide a forum to collectively consider medium and long-term requirements for peace.

In sum, the Lusaka cease-fire agreement is not perfect. It is the first step in a long path to peace. Providing support to this roadmap greatly increases the chances that some of the main reasons for conflict in Central Africa will be addressed in a more cooperative and effective manner.

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